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ABSTRACT
Interviews with 42 Prison Governors, an analysis of job descriptions from 98 
Governors, and original material reveal that their role and duties have changed in 
recent years.
The introduction of New Public Management (NPM) into the Prison Service has 
made Governors far more accountable for the operation of their prisons. They are 
now expected to achieve performance targets, deliver efficiency savings, and to 
compete with other prisons. Line management of Governors has become robust. 
More is now delegated to Governors, but at the same time scope for local discretion 
has diminished. The administrative burden on Governors has increased significantly. 
Changes in the environment in which Governors operate have also had an impact on 
their work. In particular, recent years have seen a more punitive approach by the 
media, politicians, public and judiciary, and an increase in the ability and willingness 
of prisoners (and pressure groups) to challenge a Governor’s decision.
Governors today are at the same time: general managers (managing budgets and 
people, undertaking strategic planning, auditing and monitoring); leaders (acting as a 
figurehead, representing their establishment, providing vision and direction); 
operational commanders (dealing with incidents); and prison specialists (maintaining 
security, achieving order through effective control, and providing positive regimes).
A key aspect of Governors’ work has however remained unchanged over the years. 
This sui generis element involves balancing and regulating their prisons by 
exercising power, authority, influence and discretion in a way that protects 
individuals and mitigates the negative aspects of a closed institution. Governors must 
craft prison culture, blend the various approaches to maintaining order, and 
demonstrate clear moral and ethical standards. Governors still require ‘grounded 
professionalism’. They manage their institutions based on their accumulated 
knowledge, practical experience and personal judgment. In doing so, they seek to 
ensure that prisoners are treated in a decent and humane way, their institutions are 
safe and clean, and opportunities exist for rehabilitation.
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PART ONE: 
INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT
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CHAPTER 1: 
BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH
1.1 Why study Governors?
The prison is an instrument of punishment, which constitutes the ‘darkest region in 
the apparatus of justice’ (Foucault 1979, p256). Despite calls for decarceration, 
tougher community penalties and greater social inclusion, the prison continues to 
occupy a central position in our criminal justice system. Despite their questionable 
success, prisons have become a normalised part of our criminal justice system, as 
these commentators point out:
‘the prison as an instrument of punishment has escalated further in 
importance, and solidified its position’ (Mathieson 2000, pi 73).
‘So successful has the prison been that, after a century and a half of 
‘failures’, the prison still exists, producing the same results, and there 
is the greatest reluctance to dispense with it’ (Foucault 1979, p277).
While prisons are likely to be a key, and probably the dominant, feature of our penal 
landscape for the foreseeable future, surprisingly little is known about the people 
who run our custodial institutions and what they do on our behalf. Prisons, prison 
officers and prisoners have all been studied, yet prison Governors have been the 
subject of very little scrutiny.
Prison Governors are a key occupational group within the criminal justice system. 
On behalf of society, Governors enforce the State’s most severe penalty. It is 
Governors who run the 137 penal establishments in England and Wales. Governors 
hold in custody 75,000 citizens, deprive them of their freedom and enforce the rules 
and regulations that dictate prisoners’ daily lives. Governors exercise considerable 
personal power within their institutions. Prisoners can be: physically restrained; 
segregated; transferred; confined to their cells; strip searched; refused physical 
contact with their families; and released temporarily; all on the instructions of the 
Governor. Governors manage a 24 hour, 365 day a year organisation which
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provides: various types of accommodation (for staffj prisoners and visitors); a shop; a 
catering service; a health service; a maintenance department; a sports centre; a 
college of further education; a library; industrial workshops; and possibly a small 
farm or laundry (West 1997).
It is a complex task in itselfj even before considering the individuals who are 
incarcerated. Governors have to control, care for, and contain a variety of offenders. 
Prisoners range from the hardened career criminal, and the violent and dangerous 
psychopath, to the inadequate and the mentally disordered. The majority are ordinary 
people who have committed offences of all kinds, and who want to get through their 
sentence as quietly as they can. Some, however, will be desperately trying to escape; 
some will be permanently anti-authority; many will want to carry on the delinquent 
behaviour that they bring in from the streets; a number will be desperately immature 
and unable to control their actions (particularly in Young Offender Institutions); and 
some will want to harm themselves.
The nature of the work, and the environment in which it is undertaken, has led to the 
role of the Governor being described as unique or sui generis (HM Prison Service 
1997a, para. 9.14). The critical contribution the Governor makes to the life of a 
prison has remained remarkably constant over time:
‘... the governor is the keystone of the arch. Within his own prison, 
he is ... supreme ...’ (Fox 1952, p87).
‘It hardly needs saying that the most important person in any prison is 
the governor’ (Advisory Council on the Penal System 1968, para.
190).
‘Perhaps in no organisation is the position of general manager, and 
the person who fills it, of such concern to all the organisational 
participants as it is in the prison’ (King and Elliott 1977, p i49).
‘The key managerial role in the Prison Service is that of Governor ... 
a well run prison runs more than anything else on the skill and 
approach of the Governor’ (HM Prison Service 1997a, paras 4 and 
9.14).
‘It is difficult to think of a more challenging and important job than 
governing a prison. Prisons stand or fall by the people who manage 
... them’ (Lyon 2003, p3).
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Surprisingly, academic consideration of Governors, and prison governance, is more 
limited than the importance of their role suggests that it should be. In order to 
contribute to filling this gap in the literature on prisons this study looks to provide an 
insight into the people who govern our prisons and the way in which they govern.
Studying Governors and their approach will add an additional dimension to the 
existing work on penality because ‘adequate description and understanding of 
contemporary penality depends on the perspective of those who shape and administer 
its mission’ (Lucken 1998, pi 08). It has also been argued that the aims, activities 
and values of penal actors must inform the dialogue on punishment, and that any 
sociology of punishment which ignores this direction is likely to misunderstand the 
nature of the institution (Duff and Garland 1994).
The widely held view that the Governors’ role is undergoing something of a 
transformation provides a further reason to study their work. The job of Governor, it 
is argued, is becoming more managerial and less distinct as a sui generis profession. 
The Prison Service Review concluded that the role of Governor had become much 
more demanding. It found that Governors were increasingly seen as general 
managers and concluded that ‘the responsibilities of governors and the demands 
made on them have increased enormously over the years’ and that ‘the role of 
governor is in need of redefinition and review’ (HM Prison Service 1997a, paras 9.34 
and 9.77). The view from outside the Prison Service is similar: ‘the recent period has 
been an eventful one in the prisons of England and Wales ... it seems apparent ... 
that what governing prisons means and involves will also have changed significantly’ 
(Sparks et al. 1996, pi 34-135).
1.2 Researching in criminology and public management
In researching the work of Governors this study falls within the broad scope of social 
sciences research. It is, at the same time, both criminological and management 
research. Management research is concerned with:
‘managers and their problems, and the processes of management in 
developing, operating and controlling organisations (private, public
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and voluntary) in their economic, social and political context’ 
(Commission on Management Research 1994, p5).
Governors are senior managers who run multi-million pound organisations. As this 
study focuses on Governors, it is about managers and falls within the management 
studies umbrella.
Governors, however, manage within a specific environment. Firstly, Governors are 
public servants employed by the state. As such their work can be described as 
forming part of the public administration, or public management, research sphere. 
Secondly, Governors operate within a penal environment. This research therefore 
comes within what has been described as the ‘criminological enterprise’ (Jupp 1989, 
p23). Criminological research can be broadly defined as research relating to all 
aspects of crime and criminal justice (Pond 1999, p9) and includes ‘the institutions of 
criminal justice and their workings’ (Jupp 2000, p i6). Within criminological 
research there has emerged a sub-set of research related to prisons, known as 
penology. It has been suggested that penology is:
‘a practically-orientated form of social science which ... covers the 
entire range of penal practice and administration, down to the most 
minute detail...’ (Duff and Garland 1994, p21).
The allocation of this study to any one of these disciplines would be nominal 
because, like many research studies, it straddles a number of schools and traditions. 
This thesis therefore looks to all three research domains (management, public 
administration, and penology) for insight into understanding the Governors’ role and 
work.
1.3 Governors and their role
This study has at its focus the people who occupy the Office of Governor and 
explores what they do when occupying that Office. A ‘governor’ can be defined as: a 
steersman, pilot, captain of a vessel; one who exercises authoritative control; the 
officer in command; one who bears rule in an establishment or institution; and a tutor 
(Oxford English Dictionary 1985, p713). The dictionary also defines the detail of
16
what governors do, namely, govern. That is, they: rule with authority; direct, control 
and regulate the actions and affairs of people; command; hold sway over; influence; 
guide; master; lead; determine the course; prevail; have decisive influence; 
administer; manage; order affairs and undertakings; attend to; care for; look after; 
manipulate; hold in check; curb; and restrain (Oxford English Dictionary 1985, 
p709). As later sections of this thesis will show Governors occupy many of these 
roles and perform most of these tasks in their daily work.
While Governors operate within the rules and regulations set out by Prison Service 
Headquarters they can have a direct personal impact on the ethos and function of 
their establishment, as a number of commentators have recognised:
‘A penal institution is the lengthened shadow of the man in charge’
(Conrad 1960, p245).
‘Prevailing intellectual discourses and political ideologies will have a 
substantial impact on a penal system, yet it is equally possible to 
suppose that the initiative and energy of individual actors can do 
much to shape prisons within those constraints’ (Forsythe 1990, 
pi 56).
‘Prisons are remarkably stubborn social institutions and without 
extraordinary leadership are inclined to rapidly regress into apathy 
and violence’ (Rutherford 2000, p64).
The important role that the head of a custodial institution occupies has also been 
highlighted in American research, which has suggested that: the warden’s managerial 
style is the most salient determinant of whether prisons are safe, orderly, clean and 
capable of providing inmates’ amenities (Dilulio 1987, 1991); ‘Wardens are 
important actors in the correctional arena’ (Cullen et al. 1993a, p70); and ‘the key to 
the conditions and general climate of any prison is the warden’ (Peak 1995, p269).
1.4 General prison research
Prison research has covered considerable ground over the years. The world of prisons 
has been especially fertile ground for theoretical frameworks but, as one 
commentator put it, ‘it has proven to be highly susceptible to theories resembling the
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Aristotelean spheres -  structurally neat, marginally functioning but wrong’ (Duguid 
2001, p51).
By far the largest body of prison literature looks at imprisonment generally, 
including the current and future state of our prisons (King and McDermott 1995, 
Matthews and Francis 1996, West 1997, Mathiesen 2000, Morgan 2002). The 
sociology of imprisonment has also been the subject of academic attention (Sykes 
1958, Mathiesen 1965, Matthews 1999), as have recent criminal and penal policy 
developments (Rutherford 1996, Dunbar and Langdon 1998, Faulkner 2001, Ryan
2003). Researchers have charted the development of imprisonment and the history of 
prison administration from its earliest days (Pugh 1968, McConville 1981 and 1985, 
Harding et al 1985, Morris and Rothman 1995) and some have located that history 
within wider social and political movements (Ignatieff 1978, Foucault 1979).
Studies have examined the workings of the prison system as a whole (Fitzgerald and 
Sim 1982, Rutherford 1984, Stem 1987, Coyle 1991, Cavadino and Dignan 1997, 
Bryans and Jones 2001). There have been a number of studies looking specifically at 
the development of one institution (Morris and Morris 1963, Emery 1970, Genders 
and Player 1995, Rock 1996, King and Elliott 1997). A similar case study approach, 
focusing on one institution, can be seen in other jurisdictions (Clemmer 1940 and 
Jacobs 1977). These studies included descriptions of the nature of the prison and its 
general operation. Other studies have adopted a comparative approach and have 
looked at prisons of one type (Sparks 1971), open and closed prisons (Jones and 
Comes 1977), prisons from different security categories (King and Me Dermott
1995) and differences between prisons of the same security category (Sparks et al
1996). Another study has looked specifically at women in prison (Bosworth 1999).
Various actors in the penal system have also given an account of their world. 
Prisoners’ autobiographies are produced on a regular basis. (The most insightful 
works include: Caird 1974, Boyle 1974 and 1985, Peckham 1985, Hercules 1989, 
Smith 1989, Bettsworth 1989, Leech 1993, Turney 1997, Hoskison 1998, Cook and 
Wilkinson 1999, Devlin and Tumey 1999, Jennings 2001, Wyner 2003.) The 
contribution of prisoner autobiography to the penal archive, and its importance as a 
genre in the system of discourses relating to prison and penal affairs, has been well
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documented (Morgan 1999). Prison officers are also important actors in the penal 
environment. Their role and work has come under the spotlight of inquiry a number 
of times (Cronin 1967, Thomas 1972, Liebling and Price 2001, Crawley 2003). A 
former Director General of the Prison Service (Lewis 1997), Chief Inspector of 
Prisons (Ramsbotham 2003) and senior Home Office and Prison Service officials 
(Dunbar and Langdon 1998, Faulkner 2001) have added to the literature by reflecting 
on prisons and how they should be run.
1.5 Existing studies of Governors
Like Chief Constables, their criminal justice colleagues, Governors have received 
what Reiner refers to as the ‘ultimate accolade of heroic status: a prime time TV 
series about their activities’ (Reiner 1991, p3). The Governor, which unlike other 
prison based TV programmes such as Porridge, Cell Block 11, Jailbirds and Bad 
Girls, had as its main character a prison Governor, was first shown in 1997. Popular 
television aside, Governors have not been the subject of extensive academic interest. 
The literature that does exist on Governors is mainly in the form of autobiographies 
by retired prison Governors (Blake 1927, Rich 1932, Grew 1958, Clayton 1958, 
Kelly 1967, Miller 1976).
Outside the prison environment, other criminal justice senior practitioners in this 
country have been the subject of considerably more academic interest than their 
Governor colleagues. There have been influential studies of: Chief Constables 
(Reiner 1991, Wall 1998); work pressures and job satisfaction of senior police 
officers (Brown et al. 1999); the values and beliefs of criminal justice practitioners 
(Rutherford 1994); probation managers (Statham and Whitehead 1992) and the 
judiciary (Henry 1970, Shetreet 1976, Pannick 1987, Blair 2000).
It is worthwhile reflecting on why Governors have been the subject o f such limited 
research compared to these other criminal justice elites. In contrast with judges, 
magistrates and chief constables, Governors are far less visible to the wider 
community, as their work is done out of the public view. This low profile has tended 
not to generate much discussion of their work and, as a result, researchers have
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focused on more high profile occupational groups. Access to prisons and Governors 
has traditionally been very limited. Approval had to be given by the Home Office 
and this has not always been forthcoming. Funding research on the work of 
Governors has never been a priority and:
‘In prison research, of course, there has also been the special 
problem of tense and uneasy relations between researchers and the 
sponsors or gatekeepers who control access and funding’ (Sparks et 
al 1996, p339).
Governors have also to take responsibility for the lack of research into their 
profession. In the past, they have resisted attempts at a systematic study of their 
work, preferring to perpetuate the idea that their work is sui generis and too difficult 
to describe. At a more practical level, because of the Official Secrets Act, and 
employment contracts, Governors are not able to write publicly about their work 
without official permission (HM Prison Service 1997b, paras 19.78-19.80). In short, 
Governors have not wanted to be studied, and researchers have thought other areas of 
prisons and prison life more worthy of study (Bryans 2000a, pi 5).
1.6 Prison management theories
Research in this country on aspects of the management o f prisons has tended to focus 
on specific organisational issues such as: prison culture (Finkelstein 1993); 
‘prisonisation’ and prisoner subcultures (Irwin and Cressey 1962, Irwin 1970, Cohen 
and Taylor 1972); mental health of prisoners (Gunn et al 1978 and 1991); 
administrative decision-making in prison systems (Bottomley 1973, Adler and 
Longhurst 1994); maintenance of order in prisons (Useem and Kimball 1989, Sparks 
et al 1996, Wortley 2002); absconding from open prison (Banks et al 1975); race 
relations in prisons (Genders and Player 1989); suicide and self harm by prisoners 
(Liebling 1992 and 1995); and the use of incentives and earned privileges in prisons 
(Liebling et al 1997). Some studies have considered aspects of prison regimes, such 
as work for prisoners (Simon 1999) or prisoner education (Wilson and Reuss 2000). 
Others have focused on the needs of particular groups of prisoners, such as lifers 
(Cullen and Newell 1999), were written as guides to practical aspects of how a prison
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operates (Gravett 1999), or looked at the context in which Governors operate (Carlen 
2001).
More holistic descriptions of the management of prisons can be found in practitioner 
accounts of their work (Bryans and Wilson 1998, Willmott 1999, Bryans 2000a, 
Abbot and Bryans 2001) and in official Reports and Reviews of what Governors 
should be doing (most recently, HM Prison Service 1997a and Laming 2000).
The paucity of academic interest in governing and prison management in this country 
is in marked contrast to Warden Studies in the USA, which has now established itself 
as a legitimate academic discipline. American books on the work of Wardens 
include: comparative correctional management (Dilulio 1987); prison leadership 
(Wright, K. 1994); correctional organisation and management (Duffee 1980, Peak 
1995, Houston 1995, Phillips and Connell 1996, Freeman 1999); analytical and 
critical overviews of the literature on corrections management (McShane and 
Williams 1993); and the examination of contemporary penality from the perspective 
of Wardens working in the penal system (Lucken 1998). The literature on Wardens 
also includes various articles on their work and approach, including correctional 
orientation (Cullen et al. 1993a) and job satisfaction (Flanagan et al. 1996).
Various attempts have also been made in the USA to produce models of prison 
management. Barak-Glantz (1981) offered a classification consisting of four 
approaches to the management of prisons: authoritarian (where the Governor has 
near complete power); bureaucratic-lawful (where general principles and rules are 
applied by the central administration to the Governor, and by Governors to their 
prisons); shared powers (where some power is given to prisoners); and inmate 
control (where prisoners effectively control the prison).
From his comparative study of prison systems in three states in the USA, Dilulio 
(1987) offered an alternative classification and identified three managerial 
approaches to governing prisons: the control model (paramilitary, hierarchical and 
bureaucratic style of organization emphasizing prisoner obedience to all rules); the 
responsibility model (in which prisoners are given some responsibility for organizing 
their daily fives, subject to security needs); and the consensual model (with staff who
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deal informally with prisoners, exercising discretion over rule adherence). Dilulio 
concluded that prisons which adhere to highly formalised managerial practices -  the 
control model -  were more effective, particularly when it came to reducing disorder. 
That conclusion was challenged by more recent empirical research, which found that, 
all other things being equal, the consensual model and the responsibility model were 
associated with comparatively lower levels of prison disorder (Reisig 1998, p239).
1.7 Purpose and structure of the thesis
The purpose of this study is not to elucidate a systematic sociology of imprisonment 
but rather to develop further an understanding of how prisons are managed. It hopes 
to contribute to the theory, policy and practice of running prisons. The study will 
identify who governs our prisons, discuss the work that they do, and consider 
whether that work is different from the work of their predecessors. It will consider 
whether the Governor is still the key player in a prison and whether the success, or 
failure, of a prison depends more on the Governor than on anything else.
This study also intends to contribute to the literature on public sector administration 
and management by considering the impact of a new ideology (New Public 
Management) on a particular group of public sector administrators (Governors) and 
whether it has been successful in transforming them into public sector managers.
The research aims and questions are outlined in detail in chapter 4.
The contents of this thesis have been divided into seven parts. Part One provides an 
introduction to, and the context o£ the study. Chapter 2 considers the penal 
landscape in which Governors operate, and highlights the competing and conflicting 
penal goals set for our prison system. Chapter 3 provides the organisational context 
by describing the structure and organisation of the Prison Service. It also describes 
the legal aspects associated with the ‘Office’ of Governor.
Part Two looks to the research process itself and explains how the research was 
planned and accomplished. Chapter 4 discusses the research approach, design, and
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methodology. It goes on to provide a more detailed discussion of how the research 
methods were used. Chapter 5 describes how the data was analysed and comments 
on its validity and reliability. It also looks at ethical issues in conducting the research 
and reflects on being a ‘practitioner researcher’.
Part Three traces the development of the role and work of Governors since the time 
of the first gaolers. It outlines the organisational and penal changes for each 
historical period and sets within that context how the role, work and status of 
Governors has changed over the years.
The social characteristics of contemporary Governors are analysed in Part Four. 
Chapter 8 looks at who the Governors are in terms of their origins, background, 
recruitment and training. Chapter 9 considers the Governors’ philosophy, operating 
credo and motivation.
Part Five provides a discussion of the changing context in which Governors find 
themselves operating. Chapter 10 describes changes in the external environment and 
highlights the increase in prisoners’ rights and expectations, the impact of the rising 
prison population and current political debate surrounding prisons. It also discusses 
the impact of private sector involvement, risk management and New Public 
Management (NPM). Chapter 11 takes forward the discussion of NPM and looks at 
the way managerialism has had a direct impact on what Governors do and the way 
they govern.
An exploration of prison governorship, and what it means to govern a prison, forms 
Part Six. Chapter 12 probes the generic roles and tasks Governors undertake, whilst 
chapter 13 considers Governors’ prison-specific roles and duties. Chapter 14 looks 
at the reality of governing from the individual Governor’s perspective.
Part Seven, the final part of the thesis, pulls together the earlier discussion and 
analyses the Governors’ current role. Chapter 15 highlights how Governors’ work 
has become increasingly managerial in nature, but emphasises the continuing 
significance of the Governor in achieving a balanced and healthy prison. It also 
identifies a typology of Governors based on the research and considers whether the 
work of today’s Governors remains sui generis. Chapter 16, the final chapter,
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discusses the implications of the research and its contribution to theory and 
organisational practice, before making recommendations for future research. The 
thesis concludes with some thoughts about prison governance in the future.
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CHAPTER 2: 
PRISONS AND THEIR PLACE IN THE PENAL LANDSCAPE
This thesis has as its subject prison Governors and their work. In order to put 
Governors and their working environment -  prisons -  into context, this chapter looks 
beyond prison walls to the penal landscape in which Governors and their prisons 
operate. It considers the role of prisons and what they are expected to contribute to 
society. It is not until this macro picture of the system is painted that the microcosm 
that is the world of the Governor can be fiilly understood.
2.1 Crime and imprisonment
Crime has moved from the rare, the abnormal, the offence of the marginal and the 
stranger, to a commonplace part of the texture of life (Young 1999, p30). Today’s 
‘crime complex’ (Garland 2001) sees crime as being out of control, prisons 
overcrowded, police ineffective, courts out of touch and life perceived to be unsafe. 
Crime, or at least the manifestation of crime-prevention paraphernalia, can be found 
in all areas of our daily existence. Media coverage of actual and fictitious crime 
events, and political rhetoric, all contribute to creating a fear that the criminal may be 
around the next comer waiting for us. This perception of crime levels is at odds with 
the reality of the number of crimes committed. Between 1995 and 1999 there was a 
23 per cent fall in the crime rate, according to the British Crime Survey (Kershaw et 
al. 2000).
The fall in crime has not however been matched by a fall in the prison population. 
Imprisonment remains the ‘most severe type of sentence that is open to the criminal 
court’ (Walker 1985, p i25) and is at ‘the highest point on the scale of coercive 
penalties’ in this country (Faugeron 1996, p i22). Prisons continue to be the subject 
of debate and receive more attention from legislators, penologists and the news 
media than any other penal form -  as one commentator put it: ‘. . .prisons are seldom 
out of the news’ (Morgan 2002, p i l l  8).
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2.2 Purpose of imprisonment
The purpose of imprisonment will have a significant influence over the way prisons 
are run and what Governors are called upon to do in managing their institutions. 
There is, however, a lack of clarity and agreement as to the purpose of our prisons. 
The problem has been described in this way:
‘The penalty of imprisonment, by its very nature, spreads across the 
categories of justification in a way that other forms of punishment 
do not... This pooling and blurring of the aims of imprisonment -  
involving ideas both of punishment and crime control -  makes the 
subject extremely hard to explain...’ (Dunbar and Langdon 1998, 
p9).
It is perhaps the inherent conflict between the various purposes of imprisonment that 
causes Governors the greatest challenges in their work, as later chapters will show. 
(For a more detailed discussion of the purposes of imprisonment see: Walker 1985 
and Morgan 2002.) The various goals of imprisonment are briefly described here in 
order to set the scene for later discussion of why Governors operate in the way that 
they do. It also demonstrates that some of the conflicts in the internal prison 
environment are the result of the complexity of debate in the external environment on 
the purposes of imprisonment.
Before discussing the purposes of sending people to prison, it is important to make 
clear what prisons are not intended for. It is widely accepted that people are sent to 
prison ‘as punishment not for punishment’, to quote Paterson (Ruck 1951, p23). This 
widely used dictum makes the point that whilst in prison, prisoners should not be 
subjected to any form of physical or mental punishment. Being confined in a prison 
is punishment enough. As a former Chief Inspector of Prisons put it: ‘Punishment for 
prisoners is the deprivation of liberty imposed by the courts. Punishment is not the 
business of the prison service’ (Tumim 1996, p ll). This view endorses the official 
position that: ‘Imprisonment itself ... is the punishment inflicted by law and no 
further available hardship should be imposed on a prisoner except by way of formal 
disciplinary action’ (Home Office 1984b, para. 108).
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Imprisonment today is seen therefore in terms of a specific deprivation (of liberty) 
rather than in terms of the deliberate imposition of other hardships (Sparks 1996). 
That said, the conditions in some of our prisons are still far from acceptable, as HM 
Chief Inspector of Prisons continues to point out. These harsh living conditions (ill- 
treatment by a small minority of staffj limited regimes, overcrowding and the 
continuing level of violence in prisons), it can be argued, amount to additional 
punishment, as they are degrading and inhumane (see recent European Committee 
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
reports on UK prisons: CPT 1996, 2000 and 2002).
Even if there is no deliberate intent to punish, the literature suggests that 
imprisonment may have unintended consequences and have a debilitating effect on 
many prisoners:
‘The harm caused by imprisonment is multifaceted. Most evident 
are the material deprivations of prison life, isolation from families 
and reduced prospects for future employment. In addition to these, 
the prisoner runs the risk of becoming a victim of crimes such as 
theft, robbery or assault; and more rarely, rape or murder’ (Edgar et 
al. 2003, p2).
It has been argued that there is a ‘wealth of evidence to indicate that prison sentences 
are both personally and socially damaging’ (Deakin and Spencer 2003, pi 33).
Others take the view that the long-term deleterious effects of imprisonment on the 
physical and mental health of prisoners are far from proved (Bonta and Gendreau 
1990). Few would argue however that some prisoners will suffer from anxiety, 
boredom, stress, physical deterioration and mental health problems as a result of their 
incarceration. Many will leave prison more marginalised and more committed to 
offending than when they arrived.
Imprisonment has two main espoused purposes: retribution and crime reduction. One 
academic has pointed to at least nine purposes (Walker 1985, p i25.)
There are numerous versions of retributivism in the literature, but they all share a 
concern that offenders are punished commensurately with their criminal activity.
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Retribution theory argues that offenders should have punitive losses or deprivations 
imposed on them that are commensurate with the harms they caused (or threaten to 
cause) their victims, taking into account the degree of culpability offenders had for 
causing those harms (von Hirsch and Jareborg 1991). Imprisonment then is the 
appropriate retributive punishment for offenders because it imposes a significant 
level of deprivation -  the loss of liberty (and indeed other deprivations such as the 
loss of choice and privacy). The end of the twentieth century saw ‘the rise of 
punishment as the system’s primary objective’ (Dickey 1991, pi 08).
Crime reduction as an argument for imprisonment typically takes three forms: 
incapacitation of current offenders; deterrence of would-be and current offenders; 
and rehabilitation of current offenders. The aim of imprisonment then becomes the 
reduction of the frequency and severity of actions that violate or otherwise 
undermine the rights and interests of members of society.
Incapacitation has become the predominant utilitarian model of punishment 
(Greenwood 1982, Moore et al. 1984). If imprisonment can do nothing else, 
incapacitation theory holds, it can detain offenders for a time and thus delay their 
resumption of criminal activity (von Hirsch 1986, Feeley and Simon 1992, Tarling 
1993, Zimring and Hawkins 1995). As a former Home Secretary put it: ‘Thousands 
of dangerous criminals are prevented from attacking the community while they are 
inside’ (Howard 1993).
Using incapacitation as a measure, prisons have become more effective in recent 
years. There have been no escapes of high security (category A) prisoners since 1995 
and the total number of escapes from prison has fallen from 310 in 1991-92 (HM 
Prison Service 1992, p9) to five in 2002-03 (HM Prison Service 2003b, p20).
Deterrence of would-be or current offenders as the purpose of imprisonment rests on 
the assumption that being imprisoned is more detrimental to the individual than not 
being in prison. It depends on making prisons ‘less eligible’ than fife outside 
(Bentham 1789/1970). Prisons will not effectively deter if they offer prisoners an 
overall better living situation than they enjoy in civil society. Deterrence is, of 
course, more complicated than simply being a function of what conditions are like in
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prison. It also has to do with other issues such as the likelihood of being caught and 
convicted, and cultural views of the stigma attached to being imprisoned (Beyleveld 
1980, Lloyd et a l 1994, McGuire 1995). Some academics argue that there is a direct 
and obvious relationship between the high risk of imprisonment and a lower level of 
crime. For them sending more people to prison, for longer, in increasingly harsh 
regimes, will deter prospective offenders and take those who have been convicted off 
the street: ‘study after study has shown that prison has played a crucial role’ in 
reducing crime in America (Murray 1997, pi 8). In this country some leading 
politicians have linked lower crime rates to higher levels of incarceration (Howard 
1996a and 1996b) and have cited academic research in support of their assertions 
(for example, Howard cited Marvell and Moody 1994 and Bumett 1994).
Rehabilitation, based on the idea that individualised treatment of offenders would 
reduce criminality, dominated penal thinking for much of the period up to late 1960s. 
However, by the early 1970s the hegemony of the rehabilitative ideal was shattered 
(Cullen and Gilbert 1982). Treatment programmes came to be seen as ineffective and 
the mantra that ‘nothing works’ widely accepted (Martinson 1974 and Lipton et al 
1975). There remain questions about whether the attitudes and behaviour of serious 
offenders can be altered in ways that will make them less likely to reoffend (Crow 
2001, Falshaw et al. 2003, Mair 2004). Some question the universal value of specific 
types of programmes, such as cognitive behavioural approaches (Cameron and Telfer
2004), or remain sceptical about the prospects of rehabilitative programmes, 
whatever their form.
Others argue that there is clear evidence that certain forms of interventions can 
reduce recidivism, even among hard-core offenders (Gendreau and Ross 1987, 
McGuire 1995; Cullen et al 1996, Gendreau 1996). As one commentator put it: ‘the 
relationship between participating in prison programmes and reducing recidivism has 
been repeatedly documented’ (Petersilia 2003, p6). The idea that prisons, if they are 
properly organised and focused on constructive and rehabilitative work, can make a 
positive contribution to society is again being put forward. A new commitment to 
rehabilitative aspects of prison regimes has developed, based on ‘what works’ 
treatment programmes designed to reduce the commitment to offending and enhance 
individual competencies (Cullen et al 1996). Innovative and imaginative
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interventions with ‘intractable’ offenders (sex, drug and violent offenders) have had 
positive results (Sampson 1994).
Rehabilitation activity is today more carefully targeted, rationed and subject to 
evaluative scrutiny. It is often offence-centred rather than offender-centred and it 
targets criminogenic needs rather than social needs (McNeill 2004). A former 
Director General of the Prison Service has also reasserted the positive impact that 
this new approach to rehabilitation can have on offenders:
‘For the first time in the Service’s history we are now beginning to 
produce real evidence that, contrary to public and media opinion, 
we can make time served in prison genuinely constructive and we 
can send prisoners home much less likely to re-offend than when 
they were sent to us’ (Narey 2000, p7).
Some have gone so far as to suggest that rehabilitation should be re-established as a 
primary goal of imprisonment (Tumim 1996). However, as Garland (1990) argues, 
rehabilitation today is no longer an overriding purpose, but rather a subordinate 
means. It is generally accepted that for any penal goals to be achieved, prisoners 
must be kept in custody - that is, they must be kept securely and prevented from 
escaping. Retribution and crime reduction are not achieved if prisoners are 
unlawfully at large. Security (keeping in custody those sent to prison by the courts) 
then becomes the de facto primary focus (if not purpose) of prison administrations.
If crime control is the sole purpose of prisons, then they are failing, as most prisoners 
are not reformed and new generations of criminals go undeterred. Unadjusted 
reconviction rates show that 59 per cent of all discharged prisoners were convicted 
on a further occasion within a two year time period (Home Office 2003a, p i50). For 
young males (under 21) the reconviction rate is 74 per cent. Social scientists have 
long maintained that penal systems are poor guarantors of crime prevention and 
reduction (Downes 2001). A number of criminologists have pointed out that 
imprisonment rates have little, if anything, to do with real crime levels:
‘There has been a decline in crime in countries that have increased, 
decreased or left unchanged their prison population’ (Young 2003, 
p35).
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‘Despite the vast sums of money spent on prison construction and 
administration, imprisonment has a limited effect on the level of 
crimes or the fear of crime’ (Platek 1996, p69).
‘There is no direct correlation between levels of crime and 
imprisonment, let alone a one-to-one line of causality’ (Cohen 
1985, p91).
2.3 The use of prisons today
Some see the use of imprisonment as a ‘totalitarian solution without a totalitarian 
state’ (Bauman 1995). These commentators see the great penal gulags being 
constructed in the USA and England as taking liberal democracy to its limits and as 
representing the crisis of late modernity (Cayley 1998 and Christie 2000). One 
commentator suggests that:
‘The expansion of the prison systems throughout the Western world 
(and elsewhere as well) has brought our societies to a new level of 
repressive social control. Neither offender nor victim gains 
anything from it. It threatens the democratic traditions of our 
societies (Mathiesen 2000, p i93)’
At the other end of the continuum, commentators advocate the utility of the greater 
use of imprisonment (Wilson 1975, van den Haag 1975, Dilulio 1994b, Wright, R. 
1994). This view led to a focus solely on imprisonment as the method to control 
crime (Murray 1996 and 1997). Others too have highlighted the potential benefits of 
imprisonment:
‘Far from being a cruel and unusual sanction, imprisonment, 
properly instituted, may be a just and merciful one which serves 
both the convicted criminal and the free community’ (Dilulio 1987, 
p8).
In this country, the Conservative Party, under Michael Howard’s leadership, has 
revived the ‘prison works’ message of the 1990s:
‘A principal reason for this fall [in crime] was that more criminals 
were locked up... Prison is necessary. It satisfies natural justice by 
responding to the horror of crime with a proportionate punishment. It
31
constrains, by physically preventing criminals from committing 
crimes while they are locked up. And it deters, by sending a strong 
warning to potential criminals about the consequences of crime.
Prison is also an opportunity to get criminals back on the straight and 
narrow...’(Conservative Party 2005, p9).
The 50 per cent increase in the prison population in England and Wales between 
1993 and 2000 suggests that the pro-prison lobby are in the ascendancy. The figures 
speak for themselves - in 1946 there were about 40 prisons, with approximately
15,000 prisoners and around 2000 staff (Home Office 1947, quoted in Morgan 2002, 
pi 117); in March 2003 there were 137 prisons, 73,000 prisoners and 45,500 staff 
(HM Prison Service 2003b). Unlike with some other social institutions, prisons in 
England and Wales are demand-led and, as a result, have to accommodate all 
prisoners sent to them by the courts.
It is worth reflecting on the various explanations that have been presented to account 
for the rise in the prison population. Tonry (1999) classifies the theories into five 
types: empirical (crime led); psephological (public-opinion led); journalistic; 
political; and historical. He concludes that:
‘Prison populations and trends towards greater punitiveness are broad 
outcomes of changing social and political processes’ (Tonry 2001, 
p527).
Among the reasons put forward for the rise in the prison population are: a focus on 
the control of aggregate populations through the use of different forms of risk 
assessment has widened the focus of penal intervention and stimulated the expansion 
of the penal system (Feeley and Simon 1992 and 1994); the development of a 
‘prison-industrial complex’ has increased the scale of imprisonment as investors and 
local communities have come to view prisons as sources of income and profit, and 
have a vested interest in maintaining prisons as a site of investment and economic 
activity (Lapido 2001 and Parenti 1999); and more elaborate and integrated penal 
policy and systems have led to a self-sustaining network of sanctions, through which 
a growing number of offenders will be recycled over a period of time and which 
inevitably leads to greater use of imprisonment (Matthews 2003).
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Perhaps the most significant factor in the increased use of imprisonment was the rise 
in public fear of crime in the 1990s, political reaction to that fear, and the impact it 
had on the courts (Hale 1996). Whether the media amplified crime rather than 
represented real levels, thereby creating public perceptions of ‘crime waves’ (Hall et 
al 1978), or merely set the agenda around which public opinion was formed (Smith
1987), there was general public disillusionment with politicians and the way in which 
they were responding to the crime problem The response of politicians in the 1990s 
was to:
‘seek to recover public support through identification with overtly 
populist concerns and attitudes surrounding law and order and 
criminal justice’ (James and Raine 1998, p74).
The Home Secretary’s mantra that ‘prison works’ (first articulated at the 1993 
Conservative party conference) was the most visible indication of a ‘perceptible shift 
in emphasis ... in favour of a tougher, more populist policy’ (Garland 2001, pi 13). 
Only a few years earlier the same Conservative government took the view that prison 
was ‘an expensive way of making bad people worse’ (Home Office 1990, p6). The 
consensus that had existed among politicians that the correct response to public 
opinion was to ‘manage’ it rather than surrender to it, was brought to an abrupt end 
(Hough 1996, pi 1) and the unspoken political consensus on avoiding an 
‘imprisonment auction’ was deliberately destroyed (Dunbar and Langdon 1998, p29). 
The Taw and order counter-reformation’ was underway (Cavadino and Dignan
1997).
The growth in ‘populist punitiveness’ (Bottoms 1995) amongst politicians, the media 
and the general public had a significant impact on the courts, as these commentators 
have highlighted:
‘...English Judiciary, like their counterparts in other jurisdictions 
... are under considerable populist and media pressure to make 
sentences harsher’ (Roberts 2003, p230).
‘...though sentencing in particular cases is the responsibility of the 
courts, the legislative framework and the climate of opinion within
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which sentencers make their case-by-case decisions are determined 
principally by politicians’ (Morgan 2002, pi 115).
The ‘prison works’ rhetoric encouraged sentencers to apply a criterion based on 
whether or not ‘right-thinking’ members of the public would feel that justice had not 
been done if offenders retained their liberty (Ashworth 2002). As a result the courts 
have increasingly relied on the use of incarceration as a response to the problem of 
crime. Home Office statistics (Home Office 2003b) show that while the courts are 
finding roughly the same number of serious offenders guilty (337,000 each year), as 
they were 10 years before, they are dealing with them much more harshly. The data 
indicate an increased punitive appetite of the courts. 111,600 people were sentenced 
to immediate custody in 2002, which represents the highest figure for at least 75 
years, a rise of more than 5,000 over the previous year and nearly twice the number 
sent to prison 10 years before (Home Office 2003b). The average length of sentence 
for all serious crimes has also grown in the last 10 years and the average sentence 
length for burglars has risen from 16 months in 1992 to 25 months in 2002 (Home 
Office 2003b). The prison population has also seen an increase in the proportion of 
minority ethnic prisoners and the number of female prisoners. Just as troubling has 
been the rise in the remand population (Matthews 1999, p89).
Some argue that there has been a systematic attempt to make the problem of crime as 
bad as the data will permit (Chambliss 1999) in order to allow politicians the 
opportunity to be seen to be ‘tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime’ -  
what has been referred to as ‘goveming-through-crime’ (Caplow and Simon 1999 
and Tonry 2001). Whether this is true or not, the entire system is vulnerable to non­
legislative pressure for ever higher retributive sentencing, once politicians choose to 
unleash that pressure. It has been pointed out that:
‘The rate of imprisonment is not beyond governmental control. It is 
ultimately a matter of political choice’ (Morgan 2002, pi 117).
‘Once political parties adopt rival policies of tough punishment, 
they will find themselves caught in the toils of a machine from 
which they cannot disengage’ (Dunbar and Langdon 1998, pi 58- 
159).
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Not surprisingly, the ‘prison works’ mantra and reactions from the courts and media 
caused the prison population to rise. Prison building did not keep pace with the 
increase in the population and the Prison Service found itself trying to manage a 
perpetual numbers crisis. The impact on Governors of the rise in prison numbers, and 
associated overcrowding, are discussed in chapter 10.
2.4 The penal paradigm
The last decade has seen the nature of imprisonment undergo a number of ‘relatively 
radical transformations in terms of its functions, organization, and the size and make­
up of the prison population’ (Matthews and Francis 1996, pi). Despite these changes 
and ongoing debates about penal theory, Governors have to be grounded in reality 
and take as their focus the daily operation of their institutions. The practical issue 
facing Governors is this: what does society want prisons to do with the ever-greater 
number of people that it is incarcerating?
Governors must balance the four functions of penal confinement (Faugeron 1996) - 
the custodial function (preventing escapes), the restorative function (providing 
opportunities for rehabilitation and reform), the controlling function (ensuring order, 
safety and justice) and the maintenance function (providing decent and humane 
conditions).
Assuming that prisoners are held securely, Governors then have to consider difficult 
and often controversial questions concerning ‘the provision of humane treatment in 
prisons and the kind of fife prisoners should lead while they are in custody’ (Tumim 
1996, p i2). The challenge facing any prison administrator is how to balance and 
meet all the various goals of imprisonment discussed earlier.
For some it is simply impossible to satisfy all penal goals, as it would require 
unlimited resources (Dilulio 1990). A number of commentators have expressed 
caution in this area:
‘... the country should not have unrealistic expectation of the 
system and what it can achieve’ (Faulkner 2001, p203).
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‘For a nation to expect its criminal justice system (and its penal 
section in particular) to somehow fight the massive wrongs in the 
social relationships of a community is ridiculous and wrong. It 
simply cannot be done and is a cop-out for local and central 
government policy-makers’ (Consedine 1993, p63).
All prisoners (with the exception of a very small number serving ‘whole fife’ 
sentences) will at some point return to society equipped with their prison experience. 
Doing nothing for offenders who are incarcerated will in many cases mean that they 
will leave prison more marginalized and more committed to offending than they 
were when they entered the prison system (Matthews and Francis 1996, p3). 
Governors therefore face the challenge of running their establishments in such ways 
that they are able to: keep prisoners in custody; ameliorate the potential negative 
impacts of incarceration; and achieve the rehabilitation of their inmates. How 
Governors try to do this, and the personal conflicts that it sometimes causes, are 
explored in later chapters in this thesis.
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CHAPTER 3: 
THE OPERATING CONTEXT
To understand the work of the Governor it is necessary to have an appreciation of the 
organisational context in which they have to operate. This chapter provides that 
background by describing the prison system and the structure and organisation of the 
Prison Service. It also sets the scene for discussions later in this thesis by detailing 
the people who live and work in our prisons. The chapter then goes on to outline the 
external mechanisms that monitor a Governor’s work. The last section of the chapter 
looks at the Office of Governor, the legal status of Governors and how people 
become Governors.
3.1 The prison system
3.1.1 The legal framework for prisons
The work of the Prison Service is shaped by the Prison Act 1952. That Act sets out 
the general duties of the prison authorities and defines what a prison is. The Act itself 
is a consolidation measure and reflects the values of its day. Despite the many 
changes in the last half century there has been no significant change in the legislation 
relating to the operation of prisons, even though there have been a number of calls 
for a major revision of the legislation (Home Office 1995 and Abbot and Payne
1998).
Section 47 of the Act enables the Home Secretary to make rules for the regulation 
and management of establishments and for the treatment of prisoners -  currently the 
Prison Rules 1999 (as amended by the Prison (Amendment) Rules 2000) and Young 
Offender Institution Rules 2000 (as amended). Section 52 of the Act requires this to 
be done by Statutory Instrument (currently SI 1999/728).
The Rules have been the subject of a number of commentaries (see for example, 
Loucks and Plotnikoff 1993) and have been criticised for being: unspecific about
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conditions for prisoners and their access to facilities; ungenerous in their provisions; 
and for granting prison managers extensive discretion (Richardson 1985 and Morgan 
2002). Breaches of the Rules do not provide the basis for a claim for breach of 
statutory duty and do not vest prisoners with any special rights (Hague v Deputy 
Governor o f Parkhurst Prison [1991] 3 All ER 733). The degree to which the courts 
have intervened in prison life is discussed in chapter 10.
The Prison Rules (and Young Offender Institution Rules) leave considerable 
discretion to the Home Secretary to issue directions, impose restrictions and 
prohibitions, and issue authorisations and guidelines as to the running of penal 
institutions. Senior officials exercise this power on behalf of Ministers (acting under 
the Carltona principle -  see Livingstone and Owen 1999 and chapter 10) and 
promulgate regulations and instructions in the form of Prison Service Orders (PSO), 
Prison Service Instructions (PSI) -  formerly known as Standing Orders (SO), 
Instructions to Governors (IG), and Circular Instructions (Cl).
3.1.2 Home Office and Prison Service
The Prison Department was transformed into a “next steps” executive agency in 
1993 (HM Prison Service 1993e). In many ways it was not a typical agency as there 
was no residual department within the Home Office dealing with policy. It was 
argued that prison policy and operations are so inextricably linked that responsibility 
for both must lie within the same organisation (HM Prison Service 1997a, p31).
[After the field research was competed, the structural situation changed with the 
decision to create a National Offender Management Service (NOMS), which brings 
together the Prison and Probation Services into a single entity. At the time of 
announcing the creation of NOMS, Ministers signalled that the Prison Service’s 
agency status would be ended (Home Office 2004, pi 5). The Prison Service is now, 
once again, firmly under the control of a Home Office mandarin (the Chief Executive 
of NOMS). ]
The Home Secretary is accountable to Parliament for the Prison Service and sets the 
strategic direction of the Service, defines its outputs and allocates its resources. A
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junior minister (the Prisons and Probation Minister) deals with routine prison matters 
and acts as the chair of the Strategy Board for Correctional Services (SBCS) (HM 
Prison Service 2000a, pi 3). The SBCS advises the Home Secretary on the strategic 
direction for the Prison Service (HM Prison Service 2000a, p i4). The Home 
Secretary also draws on advice on prison matters from the Home Office Permanent 
Secretary and other advisers, notably HM Chief Inspector of Prisons and the chair of 
the Youth Justice Board. At times the Home Secretary commissions independent 
reviews of the work and structure of the Prison Service (recent examples include: 
Lygo 1991, Learmont 1995a, Laming 2000, Carter 2004).
3.1.3 Function, purpose and targets
The Prison Service Statement of Purpose, promulgated in 1988, sought to capture the 
function of the Service. It reads:
‘Her Majesty’s Prison Service serves the public by keeping in 
custody those committed by the courts. Our duty is to look after 
them with humanity and to help them lead law-abiding and 
useful lives in custody and after release’ (HM Prison Service 
1988).
In addition to this Statement of Purpose, the Prison Service describes its Aim as the:
‘Effective execution of the sentences of the courts so as to 
reduce re-offending and protect the public’ (HM Prison Service
1988).
And its Objectives as:
‘Protect the public by holding those committed by the courts in a 
safe, decent and healthy environment.
‘Reduce crime by providing constructive regimes which address 
offending behaviour, improve educational and work skills and 
promote law abiding behaviour in custody and after release’
(HM Prison Service 1988).
Each year the Prison Service, in consultation with the Home Secretary, produces a 
Business Plan setting out its aims and targets for the coming year, based around the
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high level aims developed in its three-year Corporate Plan. The indicators that are 
used to measure performance against these targets are known as Key Performance 
Indicators and are set out in Appendix A. The plans also identify the core funding 
which has been allocated to the Service to deliver its commitments specified in the 
document.
3.1.4 Resources
The net annual cost of operating the public sector Prison Service is £2,105 million 
(HM Prison Service 2004b, p55). The Service has an operating income of £400m. 
The funding allocated to the Service is used to cover staff costs (£l,364m), other 
administrative costs (£969m) and programme costs (£172m). In 2003-04, the annual 
average cost per prison place was £27,320 and the cost per prisoner was £25,718. 
The cost of operating individual prisons varies from £3.6m to £35.2m each year, with 
the most expensive prison place being £49,885 per annum and the least costly 
£14,328 (HM Prison Service 2004b, p80-99).
3.1.5 Prison population and capacity
The prison population has grown significantly in recent years and there were around
75,000 prisoners incarcerated in prisons in England and Wales in 2004. The average 
daily population in custody in 2002 (the last complete statistical year on which 
figures have been published -  Home Office 2003a) was 70,860, of whom 12,790 
were remand prisoners. There were over 136,200 new receptions in 2002.
The Service has no way of knowing, in advance, who will be committed to its 
custody by the courts, and in what part of the country, on any given day. The total 
number of prisoners continues to remain just below the maximum usable 
accommodation in the whole prison estate, albeit with a margin of less than 200 
places (HM Prison Service 2004b, p8). It is only by carefully managing the 
accommodation and population that the Service has been able to avoid holding 
prisoners in police cells.
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These figures mask the fact, however, that over 21 per cent of prisoners are living in 
overcrowded accommodation (that is, held two to a cell designed for one - HM 
Prison Service 2004b, plO), and many others are being accommodated far from 
home. This level of overcrowding persists despite providing new places year on year 
(1,332 in 2003-04 - HM Prison Service 2004b).
3.1.6 Privately managed prisons
The operation and management of a number of prisons has been contracted out to the 
private sector. Nine prisons are run by the private sector - four were public sector 
built and financed but now managed by the private sector, and a further five were 
designed, constructed, managed and financed by the private sector (HM Prison 
Service 2001a, pi 10). The issue of private sector involvement in the Prison Service 
and its impact on Governors is discussed in chapter 10.
3.2 The Prison Service organisation
3.2.1 Headquarters structure
This section describes the organisational structure that was in place at the time of the 
field research. Some changes have been made to the structure since the fieldwork 
was completed.
The Home Secretary, with the agreement of the Prisons Minister, appoints the 
Director General (DG) of the Prison Service. The DG has designated authority for 
the day-to-day management of the Service and its performance against plans and 
targets as agreed with Ministers. The DG acts as the Home Secretary’s principal 
advisor on matters relating to Prison Service activities, has delegated authority on 
matters of personnel and finance, and manages the Prison Service’s budget.
A Deputy Director General (DDG) has direct managerial responsibility for the 
operational and performance management of prisons. In addition to the DG and the 
DDG, the Prison Service has a number of other directors, each responsible for a
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policy directorate (regimes, personnel, resettlement and so forth). These policy 
directorates, based in Prison Service Headquarters, develop policies and issue them 
to Governors in the form of Prison Service Orders (PSO) and Prison Service 
Instructions (PSI). Policy directorates are staffed predominantly by career civil 
servants, many of whom come from the main Home Office.
Prisons are grouped for line management purposes into 12 geographical areas, each 
with its own area manager. The High Security Estate (which contains the 8 high 
security dispersal prisons), the female estate and the juvenile estate, are managed 
functionally. [After the fieldwork was completed, the female estate group was 
abolished and female prisons absorbed within the geographical structure.] The 
structure of these areas was changed in 2000 to ally the Service’s boundaries more 
closely with other criminal justice agencies, and to ensure common administrative 
boundaries with the police and English Government Regions.
Area managers line manage Governors and report directly to the DDG. They are 
responsible for policy implementation, performance management, audit and 
monitoring. They also offer support, advice and guidance to Governors. The area 
managers are personally accountable for the performance of each prison in their area 
(Laming 2000, p28). Their role and relationship with Governors is discussed more 
fully in chapter 11.
3.2.2 Management structure within establishments
Each prison has a Governor. The type of prison, its security category and the number 
of prisoners that it holds will dictate the grade of the Governor and the number of 
other operational managers that work in that prison. The most senior Governors are 
in charge of high security and larger prisons.
The Governor directly manages a number of functional heads (security, regimes, 
finance and so forth). Reporting to each functional head will be a number of heads of 
department (education, chaplaincy, catering and so forth). This group is known as the 
senior management team (SMT). Some of the functional heads and heads of 
department will be operational managers. Operational managers have duties in
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addition to their functional or departmental responsibilities, such as acting as ‘duty’ 
or on-call governor, incident management and conducting adjudications. Operational 
managers within prisons tend to be known as ‘governor grades’ even though this title 
ceased to be officially used in 1987 (HM Prison Service 1987). One operational 
manager is appointed as deputy governor. Administrative, finance and personnel 
posts are generally occupied by non-operational managers.
A sample establishment structure is shown in Appendix B. Not all establishments are 
structured in this way. The detail of the structure will depend on the size and 
function of the establishment but a similar hierarchical structure and key functional 
areas will be found in most establishments.
3.2.3 Type and capacity of establishments
The 137 establishments range in size from large urban prisons holding over 1500 
prisoners to small open prisons holding only 150. They are of a varying physical 
condition (Morgan 2002, pi 142). Some prisons hold prisoners awaiting trial or 
sentencing (known as ‘local prisons’ and ‘remand prisons’). The function of these 
prisons is to receive prisoners from, and deliver prisoners to, the courts. They also 
assess and allocate those who have been sentenced. A number of prisoners serving 
short sentences will serve their sentence in local prisons. Other prisons (often called 
‘community prisons’) are multi-functional and hold prisoners awaiting court 
appearances, as well as those convicted. Most prisoners serving a sentence will be 
sent to training prisons (adults) and Young Offender Institutions (for those under 21 
years old).
Training prisons are classified according to the level of security they provide. The 
most secure prisons (dispersal prisons) hold prisoners in security Categories A and B. 
Category B Training prisons hold prisoners who are Category B and Category C 
Training prisons those who are Category C. The majority of prisoners are held in 
Category C prisons. Open prisons hold the lowest category of prisoners (Category 
D).
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There are separate prisons for women -  although some small units for women are 
housed in male prisons. Women’s prisons are divided into ‘open’ (less secure) and 
‘closed’ (more secure) prisons. Young adults and juveniles are held in Young 
Offender Institutions (YOIs), which again are classified as ‘open’ or ‘closed’.
3.3 Prisoners
The average prison population during 2002 was 70,860, higher than in any previous 
year. This was an increase of 55 per cent compared to 1992. Among the population 
in custody in 2002 were an average 57,220 prisoners under sentence (81 per cent of 
the total). These included 45,600 sentenced adult males, 8,320 sentenced male young 
offenders (aged under 21) and 3,300 sentenced females. The population held on 
remand consisted on average of 12,790 prisoners (18 per cent of the total), with 
11,850 males and 940 females. The population in custody also included 850 non­
criminal prisoners, who were mainly persons held under the Immigration Act 1971, 
but also included those held for civil offences such as contempt of court. (For a 
detailed breakdown of the prison population see Home Office 2003a, p4.)
The 75,000 prisoners currently incarcerated remain a very much homogeneous 
group. They are ‘overwhelmingly young, male, socially and economically 
disadvantaged, repetitive property offenders’ (Morgan 2002, pi 128). There has, 
however, been a number of shifts in the profile of the prison population, which has 
implications for the management of prisons. Of particular note are that between 1992 
and 2002 (Home Office 2003a): the proportion of prisoners serving long sentences 
(four years or more including life) increased by six per cent; the female sentenced 
population increased by 184 per cent (from 1,180 to 3,340); the number of drug 
offenders in prison rose significantly; the number of young prisoners increased (by 
54 per cent), as did the number of prisoners aged 60 and over (an increase of 203 per 
cent). The percentage of prisoners from minority ethnic groups increased from 15 per 
cent to 22 per cent, and at the same time the population of foreign nationals increased 
by 120 per cent (compared to a 55 per cent increase in British nationals).
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The nature of the prison population also creates a number of challenges for 
Governors and their staff. Many prisoners have experienced a lifetime of social 
exclusion. As a recent report has pointed out (Social Exclusion Unit 2002), compared 
with the general population, prisoners are less well educated. (80 per cent have the 
writing skills, 65 per cent the numeracy skills and 50 per cent the reading skills at or 
below the level expected of an 11 year old child.) Prisoners are, however, more likely 
to have: been unemployed (thirteen times more than the general population); to 
suffer from at least two mental disorders (over 70 per cent); and have attempted 
suicide in the past (over 20 per cent of male and 37 per cent of female sentenced 
prisoners). Creating a safe and orderly environment is problematic when 22 per cent 
of adult males were convicted of a violent offence and a further 12 per cent for 
robbery (Home Office 2003a, p75). Preventing drug supply in prisons is difficult 
when there is a huge demand (60 to 70 per cent of prisoners were using drugs before 
imprisonment - Social Exclusion Unit 2002) and 18 per cent of prisoners were 
convicted of a drug related offence (Home Office 2003a, p75).
The specific needs of various subsets of prisoners also need to be met. Female 
prisoners require different: regimes; relationships between staff and prisoners; 
offending behaviour programmes; activities; and medical interventions compared to 
male prisoners (Carlen 1983 and 1990, Dobash et al 1986, Zedner 1994 and 1995, 
HM Chief Inspector of Prisons 1997c and 2001). Similarly, young offenders require 
interventions and management tailored to their needs, as a significant minority of 
these young people are even more isolated, victimised and disturbed than their adult 
counterparts (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons 1997b and 2000a). The increase in the 
number of older prisoners places additional demands on prisons (O’Donnel et al 
2002 and Wahidin 2003). The increasing diversity in the prison population, in terms 
of ethnicity, religion and nationality, brings with it the need to provide appropriate 
services to those groups.
3.4 Prison Service staff
The Prison Service directly employs over 45,000 staff (HM Prison Service 2004b, 
p65) including uniformed staf£ administrative staff and specialists such as chaplains,
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instructors and psychologists. There are 32,537 uniformed prison officers (HM 
Prison Service 2004b, p67), which equates to a prisoner to staff ratio of 2.3:1. Prison 
officers, whilst carrying out routine custodial duties, are also involved in the whole 
range of activities that prisons provide (Liebling and Price 2001). Some prison 
officers choose to specialise in healthcare, dog handling or physical education. 
Others are also closely involved in sentence management, offending behaviour work, 
counselling and dealing with prisoners’ personal problems. It is prison officers who 
provide the frontline work in keeping prisons safe and secure, through the 
maintenance of procedural and dynamic security (Dunbar 1985).
Medical services are now provided directly by the local Primary Care Trust. [At the 
time of the research, the Prison Service directly employed doctors and other 
healthcare staff] The many other people who work in prisons are either volunteers or 
employed by contractors. Contractors provide a range of services including: 
education; probation; treatment programmes; catering; maintenance; library; and 
canteen. Non-governmental and community organisations (NGOs) contribute unpaid 
staff for a range of other purposes (Samaritans, visitors to prisoners, refreshments 
during visits and so forth).
Of the various staff groups, it is the culture of the prison officer grades that 
dominates in a prison. This cultural dominance is reinforced by the power of their 
union, the Prison Officers Association (POA). In many respects their attitude to new 
initiatives or progress can heavily influence change (see chapters 12 and 14).
The Prison Service workforce is predominantly male and white. In 2001, only 17 per 
cent of prison officers were female (Liebling and Price 2001) and minority ethnic 
staff accounted for only 5.5 per cent of the workforce (HM Prison Service 2004b, 
p49). Some female officers work in male prisons and some male officers in female 
prisons. These officers do the full range of duties, with the exception that they do not 
strip search prisoners of the opposite sex.
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3.5 External monitoring of prisons
A number of independent bodies monitor conditions in prisons. There has been an 
inspectorate, separate from the Prison Service, though part of the Home Office, since 
1981. The role of the Chief Inspector of Prisons is set out in section 5 A of the Prison 
Act 1952 (as amended):
‘it shall be the duty of the Chief Inspector to inspect or arrange for 
the inspection of prisons in England and Wales and report to the 
Secretary of State. The Chief Inspector shall in particular report to 
the Secretaiy of State on the treatment of prisoners and conditions 
in prisons’.
The inspectorate carries out its work by way of announced and unannounced 
inspections. Reports of the inspections are published and include lists of good 
practice as well as criticisms. A recent development has been the publication of 
thematic reviews into areas such as suicides in prisons, women, young offenders and 
lifers. The inspectorate has ‘established a reputation for conspicuous independence’ 
(Morgan 2002, pi 146).
The Woolf Report recommended an ‘independent complaints adjudicator’ (Woolf 
and Tumim 1991, paras 14.326 -  14.362) to look into prisoner complaints that had 
not been resolved within the Prison Service. The first Prisons Ombudsman was 
appointed in October 1994 to:
‘provide prisoners with an independent and effective avenue of 
complaint which is fair and even-handed, has the confidence of 
prisoners and the Prison Service, and contributes towards a just 
prison system’ (Prisons Ombudsman 1996).
The Ombudsman investigates complaints that are submitted by individual prisoners 
who have failed to obtain satisfaction from the Prison Service requests and 
complaints system. It has been pointed out that ‘the Ombudsman currently upholds 
just under a third of the complaints he receives, and only rarely are his findings and 
recommendations not accepted by the Director General’ (Morgan 2002, pi 147).
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Each prison also has a Board of Visitors (BOV) [renamed Independent Monitoring 
Board (IMB) after the field research was completed] whose duties are set out in the 
Prison Rules 1999 (as amended). BOVs monitor prison premises, prison 
administration and the treatment of prisoners. They inspect prison conditions and 
hear grievances from prisoners. While most Boards have a formal monthly meeting 
with the Governor, BOV members can raise issues with the Governor, area manager, 
and Home Secretary at any time. BOVs have a right to enter an establishment at any 
time and have free access to every part of it and to see every prisoner. (For a detailed 
description of the role and work of the BOV, see Worrall 1994 and Lloyd 2001.) All 
BOVs produce an annual report to the Home Secretaiy, which they are at liberty to 
publish.
3.6 The Office of ‘Governor’
3.6.1 Legal status and authority
It is the Prison Act 1952 (as amended) that vests Governors with formal authority 
and status. Governors are appointed by the Secretary of State under Section 7 of the 
Act and are, therefore, holders of a statutory Office. The exercise of the Home 
Secretary’s power under the Act to appoint persons to the Office of Governor has to 
be exercised rationally. Those making the appointment therefore have to satisfy 
themselves that the person to be appointed is fit and proper to hold the post and has 
the requisite knowledge, skills and experience to perform in the position, to an 
adequate standard.
As holders of the Office of Governor incumbents exercise powers delegated by the 
Home Secretary, as well as their own statutory powers. Governors exercise power 
delegated by the Home Secretary in various circumstances such as transferring a 
prisoner or discharging a prisoner temporarily on grounds of ill health. In some cases 
the Governor will act for the Home Secretaiy, for example in relation to home 
detention curfew and release on temporaiy licence. The Act also confers on 
Governors some statutory powers (such as the power to conduct adjudications on 
prisoners) and the Prison Rules authorise Governors to take certain actions (for
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example, to segregate prisoners), which contribute to their formal authority and 
status. Governors have the freedom to use their legitimate authority and statutory 
powers without being unlawfully constrained or fettered.
Under section 8 of the Act, Governors, as Officers of the prison, have the ‘powers, 
authority, protection and privileges of a constable’ (R v Secretary o f State for Home 
Office, ex parte Benwell [1985] QB 554). This status is useful to Governors in 
carrying out their duties and gives them a certain amount of protection whilst doing 
so (Wasik and Taylor 1995, p i27).
Governors are required to undertake the duties and tasks as set out in their job 
descriptions. In addition, they have to ensure that the requirements of Prison Rules, 
other statutory obligations and line management are met. With the permission of the 
Home Secretary (under Prison Rule 8) Governors may delegate any powers or duties 
to another officer of the prison. The legislation says very little more about the work 
and powers of a Governor. Indeed, the 1952 Prison Act spends more time defining 
the role and authority of the Chaplain than that of the Governor. The Prison Act 
recognises the Governor but does not recognise the Director General, the Prisons 
Board or the area managers who manage Governors (Abbot and Payne 1998, p31).
The warrant of the court, on whose authority the prisoner is sent to custody, is 
addressed to the Governor and requires the Governor either to produce the remand 
prisoner back to court or to keep the convicted prisoner in custody for the time 
determined. The prisoner is in the legal custody of the Governor, who is accountable 
to the court for that secure custody (si 3 Prison Act 1952). However, it is the 
Secretary of State who has the responsibility for the administration of prisons under 
the Prison Act and it is the policies of the Secretary of State that determine how 
prisoners are dealt with. The Governor's accountability, therefore, is both to the 
court and to the Secretary of State. Curiously the courts do not tend to hold 
Governors to account when they fail to hold prisoners who escape. However, there 
have been a number of cases where Governors have been summoned to court to 
explain why a prisoner has not been produced at court on time.
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3.6.2 Employment conditions
Governors are civil servants. Their annual salary is between £58,000 and £70,000 
(2002). There are no specified hours that Governors have to work, as they are termed 
‘all hours worked grades’. Governors are on call 24 hours a day, seven days a week. 
They are routinely expected to work some evenings, make visits to their prisons at 
night (between 2300 and 0600 hours) and to work some weekends. They are entitled 
to 30 days’ annual leave. The retirement age for Governors is currently 60.
Most Governors are represented by the Prison Governors Association (PGA), which 
has the status and immunities of a trade union. Governors may claim the same 
employment rights as other civil servants, including access to industrial tribunals 
(The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994) and have access to statutory 
remedies for unfair dismissal. A Pay Review Body was established in 2001 to make 
recommendations on Governors’ pay, allowances and associated terms and 
conditions of employment.
3.6.3 Appointment to the Office
Unlike their colleagues in other jurisdictions (see, for example, Vagg 1994) 
Governors are not required to have a legal qualification, or to be a lawyer, and are 
not appointed directly to the Office of Governor. Governors are appointed from 
within the ranks of existing Prison Service staff and there is no provision for 
someone to join the Prison Service and take up a Governor’s post immediately. 
People wanting to be Governors join the Service as operational managers, and after 
suitable training and experience become deputy governors, before taking up a post as 
Governor of a prison.
There are four routes to becoming an operational manager. The main route is on 
promotion from principal officer, the most senior prison officer grade. The 
Accelerated Promotion Scheme (APS) is the second route and is aimed at graduates 
and exceptional existing Prison Service staff of any rank. The third route is the 
Direct Entry Scheme aimed at experienced managers from inside and outside the
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Prison Service. The fourth route is the Cross Hierarchy Move Scheme, aimed at 
existing civil servants in other occupational groups.
Applicants for all schemes undertake written tests, attend a Job Simulation 
Assessment Centre (JSAC) and are the subject of an extended interview process. 
Successful candidates who have no experience as prison officers are required to 
undertake prison officer training and then to spend a period as a prison officer. On 
completion of the period in uniform they then undertake a prison management course 
and normally achieve accreditation as operational managers 12 to 24 months later. 
Promotion to deputy governor depends on developing the requisite skills and 
knowledge, favourable recommendations from line management and attendance at 
further assessment centres.
Promotion to an in-charge Governor post requires experience in a number of 
different types of prisons, attendance on a variety of courses, and, in most cases, 
experience as a deputy governor. People seeking a Governor’s post must first be 
successful at the ‘suitable to be in charge’ JSAC. Vacant Governor posts are 
advertised, in the main, and existing Governors, or those who have passed the JSAC, 
invited to apply. Some vacant Governor posts are filled by the DG without 
advertisement.
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PART TWO: 
RESEARCHING WHAT GOVERNORS DO
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CHAPTER 4: 
RESEARCH APPROACH, DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
Chapters four and five describe the approach taken to the research, how the research 
was designed from a methodological viewpoint, the methods that were employed to 
collect the data, the experience of data collection and how the data was analysed. 
They aim to be analytical and evaluative, as well as descriptive, because ‘reflection 
on the decisions which have been taken in research and on the problems which have 
been encountered is an essential element of doing research’ (Jupp et a l 2000, pi 69).
4.1 The history of the project
Very little research has been done on Governors and prison governance. While some 
attempts have been made to describe the work of Governors, no research-based 
studies of Governors’ work have been published. The Prison Governor: Theory and 
Practice (Bryans and Wilson 1998) was informed primarily by literature from the 
USA and on anecdotal evidence from the authors who had worked in prisons as 
operational managers. Another study has explored the competencies required to 
govern a prison (Bryans 2000a) but the postulations made about areas of competency 
were based on the author’s experience whilst training Governors, rather than on any 
objective research.
This absence of research was one reason why two major reviews (HM Prison Service 
1996b and 1997a) concluded that the role of the Governor was in need of redefinition 
and review. As a result, the Prisons Board decided, in the spring of 1998, that a 
study into the changing role of the Governor should be commissioned. The Prison 
Governors Association (PGA) fully supported the proposed study -  perhaps in part 
because ‘research about the theory and practice of an occupation confers on it a 
measure of professionalism’ (Brown 1996, pi 77).
Given my previous work on the subject, I was asked to undertake the study, as part 
of my duties as head of management, leadership and specialist training at the Prison
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Service College. The Prison Service agreed that it could be done as a research study 
under the auspices of an academic institution and as part of a higher degree. 
Preliminary work for the study commenced in the summer of 1998.
4.2 Planning the research - research methodology
Research methodology is taken here to refer to the framework within which the 
research was conducted.
4.2.1 Research aim and questions
The purpose of any research is to solve problems and/or to expand knowledge (Drew 
1980, p4). In order to undertake research it is necessary therefore to identify research 
aims and questions, which will give the research direction and coherence, provide a 
boundary and focus to the work, point to the data to be collected and give a 
framework for writing it up (Punch 1998 and Francis 2000).
With many people beginning a study, the starting point is being clear about what and 
where to research, and deciding why they are doing the research. I was in a different 
position in that many of the parameters of my proposed research had already been 
set. The subject of the study (Governors), the purpose of the research (describe the 
role of the Governor, identify the broad tasks that Governors carry out, describe how 
it has changed) and the required outcomes (a description of the role and work of a 
modem Governor) were dictated by the key stakeholder who was sponsoring the 
research (the Prison Service). This research study was similar therefore to many 
others in that research ‘agendas emerged as the by-product of a set of preferences by 
sponsors for research of a particular character’ (Hughes 2000, p237).
The exact definition of the study, detail of the methodology, and research methods, 
however, were left to me. At no point during the course of the research did the Prison 
Service attempt to influence who was interviewed, what they were asked or the 
themes that emerged. Indeed, in 2002 the Prison Service withdrew funding for the
54
research, owing to a reduction in the training budget (Narey 2002a), and had no 
further involvement with the study.
In short, the research aim was to investigate the changing role of the prison Governor 
in HM Prison Service. Underpinning the central research aim, there were a number 
of research questions:
a. Who governs our prisons and why do they do the job?
Identification of the origins, background and career paths of Governors. 
Consideration of what motivates them, their ideology and level of job 
satisfaction.
b. What do Governors do?
Identification of the tasks and duties that Governors undertake and analysis 
of their role. Consideration of the generic managerial elements of a 
Governor’s job and those that are prison specific. Analysis of how they 
shape their prisons and balance the interest of the various stakeholders.
c. How has the environment in which Governors operate changed?
Consideration of changes in the internal and external environment in which 
Governors operate and the impact those changes have had.
d. Has the level o f discretion that Governors can exercise changed and 
what is the reality o f governing?
Consideration of the actual use of discretion and the extent to which 
Governors use their discretion to further their self-defined goals rather than 
general policy. Consideration of whether Governors are disobedient or -  
more subtly -  act in a way that does not implement policy according to the 
letter and spirit of central instructions.
e. Are Governors more or less disposed to use their discretion in support 
o f centrally prescribed policy and guidelines, and to what extent are 
Governors able to deviate from policy?
Analysis of the disposition of Governors with regard to their own position 
within the prison system, how they perceive the importance of their own 
expertise, whether they are inclined to adapt general policies to their 
personal philosophies or to subordinate their views and opinions.
f  Have the role and duties o f a Governor fundamentally changed?
Assessment of whether the job has changed, and if so, in what ways. 
Consideration of whether Governors govern in the same way as previous 
generations of Governors ran their institutions.
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4.2.2 Research framework and design
This thesis falls within both the management and criminology research fields. There 
has been a proliferation of textbooks describing research methodology from the 
criminological perspective (for example, Maxfield and Babbie 1998, Jupp 1989, Jupp 
et al 2000, King and Wincup 2000, McKenzie and Bull 2002) and from the 
management studies discipline (for example, Gill and Johnson 1991, Hussey and 
Hussey 1997, Remenyi et a l 1998), in addition to generic research methodology 
texts. The intention here is not to contribute to the extensive literature on the relative 
merits of the different approaches but to briefly identify some of those approaches 
and set out where the present research sits within them.
The traditional divides between research approaches (empirical and theoretical, 
hypothetico-deductive and inductive grounded, positivism and phenomenology) are 
becoming eroded with the increase in ‘real world research’ (Robson 1993, p20). 
Indeed, Biyman makes a strong case that many of the differences between the 
traditions are in the minds of philosophers and theorists, rather than in the practices 
of research (Bryman 1988, pl72).
Considering the current research study in the light of the various methodological 
orientations, its methodology can be viewed as a broadly exploratory, descriptive, 
inductive, qualitative and theory-generating (as opposed to hypothesis-testing). This 
approach was considered best suited to a complex, under-explored setting, where 
multiple realities were likely to be found. The study was empirical rather than purely 
theory-based, and fell more within a phenomenological discipline. The focus was 
firmly on elucidating meaning and seeking to positively articulate the nature of the 
Governor’s work. In the main, understanding and categories emerged from the 
process of the study, rather than being identified in advance (Creswell 1994, p7).
However, this is not to suggest that I made no use of concepts from general social 
theories in formulating the research and in understanding the data. This ‘selective’, 
rather than ‘wholesale’, adoption of general social theories enabled me to use them in 
a ‘sparing and critical fashion’ in order to illuminate the social phenomena being 
studied (Giddens 1991, p213). This explanatory approach ‘where both theory and
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data are used conjointly in a search for true explanations of social phenomena’ 
(Bottoms 2000, p48) best describes the overall approach I adopted.
Research methodology is always a compromise between options. Reiner makes the 
point: ‘with almost all methodological choices there is a tension between getting rich 
and valid material on the one hand, and the scale and representativeness of the data 
on the other’ (Reiner 2000, p221). A number of data collection options are discussed 
below, together with the reasons underlying their use, or otherwise, in this study.
4.2.3 Literature review and secondary data
Few research projects exclude the use of secondary data. A review of existing 
documents and statistical data within the research field is an important part of any 
research. The appropriate point at which to review literature varies according to 
different styles of research and the function it is intended to perform. Francis 
suggests that a literature review has a number of functions including: topic 
identification; obtaining an indication of the extent to which a topic has already been 
researched; helping to avoid research planning errors which occurred in previous 
studies; allowing ideas to be developed regarding good research design; and 
influencing the development of a theoretical or analytical framework (Francis 2000, 
p29). A literature review was undertaken for the current research study.
4.2.4 Ethnographic approach (observation)
Ethnographic methods of research are based on what Gill and Johnson refer to as 
‘naturalist modes of inquiry, such as participant observation, within a predominantly 
inductivist framework’ (Gill and Johnson 1991, p92). The literature reveals a 
number of divergent trends in the practice of ethnography but the central feature of 
most studies is extended participant observation in order to focus on the manner in 
which people interact and collaborate in observable and regular ways in their natural 
and everyday settings. Other methods include non-participant observation and 
gathering reports from informants. Covert observation, in particular, raises a number 
of ethical issues in relation to the informed consent of participants.
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Covert observation is possible within the prison setting (for example, a study of 
prison guards in the USA was undertaken by a covert participant observer - Conover 
2001). However, covert observation was not feasible for the present study, given that 
many Governors knew me. Overt observation, as a non-participant, was possible but 
would have meant working in a range of prisons, to observe a number of different 
Governors over a period. The overt observation technique has, however, been 
criticised as a means of data collection because people often behave differently when 
under scrutiny, unless observed over a long period (Bell 1996, plO). This approach 
would take a skilled observer and a considerable amount of time to implement 
effectively. As time was limited this approach was not adopted.
4.2.5 Survey methodology - questionnaires
Robson defines survey as commonly referring to the ‘collection of standardised 
information from a specific population, or some sample from one, usually but not 
necessarily by means of questionnaire or interview’ (Robson 1993, p49). Survey 
research occupies a variable, intermediate position somewhere between ethnography 
and experimental research (Gill and Johnson 1991). Surveys can be highly 
structured and analytically based, or use more open-ended questions to collect data in 
an inductive form.
In order to capture factual information on the tasks and duties that Governors were 
being asked to undertake, a letter requesting a copy of their job description was sent 
to the Governor of each prison in England and Wales.
As a general rule ‘the nature of the evidence which may be collected by means of a 
questionnaire is regarded as relatively superficial, especially in comparison to the 
evidence that it is possible to collect from other techniques such as ... personal 
interviews’ (Remenyi et al 1998, p57). My earlier questionnaire-based study of 
Governors’ training needs supported such a view, as it produced few free text entries 
(Bryans 2000a). In the light of this experience, I took the view that questionnaires 
were unlikely to generate the rich data I needed to answer the research questions.
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4.2.6 Survey methodology - interviews
In-depth surveys ‘generally attempt to obtain detailed in-depth evidence from a 
relatively small number of informants through a series of interviews’ (Remenyi et al 
1998, p55). These interviews range from informal, unstructured discussions through 
to very structured formats with answers offered from a prescribed list. Davies 
suggests that an interview continuum exists with at one extreme interviews 
‘conducted as conversations and at the other extreme they involve little interaction 
between the researcher and the researched’ (Davies 2000, p82). Whichever approach 
is adopted, interviews can ‘yield rich insights into people’s experiences, opinions, 
aspirations, attitudes and feelings’ (May 1993, p i09).
Bell points out that the major advantage of the interview is its adaptability, as the 
interviewer can follow up ideas, probe responses and investigate motives and 
feelings (Bell 1996, p91). Interviews tend to be expansive as they gather data, 
whereas methods such as questionnaires tend to be more restrictive and limited in 
scope. However, it has been claimed that the qualitative research interview can lack 
objectivity due to the human interaction inherent in the interview situation (Kvale 
1996, p64). The interviewer is ‘either limited or helped by his or her own sex, 
apparent age and background, skin colour, accent etc’ (Oppenheim 1992, p65). It is 
particularly important therefore that the interviewer should be conscious of the 
interpersonal dynamics in the interview situation and take them into account in the 
analysis.
For the present study the advantages of using interviews far outweigh the potential 
drawbacks. Indeed, it has been suggested that:
‘Elites need to be interviewed. The best way of finding out about 
people is by talking to them. It cannot guarantee the truth, especially 
people well practised in the arts of discretion. But it is superior to any 
alternative way of discovering what they believe and do’ (Crewe 
1974, p42-43, quoted in Reiner 1991, p39).
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4.3 Doing the research -  research methods in action
This section outlines the research processes itself and how the methods, tools and 
tactics were used. It highlights the practicalities of the research, identifies problems 
that arose and how they were overcome.
4.3.1 Literature review
In order to inform the research questions, and to formulate the questions to be used 
during the interviews, the current literature on Governors and Wardens, prison 
governance, prison administration, correctional management and prison management 
was reviewed. The existing literature was identified using the Prison Service library, 
Prison Service Headquarters library and the Home Office library. Searches were also 
made using various internet-based search engines. In addition, the British Library 
Public Catalogue, the US National Criminal Justice Reference Service, Justicelink (a 
guide to criminal justice resources, provided by the Centre for Crime and Justice 
Studies, London) and the references sections from relevant books and articles were 
used to identify relevant research.
A study of documents dating from the late nineteenth century was also undertaken in 
order to inform part three of this thesis. This review considered secondary data, in 
the form of academic accounts of the early history of penal administration and 
imprisonment, and primary data including: the writings of Governors and prisoners; 
official reports; reviews; and internal Home Office and Prison Service 
documentation.
Information (theories, models, research findings) gleaned from the literature review 
is referred to in relevant sections throughout this thesis.
4.3.2 Deciding who to interview - sampling
The choice of any sampling method involves compromise in balancing 
considerations of precision, feasibility and costs (Schofield 1996). This is
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particularly so in the case of the lone researcher (as in this case) where finite 
resources can dictate research methods (Bryman and Cramer 1994). Given the time 
and resources available to interview Governors, and to analyse the data, it would not 
have been possible to interview all 126 people governing a prison at the time of the 
field research. It is not unusual in studies of this sort for sampling to be used because 
the extent of data collection is influenced by the amount of time available (Bell 1996, 
p63). Creswell recommends that a researcher typically conducts 20 to 30 interviews 
based on several visits to the ‘field’ to collect interview data (Creswell 1998, pi 13).
It was decided therefore to select a sample of Governors to interview. A sample size 
of 42 interviews, which equated to one third of Governors, was manageable given the 
time available.
I drew upon a ‘deliberate or purposive’ approach (Francis 2000, p45) to select which 
Governors to interview. A stratified random sampling methodology was adopted in 
order to ‘produce more representative and thus more accurate samples’ than a simple 
random sample (De Vaus 1991, p63). A stratified sample was selected around the , 
different types of prison, which is the main variable. The type of prison dictates the 
category, gender and age of prisoner and size of the establishment. By including the 
different types of establishment in the sample I ensured that interviews would take 
place with Governors of male/female, adult/young offender, high/low security and 
large/small prisons.
In order to produce a sampling frame the 1997/98 Prison Service Annual Report and 
Accounts (HM Prison Service 1998) was used. This document contained a list of the 
126 publicly managed prisons that were functioning at the time, together with the 
prison’s category. The number of interviews for each category was calculated based 
on the number of prisons in that category in relation to the total number of prisons. 
For example, 11 of 126 prisons were category B, which equated to 9% of prisons, so 
9% of the interviews (4 of 42 interviews) were with Governors of category B prisons. 
The results of the sampling methodology are shown in Table 1.
A random approach was adopted to selecting prisons within each category. The 
names of each prison in a category were written on a piece of paper, which was then 
placed in a box. The pieces of paper were then drawn one by one and the named
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prisons listed in the order in which they were drawn. This process was repeated for 
each category.
Table 1: Interview sample methodology
Type of 
Establishment
Number of 
Establishments of 
each type*
Percentage of the total 
number of prisons
Number of interviews 
in the sample
Local/Adult remand 34 27% 11
Dispersal 5 4% 2
Category B 11 9% 4
Category C 34 27% 11
Open 9 7% 3
YOI/RC 22 17% 7
Female 11 9% 4
Total 126 (100%) 100% 42 (33%)
*  Source -  1997/98 Prison Service Report and Accounts (HM Prison Service 1998)
The result of the exercise was a list of 42 prisons and a letter was sent to the 
Governor of each of those prisons. The letter made clear the purpose of the study and 
the way it was proposed to conduct the interview. The letter also indicated that any 
comments made in the course of the interview would be non attributable. While the 
Prison Service encouraged Governors to co-operate with the study it did not instruct 
them to do so. The support of the Director of Personnel and the PGA for the study 
was emphasised in the letters.
Only one Governor declined to be interviewed. The Governor of the next prison on 
the list for that category of prison was invited to be interviewed instead.
I was not myself one of the interviewees.
4.3.3 Formulating the questions
The approach taken in the present study can best be described as a ‘guided or focused 
interview’ for which the researcher establishes a framework by selecting topics 
around which the interview is guided (Bell 1996, p94). This form of interviewing 
combines structured and open-ended (or focused) techniques. It is designed to ‘allow
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people to answer more on their own terms than the standardised interview permits, 
but still provide greater structure for comparability over the focused interview’ (May 
1993, p93). This seemed a particularly suitable approach for what I was hoping to 
achieve, both explanatory depth in what individuals told me, and accounts that were 
comparable with each other. The purpose of these ‘exploratory’ interviews was 
primarily heuristic: to develop ideas and explore opinions about the research 
questions rather than to gather facts and statistics.
As a means to give some structure to the interviews, and to ensure that relevant points 
were covered, an interview schedule was produced. The schedule highlighted the key 
topics that were to be investigated, together with broad open questions for each of 
those topics. A number of force-choice questions were also used to gather factual data 
about Governors. A copy of the interview schedule can be found at Appendix C.
The subject areas covered in the questions were based on the research questions and 
the themes that emerged during the literature review. Questions were as open as 
possible in order to get interviewees to express their own ideas spontaneously in their 
own words and to raise additional issues. It was important to make sure that 
interviewees did not think that there was one appropriate answer to each question but 
rather that they had the opportunity to explore the range of what a Governor did and 
why.
It is vital that any interview schedule is pre-tested in some way to ensure reliability 
(Remenyi et al 1998, p ill) .  In order to test my interview schedule it was used with 
three Governors who were not going to be part of the stratified random sample. These 
Governors were selected based on their availability and personal contact. As a result 
of these pilot interviews a number of refinements were made to the final interview 
schedule. In particular, some ambiguities were removed, a number of more complex 
questions rephrased, the overall number of question areas reduced and the sequencing 
changed.
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4.3.4 Conducting the interviews
This section describes the ‘contextual factors surrounding the whole experience of 
doing qualitative interviews’ (Davies 2000, p83). The interviews were conducted 
between the winter of 1998 and the end of 2000. The interviewing was done over a 
long period as time to undertake the interviews had to be incorporated into my diary, 
as an addition to routine work commitments. The letters inviting Governors to 
participate were sent out in batches of six, in order to stagger the interviews. The 
interviews themselves lasted between one hour and 10 minutes and three hours and 
15 minutes, with an average time of two hours.
Interviews took place, wherever possible, in the interviewee’s office to ensure a 
private, quiet and non-intimidating environment. Interviewees were asked to 
minimise the level of interruptions. As most interviewees had a secretary this worked 
well, as the secretary prevented interruptions by taking telephone calls and 
preventing people coming into the office. On a number of occasions, however, 
operational incidents required that the interview be interrupted and on one occasion 
due to the seriousness of the emergency the interview was terminated and postponed 
until the following week.
At the beginning of each interview, in addition to explaining the broad aims of the 
study, the interviewee was assured of confidentiality and asked if the interview could 
be taped. It was decided to seek permission to tape all interviews in order to allow 
more detailed analysis afterwards and to prevent the interviewer missing important 
contributions. Written notes were also made during the interviews of key points 
made.
All interviewees agreed to the interviews being taped, some only after reassurance 
that the interviews were going to be confidential and that any quotes used would be 
anonymous. On five occasions interviewees asked for the tape to be turned off for a 
short period in order to recount an anecdote or describe the actions of another named 
Governor.
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The interviewees varied in the way that they answered questions. Some were highly 
eloquent and expansive in their replies; others provided more hesitant and disjointed 
responses. As a result some interviews were easier to conduct than others. In the 
main interviewees remained extremely focused on the issues presented. A number of 
the Governors were less forthcoming and more guarded, but the overwhelming 
majority were highly loquacious and opinionated. The interviews produced, as a 
result, rich data, which was informed and insightful.
4.3.5 Interviews with stakeholders
In addition to the 42 interviews with Governors described above, a number of 
interviews were conducted with stakeholders (area managers, Headquarters staf£ 
private prison directors) in order to obtain background information on the work of 
Governors. It also enabled me to identify whether stakeholders identified different 
‘themes’ in the role of the Governor compared to the views expressed by the 
Governors themselves. A total of 10 stakeholder interviews were conducted: three 
with members of the Prisons Board; four with area managers; one with HM Chief 
Inspector of Prisons and two with directors of contracted-out prisons. The 
stakeholders were selected based on their availability for interview, as they were not 
intended to be a representative sample.
Interview questions were based on the interview schedule used for Governors and 
focused on the historical and current role of Governors. These semi-structured 
interviews were taped and interviewees encouraged to answer questions in an 
expansive manner. Interviewees were assured of confidentiality and that any quotes 
would not be attributed to them.
4.3.6 Job descriptions
One important part of the research study was identifying the key tasks and duties that 
the Governor was expected to undertake. It was decided that the best way to identify 
officially dictated aspects of the job was to obtain a copy of each Governor’s job 
description. Letters requesting job descriptions were sent to the Governors of the 126 
publicly managed prisons.
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As postal requests for information tend to have a low response rate, a number of 
mechanisms were adopted to maximise the response rate (Oppenheim 1992, pi 03). 
Governors were informed that a request for their job description would be made at 
the Annual Prison Service Conference, to provide advance warning. The letter 
seeking their job description emphasised the importance of the research and the 
endorsement it had from Prison Service Headquarters and the PGA. A return 
envelope was included with each letter requesting a job description. As there was no 
need for the origin of the job descriptions to be anonymous Governors were asked to 
identify their prison on the top of the job description. Follow up telephone calls were 
therefore possible to those Governors who had not responded. A total of 98 job 
descriptions were returned which represents a sample of 78 per cent. A further five 
Governors indicated that they did not have a job description.
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CHAPTER 5: 
UNDERSTANDING THE DATA AND RESEARCH PROCESS
5.1 Analysing the data
The term data analysis is often used to refer to the ordering and structuring of data to 
produce knowledge (Glaser and Strauss 1967 and Rubin and Rubin 1995). It has also 
been described as ‘the final stage of listening to the meaning of what is said’ 
(Howard and Sharp 1983, p i00). Some commentators suggest that the analysis is the 
‘most demanding aspect of non-positivistic research’ (Remenyi et al 1998, pi 12). 
This section explains how the collected data was analysed to inform the remaining 
sections of this thesis.
I made use of the interview data in a phenomenological rather than a positivistic 
mode. A positivistic researcher would have subjected the transcripts to techniques 
such as content analysis, counted the number of occasions on which an issue was 
mentioned and used these counts to demonstrate the importance of an issue. Whereas 
my phenomenological approach led me to undertake a more interpretative analysis 
and to conceptualise on the basis of evidence available and the patterns emerging 
from it, what has been referred to as hermeneutics (Remenyi et al 1998, p68). The 
analysis of data, according to Mintzberg, follows a number of steps. The first step is 
the ‘detective work’ of looking for order and patterns; the second is the ‘creative 
leap’ which entails generalising beyond one’s data; and the final stage is to look for 
synthesis of elements into patterns rather than categories coming from ‘mechanical 
data reduction techniques’ (Mintzberg 1989, p588).
I did not adopt a purist attitude to ‘closeness’ to evidence (Weitzman and Miles 
1995) and made use of computer software to help analyse the data. The advantage of 
using computer software to aid analysis is that the most tedious aspects of analysis 
can be automated, leaving the researcher free to pursue theory-generation. However, 
there is always a danger that analysis with a computer will produce a different 
interpretation from that generated by analysis without one.
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The tapes of the interviews were transcribed for me and computer text files created 
for each interview. In order to overcome one of the drawbacks associated with 
computer analysis, I listened to each tape at least once to achieve familiarity with the 
material. The transcripts were also manually examined for concepts and themes that 
seemed significant to the interviewees and to me. All transcripts were incorporated as 
anonymised text files into a computer software package for qualitative analysis. The 
transcripts were analysed using NUD*IST (Non Numerical Unstructured Data 
Indexing, Searching and Theory-Building), a software package specifically designed 
to support qualitative analysis of non-numerical unstructured data, using indexing, 
searching and theorising tools. The coding exercise placed in one category/node all 
the material from interviews that addressed a particular theme or concept (such as 
‘maintaining order’, ‘justice and fairness’). A total of 16 level one (main themes), 
112 level two (sub themes) and 233 level three (minor themes) nodes were created. 
All the material within each category/node was then compared, to look for variation 
and nuances in meaning (Rubin and Rubin 1995).
5.2 Validity, reliability and triangulation
In any research, questions of validity, generalisability and reliability arise. It has been 
suggested that the criteria used to evaluate positivistic research (internal validity, 
external validity, reliability and objectivity) are inappropriate and should not be 
directly transposed on to non-positivistic research (Marshall and Rossman 1995). 
Alternative constructs have been proposed for non-positivistic approaches, which 
tend to be ‘softer’ than the ‘hard’ measures such as statistical validity used in 
positivistic research.
5.2.1 Validity
Validity is always relative as it is dependent on the decisions that have had to be 
taken in the planning and conduct of the research (Jupp et al 2000, pi 76). In non- 
positivistic research, validity is particularly concerned with whether the design of the 
research provides credible conclusions (Sapsford and Jupp 1996, pi) and whether the
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researcher has gained full access to knowledge and meaning of respondents 
(Remenyi et al 1998, pi 15).
One approach to assessing validity is to adopt the four tests of validity proposed for 
non-positivistic research (Remenyi et al. 1998, pi 15), which are shown in Table 2, 
together with an assessment of how closely the present research met the tests. The 
comparison suggests a high level of validity for the current research.
Given that this was the first study of its kind with Governors, I was particularly keen 
to test out emerging themes with Governors. Some commentators support this 
iterative process and point out that:
‘all of us, as researchers, have our preconceptions and 
preoccupations that can produce conceptual hegemonies, and 
corresponding blind spots. That is why early exposure to others of 
one’s preliminary research findings and tentative theorizing, in a 
non-threatening atmosphere, can often be so very beneficial to the 
constructive development of research’ (Bottoms 2000, p25).
Table 2: Assessment of research validity (after Collins and Young 1988, quoted in 
Remenyi et al 1998, pi 15)
Concerns of the researcher Present research
Quality of researcher as a sensing instrument Semi-structured interviews conducted in 
appropriate and sensitive manner.
Transparency of research process Thesis contains detailed description o f how the 
evidence was collected and interpretations made.
Quality of relationship with respondent Good level of empathy developed with 
interviewees and positive relationship established.
Quality of argument in the 
interpretation
Plausible and reasonable analysis produced. 
Useful contribution to the literature. Emerging 
results discussed with Governors. Good fit with 
the situation. Results can be used as the basis for 
action.
69
5.2.2 Reliability
Reliability traditionally focuses on whether similar observations will be made by 
researchers in a replicable study (Easterby-Smith et al 1994). In non-positivistic 
studies this is difficult to establish, as they tend to focus on a particular issue, in a 
particular setting, at a specific period in time. Two related issues present themselves 
in the current study.
The rate of turnover of Governors is high. (Only 17 of the 42 Governors interviewed 
were still governing a prison at the end of 2003.) The new Governors may have a 
different approach and views. A different researcher interviewing current Governors 
may also have come up with different conclusions, as it can be argued that ‘different 
interpreters find different meanings in the same interview’ (Kvale 1996, p210).
A major problem with sampling is ensuring that the sample population of Governors 
is truly representative and non-biased enough to allow generalisations of the findings 
to the entire current population of Governors. The sample size, at one third of the 
total population of Governors, was not sufficiently large to enable extrapolation of 
the data to the entire population. The intention of the interviews was not one of 
generalising the gathered data to the general population of Governors but of 
information gathering and clarification in order to inform the analysis.
I was also particularly conscious during the data analysis phase not to ‘cherry pick’ 
quotes simply to illustrate a perceived theme. This was an attempt on my part to 
avoid one of the drawbacks of qualitative research identified by Bryman:
‘there is a tendency towards an anecdotal approach to the use of 
data in relation to conclusions or explanations in qualitative 
research. Brief conversations, snippets from unstructured 
interviews, or examples of particular activities are used to provide 
evidence for a particular contention’ (Bryman 1988, p77).
Marshall and Rossman argue good practice guidelines, such as establishing an audit 
trail, should be followed (Marshall and Rossman 1995). In line with this suggestion, 
I made a point of keeping the evidence collected (interview tapes, transcripts and job
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descriptions) in an easily retrievable form. In addition, rough notes on research 
design decisions and the outcome of meetings with supervisors were kept and remain 
available for scrutiny.
5.2.3 Triangulation
Triangulation has become a salient feature of research methodology (Denzin 1970). 
The underlying rationale for triangulation is to try to increase confidence in the 
validity of the research findings. It is possible to distinguish between different types 
of triangulation (Gill and Johnson 1991, pi 66). Data triangulation refers to the 
collection of different data (both qualitative and quantitative data) on the same 
phenomenon. Investigator triangulation involves the collection of data by more than 
one researcher. Method triangulation involves the combination of methodologies in 
the study of the same phenomenon.
I used two main methodological tools, interviewing and documentary analysis (job 
descriptions), which created an element of data and method triangulation, and was an 
attempt not to ‘put all one’s eggs in one basket’ (King 2000, p306). In order to 
achieve a desirable ‘methodological mix’, research methods were adopted which 
elicited both quantitative and qualitative data (Lipetz 1980, p59). The interviews 
produced primarily qualitative data, but also included quantitative information about 
the characteristics of the Governors in the sample as a group. The request for job 
descriptions generated quantitative data on the core work, tasks and duties that 
Governors were supposed to undertake. The review of primary and secondary 
information sources on the historical development of the role of Governor also 
provided data that could be used as a comparator. In addition, I incorporated an 
element of triangulation by having a diversity of interviewees (from different types 
of prisons) which allowed cross-validation of perceptions, itself an aid in achieving 
validity of research results.
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5.3 Ethical issues
Underpinning all research is the need to ensure that strict ethical standards are 
maintained at all times. Ethical issues arise from ‘the nature of the relationship 
between researcher and host organisation and between researcher and the subjects he 
or she studies’ (Remenyi et al 1998, pi 19). Robson defines ethics as ‘rules of 
conduct; typically of conformity to a code or set of principles’ (Robson 1993, p29). 
Bell highlights the point that ‘care has to be taken to consult, to establish guidelines 
and to make no promises that cannot be fulfilled’ (Bell 1996, p58).
It is generally accepted that research participants have ‘certain inalienable rights that 
cannot be violated for knowledge’ (Kimmel 1988, p46). In particular, that an 
individual should be informed of the nature of research in which he or she is a 
subject, and its likely dissemination, is an undeniable right to which any human 
being is entitled (Hughes 2000, p243). Adherence to the principle of informed 
consent, according to Norris, implies that two major conditions are met: first, that the 
research subjects are made aware of and understand the nature and purpose of the 
research; second, that, from a position of knowledge, they can freely give their 
consent to participating in the research (Norris 1993, p i28). All participants in the 
present study were volunteers. They were informed of the purpose of the study in 
advance and again at the commencement of the interviews.
Access for the present study was negotiated through the Director of Personnel for the 
Prison Service. As the research subject was directly work-related and seen as 
beneficial to the organisation, access and support was forthcoming. Given that 
‘access to elites in the criminal justice system is rare for researchers’ (Hughes 2000, 
p241), I was fortunate to gain access so readily. The ease of access was no doubt 
because I was an ‘insider’ (see below) and the organisation was sponsoring the 
research. Relevant people and committees were informed about the research in order 
to ensure that protocol was maintained.
An assurance of confidentiality was given to all participants. The transcripts were 
numbered and all references to interviews were by number, not name, for example
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Governor 1 or stakeholder 2, thereby maintaining anonymity. I also avoided the use 
of pseudo-surnames, numbering or lettering for the quotes used in this thesis, as this 
may have allowed the more dedicated (and mischievous) reader to cross-reference 
the quotes and identify the Governor concerned. However, there will no doubt be 
attempts to piece together quotes and to speculate as to the identity of the participants 
in this study.
Agreement was reached with interested parties at an early stage over the 
dissemination of results. It was agreed that publication could take place so long as it 
was not possible to identify individuals from the material and that no material that 
related to security would be published.
5.4 Reflections on ‘practitioner research9 and the research process
Part of the context of any research study is the nature of the researcher. All 
researchers are subject to prejudices, cultural beliefs and values that they bring into 
the research process with them. Reiner suggests that:
‘There is no neutral Archimedean point from which objective data 
can be collected: the researcher always influences the social 
interactions that constitute the data. All one can do is seek to be 
reflexively aware of this and interpret material in the light of 
probable biases’ (Reiner 2000, p221).
As researchers will have an impact on the questions posed and approaches taken it is 
important to reflect on the type and orientation of the researcher. This section 
therefore explores the research from the perspective of the researcher.
The type of researcher can be distinguished by a number of broad dimensions (based 
on Brown 1996). Researchers studying an organisation are either ‘insiders’ 
(employed by that organisation) or ‘outsiders’ (not employed by that organisation). 
Insiders can be sub-divided into either ‘indigenous’ (worked in that organisation in a 
non-research role) or ‘imported’ (employed to conduct a piece of research). 
Outsiders can be sub-divided into ‘endogenous’ (worked in that organisation in the
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past) or ‘exogenous’ (have never worked in that organisation). Various benefits and 
drawbacks face each group.
My position as a researcher is unambiguous, in that I am clearly an ‘indigenous 
insider’. Indigenous insiders, or practitioner-researchers as they are sometimes 
known, tend to be people who hold down a job in some particular area and at the 
same time carry out systematic enquiry that is of relevance to the job (Robson 1993, 
p446). As such I am part of an emerging research community within criminal justice 
organisations. An increasing number of criminal justice professionals are being 
encouraged to undertake part-time academic study and research, in addition to their 
professional occupation. To some extent practioner-researchers can be viewed as ‘a 
comparatively rare breed of poacher-tumed-gamekeeper’ whose work ‘owes much to 
their prior experiences of those roles’ (King 2000, p302). To be a practitioner- 
researcher is to challenge one of the most popular dualisms, the juxtaposition of 
‘theory’ and ‘practice’. The idea there are ‘people who do things -  practitioners -  
and people who think about the doing of things -  theorisers’ (Duguid 2001, p49) is 
well established, and it is only comparatively recently that practitioners have taken 
up the research challenge. Theorisers, on the other hand, have a long tradition of 
undertaking ethnographic research and working within organisations that they are 
studying (in the prison context, see Fleisher 1989 and Conover 2001).
Practitioner-researchers tend to face a number of disadvantages when conducting 
research, including: time pressure; lack of research expertise; preconceptions about 
issues and solutions; and a reduction in individual freedom. Some of these 
difficulties manifested themselves during the present research. Time shortage limited 
the number of interviews that were undertaken and delayed the writing up of the 
research. As I had completed previous research projects, lack of research experience 
was less of an issue, as it can be for other practitioner-researchers.
Three specific issues to do with being an insider did concern me. Firstly, as a 
Governor I have a number of preconceptions about the issues being studied. I had to 
make conscious efforts throughout to ensure that they did not become manifest in the 
research. On the other hand, there was a clear danger of ‘over-rapport’ (Hammersley 
and Atkinson 1983, p98-104) with the interviewees and that the interviews would be
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‘contaminated with sympathy’. Practitioner-researchers are often seen as being too 
close to the subject matter to be objective. ‘Outsiders’ are considered better placed 
to:
‘...step back from the institutional context and take a dispassionate 
view. They can see the organisational structure of the institution 
better, at least potentially, because they have no vested interests’ 
(Sheptycki 1994, p i27).
An awareness of these dangers helped me to maintain a level of objectivity.
Practitioner-researchers are often accused of becoming too concerned with policy 
issues rather than academic inquiry. In the present study, there was no explicit ‘right 
answer’ and I was not put under any pressure to reach a specified conclusion or come 
up with any policy recommendations. While the Prison Service originally defined the 
subject of the research, I experienced no other organisational limitation on the way 
the research was conducted.
On the positive side, practitioner-researchers have the advantage of: pre-existing 
knowledge and experience about the organisation; ease of access; the ability to 
implement the research findings; and work-related additional insights when it comes 
to designing, implementing and analysing the data.
Governors are able to decide what research takes place in their establishments and 
react to research in ways that are inevitably ‘... coloured by their social position and 
their perceptions of the research act’ (Hammersley and Atkinson 1983, pi 97). One of 
the reasons put forward for the lack of research into the work of the Governor has 
been a reticence by Governors to expose what they do to outsiders and a general 
suspicion of researchers. There is no doubt that my access to documentation, and to 
Governors, was made much easier by my being a practitioner-researcher. Governors 
knew me, from my having already written about the work of Governors and run the 
command course at the Prison Service College. This visibility enabled me to access a 
range of people and primary data.
My experience of working in prisons over a 10 year period also made it easier to 
understand the language, processes and culture of the organisation, and this ‘insider
75
knowledge’ assisted in formulating the key themes of the research. In short, I was 
able to avoid some of the drawbacks of being an outside researcher, which have been 
described in this way: ‘the researcher coming from outside is effectively an 
ignoramus, a potential object of sympathy or scorn’ (Sparks et al. 1996, p340).
Interviewees tended not to be threatened by me, as a practioner-researcher, because I 
was considered to be ‘one of them’. This element of trust helped to prevent the 
relationship between researcher and the researched from becoming ‘hedged about 
with mistrust, concealment and dissimulation’ (Lee 1993, p2). I did nothing to dispel 
this view in advance of the interview as:
‘Impressions of the researcher that pose an obstacle to access must be 
avoided or countered as far as possible, whilst those that facilitate it 
must be encouraged, within the limits set by ethical considerations’ 
(Hammersley and Atkinson 1983, p78).
While the external researcher’s ‘blissful advantages of naive ignorance, waiting to be 
informed’ (Reiner 1991, p46) is not a ploy available to the insider, there were some 
advantages of being known to be an insider. Interviewees clearly perceived at least a 
moderate degree of empathy coming from me due to my status as a Governor. This 
may have made them more willing to be honest and frank about their experiences, as 
these quotes from Governors reveal:
“I know you will use this information carefully.”
“It is interesting but I wouldn’t have done this sort of interview with anyone I didn’t 
know and trust.”
During the course of the interviews Governors made comments which indicated that 
they appreciated my status as an insider. A number of Governors believed that I 
would ‘understand’ what they meant:
“As you know...”
“Again as you’ll know...”
“I think, you know...”
“I think you and I know”
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Others made reference to my status as a practitioner:
“You will be familiar with this argument.”
“You will have heard staff say, as I have...”
“I think you’ve probably done it yourself.”
“Come on, you know as well as I do...”
“I bet as a Governor you’d answer that question in the same way.”
On the other hand, it is possible that some interviewees were less frank and honest 
about the job and its pressures because I was a colleague rather than an outsider who 
they would not meet again. Reiner rightly points out that ‘all interviews are 
inevitably a form of reciprocal impression management’ (Reiner 1991, p47). Some 
Governors may have told me what they thought I wanted to hear; a few may have 
been deliberately controversial in their responses; and others made comments aimed 
at the audience who would read the research.
There is a danger that a researcher may become captivated by the particular group 
being studied and come to take on their point of view to the exclusion of others. 
Examples abound, particularly in the research literature on prisons, of the dangers of 
‘going native’. (See for example, Fleisher’s (1989) reflections on ethnographic 
research as a correctional worker.) In the case of the current research, my position as 
a Governor researching Governors brings with it particular concerns. Anyone 
looking at the research can reasonably ask whether the subject of study, the 
formulation of the research and interview questions, the interpretation of the 
Governors’ answers and the conclusions reached were influenced unduly by my 
status as a ‘practitioner’. During the research I remained conscious of the ambiguity 
of my dual role and tried to address the research questions based on the evidence 
provided by Governors rather than on my own perspectives. This meant constantly 
reflecting on concepts used in the study (management, leadership, justice, order and 
so forth) and involved a level of self-criticism in response to the knowledge gained.
There can be no perspective-free, absolutely objective account by a ‘practitioner- 
researcher’, but what I tried to do is to be reflexive throughout, and particularly 
cautious when it came to interpreting the results of this research. Nonetheless, there
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is a need for readers to be alert to the precise position from which this thesis is 
written.
5.5 Final thoughts on the approach taken
It can be seen from the above description that I opted for what Gill and Johnson 
(1991, p i27) termed a methodologically pluralist approach. There is clear merit in 
acquiring different kinds of complementary data about a subject using different 
research techniques in the same empirical study. It is also suggested that a 
methodologically pluralist approach creates the methodological triangulation 
required to overcome the bias inherent in a single-method approach. Denzin suggests 
that using multiple methods will allow the different methodological strengths and 
weaknesses to cancel each other out to produce more convincing findings (Denzin 
1970, p297). A summary of the areas of study, together with the research method 
and data generated is shown in Table 3.
It has been pointed out that ‘improvements in corrections policy and practice are 
more likely to emerge if researchers and practitioners work more closely together’ 
(Petersilia 1996, p223). The present study is an example of a piece of research 
conducted by a practitioner-researcher, which brings together the knowledge and 
experience of a practitioner in the field being studied, with the analysis and rigour of 
a supervised academic research study. As such it hoped that it has advanced the study 
of penology by providing a distinct contribution to the knowledge of the world of the 
Governor.
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Table 3: Summary of research approach
ASPECT OF RESEARCH RESEARCH METHOD DATA GENERATED
Research framework Discussion of research 
methodology and methods
Research strategy, 
approach and methods
Identify key concepts in the 
existing literature and generate 
research questions
Literature review Key concepts and research 
questions
Trace historical development of 
the Office, role and duties of the 
Governor
Review and analysis of primary 
and secondary data sources
Chapters tracing historical 
development and 
identifying key issues
Identify the theoretical role, tasks 
and duties of the Governor
Analysis of job descriptions 
obtained from Governors
Data on the role, tasks and 
duties of the Governor
Explore Governors’ perceptions 
of role and duties
Interviews with 42 Governors
Interviews with 10 key 
stakeholders
Governors’ perceptions of 
their role and duties
Stakeholders’ perceptions 
of Governor’s role and 
duties
Analyse data Analysis of job descriptions and 
review of transcripts to identify 
key themes and quotes
Identification of themes and 
quotes in literature
Computer analysis of data using 
NUD*IST
Identification o f who is 
governing, their 
philosophy, operating 
credo and motivation.
Understanding of role and 
tasks o f the Governor
Formulate implications and 
conclusions from research to 
further understanding of prison 
governance
Review of analysis and key 
literature sources
Changes to Governor’s 
role
Continuing significance of 
Governors and unique 
elements of their work 
today
Contribution to penal and 
management theory
Recommendations for 
improvements to practice.
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PART THREE:
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROLE OF GOVERNOR
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CHAPTER 6: 
EARLY GOVERNORS (BEFORE 1962)
6.1 Introduction
Part three charts the development of the Office, role, duties, recruitment, selection 
and accountability of Governors over the last 500 years. A knowledge and 
understanding of this history is critical to understanding the work of today’s 
Governors. The manner in which the role and Office evolved has had a direct impact 
on what prison staffj and prisoners, expect of current Governors. Many of the duties 
undertaken by Governors today have their origins in what their predecessors were 
required to do.
For the purposes of charting the changes, history has been broken down into various 
periods. The boundaries drawn for the historical periods in this thesis were based on 
an Act or Report that caused a discontinuity in the work, role or management of 
Governors. Another researcher may well legitimately adopt different points to divide 
the history.
This chapter is not intended to be a detailed history of imprisonment, which has been 
well documented elsewhere (Pugh 1968, Harding et al 1985, Morris and Rothman 
1995). While the early history of penal administration has also been well researched 
(see for example, McConville 1981 and 1995, Forsythe 1990), it has been pointed 
out that the ‘full history of prison management in Britain in recent times remains as 
yet unwritten’ (Sparks et al. 1996, pi 35).
6.2 Gaolers and keepers (before 1779)
Historical studies of imprisonment indicate that imprisonment has existed in some 
form in this country since the eighth century and by 890 the word ‘prison’ (carcerr) 
first makes its appearance in a code of laws (Pugh 1968, p2). The Sheriff or owner, 
of the franchise prison, built and repaired these gaols, equipped them and accepted
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responsibility for securing the prisoners. The day-to-day work of running the prisons, 
however, was deputed to others. In some cases the Sheriff or franchise holder sold 
the ‘custody’ of the gaol temporarily to someone willing to purchase it. In others they 
granted the gaolership to a ‘keeper’. From the later thirteenth century the Crown 
strove to appoint its own servants to run gaols and the practice of using gaolerships 
as a means of providing for minor civil servants, to the detriment of local patronage, 
soon became the norm (Harding et al 1985, p27).
The titles of the people appointed to run the gaols were as varied as the types of gaols 
themselves: Gaoler; Bailiff; Warder; Counter; Porter; Keeper and Undermarshal. The 
title of the office holder would depend on the name adopted by the person holding 
the office, or the person making the appointment, rather than on any statutory 
provision (Pugh 1968, p i48).
Prisons at this time were largely self-financing operations and, where no salary was 
paid, gaolers had to derive their income from the fees paid by prisoners (in return for 
food, accommodation and so forth). Additional income came from the profits of 
commercial opportunities that they organised, as the gaoler took a percentage of the 
proceeds made by the prisoners from the sale of their products (Pugh 1968, p332).
Gaolers were expected to provide their own subordinate staff out of their prison 
income. As a result they often employed as few personnel as possible. Keepers 
tended to allow prisoners to police themselves and ‘tolerated a wide measure of self- 
government on the part of those confined’ (McGowen 1995, p74) and often shared 
power, or least reached an accommodation, with the prisoners.
The primary purpose of the early prisons was to detain prisoners and to ‘deliver’ 
prisoners for trial. Gaolers were not expected to reform or rehabilitate their prisoners 
but simply to prevent escapes and hold their charges until they paid their debts or 
until their sentence expired. Contact with prisoners was often prohibited and where it 
did occur the gaoler:
‘must not, at any time ... hold unnecessary conversations with the
prisoners, but must give his commands and receive their wants in as
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few words as possible’ (Regulations for Chester Castle, quoted in 
Webb and Webb 1922, pi 03).
By 1225 the post of gaoler formed a well-recognized occupation. Most were simple 
men, known by their occupational names, which have left their traces in the 
surnames of Galer, Gayler, Gaylor, Jailler, Gayle and Gale (Reaney 1958).
The fourteenth century saw steps being taken in some of the larger municipal areas to 
find men of more responsible character to become keepers. Ordinances were laid 
down which required that only men of good character should be appointed ‘keepers’ 
and that they should be confirmed in office annually to ensure that they had carried 
out their duties faithfully (Pugh 1968, pi 85). Keepers were expected to directly 
manage the prison, and, in order to do so, were often required to live in quarters 
located within the prison (Pugh 1968, p357), a requirement that was to remain in 
force until well into the twentieth century. In addition, they were required to visit all 
parts of the prison on a daily basis; a practice later enshrined in legislation and 
continuing today.
An important development for the emerging profession came in 1356 when the City 
of London drew up regulations for the good governance of its four prisons (Pugh 
1968, pi 86). While this move helped to ensure good conduct on the part of its 
keepers, it was also a first move towards clarifying the duties and level of 
performance required of them. The City ensured that the regulations were observed 
by sending in ‘visitors’ to inspect and report on the state of the prisons and the way 
they were being managed. These ‘visitors’ were given the power to fine, and in the 
last resort, to expel unsatisfactory keepers.
The term ‘Governor’ was first introduced for independent regulators who oversaw 
prisons. The London Bridewell, set up in 1556, had a reformatory function and, in 
order to avoid the dangers of a profit-orientated keeper was put into the hands of an 
independent unpaid body of regulators (O’Donoghue 1923). These ‘Governors’ 
played a part in the affairs of the prison that went beyond policy-making and 
inspections to include getting involved in daily operational decisions (McConville 
1981, p36).
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Given the limited role that the gaolers were expected to undertake the occupation 
was not highly regarded. The Gentleman’s Magazine in July 1767 went so far as to 
describe keepers as ‘low bred, mercenary and oppressive, barbarous followers who 
shrink at nothing but enriching themselves by the most cruel extortion’ (quoted in 
Webb and Webb 1922, pi 8). Keepers often found themselves in very serious trouble 
because of their ill treatment of prisoners, and prison history is punctuated by 
investigations into ugly scandals.
6.3 Gentlemen Governors (1779-1876)
It was not until the end of the eighteenth century that real attempts were made by 
central government to exert greater control over what happened in prisons. The 
Penitentiary Act of 1779 (19 Geo. Ill c.74), and subsequent Prison Acts, set out the 
role of imprisonment and instructions for the management of penal institutions. 
Increasingly the attention of parliament turned to standardizing the operation of 
prisons and improving conditions for those incarcerated. The impact of these changes 
was felt directly by keepers whose freedom was curtailed by the various pieces of 
legislation which over time: abolished fees; prohibited private trading; required them 
to keep detailed journals of their activity; and subjected them to quarterly reports by 
the justices.
The duties of a Governor were, for the first time, set out in Section 10 of Peel’s Gaol 
Act of 1823 (4 Geo. IV, c.64). The Act required the Governor to visit each cell at 
least once every twenty-four hours and to keep a journal. The Governor’s primary 
task was to maintain the safe custody of prisons (McConville 1981, p263) and to 
ensure that adequate control was exercised within the prison. Governors were also 
required to: supervise floggings and hangings; escort prisoners to London who were 
due for transportation; take prisoners to court whenever they were required to make a 
court appearance (which involved Governors being absent from the prison for a large 
proportion of their time); and keep a variety of books and journals (McConville 1981, 
p273-279). The Act of 1823 required that the Governor reside in the prison and any 
absence had to be approved in advance and an entry made in the journal.
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Formal monitoring of a Governor’s activity came with the passing of the Prisons Act 
1835 (3 & 6 Will. IV, c.38), which introduced the appointment of government 
inspectors to visit prisons and make reports to the Secretary of State.
Governors made steady and substantial progress away from the disreputability of 
earlier periods with the social upgrading of the people recruited to govern. The new 
breed of Governors came from the Services, which reflected the view that the 
primary objective of a Governor was control (Harding et al. 1985, pi 68). The 
movement of gentlemen officers into positions formerly occupied by men of Tower 
social standing’ indicated the increasing importance of prisons as institutions. Those 
who specialized in prison administration came to be seen as vital and respectable 
public servants (Ignatieff 1978, pi 90).
A gentleman could take up a prison governorship without loss of self-respect. 
Advertisements were placed in the local and national press, seeking applicants for 
governorships, who could demonstrate the necessary characteristics of: firmness; 
humanity, cool deliberation; some education; and considerable knowledge of human 
nature. Varied prison experience had also become a recognized qualification and 
highly desirable in a candidate for governorships (McConville 1981, p314). 
Governors increasingly required greater skills, good levels of literacy and numeracy, 
and a higher degree of probity than their predecessors of earlier in the century. The 
improved social standing of Governors, and their experience of several different 
disciplinary systems operating in prisons, resulted in Governors having greater 
influence on penal policy, both at a local and at a national level.
The term Governor was also increasingly used to refer to these salaried officers (as 
distinct from entrepreneurial keepers). The title of ‘Governor’ received official 
endorsement in 1839 when an enactment provided that:
‘If the Persons authorized by Law to appoint the Gaoler or Keeper 
of any Prison shall appoint such keeper by the Style of Governor 
such Governor shall have all the Powers and Duties of the Gaoler or 
Keeper at that Prison; and all Enactments made with regard to the 
Gaoler or Keeper shall apply to the Governor so appointed’ (An Act 
for the better ordering of Prisons 1839, s.24, 2 & 3 Viet., c.56).
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An important development came in 1850 with the creation of a national Convict 
Service, which was centrally administered. The actions required of Governors in the 
new Convict Service were set out in detailed regulations and the Directors appointed 
to run the Convict Service closely monitored adherence to them. The ‘Rules and 
Regulations for the Government of Convict Prisons’ contained one section that dealt 
specifically with the Governors and their duties (Home Office 1858, p6-18). They 
required the Governor to: have ‘a general superintendence over the prison and 
prisoners’; exercise ‘his authority with firmness, temper, and humanity; abstain from 
all irritating language, and not strike a prisoner’; attend Divine Service in the prison 
whenever it is performed; visit and inspect daily the wards, cells, yards and divisions 
of the prison, the kitchen and the workshops; see every prisoner ‘once at least in 
every twenty-four hours’; visit the infirmary frequently; enforce a high degree of 
cleanliness in every part of the prison; and take every precaution necessary for 
preventing escape (Home Office 1858, paras 2-11). The Governor was also required 
to keep 10 books and journals covering everything from prisoners’ property to a 
misconduct book and accounts book (Home Office 1858, pi 3-15). Each year the 
Governor was required to submit to the Directors a written account of life in the 
previous year. It was not until the 1865 Prison Act (28 & 29 Viet., c.126) that the 
discretion of the Governors of local prisons was limited in a similar way.
6.4 Administrator Governors (1877 to 1945)
The next significant change came with the 1877 Prisons Act, which vested overall 
responsibility for all prisons and prisoners (the 10,000 prisoners held in convict 
prisons and 21,030 held in local prisons) in the Home Office. The Act was seen as 
necessary to improve penal administration, ensure a greater measure of uniformity 
across the penal estate, and to placate the ratepayers by reducing costs (McConville 
1995, pi 92). Actual administration of the prisons was delegated to a Prison 
Commission, which was accountable to the Home Secretary. An Inspectorate 
assisted the work of the Commission.
The new Prison Commission took the view that a national prison system required 
fewer prisons, the restructuring of prison staff and the removal of the less
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professional kind of administration still found in some of the local prisons (Harding 
et al. 1985, p200). The structural changes resulted in a reduction in the number of 
prisons from 113 to 69 (McConville 1995, pi 94). The closures led to the dismissal of 
41 Governors and 17 deputy governors (Thomas 1972, p72).
The main aim of the Commission was to centralise control and enforce uniformity 
across the penal estate. The Commission asserted control and imposed a new regime 
of regulation and standardisation on prisons. The discretion of the individual 
Governor was quickly eroded and uniformity was applied to all areas of the prison’s 
activities, from discipline and labour to health, diet and discharge arrangements. The 
Prison Commissioners believed that it was possible:
‘by a uniform efficiency of administration upon ‘enlightened’ 
principles, in which governors ... were given precisely detailed rules 
with which they are required to conform, to prevent the evil 
consequences that had admittedly happened in the diversely 
administered prisons of 1822-77’ (Webb and Webb 1922, p208).
Governors’ discretion became so limited, and prisons so regulated by the 
Commission, that:
‘A Prison Commissioner could pull out his watch and boast that he 
could say at that moment what every prisoner was doing in every 
prison in England’ (Ruck 1951, p9).
The duties of Convict Service Governors were laid down in the Standing Order for 
the Government of Convict Prisons (Home Office 1894). Similar regulations for 
local prison Governors were set out in the 1878 Rules for Local Prisons (Anderson 
1878). The Governor’s duties, as set out in Rules 79 to 100, constituted a blueprint 
for the management of the entire institution, from the broad requirement to ‘see that 
discipline is maintained among the convicts at all times’ to the detailed instruction 
that: ‘He will not allow any dog, poultry, pigeon, pig, or rabbit to be kept in the 
prison, or in any quarter of a subordinate officer’. Some of the Regulations were as 
prescriptive of the Governor’s private life: ‘He shall reside in the prison, and he 
shall not be absent from it for a night without permission in writing from a visiting
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justice’. Governors kept to these rules and there were few demands to exercise 
initiative or assume individual responsibility (McConville 1995, p523).
Governors also lost the power to decide on many personnel matters. Thomas 
suggests that ‘governors became less and less able to deal with staff problems. More 
and more officers had to rely on visiting Inspectors and Commissioners to help them 
with personal problems about pay, postings, quarters and so forth’ (Thomas 1972, 
pi 02).
The 1877 Act also changed the function and role of the Justices. It confined their role 
to inspecting and reporting to the Home Secretary, and to adjudicating upon and 
punishing serious prison offences. Their policy making, administrative and executive 
powers were removed, so that direction for the work of the Governor came solely 
from the Prison Commission and not from any local functionary (McConville 1995, 
p436).
By the mid 1890s the Commission ‘had completely succeeded ... in promoting 
uniformity, economy and a generally improved administration’ (Ruggles-Brise 1921, 
pi 37). However, there was a strong reaction from both the public and informed 
opinion against the over rigid and disciplinary approach adopted by the Commission. 
As a result, the Gladstone Committee (Home Office 1895) was set up to consider 
what changes were required. The Act which followed (Prisons Act 1898) placed the 
control of local and convict prisons under one Board; gave the power to the Secretary 
of State to make Rules for the government of convict and local prisons, thereby 
allowing the Rules to be changed without the necessity for fresh legislation and 
established a Board of Independent Visitors for every convict prison.
The daily operation of the prison continued to be controlled by Prison Rules and 
Standing Orders. In the case of local prisons, by 1911 there were 1441 Standing 
Orders and 313 published Rules that regulated almost every detail of prison life. The 
Standing Orders prescribed the precise daily and weekly timetable, the exact objects 
(from personal clothing to books and cell furniture) allotted to each prisoner and the 
principles to be followed by the Governor in censoring letters, searching prisoners 
and the treatment of mentally ill and suicidal prisoners (Hobhouse and Brockway
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1922, p64). A distinctive feature of the management of prisons at this time therefore 
was the continuing level of central prescription.
The day-to-day work of Governors in the early part of the twentieth century seems to 
have been very similar to the work of their predecessors:
‘His first duty in the morning is to attend chapel and, from a seat 
which overlooks the whole building, observe that discipline is duly 
maintained. He then sits in the orderly room, hears the 
“applications”, adjudicates upon the “reports”, and conveys the 
contents of official and other permissible communications to the 
prisoners concerned. An inspection of the prison follows... In most 
instances the practice is for the governor to pass round the landings 
of one hall a day, glancing into the cells as he passes, and to walk 
through the workshop and yards in a similarly remote manner... A 
visit to the prisoners on punishment and in the hospital is never 
omitted, but even here it is in most cases little more than a matter of 
form. The morning’s duties are concluded by an examination 
(generally cursory) of the food in the kitchen. The governor will 
sometimes pay a surprise visit of inspection during the afternoon, 
and the rules require him, at least once a week, to go through every 
part of the prison at an uncertain hour of the night’ (Hobhouse and 
Brockway 1922 p365).
Many Governors though did not find their duties too demanding. William Blake, a 
Governor from 1901 to 1925, took the view that:
‘The work of a prison Governor is just as hard as he cares to make 
it... there is not very much to do. He will be able to make his 
inspection in something under the hour; there is very little office 
work, and if he is fortunate enough to have a reliable chief warder 
... he has plenty of time for golf and tennis or whatever his chosen 
recreation may be. From about 9 a.m. until noon is about all the 
actual time necessary for him to perform the purely routine duties of 
his office. A look round in the afternoon, with perhaps another in 
the evening . ..’ (Blake 1927, p24).
During this period there was a careful process of vetting suitable external applicants 
for the post of Governor. Social status and previous contacts continued to be 
important. There was an established custom of choosing a recognised ‘type of man’ 
with military or colonial experience, whose previous conduct could be clearly 
vouched for (Forsythe 1990, pi 41). Of the 54 Governors in 1922, 31 had served with
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the armed forces (Hobhouse and Brockway 1922, p362). Commentators took a rather 
negative view of Governors and concluded that:
‘Governors are men of limited knowledge, disciplinarians, lacking 
in imagination, sceptical about new proposals, but conscientious 
and just. Typical prisoners’ view of governors is that they are
‘distant gods’ who deal out punishments and privileges, stride
majestically past the cell door on tours ... and sit in loft aloofiiess in 
the chapel’ (Hobhouse and Brockway 1922, p364).
Half of the Governors at that time had been promoted from the subordinate staff.
The ability to undertake clerical tasks was taken into account when it came to
appointments and promotions within the Prison Department. The need for clerical 
ability explains why most promoted Governors were drawn from ‘clerk and 
schoolmaster’ class of warders.
One significant development during this period was the appointment of the first 
female Governor in 1921 (Forsythe 1990, p i44).
The period between the wars was a time of great optimism, as Paterson (a prison 
Commissioner) led a search for a constructive approach to the treatment of offenders. 
That approach was exemplified most in regard to the Borstal Service for young 
offenders. In a variety of ways, during the inter-war period, Britain became the 
centre of the prison reform movement, one consequence of which was a limited 
relaxation in the tight management exercised by the Commission. While Rules 
continued to proliferate, Governors were allowed some freedom in managing the 
detailed operation of their prisons (Memorandum to Governors, Male Borstal 
Institutions, quoted in Ruggles-Brise 1921, p244). Some commentators go so far as 
to suggest that:
‘the personality of the Governor was a deciding factor in the nature 
of the regime, for the Prison Commissioners were often far away in 
London and the Inspectors’ visits, although regular, were not frequent 
... what actually happened depended upon the personality of officials 
as much as state policy’ (Forsythe 1990, pl41 and 213).
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Paterson also led a drive to recruit potential Governors from a variety of 
backgrounds. He was clear about the sort of person he needed:
‘Men of personality and character can be drawn equally well from 
among ex-army officers, doctors, lawyers and schoolmasters. The 
necessary qualifications are an aptitude for leadership, a desire for 
service, a private life above suspicion, and sufficient intelligence to 
understand the guiding principles and grasp the details of a penal 
system. To these should be added a requisite qualification for any 
special career, good health and a constitution above the average’
(Ruck 1951, p21).
All candidates selected to be Governors were sent on a training course. The course 
consisted of the trainee Governors performing the duties of each grade: assistant 
warder; warder; principal; chief clerk and storekeeper. On completion of this training 
and more general instruction, trainee Governors were posted as deputy governors for 
a number of years before being offered a Governor’s post (Blake 1927, pi 5-16).
The decision to recruit ‘direct entrant’ trainee governors, in addition to promotion 
through the ranks and appointment directly to a governorship, was to have a long­
term impact on the prison system. As Thomas points out:
‘These were people who had no previous experience of prisons, but 
who were considered to be of a cadre, which would spearhead the 
increasing volume of changes ... the presence of such staff has 
given the English governor tradition an especial, often liberal, 
intellectual flavour . . .’ (Thomas 1972, p224).
The influence of these more liberal and reforming Governors did much to relax the 
regime and encourage a more positive atmosphere in prisons. Many Governors saw 
their role as ameliorating prison conditions, with some limited attempts at reforming 
the individual. Governors also maintained an interest in their prisoners after their 
release and there are many examples of Governors: setting up homes for ex-borstal 
boys; employing ex-prisoners in their homes as cooks and housemaids; and visiting 
prisoners after release ‘in order to encourage them’ (Forsythe 1990, p i00).
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6.5 Reforming Governors (1946-1962)
By 1946 the Prison Commission had expanded and a system of six directorates 
(Prison Administration, Industries, Works, Medical Services, Education and 
Welfare) had been set up in London to oversee the work of prisons. However, post­
war Commissioners continued to view the Governor as the most important figure in 
any establishment:
‘The Governor is the keystone of the arch. Within his own prison, he 
is in much the same position as the captain of a ship -  supreme in an 
isolated community, responsible for the efficiency and welfare of his 
crew as well as for the safe arrival of his passengers at their journey’s 
end’ (Fox 1952, p87).
Governors continued to exercise considerable power over the individual member of 
staff and prisoner. As one commentator put it: ‘however benevolent he may be, he is 
in fact a dictator, being at once chief administrator and judge, capable of punishing 
and rewarding those in his charge’ (Klare 1960, p85).
The work that the post-war Governor was expected to undertake increased in scope, 
as the Commission turned its attention to making prisons more effective at 
rehabilitating prisoners. Governors had to adjust their sights to the newly restated 
objective of rehabilitation and to manage more complex regimes (Conrad 1960, 
p245). The introduction of humanitarian and treatment goals into the prison also 
changed the way the prison had to be managed. New personnel in the form of 
psychologists, psychiatrists, caseworkers and welfare officers were given primary 
responsibility for implementing the humanitarian and treatment goals. Governors 
found themselves having to manage the conflict between the new professionally 
trained staff and the established custodial staff as rehabilitation efforts were often 
seen as compromising security and safety (McCleery 1961).
The simple single line organisation was changed to a more bureaucratic one in which 
there was a multiplicity of hierarchies with specialised but overlapping functions. 
The Governor had to manage and integrate a range of departments (including works,
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clerical, farms and gardens, welfare, education, physical education and healthcare), 
which had:
‘grown like Topsy and have in a truly Parkinsonian fashion 
accumulated power, and created their own often secret and very 
private lines of communication which completely side step the 
Governor’ (Lee 1966, pi 3).
Governors found themselves in charge of the custodial, treatment and service sub­
systems and were faced with the task of directing and co-ordinating their activities. 
To do this without violating formal or informal expectations of the various specialists 
demanded considerable skill (Garrity 1964, p i66-167).
In contrast to earlier periods, where the Commission had created an impenetrable 
barrier between prisons and the community, Governors were expected to develop an 
external focus, as prisons became much more part of the community. A former 
Commissioner noted this change in emphasis:
‘The Governor is responsible for ... ‘selling’ his job in private to the 
more important visitors to the prison and in public at a variety of local 
meetings and functions’ (Fox 1952, p88-89).
It was not until the Wynn Parry Report (Home Office 1958) that the new role and 
duties of the Governor were described in an official document. The Report succinctly 
captured the essence of what was required of a Governor in relation to managing 
both the internal and external environments:
‘The Governor is responsible to the Commissioners for everything 
that goes on in his establishment: the principal aspects of his work are 
the maintenance of security, good order and discipline; the leadership 
of those sections of his staff more closely concerned with the training 
of the inmates, and the direction of their efforts to this end; the co­
ordination of the various departments within the establishment; the 
development of useful activity in work, education and recreation; co­
operation with outside bodies such as the education authority and 
with voluntary agencies and workers; and responsibility, as Sub- 
Accounting Officer, for the proper use of public money and property’ 
(Home Office 1958, p44).
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The day-to-day work of the Governor was, however, very bureaucratic, and some 
expressed concern that Governors would ‘soon drown in a sea of petitions, reports, 
instructions, minutes, requests for information, returns, amendments to standing 
orders, and so forth’ (Klare 1960, p86) - a theme that was to recur in reports on the 
Prison Service over the next 40 years.
Many Governors at the time found the job to be satisfying but one which imposed 
‘considerable strain, demands all one’s energy and resources, requires one to learn 
much that is painful, and calls for considerable modification of one’s character’ 
(Kelly 1967, p i73). Other Governors went further in describing the pressure that the 
job of being a Governor brought with it:
‘It is difficult to put on to paper just what tension a prison governor 
experiences ... and it is not surprising that so many of us have at one 
time or another almost cracked under the strain. Because, do not 
forget, anyone with the responsibility of a prison governor is living an 
unnaturally tensed life’ (Fancourt-Clayton 1958, pl25-126).
The development of the Governors’ role and duties led to changes in the recruitment 
criteria. A former Commissioner reflecting on what was expected of a Governor 
concluded that:
‘The time is long past when the post of prison Governor was a 
suitable niche for the retired officer with the reputation of ‘a good 
disciplinarian’. The command of a large prison today calls not only 
for a vocation for such work but for special personal qualities and 
adequate educational and administrative qualifications’ (Fox 1952, 
p87).
In the post-war period appointments were no longer made to governorships directly: 
all Governors were appointed from the ranks of deputy governor. It was expected 
that Governors would learn the elements of the work in the junior governor grades 
before succeeding to the command of a prison. The Commissioners followed the 
principle that vacancies in the ranks of assistant governors should be filled by 
promotion from within the Service, to the extent that suitably qualified candidates 
were forthcoming. However, the four Staff Courses held between 1945 and 1950 had 
only selected 14 men and two women from the officer ranks (Fox 1952, p89). The
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majority of vacancies for assistant governors were filled by direct entry candidates, 
despite opposition from the POA (Home Office 1958, paras 11-13).
Chapter 7 now goes on to chart the developing role of the Governor in more recent 
years, to discuss the main themes in the evolution of the role, and considers how that 
historical development exerts an influence on today’s Governors.
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CHAPTER 7: 
MODERN GOVERNORS (FROM 1963)
7.1 Prison Department Governors (1963-1978)
The Criminal Justice Act 1961 provided the legislative foundation for the abolition 
of the Prison Commission in England and Wales. The order giving effect to the 
dissolution of the Commission was laid in February 1963 and a Prisons Board, 
located within the Home Office, was appointed to formulate policy and manage the 
Prison Service. The creation of the Home Office Prison Department marked a shift in 
the approach to prisons. Governors, and their prisons, became part of the 
bureaucratic machinery of the Home Office and were subject to the civil service 
administrative approach and style.
The daily routine of a Governor after the abolition of the Commission, however, 
remained very similar to that of earlier Governors. A former Governor, Alistair 
Miller, described his typical day as consisting of: arriving at the prison by 8.45 am; 
holding a morning meeting with senior staff to discuss operational issues; 
distributing the incoming mail which required action; touring the prison 
accompanied by the Chief Officer; undertaking adjudications and applications prior 
to tasting the food in the kitchen. Some afternoons Miller spent doing office work, 
writing letters and making reports or wandering around the prison by himself for 
random inspections. Other afternoons were spent chatting with prisoners or attending 
formal meetings with the POA, Board of Visitors (BOV) or Prison Visitors. During 
the evenings Miller would visit the recreation rooms or education classes to chat to 
the staff and prisoners (Miller 1976, p i-7).
While the work remained similar, the monitoring of a Governor’s performance 
underwent some important developments (Home Office 1969, para. 231). An 
Inspectorate was introduced in 1969, to visit prisons and report on the reality of 
prison life for prisoners. In the following year a four-regional structure was 
introduced for the management of prisons. The Regional Directors had direct
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operational line management responsibility for Governors in their regions. The 
notion of an ‘intermediate manager’ between Governors and Headquarters had first 
been suggested in the Gladstone Report 75 years earlier (Home Office 1895, para. 
155). The development of regional offices, with their specialist advisors looking at 
all aspects of the prisons in the region, created much tighter supervision and 
monitoring than Governors had ever experienced before.
The late 1960s saw Governors continuing to take on a more coordinating role. This 
was reflected in a submission to the Council of Europe. The paper noted that:
‘in the past the governor was regarded more as the authoritarian 
head of the establishment who directed his staff in the efficient 
running of a machine which was not complicated ... for many years 
now governors have been looked upon as managers and leaders of a 
complex team’ (Council of Europe 1969, pl21).
The 1969 White Paper, People in Prison, emphasised this more inclusive approach 
that Governors had to adopt:
‘The Governor of a prison is responsible for the maintenance of 
security, good order and discipline, for the effective co-ordination of 
the work of all the members of his staff, for the regime of the 
establishment and the treatment and training of offenders, and for the 
proper use of public money and property. This is a formidable 
assignment. It requires qualities of leadership and management, 
allied to a continuing concern for individuals’ (Home Office 1969, 
para. 235).
Modem prison management required that the Governor become ‘head of an 
independent staff team with five main management responsibilities: setting goals and 
roles; free communications; interpretation; boundary function; planning and 
research’ (Tyndall 1969, p i36-137).
A Working Party on the recruitment of Governors gave further consideration to the 
changing role and concluded that ‘the exercise of authority in a simple hierarchical 
setting, if this was ever an adequate description of a prison governor’s task, it is so 
no longer’ (Home Office 1972, para. 14). The Working Party went on to describe 
the work of a ‘modem’ Governor:
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‘Essentially a governor is concerned with achieving defined 
objectives through the resources made available to him and in 
managing the details of his prison’s executive affairs; he needs to be 
competent in analysing problems, making sensible decisions and 
ensuring the adequacy of the prison’s communications. He has a 
major responsibility for the organisation and direction of his prison 
and in this is concerned with the management of change, the 
resolution of conflicts and the mobilisation and co-ordination of 
resources’ (Home Office 1972, para. 14).
The working party’s reformulation of the work of the Governor is significant in that 
it makes clear for the first time that the Governor is required to have the ability, and 
desire, to exercise generic management skills in order to deal with the growing 
volume and complexity of available resources, rather than simply exercising a 
command function.
The 1974 Prison Management Review (Home Office 1974) went so far as to consider 
whether a prison actually needed a Governor, rather than ‘a lay management 
committee appointed by the Secretary of State to make the general management 
decisions on the lines now developing in many other institutional fields’. This notion 
appeared to suggest a return to the management system used for the Bridewell in 
1556 (see section 6.2 above). It concluded, however, that there was still a need for ‘a 
permanent official to carry out the function of general manager of a penal 
establishment’ (Home Office 1974, para. 242). The Review contrasted the tasks of 
previous generations of Governors with what was required in the 1970s:
‘Virtually all work was codified in detail. Governors were 
themselves little more than high-grade operatives and supervisors of 
codified work ... the range and sophistication of modem penal 
operations is such that the assumption is no longer tenable. The 
reality is that the function of the governor has evolved from a simple 
command role towards that of a general manager of this complex of 
operations’ (Home Office 1974, para. 26).
The work of the ‘general manager’, according to the Review, was not to act as the 
day-to-day decision maker on normal operations but as ‘a general administrator’. The 
job required ‘hard systematic work’ and the ‘acquisition and judicious use of a great 
deal of practical data, knowledge and technique’ (Home Office 1974, para. 243). The
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proposals contained in the Review entailed a radical change in penal governance. In 
particular, it sought to severely curtail a Governor’s level of autonomy, and 
emphasised that Governors should adhere closely to set policy:
‘The task of management at local level is to carry out HQ policies 
with the most economic and effective expenditure of resources and 
that local management is not free to add to or to reduce its designated 
activities according to its own assessment of penal priorities’ (Home 
Office 1974, para. 4).
The changing expectations of the Governor were reflected in the recruitment 
advertisements for assistant governors. In 1967 advertisements suggested that 
Governors’ ‘duties demand a lively interest in social problems, and a good 
understanding of modem methods of handling them’. This was replaced in 1969 by: 
‘Are you interested in social work? Could you also, with the right training, do a good 
managerial job?’ By 1972 advertisements were describing the role as: ‘Management 
with a social purpose ... you are primarily a manager’ (Waddington 1983, pi 6).
Arguably, the biggest change to the Governors’ work in this period was that they 
found themselves managing an ‘anarchic’ industrial relations situation (Thomas 
1981, p226). Governors were increasingly concerned, not with prisoners and their 
rehabilitation, but with how their unpredictable and militant staff could be handled. 
Governors, through their professional Society, expressed their unease about the 
deterioration of the prison system:
‘In the face of industrial action on a growing scale governors 
received little advice. The Home Office’s main concern was to 
impress on governors that the Army and Police would not be called 
in; that normal disciplinary measures would not be used against staff 
taking any form of industrial action, and that it was up to governors 
to keep their establishments running as best they could’ (May 1979, 
para. 150).
7.2 Prison managers (1979-1986)
The May Committee was set up in 1978, at a time when there was general 
dissatisfaction with the way the Prison Service was organised and run, with the state
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of prison buildings, and with the conditions in which staff and inmates alike were 
required to live and work (May 1979, para. 1.1). May was particularly concerned that 
prisons should ‘not be allowed to degenerate into uncaring institutions dulled by their 
own unimaginative and unenterprising routines’ (para. 4.46).
The May Committee were clear in their view that ‘Governing Governors must 
govern, which means being directly responsible for all that occurs within their 
establishments’ (para. 5.82). In order to achieve this, the Committee had no doubt 
that ‘the role of the Governors, and the way in which Governors themselves perceive 
that role, must change radically’ (para. 7.23). The Report spelt out the new duties and 
responsibilities that it believed Governors should assume in relation to regimes and 
industrial relations. Changes in Headquarters’ organisation, the development of the 
role of Regional Offices, and the introduction of an independent Inspectorate, 
followed the Report’s publication.
The 1980s saw further changes to the management of the Prison Service as a result of 
external pressures and, in particular, the Government’s Financial Management 
Initiative (FMI). FMI provided a managerial, as well as a financial, framework for 
the Prison Service to plan, control inputs, allocate resources, and check effectiveness 
(Evans 1987, p9-l 1). In the Prison Department, the manifestation of FMI can be seen 
most clearly in Circular Instruction 55/1984 (HM Prison Service 1984). The 
document set out a general framework in which the operation of individual 
establishments could be set, and created the machinery by which Governors would 
be held to account for the operations of their establishments. Its main principles were 
that: the key manager was the Governor (who was charged with the delivery of 
Departmental policy); and that the Governor’s accountability should be defined by 
explicit terms of reference agreed with their line manager in a ‘contract’ and 
accounted formally in an annual report (Train 1985, p i77-186).
Devolution to Governors of budgets and financial management of their 
establishments followed. Real budget allocations in cash terms were introduced in all 
establishments in 1986. This financial devolution increased Governors’ flexibility 
and their ability to redeploy resources where they were needed most. However, it 
also brought a requirement to take a detailed look at how money was spent, expose
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uneconomic practices, make unpopular resource decisions and cut back in areas of 
activity that were desirable but not affordable (HM Prison Service 1986). A new 
costing system provided in-year monitoring of the spending of budgets, and 
Governors found themselves, for the first time, having to account for variance in 
expenditure against planned levels.
Concern was expressed by some that budget management would add to the 
administrative burden facing Governors:
‘Traditionally, we have rightly been sensitive about a Governor 
being thought o£ or becoming, aloofj isolated, office-bound -  and 
yet the struggle to break free of the office, meetings, and 
telephones, has become increasingly fierce, and the budget, with 
all its ramifications, adds significantly to this’ (Curtis 1987, p24).
Other management developments in the 1980s included: the development of 
‘accountable regimes’ setting out the regime for each prison (Chaplin 1982 and 1986, 
Evans and Marsden 1985); the introduction o f ‘operational assessments’ to measure 
the performance of all aspects of a prison (Marriage and Selby 1983, p i2); and the 
formulation of ‘regime baselines’ specifying targets for regime delivery (Evans 1990, 
p3). Taken together, these comprised the basic management model that emerged in 
the Prison Service in the 1980s. From a theoretical position, this is an unremarkable 
process of defining aims, objectives, work output, and performance criteria. In 
practice, however, it represented a significant development for the Prison Service and 
an important change for the Governor. Governors, and their prisons, had become the 
subject of a myriad of management tools, planning processes and detailed 
monitoring. Governors were increasingly being held to account for the performance 
of their establishments.
A Review of the grading of Governors in 1981 concluded that all Governors had a 
number of specific functions in common, although the amount of time which each 
occupied, and their complexity, varied according to the nature of the establishment 
and the extent to which they were able to delegate to other governor grades (Home 
Office 1981, para. 4.7). A total of eight functions common to all Governors was 
identified: command; inspection; industrial relations; inmate management; staff
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management; management of other resources; policy and development; and 
representation.
A subsequent review (Home Office 1984a) reached the view that that the Governor 
was ‘both operational commander and general manager’ and should:
‘achieve an effective balance between the different elements of this role, 
in which he can reconcile his traditional position as operational decision 
maker with the increasing managerial and representational demands he 
faces’ (Home Office 1984a, para. 60).
There was a recognition that establishments had to be organised in such a way as to 
create room for Governors to be able to plan, and provide strategic leadership and 
direction, rather than simply responding to the immediate operational demands. The 
review team recommended that the Prison Department should: encourage the 
delegation of tasks by Governors to their subordinates; review tasks laid by the 
Department on Governors personally; be clear who to hold to account for the 
discharge of which responsibilities; reduce the number of staff who report directly to 
the governor on a day-to-day basis to between six and eight; change the working 
pattern of Governors so that they worked a five-day, Monday-Friday week, rather 
than a 10-day fortnight, and ensure that Governors have the real authority and 
powers they need to carry out their jobs by delegating more responsibility to them 
(Home Office 1984a, para. 60).
Significantly, the Report suggested that it was not necessary for the Governor to visit 
all parts of his establishment every day and that there was no reason:
‘why this task -  the Governor’s round -  should not be delegated to a 
“duty governor” for the day, whose responsibilities, along with certain 
others, might be carried out on a rota basis by any one of the senior 
management team of the establishment’ (Home Office 1984a, para.
61).
While the tasks of the Governor came under the spotlight, the importance of the role 
of the Governor was never questioned. At the time of introducing the new 
management framework for the Prison Service the then Director General made clear 
that:
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‘The key manager in the Prison Service is the governing Governor.
The Department’s policies are delivered by him and his staff in the 
establishment for which he is responsible. In the final analysis, 
that is what matters’ (Train 1985, pi 79).
7.3 Chief Executives (1987-1997)
A radical re-organisation of human resource systems and management structures in 
the Prison Service was launched in April 1986, under the banner ‘Fresh Start’ (HM 
Prison Service 1987). The new scheme restructured the pay of prison officers, 
limiting overtime payments, which had been regarded for some years as demand-led 
and uncontrollable. Working practices were changed by re-organising staff into 
groups with a degree of flexible rostering and by assimilating overlapping middle 
management grades. Management systems were altered in an attempt to assign clear 
roles and accountabilities, integrate specialist staffj and co-ordinate efficient prison 
regimes under the Governors’ unifying direction.
Before Fresh Start around 75 per cent of a Governor’s week was out of their control 
(Barclay 1988, p5). The Governor’s work was dictated by: routines that had their 
basis in history; ‘statutory duties’; managers and trade unions that expected direct 
access; demands from Region and Headquarters to attend management meetings; and 
attendance at institutional meetings. Fresh Start went some way to free up the 
Governor from these routine tasks by introducing a new management structure, 
which contained fewer management levels and clearer lines of accountability. As a 
result Governors had a span of management control of between four and six people, 
rather than the 10 to 14 people who had previously been reporting to them.
While it was clear that the Governor was the ‘overall manager of all management 
operations and ultimate commander in emergencies’, the changes implemented by 
Fresh Start resulted in the Governor only taking personal command during ‘major 
emergencies’, leaving other operational staff to deal with less serious incidents (HM 
Prison Service 1987, pi 6). This was a major change from what had been expected of 
earlier Governors. Fresh Start also clarified that Governors were expected to work 
from Monday to Friday, with only periodic attendance out of hours and at weekends.
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Traditionally the Governor’s rounds had been the means of keeping in touch with the 
grass roots of the establishment. However, in many establishments the Governor’s 
rounds had become a combination of routine and ritual. Indeed, one former 
Governor suggests that: ‘this routine has been predictable to the extent that, if he 
visited at another time of the day, the greeting was still ‘Good Morning’ (Barclay 
1988, p5). The management structure introduced under Fresh Start, together with the 
ability to delegate tasks to senior managers, freed Governors from traditional routine 
duties (daily ‘rounds’, sampling food, visiting the segregation unit and healthcare 
centre, prisoner applications).
One area of some controversy was allowing Governors to delegate the adjudication 
responsibility. Conducting adjudications is a quasi-judicial activity and traditionally 
accepted as a key way for a Governor to set the tone and standards in an 
establishment. Advocates of change argued that the Governor should focus on 
managing adjudications through setting standards and by scrutinising the records of 
adjudications that had taken place (Barclay 1988, p6). Others took the view that the 
Governor ‘must retain direct contact [by doing adjudications] ... to set his standards 
of conduct for staff) as well as for inmates, and in doing so to establish the tone of 
the establishment in the discipline and control context’ (Gadd 1988, p8). The matter 
continued to be the subject of debate over a decade later (HM Prison Service 1997b).
The new approach, in which the Governor worked Monday to Friday and no longer 
routinely visited all parts of the prison, began to change the way operational staff 
viewed the Governor. The Governor began increasingly to be seen as a manager who 
worked the hours of non-operational staff and who was seen less frequently around 
the prison especially in the evenings and at weekends.
Some Governors expressed their concern about the direction the role of the Governor 
was moving in and the potential pitfalls it brought:
‘No doubt, if released from the eveiyday pressure of what is 
now seen as routine work and problem solving, a governor 
may well be able to focus more of his attention on the wider 
strategic aspects of effectively managing a modem prison
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establishment. There is, however, a price to be paid for this if 
a correct balance is not struck between managerial remoteness 
and the personal involvement of the governor in relation to all 
his staff. That price is amorphous management, lacking in 
inspirational direction and personal example. If so, I gaze 
upon such a governor with a sense of unease... I do not see 
my role in the new era of Fresh Start as being limited to the 
leather upholstered chair of the managing director in the 
boardroom’ (Gadd 1988, p7-9).
Despite the changes made by Fresh Start, a review in 1988 found that most 
Governors were still spending two to three hours each day visiting various parts of 
their prison to keep in touch with staff and inmates. Some Governors involved 
themselves daily in adjudicating and in personally handling petitions from individual 
prisoners (HM Treasury 1989). The review concluded that Governors:
‘share broadly comparable characteristics. Postholders were 
charged with ensuring the overall efficiency and effectiveness 
of the establishments to which they had been appointed. At a 
more detailed level their responsibilities required them in 
particular to ensure that acceptable standards were achieved 
for the welfare and occupation of inmates. They were 
expected to ensure that high standards of order and discipline 
were adhered to, that the morale and career interests of prison 
staff were maximised, good industrial relations were 
maintained and that the establishment was adequately 
resourced to carry out its approved functions’ (HM Treasury 
1989, p6).
The early 1990s saw a major switch in emphasis from central management by Prison 
Service Headquarters to devolution to Governors. This was in part due to the 
findings of the Woolf Report, which concluded that:
‘The Prison Service should aim for a situation where it is 
appreciated by the Service as a whole that management (and 
the framework of controls that have been created) only exist 
to enable Governors to govern... We recommend therefore 
increased delegation to Governors for the functions connected 
with the management of the prison’ (Woolf and Tumim 1991, 
paras 12.73 and 12.79).
This view was supported by a subsequent report that concluded that: ‘too often 
governors lack any real control over their personnel or their budget’ and ‘plans to
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devolve greater personnel and financial responsibility to governors should proceed as 
quickly as possible’ (Lygo 1991, paras 40-41). The 1991 White Paper accepted the 
need to empower Governors and made clear that: ‘the delegation to governors of 
budgetary and personnel management responsibilities should be extended’ (Home 
Office 1991, para. 3.8).
There was a recognition that ‘devolution would bring with it increased demands on 
Governors’ as they were ‘asked to take on the full role of general managers’ of their 
establishments (HM Prison Service 1994c). Governors were required to understand 
specialist areas, such as finance and personnel, as well as having to think and plan 
strategically. Devolution continued to be a priority into the mid 1990s and the Prison 
Service made devolution the key strategic priority for 1994-97. The corporate plan 
pointed out that:
‘Governors will be the focal point in delivering the Service's 
objectives. They will have wide delegated authority to 
innovate, and to manage effectively within the national policy 
framework and specific local plans. They will be expected to 
use their initiative and will be accountable for the 
performance of their establishments, in particular the delivery 
of agreed local objectives and targets’ (HM Prison Service 
1994b, para. 1.18).
These developments led to concerns amongst some Governors about their changing 
role:
‘All governors are certain that the style of governing will 
have to change. More and more, governors will be office 
bound. As one governor put it: “it is not my job to care for 
prisoners, but to care for staff who care for prisoners.” 
Governors must learn to delegate to survive, but the result is 
that they will be much less in evidence and certainly less 
accessible’ (Selby 1994, p23).
The Prison Service responded to these concerns by directing Governors to:
‘ensure that there are mechanisms in place to enable them to 
spend time “managing by walking about”, this might be by 
the provision of secretariat, staff officer, planning, project or
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development roles’ and to ‘review their management 
structures’ (HM Prison Service 1996a).
There is no doubt that by the mid 1990s the Governor’s role had become far more 
complex and the need for management skills accordingly far greater. The wide range 
of responsibilities the Governor began to take on, including financial and personnel 
management, detailed strategic and business planning and target setting, would have 
been alien to Governors of previous decades. It was recognised that Governors could 
no longer do everything themselves and would in the future have to rely on senior 
managers and intermediate management to ensure the implementation and delivery 
of all policies. However, there remained some ambiguity about what tasks the 
Governor should delegate. The 1996 Management Development Project concluded 
that:
‘There are many tasks historically associated with governors 
personally which may not need to be performed by them. There are, 
however, unique competencies and terms relating to the in-charge role 
... which differentiate those roles from others and cannot be delegated’
(HM Prison Service 1996b, para. 1.9).
Following significant criticisms set out in the reports which followed the prison 
escapes in the mid 1990s (Woodcock 1994 and Learmont 1995a), a Prison Service 
Review was set up to take a strategic look at the management and organisation of the 
Service. The review reported in October 1997 and concluded that:
‘the responsibilities of Governors and the demands made on them have 
increased enormously over the years... the role of the Governor is in 
urgent need of redefinition and review’ (HM Prison Service 1997a, 
paras 9.34-9.39 and 3.26).
This recommendation from the Prison Service Review provided the origin for the 
current study (see section 4.1).
7.4 Some themes from history
Chapters 6 and 7 have traced the evolution of the Office, role and duties of the 
Governor as they developed over the last 500 years. This historical framework
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provides an understanding of why today’s Governors are required to undertake 
certain tasks and duties, and gives the background to how the Governor came to be 
such an important actor in the prison.
Tracing the historical development of the role is important, as the profession of 
governing has developed through an oral tradition. There is little written material to 
guide Governors on how to govern. Governors learn from their predecessors, who in 
turn learnt from the Governors for whom they worked. Knowledge and 
understanding is passed orally from generation to generation. ‘Jailcraft’ is developed 
over time and lessons learned from peers and from previous generations of 
Governors -  Governors all serve in establishments under other Governors before 
they get to govern.
The work of the Governor has evolved over the years. Major changes in the role have 
been brought about as a consequence of crises - a social crisis outside, or an internal 
one such as a riot or escape. Comparisons with previous periods can be made in 
terms of delegated authority; independence from central control; and social standing.
The era of early keepers, gaolers and wardens was very much one of caprice. By the 
nineteenth century Governors were required to have a disciplinary ethos and to 
achieve administrative efficiency and uniformity in the operation of prisons. They 
were the subject of centralised control and their work directed by detailed regulation. 
The management of prisons was redefined as a bureaucratic task, demanding 
knowledge, skill and expertise. Considerations of an emotional or moral kind found 
in earlier keepers had no place in the work of a ‘modem’ Governor.
By the mid twentieth century, Governors had a more reforming ethos and were given 
greater freedom to experiment and to try out rehabilitative regimes for prisoners. 
They possessed sufficient freedom to mould their establishments and regimes 
according to their personal philosophies. The development of custodial and treatment 
aspects of regimes increased the scope of the Governor’s work. Governors became 
‘criminological technicians’ (Garland 1990, pi 85) who adopted a scientific approach 
based on therapy, treatment and rehabilitation.
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More recently, Governors have been required to adopt a more managerial ethos. 
Prisons have to be managed in a more passionless and bureaucratic manner. 
Efficiency and compliance have become the administratively defined goals. 
Governors are increasingly seen as general managers and held to account for the total 
operation of their prisons, through more comprehensive line management.
Some aspects of the Governor’s work have remained remarkably constant over the 
years. Throughout history Governors have been required to: maintain a personal 
presence by frequently visiting all parts of the establishment; adjudicate on at least 
some disciplinary matters; sample the prisoners’ food on a daily basis; closely 
monitor prisoners in segregation and hospital; undertake a number of symbolic and 
ceremonial duties; liaise with the local community; and deal personally with major 
incidents.
Other elements of a Governor’s job changed, only to have the same element 
reintroduced many years later. For example, early Governors were expected to act as 
entrepreneurs, to generate work for their prisoners and make a profit from their 
labours. Such activity was prohibited in the twentieth century. However, today 
Governors are again being exhorted to make contact with local industry and to use 
prisoner labour on commercial contracts in order to generate revenue for their 
prisons.
Some facets of a Governor’s role and duties have changed significantly. The amount 
of devolution has increased, but this has been matched with more monitoring and 
greater personal accountability. The scope for individuality and discretion has been 
reduced and replaced with a stronger degree of uniformity and regulation. While 
Governors in the early nineteenth century were the subjects of as much detailed 
regulation as today, their implementation of the rules and instructions was not the 
subject of such close scrutiny as one finds currently. Governing also became more 
complex over the years. Governors had to learn to manage more varied regimes, 
increasing numbers of specialist staffj multiple hierarchies and overlapping 
functions. More recently, Governors took on responsibility for the general 
management of the whole institution, including personnel and financial aspects.
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In short, Governors moved from being amateur and capricious gaolers, to military 
men administering their institutions according to laid-down rules, to charismatic 
feudal barons exercising patriarchal authority over their prisons, to being general 
managers bound by bureaucracy and legal rules. The thesis now goes on to look in 
more detail at today’s Governors and the work that they do.
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PART FOUR: 
GOVERNORS TODAY
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CHAPTER 8: 
ORIGINS, BACKGROUND AND CAREER PATH
There is little information in the public domain about the background and 
characteristics of prison staff. This is particularly the case with Governors, where 
media representation has added little clarity. Information on Governors’ origins, 
career paths and ideology can provide an important perspective on why Governors 
operate in the way that they do, and provide an opportunity to identify common 
features amongst Governors, as well as highlighting significant differences. Part four 
of the thesis now goes on to explore these issues.
8.1 Introduction
The historical overview in part three indicated that at certain points in history 
Governors formed a socially distinct group. For example, in the early twentieth 
century Governors were predominantly ex-military officers, who shared a similar 
middle class background and approach to governing. This chapter considers whether 
Governors in the sample form a distinct section of the general population or whether 
they are representative of it. It also contrasts the Governors’ background with that of 
the prison officer group whom they manage. The reasons Governors gave for joining 
the Prison Service are also discussed, as they may offer clues to the perspectives and 
practices the Governors now adopt. The chapter then looks at the path the sample 
followed in their careers, in order to identify any common features. This chapter also 
examines whether there is any substance to the assertion that many prison officers 
have progressed to the rank of Governor.
8.2 Demographic and family background
The Governors in the research sample were predominantly male (86 per cent), which 
is similar to the figure reported in other studies (Cawley 2001 and Liebling and Price 
2001). The gender representation to be found in prison officer grades is similar, with 
85 per cent being male (Bryans and Jones 2001, pi 55). While the percentage of
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female Governors has increased to 14 per cent, from the two per cent recorded in a 
1997 study (Bryans 2000a, p i6), females remain under-represented within the ranks 
of Governors. A similar gender imbalance is replicated in other jurisdictions (for 
example, in the USA 86 per cent of Wardens are male - Flanagan et al. 1996, p388). 
This under-representation also is found at senior levels in all criminal justice 
agencies and services. For example, females account for only seven per cent of 
senior police officers (at superintendent and above) and nine per cent of circuit 
judges (Home Office 2001, p43-47).
No Governors in the sample were from a minority ethnic group. At the time of the 
research, there was only one Governor from a minority ethnic group. Only 0.9 per 
cent of assistant and deputy governors are from a minority ethnic group (Liebling 
and Price 2001, pi 8). This again reflects the situation in other criminal justice 
agencies and services where minority ethnic representation is low amongst senior 
staff (for example, 0.8 per cent of police superintendents and above, one per cent of 
circuit judges, 4.5 per cent of senior probation staff -  Home Office 2000, p62-64).
Governors in the sample were bom in the range 1939 to 1963, but nearly half were 
bom between 1944 and 1948, as Table 4 shows. Only 14 per cent of Governors are 
under 40, compared to 55 per cent of prison officers who are under 40 (Liebling and 
Price 2001, pi 9). The majority of Governors (67 per cent) in the sample were over 
50 years old.
Table 4: Age Profile
Year bom Percentage (%)
1959 - 1963 14
1954- 1958 9.5
1949-1953 9.5
1944. 1948 48
1939-1943 19
Total 100
N = 42
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Governors were asked to identify their fathers’ employment status at the time that the 
Governors joined the Prison Service. As Table 5 shows, just over a third (37 per 
cent) of Governors had a father who was in manual work and just over a third (38 per 
cent) came from intermediate and junior non-manual backgrounds. These origins are 
similar to the current socio-economic group distribution of the population as a whole, 
where 44 per cent are in the manual group, and 35 per cent in the intermediate and 
junior non-manual group. A slightly higher percentage of Governors (25 per cent), 
compared to the general population (22 per cent), come from a professional and 
managerial background (National Statistics 2001).
Table 5: Socio-economic origin
Socio-economic
group
Percentage (%) at time of 
joining Prison Service
Professional 7
Employers and 18
managers
Intermediate and 38
junior non-manual
Skilled manual 22
Semi-skilled manual 10
Unskilled manual 5
Total 100
N = 42
Many Governors (61 per cent) regard themselves as having been socially upwardly 
mobile, compared to their family origin. This is particularly true of Governors who 
joined as prison officers, where 86 per cent considered that they had moved 
significantly from their family’s socio-economic group. This upward mobility 
amongst Governors reflects a similar pattern to that found amongst chief constables 
(Reiner 1991, p57).
Few Governors come from Prison Service backgrounds. Unlike chief constables, 
(where between 10 and 20 per cent have a father who was a police officer - Wall 
1998, p289), only one Governor had a family connection to the Prison Service:
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“My father was then in the Colonial Prison Service. My sister in the Women’s 
Prison Service. And so, there was a family background to it.”
However, this may be changing as five per cent of Governors in the sample indicated 
that they had a child working in the operational Prison Service.
8.3 Education
The type of education received, and the level of qualifications obtained, are 
important indicators of the social worlds from which someone has emerged 
(Stanworth 1984, p251). As Table 6 shows, 72 per cent of Governors went to 
grammar or private (non-state) schools. This is a much higher percentage than is to 
be found in the general population of similar ages to the Governors (Halsey et al. 
1980). Governors have therefore tended to be drawn from the educationally more 
successful strata of the intermediate and junior non-manual and skilled manual socio­
economic groups. The number of Governors who attended private education has 
declined in recent years, to the current position where all the Governors in the sample 
who attended private schools are over 50 years old.
Table 6: Schooling
Type of school 
attended by 
Governors
Percentage
%
Grammar 48
Private 24
Comprehensive 16
Other 12
Total 100
N = 42
Not only have Governors achieved more educationally than the norm for their socio­
economic background, in terms of the type of school they attended, but they also 
performed well at those schools. Over 90 per cent of Governors have some 
educational qualifications, as shown in Table 7. A large number of Governors (41 per 
cent) in the study have degrees, which compares to 25 per cent of chief constables
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(Reiner 1991, p59), and one per cent of prison officer grades (Marsh et a l 1985, 
pi 09). A similar situation exists in the USA where just over 50 per cent of Wardens 
have a degree or similar qualification (Flanagan et al 1996, p388).
Table 7: Highest Educational Attainment
Highest qualification 
obtained
Percentage
%
None 7
O level/GCSE 26
A level 26
Degree 41
Total 100
N = 42
Attainment of a degree should not be mistaken with attendance at university. A 
quarter of those Governors in the sample who had a degree obtained that degree 
whilst working in the Prison Service and studying part time.
Of particular interest is the relatively large number of Governors in the sample who 
have a degree that is occupationally linked. The most frequently occurring subjects 
for the degrees are: psychology (24 per cent); law (18 per cent); sociology (18 per 
cent) and criminology (12 per cent). All of the Governors who completed their 
degree whilst employed by the Prison Service studied a work-related subject such as 
criminology, management or law.
8.4 Previous occupation
The majority of Governors (81 per cent) had some experience of outside employment 
between leaving school and joining the Prison Service, which compares to 100 per 
cent of prison officers who had another job before joining the Prison Service (Marsh 
et al 1985, pi 10). Those recruited directly from university account for only 19 per 
cent of Governors. Governors in the sample had a diverse range of pre-Prison 
Service experience, as Table 8 shows.
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A number of Governors (19 per cent) had been in the armed forces and of these three 
quarters had held a commission. This compares to 51 per cent of prison officers 
(Marsh et al 1985, pi 10) who had been in the armed forces at some point prior to 
joining the Prison Service (only 23 per cent of whom had been in the armed forces 
on National Service). The small number of Governors with an armed forces 
background contrasts sharply with earlier periods where ex-armed forces Governors 
were the norm (see chapter 6) and with chief constables where half had completed 
military service of some sort (Wall 1998, p273).
Table 8: Occupation Prior to Joining the Prison 
Service
Occupation prior to 
joining Prison 
Service
Percentage (%)
University student 19
Armed forces 19
Police 12
Teaching 12
Management 10
Social work 7
Other 21
Total 100
N = 42
The occupations of Governors prior to joining is very different from the profile for 
prison officers, 56 per cent of whom had been in manual occupations and 13 per cent 
in lower non-manual occupations immediately prior to joining the Service (Marsh et 
al. 1985, pi 10).
8.5 Motivation for joining the Prison Service
Sociologists have developed the concept of an ‘orientation to work’, referring to the 
wants and expectations which people bring to their employment, and the 
interpretation which they thus give to their work. A person’s orientation to work is 
seen therefore as a key factor, which shapes an individual’s attitudinal and 
behavioural patterns at work. It is reasonable to assume that Governors’ initial
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expectations were a contributing factor in the explanation of their subsequent 
perspectives and practices at work. Their original mindset and motivation for doing 
the work was what Reiner refers to as ‘the primary grid for constituting subsequent 
experience’ (Reiner 1991, p62).
This section explores what attracted Governors to join the Prison Service at the 
outset of their careers. From a methodological point of view, establishing 
retrospectively Governors’ original reasons for joining the Prison Service is 
somewhat problematic. Subsequent events, maturation and experience may well have 
led Governors to reinterpret their reasons for joining. It has also been suggested that 
‘memories are reconstructed in the light of present concerns and that people will be 
vague about the events of years ago’ (Sapsford and Jupp 1996, p5).
The reasons given by Governors in the sample for joining the Service can be grouped 
into ‘instrumental’ ones (extrinsic, material aspects of the job such as pay, status, 
security and career prospects) and ‘non-instrumental’ ones (intrinsic to the work 
itself such as the interest or social utility of the role). Some Governors expressed 
mixed reasons for joining, which were both instrumental and non-instrumental.
The vast majority of Governors in the sample (76 per cent) expressed a non­
instrumental reason for joining the Prison Service. A smaller percentage of 
Governors who joined as prison officers (26 per cent), compared to those who joined 
as assistant governors (50 per cent), expressed a non-instrumental reason for joining. 
This perhaps reflects the original job expectations of prison officers and assistant 
governors. People joining as assistant governors were anticipating doing more 
rehabilitative and managerial work, whereas people joining to be prison officers 
expected to be doing more routine custodial work.
The reasons for joining also varied with the period in which the Governor was 
recruited. Recruitment advertising in the 1960s was focused on the ability to change 
offenders. By the mid 1970s the emphasis was more on ‘management with a social 
purpose’ and in the early 1980s the job of assistant governor was being described as 
that of ‘manager’. Over 80 per cent of Governors joining as assistant governors in the
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1960s did so for vocational reasons (social utility, reforming prisoners, ‘doing 
good’), compared to only 27 per cent who joined after 1976.
The primary non-instrumental reason given was a vocational one (33 per cent), and 
in particular the desire to work with offenders.
“Quite simply, I’d always wanted to work with offenders. And that was the 
beginning and the end of it.”
“It was sense of a vocation no doubt about it... the attraction was being involved 
with offenders and trying to effect some change.”
For 17 per cent of Governors the mixture of social work and management was the 
challenge of the role:
“I wanted to do something of value to society generally. I wanted to do a job in 
management, I wanted to do something in the public sector ... It was the 
combination of managing in a social work environment that made me do the Prison 
Service.”
“It was two things together. Advertisements at the time billed it as management 
with a social work purpose. I was a social scientist, I was actually going to be a 
teacher but was also interested in doing a management job.”
The variety and excitement of the work, rather than the nature of the work itself 
encouraged a number of Governors (14 per cent) to apply:
“I think it was the notion of doing something different, doing something that was 
potentially quite challenging, doing something that was slightly out of the norm.”
“Essentially, I just wanted a job, a job which would interest me. It did interest me, 
not because of any need or desire to reform people or to be a manager or what else.
I just wanted an interesting job.”
There were a small number (seven per cent) of Governors who were interested in the 
job because of its managerial nature:
“The advert was very managerial and that is what attracted me. I wanted to be a 
manager rather than a borstal housemaster and change people. I am a bit dubious 
about people who join with this great desire to reform people, because usually they 
fail miserably at doing it... But that’s about it really, I mean there was no great 
desire to do good.”
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For a few others (five per cent) it was the disciplinary and regimented environment 
that was the attraction:
“I thought well this is quite interesting and the administrative tasks appealed to me - 
I like order. I had been in a Service, military background, and to me the Prison 
Service seemed a reasonable chance of maintaining service to the Crown, working 
in a disciplined environment and doing something useful for the community.”
Only 14 per cent of Governors in the sample expressed an instrumental reason for 
joining the Prison Service. The reasons were varied but included career structure, 
job security and salaries, as the following quotes indicate:
“I wanted a second career because I was 33 at the time. I wanted a career that gave 
me an opportunity of getting in at a management level. The Prison Service was the 
first one I saw like that.”
“I joined the Prison Service for money, because I couldn’t afford to pay the 
mortgage and my wife was pregnant. People told me I could double my pay 
overnight, which I did.”
Other reasons for joining included:
“There were hardly any women governors, that did it, and that is really what 
hooked me. I wanted to show that women could do the job”
“Joining the Prison Service genuinely was for a bet and I was in the mess and the 
barman was reading a newspaper and I could see an advert that said join the Prison 
Service and he said ‘bet you won’t do that’. I said OK then I will and then when my 
Dad said I couldn't, I thought bugger you and did.”
A number of Governors in the sample (10 per cent) offered mixed reasons for joining 
the Prison Service, in which intrinsic attractions were inextricably linked with more 
instrumental considerations of money or security.
“It looked like quite an interesting job and I didn’t have any great technical skills. 
My strength was mainly dealing with people, and I thought, Prison Governor, 
sounds like a nice thing to aspire to. Seemed a safe job, and money was good.”
“To be honest the main reason was because there was good pay and 
accommodation. It also met my need to work with people.”
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8.6 Point and mode of entry
The Governors in the sample joined the operational Prison Service between 1961 and 
1993, with half the sample joining before 1975. The period in which they joined is 
shown in more detail in Table 9.
Table 9: Year Entered Prison Service
Year of entry Percentage (%)
1960-1965 14
1966-1970 26
1971 -  1975 14
1976-1980 24
1981 -1985 19
Post 1985 3
Total 100
N = 42
Governors entered the Service at a variety of ages, which reflects the different modes 
of recruitment. The overall pattern is shown in Table 10. Over half the Governors (64 
per cent) entered the Service when they were 25 or younger. This compares to only 
26 per cent of prison officer grades who joined when they were younger than 25 
(Marsh et al 1985). A similar percentage of Governors (19 per cent) and officers (24 
per cent) joined in their early thirties. However, no Governors joined after the age of 
36, compared to 20 per cent of prison officers who were 35 or over when they joined.
Table 10: Age Entered Prison Service
Age joined Percentage (%)
21 - 25 64
2 6 -3 0  17
31-35 19
Total 100
N = 42
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Earlier chapters have described how modes of entry have changed over the years. A 
third of Governors in the study joined the Service as prison officers. Of these, 64 per 
cent were promoted through the various uniformed grades, and the others (36 per 
cent) were promoted directly from prison officer to assistant governor, on a fast-track 
scheme. The majority of Governors in the sample (65 per cent) joined on a direct- 
entry assistant governor scheme.
Table 11: Mode of Entry to Prison Service
Mode of entry Percentage (%)
Prison officer 33
Assistant governor 65
Other 2
Total 100
N = 42
8.7 Working in the prison officer grades
Governors who joined as direct-entry assistant governors before 1972 were not 
required to serve a period of time as a prison officer. Of the sample of Governors, 26 
per cent fell into this category and have never served in uniform as prison officers, as 
Table 12 indicates.
Table 12: Period Served as a Prison Officer Grade
Period as a prison 
officer
Percentage (%)
None 26
Fewer than six months 29
Six months to one year 14
More than one year 31
Total 100
N = 42
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A number of Governors (29 per cent) in the sample were required to serve a period 
of up to six months as prison officers. The amount of time varied with the 
requirements of the scheme in the year in which they joined. The experience as 
prison officers was generally welcomed:
“I got to spend a few days doing each officer job in the prison, from courts to 
bathhouse. Because they knew that I was going to be an AG [assistant governor], I 
got all the worst jobs like supervising the collection of shit parcels from the yards 
and supervising Cat A exercise in two foot of snow. It was bloody hard at the time 
but helped me to understand how a prison works. It also helped me realise that the 
job of an officer is very routine and monotonous but things can blow up at any 
moment.”
A further 14 per cent, who were under 24 years old when they joined, were required 
to spend a longer period (of up to 12 months) as an officer:
“I did a year as a prison officer at [a small local prison] which is very useful. Learnt 
a lot about the job which has helped me through the years. You got to know about 
the Spanish practices, how the POA worked and where staff hide in a prison. I 
learnt how to handle prisoners -  to see the tricks they get up to.. .it was worth doing 
the time in uniform”
“Spent nearly a year as an officer. The first few months were very useful but after 
that it was a waste of time. Didn’t learn much, just wanted to get on and be an AG 
[assistant governor]. But it has helped my street cred with staff as I can point out 
that I have done their job - 1 just don’t tell them for how long. ”
Governors who joined as prison officers (33 per cent) spent between 18 months and 
24 years in the prison officer grades before joining the governor grade. The average 
period spent in the prison officer grades for those promoted directly to assistant 
governor was seven years. Those who served as a prison officer, senior officer and 
principal officer, took an average of 20 years to achieve promotion into the governor 
grades. An indication of the range of experiences that those Governors who joined as 
prison officers went through before becoming assistant governors can be seen in the 
following quote:
“I was posted to [a large local prison] initially as an officer in 1966. Promoted to 
senior officer in July 1972 to [a category C training prison]. Promoted to PO 
[principal officer] in July 1977 back to [the large local prison]. Sideways move in 
April 1980 to Region to work on what was then the old manpower teams. 1984 
moved to [a small remand centre for young offenders] as Chief Officer. Mid 1987 
came across into the governor grades with Fresh Start.”
123
8.8 Working as assistant and deputy governors
At some point in their career, regardless of mode of entry, all Governors in the 
sample (with the exception of one individual who was part of a cross hierarchical 
move scheme) have served as assistant governors. The number of assistant governor 
posts that the Governors in the sample occupied varies, as can be seen in Table 13.
Table 13: Number of Assistant Governor Posts 
Occupied before being appointed a Governor
Number of assistant 
governor posts
Percentage (%)
None 3
1 5
2 14
3 38
4 26
5 or more 14
Total 100
N = 42
The majority of Governors (83 per cent) had occupied a deputy governor post at 
some point in their careers and of these 40 per cent had been deputy governor at two 
prisons. However, as Table 14 shows 17 per cent of the Governors in the sample had 
not occupied a deputy governor’s post.
Table 14: Number of Deputy Governor Posts 
Occupied before being appointed a Governor
Number of deputy Percentage (%) 
governor posts
None 17
1 43
2 40
Total 100
N = 42
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In order to establish their breadth of experience before their appointment to a 
governorship, Governors in the sample were asked how many prisons they had 
worked in during their careers. The results are shown in Table 15. The majority (98 
per cent) of Governors had worked in four or more prisons. In contrast, over half (55 
per cent) of prison officers have only worked in one prison in their careers (Marsh et 
al. 1985, pi 12). This high level of mobility amongst Governors has tended to 
reinforce the perception held by officers that Governors are transitory and are only 
‘passing through’ a particular prison (see section 16.2). The number of prisons that 
Governors had worked in was not related to their mode of entry.
Table 15: Number of Prisons Governors had 
worked in during their careers
Number of Prisons Percentage (%)
1 0
2 to 3 2
4 to 6 62
7 or more 36
Total 100
N = 42
The Governors were also asked about the types of prison in which they had served. 
There are five main types of prison (local/remand, dispersal, training, young 
offenders and female -  see chapter 3). While only seven per cent of Governors had 
worked in all five types of prison, 74 per cent had worked in three or more different 
types.
Table 16: Number of Different Types of Prisons 
Governors had worked in during their careers
Number of types Percentage (%)
1  2
2 24
3 43
4 24
5 7
Total 100
N = 42
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A number of assistant governor and deputy governor posts are non-operational and 
exist outside of prisons. These posts deal with policy matters or prisoner 
management issues (such as population or incident management) at Prison Service 
Headquarters, or are in the training organisation. Only a small number (12 per cent) 
of Governors in the sample had not worked in a non-operational post. This compares 
to 98 per cent of prison officers who had not worked in a post outside a prison 
(Marsh et al 1985, p 112). The Governors who had joined as prison officers 
accounted for the majority (80 per cent) of those whose experience was limited to 
operational prison based postings. A large number (31 per cent) of Governors had 
experience of more than one type of post outside an establishment, as Table 17 
indicates.
Table 17: Experience in Posts Outside a Prison
Type of post Percentage (%)
Policy 19
Prisoner management 19
Training 19
More than one type 31
None 12
Total 100
N = 42
The data suggest that prior to being promoted to the rank of Governor, not only were 
assistant governors required to work in a number of prisons, they were also required 
to work in different types of prison and in non-operational roles.
8.9 Promotion to Governor
Governors in the sample had spent between seven and 33 years in the Prison Service 
prior to their appointment to the Office of Governor. (Only one Governor had been in 
the Service for a shorter period.) A third had been in the Service for more than 20 
years, with a further third having served between 16 and 20 years, as Table 18 
shows.
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Table 18: Number of Years in the Prison Service 
Before being appointed a Governor
Number of years Percentage (%)
Fewer than 10 5
11 to 15 26
16 to 20 36
More than 20 33
Total 100
N = 42
The age of the Governor on first appointment to the Office also varied, as Table 19 
shows. Just under a third of the sample were 40 or under at the time of their 
appointment, compared to half who were in their forties and 19 per cent who were 
over fifty.
Table 19: Age when First Appointed a Governor
Age when appointed Percentage (%) 
Governor
40 or under 29
41 to 45 26
46 to 50 26
51 to 55 19
Total 100
N = 42
Governors also varied in the amount of governing that they had done, as Tables 20 
and 21 show. A third of the sample had been a Governor for 10 or more years, and 
over half had been a Governor of more than one prison. On the other hand, 40 per 
cent of the sample had been a Governor for three years or fewer and 45 per cent had 
only governed one prison.
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Table 20: Number of Years as a Governor
Years as a Governor Percentage (%)
Fewer than 1 7
1 to 3 33
4 to 6 22
7 to 9 7
10 or more 31
Total 100
N = 42
Table 21: Number of Posts as a Governor
Number of posts as a Percentage (%)
Governor
1 46
2 26
3 24
4 2
5 or more 2
Total 100
N = 42
At the time of interview around a third of the sample had been in post for fewer than 
two years, a third in post for two to three years and a further third for four or more 
years, as Table 22 demonstrates.
Table 22: Time in Current Post
Time in current Percentage
Governor post %
Fewer than six months 5
Six months to one year 24
2 to 3 years 36
4 to 5 years 19
More than 5 years 16
Total 100
N = 42
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8.10 Conclusions
This chapter has explored Governors’ social origins, education, early work 
experience, motivation for joining the Prison Service and career histories. It found 
that the majority of Governors were male, white, over 50 years old and came from a 
skilled manual or non-manual socio-economic background. Governors are 
educationally more successful than their peer group and nearly half hold degrees. 
Most Governors had a previous occupation before joining the Prison Service and 
joined mainly for non-instrumental reasons. While the majority entered the Prison 
Service on the ‘fast track direct entry’ scheme, over three quarters have served a 
period as a prison officer. Prior to being appointed Governors, most of the sample 
had been assistant governors in a variety of prisons and had also undertaken at least 
one non-operational posting. A majority had also been deputy governors in one or 
more prisons. The training that the sample received prior to governing varied and 
depended on the date they joined and the period in which they were promoted. The 
Governors in the sample have considerable experience in the role of Governor. Over 
half of them have been Governor of two or more prisons. A similar number have also 
been a Governor for four or more years.
The data suggests that the Governors in the sample are distinct from the people that 
they manage - prison officers - in a number of ways. Governors are older, from a 
different socio-economic background, have attained higher levels of education and 
have worked in a number of different prisons.
Two distinct groups of Governors emerged from the data: those Governors who had 
been ‘promoted through the ranks’ and those Governors who were direct entrants. 
This split in the Governor rank is a relatively new phenomenon, as, until relatively 
recently, few Governors had been promoted from the uniformed prison officer 
grades. One effect of this change is that it is no longer the case that all Governors 
share the same demographic and social profile. In the early 1980s it was still being 
suggested that:
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the occupation of Governor, like some professions and the 
military, is not only a role, it is also a status which means that 
incumbents of the Office are not simply required to perform certain 
duties, b u t ... be a certain type of person’ (Waddington 1983).
Governors who had been promoted through the ranks tended to have a different 
profile compared to their direct entry colleagues. They were generally older, came 
from manual working backgrounds, had lower levels of school education, and joined 
the Service for more extrinsic reasons. While they had occupied fewer assistant 
governor posts than direct-entry Governors, all ‘promoted through the ranks’ 
Governors had been deputy governors at some point. This group had received less in- 
service training, but many had obtained a degree whilst working in the Prison 
Service.
The next chapter will consider the motivation and ideologies of Governors. It will 
also explore whether the backgrounds and career patterns identified in this chapter 
offer an explanation for those ideologies. In particular, it will discuss whether the 
two groups of Governors identified here (direct entry and ‘promoted through the 
ranks’) are motivated by different factors and have different ideologies.
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CHAPTER 9: 
MOTIVATION, IDEOLOGY AND JOB SATISFACTION
What motivates people to take on the governing role, and the values and beliefs that 
underpin the way they govern, are unexplored areas. This chapter seeks to shed some 
light on the subject by exploring Governors’ motivation, ideology and job 
satisfaction. These are complex concepts about which there is extensive literature. 
(For a helpful summary see Dawson 1996.) A detailed exposition on the definition 
and measurement of motivation, job satisfaction and ideology is not the purpose of 
this chapter. The aim here is to explore Governors’ feelings about why they do the 
job, what underpins the way they approach the role and whether they find governing 
satisfying.
9.1 Motivation
Many people joining the Prison Service as assistant governors do not go on to 
become Governors. Some decide that they do not want the responsibility that the role 
of Governor brings; others discover that their knowledge, experience or competence 
is judged not to be sufficient to merit promotion to Governor. This section looks at 
why the Governors in the study were motivated to become Governors.
For one interviewee, the reason he wanted to be a Governor was self-evident:
“That’s why I joined. I joined to be the Governor.”
Other Governors suggested a range of different ‘instrumental’ and ‘non­
instrumental’ reasons for wanting to be a Governor, rather than a single source of 
motivation. These reasons tended to focus on the ‘intrinsic’ nature of the work such 
as achievement, responsibility and self-esteem, factors that have been described as 
the higher-level motivators (Maslow 1954). There was less mention of lower-level 
motivators and ‘extrinsic’ factors such as job security, pay and social status.
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Promotion to the Office of Governor was regarded by some as a natural step from 
the deputy governor role. The Prison Service is a hierarchical organisation and 
personal success is often measured by promotion, and particularly appointment to 
the role of Governor. People regard becoming a Governor as the pinnacle of their 
career. For these Governors the motivation was about career path, achievement and 
the desire to be head of a prison:
“I suppose it’s just about the next challenge, it’s just about the next logical career 
path ... The ultimate achievement is becoming the Governor.”
The ability to control what happens in, and to exert a personal influence on, the 
operation of a prison was the underpinning motivation for a number of Governors. 
This was described in a variety of ways but the central theme was around the 
Governor being the key person in the prison:
“I wanted to stamp my own sort of hallmark on what was delivered. You see 
yourself as the number one with the opportunity of influencing the way the 
institution runs, beginning to put into it some of the things which you feel are 
important, the values that are important.”
One Governor seemed to be have the job pushed upon him, without any particular 
desire on his part to be a Governor:
“It was thrust upon me. I was quite happy being the Dep and my Area Manager 
wanted me to take over. I had had no thoughts. I mean I thought about progressing 
up through the ranks, yes, but I had no burning desire to be a Governor.”
Another was more cavalier in his motivation:
“[I had] a kind of vague sense that I’d got an understanding of how this needed to 
be done, so I wanted to have a go.”
9.2 Ideology -  values, beliefs and goals
While Governors work within specified formal procedures, and are constrained by 
numerous rules, orders and instructions, they retain a considerable amount of 
discretion. How Governors exercise this discretion is shaped, at least in part, by their 
underlying ideologies and value sets. The nature of the relationship between ideology
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and practice is, however, both ‘complex and unpredictable1 (Rutherford 1994, p2). 
Governors may not make decisions with explicit reference to their ideological 
preferences, but those preferences underpin and influence their decision-making. 
This was made clear by a number of Governors during the course of the interviews:
“From my point of view, and from my observation, I have seen lots of Governors 
who have had ‘a bee in their bonnet’ about certain things, and that might be based 
on their own feeling, their own political, religious and moral beliefs.”
“I think that many of the people that I have worked with have shown strong ideals, 
if you like, of where they wanted to go. And I think that has underpinned everything 
they’ve done, particularly if  you are someone who comes in with a strong moral 
belief and a strong religious belief.”
Little is known about the values and beliefs that shape the work of criminal justice 
practitioners. The one seminal work in this area is Rutherford’s study of the 
orientation of criminal justice practitioners (Rutherford 1994). Rutherford 
hypothesised that the values and beliefs that shaped the daily work and professional 
careers of criminal justice practitioners fell into three credos or clusters:
‘The first of these embraces the punitive degradation of offenders.
The second cluster speaks less to moral purpose than to issues of 
management; pragmatism, efficiency, and expediency are the themes 
that set the tone. Third, ... there is the cluster of liberal and 
humanitarian values’ (Rutherford, 1994, p3).
Given the importance of Governors’ underpinning ideologies to their approach to 
governing, the current study looked to generate a narrative that explored Governors’ 
working credos. In order to obtain that data Governors were asked about their 
values, beliefs, motivations and levels of job satisfaction. Their responses were then 
compared with Rutherford’s three credos, in order to see if the same classification 
could be applied to Governors some ten years after Rutherford’s original research.
Few of the Governors in the sample expressed a precisely formulated working 
ideology when asked about their values and beliefs. Governors are not encouraged to 
articulate their beliefs and values in their daily work, or to discuss such issues with 
colleagues:
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“The Prison Service is a very macho organisation -  we don’t speak about what we 
feel and not many people go on about what they believe... It is usually only after a 
few pints that Governors open up and talk about what they believe in.”
“You know this is the first time that I have been asked to speak about my beliefs 
and values since finishing the AG’s course [initial training course for assistant 
governors]. It is not something we talk about much.”
Governors’ values and beliefs tended to emerge when discussing operational matters, 
rather than when asked to focus on their belief systems.
Some Governors indicated that they had changed their values and beliefs during their 
career, reinforcing Polkinghome’s view that ‘self... is not a static thing or substance, 
but a configuration of personal events into an historical unity which includes not only 
what has been but also anticipates what we will be’ (Polkinghome, 1988, p50). The 
reasons for changing varied: for some it was the maturation process; or the 
experiences they had gone through as governor grades; others had been influenced 
by what had occurred in the wider environment.
While Governors indicated a variety of ideological perspectives, there was a 
common theme running through all the interviews. Governors had a fundamental 
belief that the Prison Service and its Governors should exemplify the values of 
humanity and compassion. This sentiment is captured in the following quote:
“For me probably humanitarian values and compassion are some of the strongest 
attributes that civilised human beings can have and I think a well run Prison Service 
or a well run criminal justice system has those attributes in its people.”
This widely held view supports Rutherford’s conclusion that ‘the expression of 
humane values within criminal justice ultimately resides with practitioners’ 
(Rutherford 1994, p xii).
9.2.1 Reform and rehabilitation ideologies
The majority of Governors in the sample (73 per cent) expressed values and beliefs 
that were closely associated with Rutherford’s credo three: ‘empathy with suspects, 
offenders and the victims of crime, optimism that constructive work can be done 
with offenders’ (Rutherford 1994, pi 8). Terms such as ‘social imperative’, ‘social
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conscience’ and ‘social purpose’ populated the Governors’ discourses, as these 
quotes indicate:
“I have a very clear orientation towards rehabilitation of prisoners. The advertising 
was actually slanted that way... A large number of aspiring Governors still held that 
sort of value and I think still do and I think the vast majority who come in now even 
hold something of a social imperative in terms of the role.”
“I would find it difficult to understand someone coming to this sort of job without 
some sort of social conscience and a view that they are both serving society and 
have some sort of interest or concern about crime in the community and reducing it.
There must be some elements of that motivation for the majority of people.”
For many Governors the belief that prisoners have the capacity to change is key to 
their approach. These Governors want to provide regimes that will deliver these 
changes and return prisoners to their communities having been rehabilitated. 
‘Rehabilitation orientated’ Governors believe prisons to be constructive and 
purposeful places, which will reduce reoffending.
“I firmly believe that in a prison we need a culture o f hope, and that’s hope for the 
staff and the prisoners, where it’s clear people are treated fairly and justly, that 
inmates can respond... I think i f  the Prison Service loses that reforming, moral sort 
of stance, then it will lose much of what’s really good about it... I would not want 
just to lock people up, I mean, even if  they had TV in the cell and association all the 
time and they were treated justly, and good food, and clean and safe and everything 
else. I just think the Prison Service has to have in its vision, in its purpose, in its 
aims, the ability to facilitate people to stop from offending.”
“Ultimately I believe in the ability of human beings to change. That’s my 
underpinning philosophy of life. I also believe that prisoners change from being 
treated with respect and with understanding, and being given opportunities to 
actually get themselves sorted out.”
Other Governors adopted a more pragmatic approach. While espousing the principle 
that prisoners can change, they believed that prisoners themselves must decide that 
they wanted to change and be motivated to take up the regime provided (what has 
been referred to as opportunities for ‘facilitated change’ - Morris 1974):
“I take the view that people change when they are ready and that you give them the 
facility to make that change when and if  they are ready, and in the meantime you do 
your utmost to make them decent towards each other and show them that there is 
another way, and a lot of that is personal example. So I suppose my motivation, I 
suppose, is more about the humanitarian bit, but it is a pretty robust humanitarian 
bit. I am not a bleeding heart.”
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9.2.2 Managerial ideologies
The remaining Governors (27 per cent) tended to define their values and beliefs in 
more managerial terms. These Governors fell within Rutherford’s credo two, in 
which practitioners ‘dispose of the tasks at hand as smoothly and efficiently as 
possible. The tenor is one of smooth management rather than moral mission’ 
(Rutherford 1994, pi 3). To some extent this may reflect a more general trend in that 
‘positive sentiments have been increasingly marginalised in official discourses and 
replaced by more utilitarian objectives and expectations’ (Garland 1990, pi 83).
A number of Governors in the study adopted a clear managerial perspective. For 
them the role was about running an efficient operation that focused on delivering 
core services to prisoners, meeting KPIs and adhering to Prison Service Orders, 
rather than pursuing any ‘moral mission’. These Governors tended to adopt a more 
dispassionate bureaucratic style of management that sought procedural fairness rather 
than any more elevated commitment to substantive justice, reform or rehabilitation.
“There seems to be a group of people who joined just to be managers, and it could 
have been managing a different sort o f organization and I guess that I am probably 
one of them.”
“I did just want to manage, actually, it’s not about changing people... I still regard 
myself principally as a manager.”
“The end result to me is that the prisoner on the landing gets his food, gets his 
bedding, gets his visits, and we pull all these bits together and now somebody has 
got to do that and it’s my job to try and help the people that are doing it, or enable 
them. If I have to set a priority then it would be this hotel function -  I don’t really 
believe we can do too much more.”
A small number of Governors adopted an actuarial approach (Bottoms 1995 and 
section 10.6) to prisoners. They valued systems and procedures over the needs of 
individual prisoners:
“I see prisoners as an essential part of the job, but I don’t see them as individuals as 
being particularly important individuals. And, as a result, I’m not particularly 
interested whether or not we’re doing wonderful personal officer work on the wing 
or anything like that; all I’m interested in is do we have a system and as long as we 
have a system and there are ways of monitoring that system’s working, that’s what 
I’m interested in.”
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“Somebody’s particular individual problems as a prisoner do not interest me. I am 
here to look at the bigger picture. I do not get involved with individual prisoners.
For me it’s much more about looking at the needs of groups of prisoners.”
Some Governors spoke of their belief that the role was about treating prisoners 
decently and fairly rather than trying to achieve the broader goal of reform and 
rehabilitation:
“I think it’s containment and I don’t think that we’re doing anything - we may play 
at other things... I don’t believe for a moment that in a local like this that a three 
day anger management course and a two day anti-bullying course and a one day 
taking and driving away course do any good - 1 mean, these get us brownie points 
from people who don’t really understand what we’re doing. It would be insane of 
me to think that these are going to have any lasting impact on anybody’s life at all.”
“I suppose without getting too grand an idea, I just like to see people being treated 
right. Now, by that I mean, if  a guy needs to go in a special cell, then I’m quite 
happy to put him in, sign the piece of paper. If he needs to get a phone call while 
there, then I’ll want to make sure that the process is there for him to be able to get 
one. So it’s just about treating people right, and maybe then getting them on the 
road to recovery. But there’s no grand plan. I’m no social reformer.”
Others adopted a ‘normalising’ discourse (King and Morgan 1980) and were keen to 
prevent or obviate the negative effects of prisons so that prisoners did not become 
worse during sentence:
“I know a lot of Governors, and I respect that they are motivated to rehabilitate 
prisoners. My bit about prisoners is actually about wanting to ensure that they don’t 
get brutalised. I don’t have very big expectations about what prison does to 
prisoners because partly I believe prison is just such a weird environment. But I do 
believe that prisons can be profoundly negative and damaging places and I am quite 
attracted to playing my part in minimising that. It may sound quite an odd 
motivation but it’s real.”
“My agenda, which I think, if  I’m honest, is most strong for me, is about 
contributing to changing the culture of prisons. I’m very attracted to that. I want to 
make sure that people do not come out worse than when they went in. I am not sure 
that we can change many of them.”
9.2.3 Punitive ideologies
Rutherford’s credo one focused on practitioners who had a:
‘powerfully held dislike and moral condemnation of offenders ... 
who, when caught, should be dealt with in ways that are punitive and 
degrading’ (Rutherford 1994, pll).
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No Governors expressed credo one punitive sentiments or beliefs during the 
interviews. There was a widely held belief amongst Governors that imprisonment 
should be as used as a punishment, not for punishment. Whether they adhered to a 
reformist orientation or to a more managerial one, Governors believed that prisoners 
should be treated fairly and with humanity. No Governor suggested that prisoners 
should be further punished for their offence. As Garland points out:
‘Prison officials, in so far as they are being professional, tend to 
suspend moral judgement and treat prisoners in purely neutral 
terms... prisoners will be treated not as evil or wicked persons on 
account of their offence, but as good or bad inmates on account of 
their institutional conduct’ (Garland 1990, pi 83).
The following quotes typify the line taken by the Governors:
“I mean punishment never enters my head. I’m sure that sounds awful but it really 
doesn’t and punishment is a matter for the law. I keep saying to people and I think 
it’s true, my job isn’t about imprisonment it’s about freedom. I really am a 
Gladstone believer, you know, so actually, the law does the punishment. By the 
time we get them the punishment is dealt with.”
“I know it is a euphemism but prisoners are sent to prison as a punishment not for 
punishment. Their punishment is the loss of liberty and we are here to keep them 
inside not to inflict punishment on prisoners.”
Political pressure in the 1990s for more punitive and ‘austere’ prisons (see section 
10.3) was a concern for many Governors. While they did not indicate that this had 
resulted in an ‘ideological crisis’ as some commentators have suggested (Cullen et 
al 1993b), Governors did indicate that the movement to cut some programmes, 
services and amenities from prisons resulted in an environment that was 
simultaneously more punitive and less in line with their own ideological beliefs:
“The closest I came to leaving the service was when Michael Howard was Home 
Secretary. He really didn’t understand prisons and couldn’t be bothered to visit 
them to find out. His ‘decent but austere’ approach and punitive rhetoric set us back 
years. He thought prisons should be negative and unhealthy places. Most Governors 
had no time for him or his antediluvian views.”
“I found the early 1990s very difficult. Howard kept going on about conditions in 
prison, not to make them more humane or decent but to make them more austere. 
Many of us had huge problems with what he wanted to do with prisons. Governors 
are quite a liberal-minded group and we thought Howard was out to turn our prisons 
into nothing more than penal warehouses... I had a real conflict in my heart about 
whether I really wanted to govern somewhere like that.”
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9.3 Job satisfaction
Although job satisfaction receives a great deal of attention in the social science 
literature, there have been comparatively few studies conducted in the criminal 
justice setting and no studies looking specifically at the level of job satisfaction 
amongst Governors. This led one researcher to conclude that heads of custodial 
institutions are ‘an occupational group virtually ignored by work satisfaction 
researchers’ (Cullen et al. 1993b, pl41).
The present study looked at the broad domain of a Governor’s satisfaction with his or 
her overall job, rather than with any specific facets (Brayfield and Rothe 1951). Job 
satisfaction is a subjective, individual-level feeling reflecting: whether a person’s 
needs are or are not being met by a particular job (Lambert et a l 2002, pi 17); the 
challenge presented by work; the level of autonomy, the sense of achievement; 
recognition for effort or quality of work; and also the earnings and other rewards 
obtained (Culley et al. 1999, p21)
Of the sample of Governors, 87 per cent stated that they were satisfied overall with 
their job. Previous research indicates that job satisfaction is positively related to 
occupational status (Gruenberg 1980). One would expect therefore that Governors 
would have higher satisfaction levels than other prison staff. The current research 
supports this view, as Governors’ level of satisfaction exceeded the level found for 
prison staf£ which was 64 per cent in a 2001 study (HM Prison Service 2001b, pi 1).
Governors might be expected to be generally unhappy with their work if 
commentators were correct in their claim that prisons were dehumanising to staff and 
prisoner alike and that Governors were in a beleaguered profession. These 
perspectives do not seem to be borne out by the data. The 1998 Workplace 
Employee Relations Survey found that job satisfaction amongst managers was 71 per 
cent (Culley et al. 1999, p22). Governors seem to derive satisfaction from their work 
at a similar, or indeed slightly higher, level to that found among managers as an 
occupational category. Many Governors indicated that they would take the job again
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without hesitation, felt the job measured up to the expectations they had when they 
first became a Governor, and would recommend their job to a good friend.
Governors gave a variety of reasons for their high level of job satisfaction. A number 
of Governors pointed to their involvement with people as being the most satisfying 
element of their job. For many their ability to impact in a positive way on the lives of 
prisoners was the most rewarding aspect. There is a close link between the 
sentiments expressed and the credo three ideology discussed earlier. The following 
quotes typify the sentiments expressed by Governors:
“I suppose at the end of the day it’s dealing with people which gives job 
satisfaction. It’s the dealing with prisoners however difficult and however 
complicated their problems are, and somehow ameliorating their pain and their 
misery.”
“It began to offer me what I particularly wanted from my working life. It was 
primarily dealing with people. Seeing those people out there succeed gives me a 
sense of achievement.”
The nature of the job itself was at the heart of their job satisfaction for other 
Governors. In particular, Governors spoke of the variety of work that they undertook, 
and the fact that no two days were the same. They enjoyed the daily challenges and 
having to deal with complex issues:
“I think it’s a very fulfilling job. Many jobs are, but I think in terms of daily 
challenges, the beauty of being a Governor is the feet that it is so varied... Nowhere 
else do you get the complete variety and complete responsibility that you get within 
a prison environment.”
“I think it’s the best job in the world, being a prison Governor... I think you would 
be hard pushed to find a job that has got so much interest, so much variety and so 
much fun in it. It really is enjoyable.”
A number of Governors spoke of job satisfaction in relation to their ability to do the 
job well. For them it was a sense of personal achievement in running an effective 
prison that they found most worthwhile:
“It’s the satisfaction of trying to do what I now know to be an incredibly difficult 
job, to do it well, that I find the most rewarding.”
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During the interviews, Governors did however point to a number of things that 
reduced their level of job satisfaction. In particular, Governors spoke of the lack of 
resources and increased bureaucracy as being the most frustrating and least satisfying 
elements of their job, as the following quotes suggest:
“I still want to be in a position where I can influence for the good and that is why 
I’ve found the last four years very frustrating. I have felt unable, because of various 
constraints, to change anything radically for the good. [A large local prison] for the 
past four years has made very little progress regime-wise... We’ve had no success -  
I’ve had no success during my time as Governor in changing that.”
“There are times when I could just throw my keys away, when the frustration gets 
too much. You’re not asking for a lot of money but you just can’t get through the 
red tape, or you’re stuck with an intransigent group of people and feel as i f  you’re 
just knocking your head against a wall.”
The other main factor leading to reduced job satisfaction was a loss of autonomy (see 
chapter 11), as these quotes reveal:
“I don’t enjoy the job as much as I did. Things are different now than they were 
when I first became a Governor. As Governor of [a training prison] I have less 
freedom than my predecessor did, less discretion and more interference by reptile 
towers [Headquarters], It is starting to feel like I am not in charge of my own prison 
anymore.”
“They don’t want Governors like me anymore. They want managers who do KPIs 
and manage a budget. Governors are being screwed down these days -  there are 
hundreds of bloody orders and instructions all wanting me to do something, or to 
stop doing something ... Some of the fun has gone out of the job.”
As no previous data exists on the level of job satisfaction amongst Governors, it is 
not possible to assess whether job satisfaction levels have changed as a result of 
contemporary developments in prison administration. The Prison Service staff survey 
found a nine per cent reduction in the level of staff satisfaction between 2000 and 
2001 (HM Prison Service 2001b, pll). One might extrapolate from these findings 
that the level of satisfaction amongst Governors may also have fallen, as they are 
being caught in the uncomfortable nexus of increasing problems (overcrowding, 
reducing budgets, serious incidents) and shrinking administrative discretion.
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9.4 Conclusions
This chapter has explored issues surrounding why Governors do the job, what they 
believe in and value, and whether the work gives them job satisfaction. These are 
very personal issues for Governors and, as the study found, are not issues about 
which Governors routinely speak. While few Governors made explicit reference to 
their ideology, the interviews did reveal that Governors tended to ground their 
approaches and decision-making with reference to values and beliefs. This can be 
seen in many of the quotes used later in this thesis and supports Miller’s assertion 
that ideology shapes the daily work of criminal justice practitioners:
‘Ideology and its consequences exert a powerful influence on the 
policies and procedures of those who conduct the enterprise of 
criminal justice’ (Miller 1973, pi 42).
Most Governors indicated that they took on the governing role in order to make a 
difference to prisoners’ lives and to provide opportunities for reform. Others wanted 
to be good managers who ran efficient institutions. The interviews revealed high 
levels of job satisfaction amongst Governors and suggested that this was due to the 
varied nature of their work and the ability to achieve the goals that they set out to 
achieve.
The data showed no clear link between Governors’ origins, ideology and the 
approach that they adopted. Many other factors influenced their work. (See chapter 
14 on the reality of governing.) Some Governors, for example, pointed out that 
things that had happened to them, whilst working in the Prison Service, had changed 
their perspective; others that their orientation changed depending on the type of 
prison they worked in.
The main theme to emerge from the data was that Governors who were promoted 
from the uniformed grades tended to be more managerial in their expressed 
ideologies than Governors who were direct entrants. The trend amongst direct entrant 
Governors is, however, changing. The more recently recruited direct entrant 
Governors adopted a more managerial ideology than their predecessors. A typology
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of Governors linking their background, career and management approach can be 
found in section 15.1.
The interviews took place between 1998 and 2000 and should be placed in that 
historical context. The beliefs and language used by interviewees no doubt reflected 
the politically correct line at that time -  a focus on performance, delivery and 
managerialism. Earlier generations of Governors would probably not have adopted 
such managerial language and perspective. In addition, had the interviews taken 
place in the mid 1990s, the levels of job satisfaction may well have been lower, 
because of the negative publicity generated by prison escapes, the emphasis on 
security and the political desire for austere prison regimes.
The new optimism that emerged by the late 1990s, associated with the ‘decency’ 
agenda, was reflected in the interviews.
If the interviews took place today, levels of job satisfaction might well be lower. The 
growing managerialisation and ‘bureaucratisation’ of prison administration, with 
steadily increasing oversight, direction, and control exercised by Headquarters, may 
augur poorly for maintaining the job satisfaction associated with being a Governor. 
Highly centralised, hierarchical authority may have organisational benefits, but may 
also produce the unintended consequence of diminishing Governors’ satisfaction 
with their work as their autonomy is reduced and organisational goals become more 
managerial and less in line with Governors’ personal ideologies.
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PART FIVE:
GOVERNING IN CHANGED CONTEXT
144
CHAPTER 10: 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES AND THEIR IMPACT ON 
GOVERNORS
10.1 Introduction
Governors, and their prisons, do not operate in a vacuum, much as some Governors 
may wish that they did so. Like all institutions, prisons are:
‘affected by the forces of economics, politics, culture, and
technology. For all their apparent autonomy, each one is situated 
within an ensemble of social forces and is structured by the values 
and social arrangements which form its effective environment’
(Garland 1990, p 283).
Organisational theorists have long held the view that changes in this external
environment precede and lead to changes in the structure and management of
organisations themselves (Chandler 1962, Wilson 1989, Desveaux 1995). The 
demands of the external environment on the public sector have led to a radical 
change in its management and organization. This was particularly so in the case of 
prisons, as ‘the external environment exerts an enormous influence over the mission, 
behavior, and structure of correctional organizations’ (Freeman 1999, p xiii).
The environment in which Governors operate can be described as a complex 
interaction between: politicians; the judiciary; the media; prisoners; pressure groups; 
and unions. Changes in society over recent years, together with other changes in the 
environment in which prisons operate, have also had a significant impact on 
Governors and their work.
Chapters 10 and 11 look at some of the most significant of those developments and 
consider what effect those changes have had on Governors. Chapter 10 considers: the 
growing recognition of prisoners’ rights; the increased influence of politicians and 
the public; the rise in the prison population; private sector involvement with prisons;
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and the culture of risk management and actuarial approaches to the management of 
offenders. Chapter 11 then addresses the significant impact that managerialism has 
had on Governors.
10.2 Prisoners’ rights and expectations
One of the most significant developments in recent years has been the acceptance of 
the concept of prisoners’ rights and prisoners’ ability to challenge the way they are 
treated in prisons. As a consequence of the introduction of the Human Rights Act 
1988 (which came into force in October 2000), developments in case law, and the 
creation of the Prisons Ombudsman, Governors’ decisions are increasingly being 
scrutinised and challenged.
Before 1979 the courts took little interest in ensuring the rights of prisoners. The 
courts were clear that the Prison Rules did not give prisoners any rights, and, as a 
consequence, if the Rules were breached that did not of itself give prisoners a cause 
of action against those who had breached them. Judges took the view that if the 
courts were to ‘entertain actions by disgruntled prisoners’ the Governor’s life would 
be made ‘intolerable’ (Lord Denning in Becker v. Home Office [1972] 2 QB 407). 
Prisoners were effectively prevented from accessing the courts by such rulings and 
Governors took advantage of this limited scrutiny:
“I’m not proud of it but in the past I’ve manipulated adjudications to find a 
prisoner guilty. You knew back then that you would not be challenged. There 
were no lawyers, no real appeals ...”
“I remember when we used to turn a blind eye to things even if  you sometimes 
thought that there may be something in it. The interests of the prison sometimes 
had to outweigh the individual prisoner.”
Following a series of judgments (most notably R v. Board o f Visitors o f Hull Prison, 
ex parte St Germain et al. [1979] 1 All ER 701, and R v. Deputy Governor o f 
Parkhurst Prison, ex parte Leech [1988] 1 All ER 485) the courts have increasingly 
shown a tendency to review how Governors exercise their discretion. By 1992 all 
decisions made by Governors in the discharge of their functions were reviewable by 
the High Court (R v. Deputy Governor o f Parkhurst Prison, ex parte Hague and 
Weldon [1991] 3 WLR 340). The courts have intervened in transfers, segregation,
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medical consent, drug testing, tariff setting for life sentence prisoners and 
categorisation (Creighton and King 2000, Cheney et al 2001, Lennon 2003), all of 
which has added to the complexity of decision making for the Governor.
“These days none of us would dare ignore a complaint as we know that they 
[prisoners] will be on the phone to their brief as soon as they walk out of the 
office... Just look at all the adverts in Inside Time [a prisoners’ newspaper] for 
solicitors who are encouraging prisoners to take action.”
“Life has become more complicated. Adjudications are more complicated. Even 
these trainees will ask for legal representation. Ten years ago they were wheeled in, 
wheeled out, if  they didn’t plead guilty they were going to be found guilty, and the 
appeal system was pretty much that the Secretary of State can find no grounds for 
interference. You didn’t write to solicitors. Life is more complex.”
The increase in the level of judicial and legal interest in the operation of prisons led 
the Prison Service to issue an Information and Practice Guidance Note to Governors 
titled 'The Judge At Your Gate’ (HM Prison Service 2000d). One of the underlying 
reasons for issuing the document was the number of errors Governors were making. 
The Note concludes by stating:
‘We hope that this booklet will encourage you to take legal advice 
before committing the Minister or the Prison Service to a particular 
decision if there is any doubt in your mind’ (HM Prison Service 
2000d, p30).
While the Human Rights Act has not had a significant widespread impact to date, as 
some people suggested that it would (Shaw 1998), there have been a number of 
‘landmark’ rulings in Prison Law (see Lennon 2003). Of particular note have been: 
decisions in relation to lifers; prisoners’ access to the media; legal privilege of 
documents in a prisoner’s possession; and the right of children to remain with their 
mothers in mother and baby units. The level of judicial examination of Governors’ 
decisions has increased significantly and is likely to increase further in both domestic 
and European courts.
There has also been a recent trend for penal pressure groups to use the courts to 
change penal policy and to assist prisoners with bringing cases against their 
Governors. The Howard League for Penal Reform, in particular, has adopted a policy 
of supporting test cases, and providing legal advice to prisoners. The Howard League
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has demonstrated that they have locus standi and can bring action for judicial review. 
A recent example was the judicial review of the policy on children held in Young 
Offender Institutions (R (on the application o f the Howard League for Penal Reform) 
v. Secretary o f State for Home Department (No. 2) [2002] EWHC 2497) in which the 
court held that the Children Act 1989 should apply to children held in YOIs. This 
trend is likely to continue as:
‘Litigation is a means by which a progressive agenda of humane 
penal reform can be pursued’ (Valier 2004, p24).
On some occasions the courts have removed powers from Governors. For example, 
the 2002 decision of the European Court in Ezeh and Connors led to the removal of 
the Governor’s ability to award additional days for disciplinary offences (HM Prison 
Service 2003b).
A further development was the establishment in 1994 of the Prisons Ombudsman 
(Prisons Ombudsman 1996). The Ombudsman looked into 3,132 complaints made by 
prisoners in 2002-03 (Prisons and Probation Ombudsman 2003). These complaints 
were in relation to the full breadth of a Governor’s work: adjudications; conditions; 
security; regimes; pre-release; contact with families; property; religion; segregation; 
transfers; and allocations. The Ombudsman has pointed out that his inquiries look at 
minor matters, as well as bigger issues:
‘I am sometimes criticised for investigating apparently minor matters.
But nothing is trivial in prison when you have so little autonomy, so 
few possessions, so little influence, and when every aspect of your 
life is ordered for you’ (Prisons and Probation Ombudsman 2003, 
plO).
Prisoners are today also able to challenge a Governor’s decision through a formal 
Request and Complaint system. This system allows prisoners to write directly to the 
area manager to appeal a Governor’s decision (see PSO 2510).
The increased scrutiny of Governors’ decisions has added to the complexity of the 
work. Governors today need to be able to ensure consistency in their treatment of 
prisoners and justify their decisions, or find their actions overturned or criticised.
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This has made Governors more wary and, some have argued, more conservative in 
their approach.
“I am very careful these days in dealings with prisoners. I know that if  they do 
not like what I said they will be on the phone to their brief or the ombudsman. I 
make sure the evidence is there to support what I decide or else I will lose it. But 
it makes it more difficult to treat them as individuals. If I do something for Joey 
on C wing, then I know that Charlie on D wing will want the same, and if  he 
doesn’t get it there will be a CARP [a request and complaint form] or a letter to 
his MP.”
The prisoner is now regarded, ‘to a much greater extent than thirty or forty years 
ago, as a person with rights’ (Bottoms 1995, p8). Prisoners have also, to some 
extent, come to be seen as consumers whose opinions need to be taken into account 
in the management of institutions (reflecting the ‘consumerist management’ element 
of managerialism). For example, prison surveys (such as Walmsley et a l 1992) 
have raised prisoners’ expectations, and the Citizen’s Charter set out the standards of 
service required of the Prison Service (HM Prison Service 1993f). Governors 
therefore have to be far more conscious of the ‘judge at the gate’ and the 
‘Ombudsman at their elbow’, when making decisions and exercising their discretion. 
They need to ensure that prisoners’ rights are not denied, that prisoners are treated 
consistently and that their decisions are fair and reasonable.
10.3 Politics, the media and prisons
An organisation has a high degree of legitimacy in a society when its actions are 
perceived as ‘desirable, proper or appropriate’ (Suchman 1995, p574). The Prison 
Service, like other public institutions, must therefore operate in a manner that ensures 
the confidence of politicians and the public.
Until the last decade, politicians and the public had, in the main, left direction and 
control of penal policy under the auspices of penal bureaucrats within Government, 
who took their lead from research findings (Pratt 2000b, pi 38). Throughout the 
1990s issues of law and order increasingly captured ‘public attention and, in turn, 
became one of the most compelling social issues for politicians’ (James and Raine 
1998, p4). A different set of relationships took shape whereby politicians and public 
sentiment seemed much more closely in tune, with penal experts shifted to a fringe
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role. What seems to have taken place is some sort of convergence of interests 
between government and people: penal policy increasingly bore the imprint of the 
‘popularization of crime politics’ (Bottoms 1995). Imprisonment was justified not by 
any reference to the criteria of experts, but on the grounds that ‘this is what the 
public want’. Incapacitation, rather than reducing reconviction rates, came to be the 
test of penal effectiveness.
Governors were no longer seen as penal experts who needed to be consulted on 
matters of penal policy. As the PGA put it:
‘....[the] Conservative Government played the law and order card.
Our views became less important to Michael Howard than those of 
editorial writers’ (Prison Governors Association 2000).
The relationship between ministers and Governors became a troubled one in the 
1990s. Clear differences on issues of policy and operational matters emerged. While 
Governors accepted that ministers should develop policy (even if Governors did not 
agree with the policy being developed), Governors maintained that day-to-day 
operational matters and management of individual prisoners should be left to them. 
Some commentators shared this view:
‘Within the law, and the policy as approved by Parliament, the 
treatment of individual prisoners should be a matter of professional 
and managerial, and not political, judgement’ (Faulkner 2001, p301).
The creation of the Prison Service Agency in 1993 was generally welcomed as 
providing protection from political interference in operational matters. Indeed, one 
of the underlying reasons for the creation of agencies was to separate out the policy­
making functions from operational concerns and hand over the ‘murky plain of 
overwhelming detail’ to managers (Power 1997). The then Home Secretary 
conveniently re-emphasised the divide between ‘policy’ and ‘operations’ at the time 
of the escape from Whitemoor prison, which allowed him to argue that the escape 
was an operational matter and that it was the Director General of the Prison Service, 
and not ministers, who should bear responsibility for the failure.
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This managerial and operational autonomy was rather short lived. Despite the 
creation of the Prison Service Agency, the Prison Service never did get effective 
operational independence from the main Home Office and ministers. The reality is 
that it is ‘inevitable that Ministers will be interested in and wish to influence the 
executive functions of the Prison Service, ie: its operations’ (HM Prison Service 
1997a, p34). The Home Secretary, who argued so strongly for a divide between 
operations and policy, was quick to intervene in operational matters, ranging from 
the dismissal of the Governor of Parkhurst prison after a security lapse to demanding 
more austere regimes (Ryan 2003, p99). Since then the ‘independence’ of the Prison 
Service on operational matters has slowly been eroded. The government now 
recognises that ‘the Prison Service has, in practice, been a Next Steps Agency in 
name only for some time’ (Home Office 2004) and has brought the Service back 
within the Home Office in creating a National Offender Management Service. 
Governors now find themselves firmly back under the control and influence of the 
Home Office, its ministers and civil servants.
There has been an increasing trend in recent years for ministers and MPs to comment 
publicly on what should, and should not, be happening in our prisons. In that sense 
the world of the Governor is becoming increasingly politicised. It cannot be disputed 
that the Home Secretary has a legitimate interest in the operational performance of 
the Prison Service, not least as he may be called to account in Parliament for it, as 
the Carltona principle makes clear:
‘The duties imposed upon Ministers and the powers given to 
Ministers are normally exercised under the authority of Ministers by 
responsible officials of the department ... Constitutionally, the 
decision of such an official is of course, the decision of the Minister; 
the Minister is responsible. It is he who must answer before 
Parliament for anything his officials have done under his authority’
(Carltona v Works Commission [1943] 2 All ER 560).
Parliamentary Questions about the Prison Service are today answered by a Home 
Office Minister and not by the Director General or another senior Prison Service 
official, as they had been for a number of years prior to 1997. A parliamentary 
statement made clear that this was to enable ‘ministers to answer personally to 
Parliament for what is done in our prisons’ (Hansard, 31 July 1997, Written Answers
151
91). Given their level of accountability it is understandable that ministers will want 
to take an interest in what is happening in prisons.
Governors, as a result, have had to develop a clear insight into the essentially 
political dimension of their work. They have to be aware that all their actions will 
be judged against whether they fit with ministers’ policies. Governors have to 
respond to changes in ministerial views about prison conditions, such as the 1993 
‘Prison works’ speech by the then Home Secretary, which marked a change of 
direction towards a more austere view of prisoners’ entitlements (Dunbar and 
Langdon 1998, p29). A number of Governors commented on the growth in political 
interest in their work. For many this political interest reached its peak during 
Michael Howard’s tenure at the Home Office:
“Undoubtedly in my experience, it is necessary in prisons to be aware of the 
political dimensions that apply and that was never more evident than under Michael 
Howard, when it was certainly like walking a tightrope, but also being able to cope 
with the issues in the press on political matters.”
“I think that one o f the things that the Governor has to be aware o f and sense is 
what’s happening in the local community, and what’s happening nationwide, 
because when Michael Howard was trumpeting the need for keeping people inside 
and not letting them go anywhere, it was being echoed in our local community and 
our local press.”
Governors who failed to respond found themselves subject to public chastisement by 
ministers, as the Governor who proposed to build a pitch-and-putt course in his 
prison found out. The then Home Secretary did not consider that it had a place in 
‘decent but austere’ prison regimes and had the decision overturned after much 
embarrassment to the Prison Service, ministers and the Governor himself. The then 
Director General commented:
‘A governor’s ill-judged decision to provide his inmates with a pitch- 
and-putt course caused a massive political and media reaction, 
distracting the management for weeks on end as inquests were 
conducted and policy re-examined’ (Lewis 1997, p63).
The need for Governors to adhere to ministerial views, and to avoid embarrassing 
ministers, is not without its critics. Carlen, for example, comments that:
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‘the injunction that “the ‘minister’ must never be embarrassed” is one 
of the least questioned of the rules of which governors are expected to 
be mindful, even at times when, as during the last couple of decades, 
the ministers themselves have fashioned constantly-changing prison 
policies to appease populist punitiveness rather than to further the 
objectives of any principled and long-term penal policy designed to 
address the causes of recidivism’ (Carlen 2001, p5).
While many Governors would support such a view, the reality is that increased 
political interest, or at least the willingness of politicians to castigate Governors 
when things go wrong, has resulted in Governors taking fewer risks in their decision­
making. For example, when the Home Secretary tightened the rules on the use of 
Release on Temporary Licence (ROTL), by which Governors authorise prisoners to 
work or spend time outside prison, Governors were told that they would be held 
personally responsible for any future ROTL failures. As a result Governors ‘became 
so nervous about releasing anyone that its use virtually dried up’ (Ramsbotham 2003, 
pi 61). Governors made a similar point:
“I think politicians have got in the way. We are still suffering from the influence of 
Michael Howard, I think, in terms o£ you know, he wasn’t prepared to defend the 
Prison Service, or justify things. We have this tabloid journalism rules okay. And 
the problem with that I think is that we have now internalised it into a form of self­
censorship. And we don’t, as Governors, take risks that we would have taken 
before.”
Another important development has changed the relationship between Governors 
and MPs. In the past, correspondence from MPs concerning prisoners went through 
the hands of civil servants at Prison Service Headquarters where responses were well 
crafted and subject to the time-honoured civil service skill of saying as little as 
possible. Today, Members of Parliament are encouraged to write directly to the 
Governor concerning matters raised by individual constituents concerning individual 
prisoners. This has become a potentially sensitive area for Governors, as they need 
to be able to defend their decisions in writing on a wide range of issues. They need 
to produce sustainable arguments that have to hold up under scrutiny, as MPs, if they 
are not content with the reply, can take the matter up with ministers in writing or by 
way of Parliamentary Questions.
Widespread media coverage of prisons takes place in response to operational 
failures. A number of high profile escape attempts, riots and disturbances, rooftop
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protests, deaths in custody, and instances of racism and brutality have all rightly 
received extensive media coverage. In addition to ‘big issue’ media coverage, there 
is also an ever increasing media desire to expose instances of what is seen as poor 
judgement by prison officials (‘luxury foods in prison’, ‘cells to be painted pink to 
calm prisoners’, ‘prisoners to be given karaoke machines to improve their self 
confidence’, ‘prison orders takeaway for prisoners’) and more routine failures of the 
workings of our prisons (‘prisoners visit Tescos to buy alcohol’, ‘prisoners run 
businesses from inside’, ‘mobile phones in every prison’, ‘more drugs in prison than 
outside’). Given the level of media interest and willingness to ‘expose’ perceived 
shortcomings, Governors have to be more mindful that the result of one of their 
decisions will find its way (via staffj prisoners or an investigative journalist) into the 
public domain, where it will receive the full glare of publicity.
10.4 Prison population and overcrowding
One of the biggest impacts on prisons and their Governors in recent years has been in 
relation to the rise in the prison population and the level of overcrowding that has 
resulted. The peak in the prison population at over 51,000 in 1988 was followed by a 
decline in numbers to a low of 40,600 at the end of 1992. Since then the prison 
population has continued to grow to the current level of around 75,000. It soon 
became apparent that overcrowding was heading relentlessly out of control, as the 
prison population continued to exceed available accommodation. The dangers caused 
by prison overcrowding are something about which Governors are all too conscious, 
as ‘it is a short step from the increased use of imprisonment to overcrowding and the 
decline of penal conditions’ (Platek 1996, p58).
Whatever the reason for the increase in the prison population (see chapter 2 for a 
discussion of the issues) it is Governors who have to accommodate and manage the 
increase in prisoner numbers. In the short term, Prison Service officials look to find 
quick-fix solutions: use of police cells; quick-build accommodation blocks in 
existing prisons; extension of early release on electronic tags and ‘doubling-up’ of 
cells (locating two prisoners in cells designed for one). Despite these short-term 
measures, the pressure of numbers still means that Governors have to locate
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prisoners in inappropriate or overcrowded accommodation. Nearly a quarter of 
prisoners were sharing cells designed for one in September 2003, some 16,552 
prisoners (Goggins 2003).
From the Governors’ point of view, the constancy of the crisis can lead to goal 
displacement -  where the goals of reform and rehabilitation are replaced by the more 
short term goals of managing prisoner numbers:
‘An imaginative governor and staff will always try to find ways to 
avoid the worst effects, but a seriously overcrowded prison eventually 
becomes overwhelmed by the number of transactions that have to be 
performed, so that little is left except security and the most basic 
services’ (Dunbar and Langdon 1998, p39).
These organisational pressures can threaten the basic humanity of the system. 
Prisoners are: forced to share cells containing a toilet; moved around the country far 
from their families to fill vacant beds; prevented from finishing education and 
vocational courses; and unable to move prison to attend offending behaviour courses. 
Coping with the impacts of overcrowding creates a danger that Governors are forced 
to see prisoners not as individuals in whom investments are made to effect their 
normalisation, but as cogs in a well-oiled production line. Governors were quick to 
point out the impact that overcrowding can have on their work:
“It is sad to say it but things feel as though they are going backwards. 
Overcrowding has come to dominate my thinking. It is about day-to-day survival 
and coping with the next busload arriving at the gate.”
“This may not be true for Governors of training prisons, mind you even those 
Governors are feeling the impact of the churn caused by overcrowding, but for me it 
is more about warehousing prisoners than doing anything else. Personally I find that 
very sad. It was not why I joined the Service those many years ago.”
10.5 Privatisation and market testing
One of the most controversial changes in the penal environment in recent decades has 
been the decision to use the private sector to provide custodial services. The 
involvement of the private sector can be seen as part of the broader and more 
developed managerialist agenda in relation to organisational design. Privatisation is 
an especially contentious aspect of criminal justice politics because it:
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‘Crystallizes a conflict of world views between a managerialist 
outlook concerned with utilities (the best prison is the one that most 
efficiently and correctly performs its allocated tasks) and one which 
emphasizes the moral and constitutional dilemmas of imprisonment 
(punishment is at best a necessary evil; it involves the exercise of 
power in imposing a painful deprivation and is hence a unique kind of 
public obligation)’ (Sparks et al 1996, p22).
The Prison Service was one of the first public sector organisations to feel the pressure 
of the market through the tendering and contracting out of some prisons (James and 
Raine 1998, p35). The Criminal Justice Act 1991 conferred powers on the Home 
Secretary to contract out the management of custodial facilities. Since their coming 
into force, the strategy to engage the private sector in the provision of prisons has 
developed three distinct approaches: provision and management of new prisons under 
the Private Finance Initiative (PFI); market testing of state owned prisons which are 
currently operating under a Service Level Agreement (SLA) by the public sector or 
under contract with the private sector; and contracting out the management of poor- 
performing state-owned establishments. By June 2003 implementing the strategy has 
resulted in: two state-owned prisons being handed over to the private sector to 
manage; two operating under SLAs within the public sector; and a further nine 
prisons procured and managed by the private sector under the Private Finance 
Initiative (National Audit Office 2003, p7-9). The long, and sometimes troublesome, 
development of privately-managed prisons has been well-documented elsewhere (see 
especially James et al 1997 and Harding 1997).
The Government has made clear its continuing support for a role for the private sector 
in the provision of Prison Services. In a statement by the then Prison Minister, at the 
time of publication of the Carter Report on Private Sector involvement in prisons, she 
made clear that the private sector had provided high-quality prison services at lower 
cost than the public sector (Hughes 2002). In addition to lower costs, it is argued that 
privatisation can provide ‘the opportunity to experiment and innovate in ways which 
would have been impossible in the Prison Service’ (James et al 1997, p66). 
Advocates of private prisons believe that the private sector offers the opportunity to 
generate fresh ideas and introduce new initiatives, as well as enabling the provider to
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break free from some of the entrenched operating principles and working practices of 
the Prison Service.
Privately managed prisons are now so entrenched as part of the penal landscape that 
policy makers and academics have become less preoccupied with debating the 
ideological considerations underpinning the case for or against privatisation and 
‘more concerned with consequentiality questions relating to the practical operation of 
public-private partnership and consideration of the forms and regulation of private 
sector involvement’ (Genders 2003, p i38).
A number of organisations and individuals do, however, continue to take a contrary 
view on the success of privatisation (see, for example, Prison Reform Trust 2001). 
What is clear is that the privatisation of prisons has entailed changes in structure and 
organisation of the Prison Service, policy-making, management and operation of 
prisons (what Stolz 1997 refers to as ‘correctional subgovemment’). If nothing else, 
when a private-sector company is contracted to run a prison, the profit motive gets 
introduced into the spectrum of existing multiple goals (Shichor 1999, p230).
For the purposes of the current study, the presenting issue is whether the character 
and process of private-sector involvement has influenced Governors and had an 
impact on what they do. There is an important distinction to be drawn between the 
specific benefits related to an individual prison and the broader impact on all prisons 
in the prison system. A number of commentators have pointed to the benefits of PFI 
to the prisons involved:
‘It is already beginning to be clear that these establishments tend to 
score well in terms of service delivery, clear management aims and 
the expectations of staff performance. They also tend to be innovative 
and to operate in a way that gives meaning to the prison service’s 
statement of vision, goals and values’ (Dunbar and Langdon 1998, 
p37).
‘A key innovation by the private sector has been in promoting a more 
constructive staffprisoner relationship’ (National Audit Office 2003, 
p7-9).
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When it comes to assessing the impact that PFI prisons have had on existing public- 
sector prisons, Governors were less convinced:
“Far too much attention has been wasted on the debates about the contracting-out 
of prisons. What difference has it made to [a training prison]? None, that’s how 
much.”
“One of the original reasons for going for privatisation was that the public-sector 
prisons would learn from the private sector. To be honest, that just hasn’t 
happened.”
“The DCMF [Design, Construct, Manage and Finance] or PFI prisons... haven’t 
really made much difference to what we do or the way we do it.”
“... don’t tell me that privatisation has had a big impact on the state sector 
because it hasn’t.”
The National Audit Office report on the Operational Performance of PFI Prisons 
took a similar view:
‘there is little available information on ... whether the use of PFI has 
brought wider benefits to the Prison Service ... we found only limited 
evidence that good practice from the private sector was being 
incorporated into public sector prisons’ (National Audit Office 2003, 
p5 and 34).
Since 1992, the Prison Service has permitted the public sector to compete directly 
with the private sector for the management of some existing prisons. (See Bryans 
1996 for the detailed early history.) This ‘market testing’ of prisons has, it is argued, 
improved the competitiveness of the public sector. The spur of competition had 
generated bids that represented levels of performance and value for money that had 
not previously been seen in the public or private sector. Having to compete with the 
private sector has pushed down costs and made Governors leading in-house bid 
teams think creatively about how to provide services. An important feature of the 
public-sector bids has been the active participation of the POA in the bidding 
process, who have agreed to significantly lower staffing levels than was the case 
before competition. The National Audit Office concluded:
‘The success of in-house management teams in bidding against 
private sector teams for the operation of prisons has been seen as an 
example of how performance has improved to the point that the
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Prison Service can now compete successfully on operating costs’ 
(National Audit Office 2003, p5).
Governors, on the other hand, did not think that market testing had had a broader 
impact, other than at the individual prisons which were being market tested:
“We all kept a beady eye on what was going on with market testing but it was 
something that other people were going through not us. After all, what are we 
talking about, wasn’t it only two, or was it three, prisons that were market tested 
in the end? That was not going to change the rest of the system. Just because the 
POA at Strangeways lowered their staffing levels my lot weren’t going to do the 
same.”
Today ‘market testing’ has been replaced by ‘performance testing’ whereby poor 
performing prisons are publicly identified and given six months in which to improve 
their performance. A failure to improve means that the prison faces closure or being 
contracted-out to the private sector, without the opportunity to do an in-house bid. 
Governors suggested that this form of performance testing did have a direct impact 
on them. First, as a matter of professional pride Governors did not want to appear at 
the bottom of a performance table, and secondly, Governors did not want their prison 
to be identified as a poor performing prison and subjected to performance testing:
“It’s been much more about league tables, performance levels and internal 
competition than about private prisons. All Governors, even if  they don’t admit it in 
public, try and keep off the bottom of the tables. That’s not about being privatised.
Exactly how many state prisons have been privatised? Well none, that’s how many 
and all that crap about market testing of open prisons, nothing happened -  it’s not 
the privatisation bit but professional pride. Who wants to be at the bottom of 
division three and heading for relegation.”
“I use the league tables to assess my performance against other comparable prisons 
and then use that to speak to staff about what we need to do to catch up. I find it a 
helpful tool because it’s not [me] telling them to do better but other prisons’ 
performance.”
The impact on Governors has therefore been more to do with competition than with 
privatisation, which reflects findings elsewhere (Donahue 1989 and James et al. 
1997, p i75). A former Director General is clear in his view of the benefits of 
competition:
‘No one can doubt what private sector competitiveness and the threat 
of contracting out has done for the better treatment of prisoners’
(Narey 2003).
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Governors find themselves today operating in a more competitive, and less 
collegiate, world. More than ever before, their focus is on how their prisons are 
performing relative to other similar prisons.
10.6 Risk management and actuarial approaches
Late-modern western society has seen a shift from ‘penal welfarism’ based on the 
rehabilitation of offenders to a ‘new penology’ focusing on the management of crime 
and risk (Garland 2001). The criminal justice system’s preoccupation with risk has 
been well documented (Douglas 1986 and 1992, Giddens 1990, Beck 1992, Hay and 
Sparks 1992, Ericson and Haggert 1997, Hudson 2003, Kemshall 2003). Risk 
management has increasingly tended to view offenders as members of specific 
categories and sub-populations (Cohen 1985, Reichman 1986) or as ‘aggregates of 
dangerous groups’ (Feeley and Simon 1992, p449). The emphasis is on managerial 
processes dedicated to classifying offenders into risk groups, and then managing 
them in groups (rather than as individuals), as a means of maintaining the system at 
minimum cost (Feeley and Simon 1994).
This ‘actuarial approach’ (Bottoms 1995 and Young 1999), has been reflected within 
the prison walls and there has been a ‘gradual infiltration of risk management 
principles into prison administration’ (Sparks et al 1996, p93). In the period from 
the mid- 1990s Governors became less concerned with the diagnosis, intervention 
and treatment of individual prisoners and more occupied with aggregate 
classifications to ensure secure confinement and control. Less attention was given to 
the elimination of future crime than to minimisation of the risks of escape, suicide 
and of self-harm, loss of order, and ‘embarrassing the minister’. Decisions were 
made:
‘... based not on study of the character of the offender or the nature of 
the offence, still less on any consideration of rights or due process, 
but on profiles of risk and dangerousness and on actuarial predictions 
of future behaviour, and danger to the public’ (Faulkner 2001, p95).
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Formal systems of internal rules and procedures for risk assessment have replaced 
Governors’ ‘professional’ judgment of risk. This more mechanistic approach has 
little need for human relationships or individual judgement, and decision-making has 
become more automatic and impersonal (Jones 2000). A number of Governors 
highlighted this issue:
“I see much less of prisoners these days and certainly make most decisions about 
them based on paper. I remember when I would see a prisoner before making a 
decision about his category or temporary release. I would interview him and reach a 
judgement about his suitability. It was all very subjective mind you and partly based 
on the cut of his jib, if  you see what I am getting at. But it was much more personal 
and you would use your experience and judgement.”
“Deciding on someone’s category has become much more scientific. Lots of 
algorithms and boxes.”
“These days though the emphasis from Headquarters seems to be more and more 
about taking a sheep-dip approach. It is less about the individual and more about 
prisoners as a group. Well, that makes it easier from a management point o f view -  
treat everyone the same and don’t waste time looking at what makes an individual 
tick - but is that really what this work should be about? When I joined it was more 
about individual needs and what was needed to stop prisoners reoffending.”
Professional assessments are increasingly seen as unimportant when compared to 
actuarial assessments based on factual information. Individual treatment needs have 
been replaced with group treatment needs, as individuals assume the shape of their 
diagnosed problem (Duguid 2001, p61). Concern has been expressed that the 
complexities o£ and differences among, offenders can be underestimated and 
‘offenders will be made to fit willy nilly, even if it means stretching them a bit or 
lopping offbits here and there’ (Leach 2000, pl45). Prisoners become members of a 
specific group and are labelled (‘addicted’, ‘untrained’, ‘violent’, ‘learning disabled’, 
‘sexual offender’, ‘career criminal’, ‘sociopath’) and are allocated into group 
programmes (‘anger management’, ‘drug treatment’, ‘enhanced thinking skills’, 
‘group counselling’, ‘job training’) along with others who are allocated a similar 
label. The individual identity is subsumed. All ‘sex offenders’, for example, are 
deemed in need of a sex offender treatment programme. All substance misusers are 
‘encouraged’ to do a drug treatment programme. And all prisoners with low 
educational levels are required to do basic education. Treating prisoners in groups 
rather than looking at individual needs has come under some criticism:
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‘. .. each prisoner is different. What works for one will not necessarily 
work for anyone else... the desire to offer basic literacy and 
numeracy skills seems to stem not so much from a wish to understand 
why the prisoner has offended, and what will help him or her to 
change, but from a more atheoretical interest in managing the prison 
population’ (Wilson and Reuss 2000, pi 1,19).
10.7 Conclusions
This chapter has sought to demonstrate that the environment in which Governors 
work today is more complex than the environment in which their predecessors 
operated. Governors and their decisions now face far more scrutiny. Prisoners are 
able to question and challenge a Governor’s action (or lack of action) in the courts, 
with the area manager and through the Ombudsman. Ministers and politicians are 
taking greater interest in prisons and are more inclined to comment on the internal 
operation of a prison than in the past. The media are also becoming more active in 
their willingness to expose what they consider to be relaxed regimes and ‘soft’ 
treatment of prisoners. Involvement of the private sector has also added to the 
pressure on Governors. Their prisons are now benchmarked against privately 
managed prisons and public prisons of a similar type. Governors are challenged as to 
why their prisons are performing ‘less well’. The way Governors deal with prisoners 
is also changing. The adoption of risk management, and an actuarial approach, has 
put Governors under some pressure to be more concerned with rational management 
and regulation of aggregates rather than with individual prisoner-focused 
interventions and needs.
The next chapter looks at the significant impact that one other environmental change 
has had on Governors -  the managerialisation of the Prison Service.
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CHAPTER 11: 
THE PRISON SERVICE AND MANAGERIALISM
Managerialism has, it can be argued, been the most significant development in the 
operation of our prisons in recent years. As the chapter will show, managerialism has 
changed the Governors’ world in a number of ways: the work they undertake; the 
way they are managed; and the level of discretion they can exercise.
11.1 New Public Management
It is widely acknowledged that organisations are driven to incorporate the practices 
and procedures defined by ‘the prevailing rationalized concept of organizational 
work’ (Meyer and Rowan 1977, p340). This is certainly true of public-sector 
organisations in this country, which have undergone something of a fundamental 
reformulation over the last two decades (see Pollitt 1993, Flynn 1997, Clarke et al. 
2000). The Conservative government in the 1980s, as part of its commitment to 
lowering public expenditure and redefining the role of the state, launched a major 
reform programme that affected the Prison Service, like other central government 
departments. The reform programme was based on the importation of a number of 
private-sector management techniques. This set of tools, ideas, beliefs and 
behaviours, when applied to the public sector, became known as New Public 
Management (NPM).
At first it seemed that the commitment of successive Conservative administrations to 
spending more on law and order, while cutting back elsewhere, seemed to save the 
criminal justice system from NPM changes sweeping through other areas of the 
public sector. Criminal justice professionals viewed themselves as ‘bystanders in the 
reform process’ (Clarke et al 1994a, p9). However, before long the criminal justice 
system itself was being subjected to the full rigours of NPM and radical changes 
were implemented across the criminal justice system (Garland 1990, McLaughlin 
and Muncie 1994).
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‘To differing degrees, the organisational culture and ways of working 
of the criminal justice agencies, like all other public sector 
organisations, have been transformed in recent years by the wave of 
managerialisation in part promoted and imposed by “new right” 
politicians as they have sought to inject private sector principles and 
practices into the public sector’ (Raine and Wilson 1997, p x).
What has taken place has been described as an ‘ideological process of 
managerialization’ which has transformed relationships of power, culture, control 
and accountability in public services (Clarke et al. 1994a, p3). Managerialisation 
(defined here to mean the implementation of NPM) has been an incremental process. 
There was no sudden departure from the ways things had been done previously and, 
as a result, many practitioners were unaware of the scale or degree of change that 
was taking place. The lack of a single clearly-defined NPM model created a certain 
fluidity (what Willcocks and Harrow 1992 call its ‘contingent’ nature) and each 
public-sector organisation took up the NPM mantle in different ways and to varying 
degrees.
11.2 Early managerialism and devolution to Governors
In the early 1990s Governors had limited devolved power over areas such as finance 
and personnel. Governors were unable, for example, to move resources from one 
area, to another, as a former Director General pointed out:
‘Governors were apparently unable to make basic decisions about 
such critical matters as how many people worked in their prisons, 
who they were, and what money was to be spent on’ (Lewis 1997,
p6).
A Governor described the historic position in this way:
“Well, first of all there were no budgets... The budgets were run by the 
functional groups in Headquarters who were the budget holders, so for example, 
the Chief Education Officer of the Prison Service held the education budget, so 
he could tell you how much it cost to run education in prisons. He may or may 
not have been able to tell you how much it cost to run education in any particular 
prison. But the Governor wouldn’t have known. The Governor had no financial 
responsibility... I mean really the only financial responsibility the Governor had 
as an accounting officer was to do cash checks.”
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Managerialism emphasised ‘decentralising management responsibilities’ (Pollitt 
1990, p55) and by the 1990s there was a clear view that: ‘Governors must be given 
the discretion to exercise their own judgements and to make a reality of their position 
as managers of the prison’ (Home Office 1991, para. 3.7). The work of Headquarters 
was redirected to help Governors govern their establishments, within policies, 
strategies and objectives established by ministers, and subject to the resources 
available. The role of Headquarters was to be transformed into one that would 
provide ‘the advice, assistance and instructions necessary to achieve those ends’ 
(Home Office 1991, para. 3.8).
As a result, responsibility was devolved to Governors in the key areas of finance, 
personnel and prison regime. With devolution came increased responsibility as 
Governors were held to account for a range of matters over which their predecessors 
had no control:
“Certainly there is the whole area with devolution of responsibility for budgets, and 
for recruitment, selection, and promotion of staf£ and a whole other range of purely 
devolved responsibilities. But I think probably the biggest issue has been the 
emphasis on actually managing the whole of the establishment in a much more 
cohesive kind of a way. I think, certainly going back to when I joined, it felt very 
much as though the Governor kind of managed almost the ethos o f the 
establishment, and little else, and that other professionals managed other 
professional groups within the establishment, whereas I think it is much more now a 
question of the Governor managing the establishment, and all the groups of 
professionals in it.”
The devolution of financial management gave Governors the freedom to respond 
flexibly to changing needs and demands. They were able to move money (and hence 
staff) from one area to another, and fund new initiatives locally.
“Increased devolution of financial management and accountability dramatically 
increased the Governor’s ability to manipulate the budget to meet the strategic 
needs of the establishment.”
With increased control over budgets came greater accountability for ensuring that the 
budget was not exceeded and an expectation that ‘efficiency savings’ would be 
delivered. For example, in 1995 Governors were told that they had to reduce costs by 
an average of four to five per cent per year, or 13.5 per cent in three years from April
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1996 (HM Prison Service 1998). For the first time each Governor was required to 
achieve financial savings at his or her own prison.
The devolution of responsibility for personnel matters also had a major impact on 
Governors’ work. Governors found themselves dealing directly with staff 
recruitment, selection and discipline. Historically all these areas had been the 
responsibility of Headquarters or regional offices. Provided that Governors were able 
to find the funding from within their budgets they were able to create new posts, 
select and appoint staff, conduct promotion boards, and discipline or dismiss staff on 
performance or health grounds:
“The issues of personnel, managing staff resources, using staff resources, much of 
that was forced on us by devolution of responsibilities, but it is a good thing. It is 
something we should have been doing. There was an era of Governors who didn’t 
hire or fire, therefore didn’t take any responsibility for performance.”
“With devolved personnel, you have much more freedom than you used to, but 
when I first took over as Governor... it was difficult to get rid of staff it was 
difficult to manage staff because of personnel systems, you were stuck with a staff 
which you didn’t really have control over. Even though it takes up a lot of my time,
I can now manage staffing properly. ”
Devolution took place in other areas such as regime development. Governors were 
given the freedom to provide and manage prisoner work at their prisons. By 1993 
Governors were ‘free to find local sources of work’ for their prisoners (Simon 1999, 
p63) and some Governors embraced the ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ (Osborne and 
Gaebler 1992) with great enthusiasm:
“It was an exciting period as we could finally tell PSIF [Prison Service Industry and 
Farms Division] where to get off. It was suddenly up to you to decide what regime 
and work you wanted in your prison.”
“Once we got the freedom, we could go outside the Service and look for local work 
opportunities. It was a bit like being a businessman and looking for local markets. 
We came up with some very innovative work schemes.”
Governors were clear in their view that the scope for individuality increased 
significantly in the early 1990s, as Governors were given more devolved 
responsibility:
“In the days of Derek Lewis [Director General of the Prison Service 1992-95] 
much was devolved to Governors, things like budgets and staffing levels. We
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could pretty much do what we wanted with the money as long as it was within the 
rules... It really did feel like we were running our own businesses.”
11.3 Managerialism as the panacea
Governors made good use of their devolved powers, often did not fully implement 
directions from Headquarters, and in some cases increasingly disregarded the centre. 
A significant variation between prisons in what they were delivering emerged as a 
consequence of Governors deciding which policy to implement and where to use 
their financial resources. One commentator put this way:
‘If not restricted ... the field administrations may de facto become 
more or less independent from central headquarters or even turn their 
prisons into fiefdoms’ (Boin 1998, p68).
The mid 1990s also saw a number of organisational failures: six exceptional-risk 
prisoners, including five IRA terrorists, escaped from HMP Whitemoor using 
firearms; a pound of Semtex was discovered in the false bottom of an artist’s 
paintbox belonging to an IRA prisoner; guns were found at HMP Manchester and in 
the process of being smuggled into HMP Durham; Fred West hanged himself in 
Winson Green prison; and three prisoners (two of whom were category A) escaped 
from HMP Parkhurst, a maximum-security dispersed prison (see Lewis 1997, pi 50- 
165). This degree of organisational failure undermined political and public 
confidence in the Service and led some to the view that devolution had gone too far 
and some fundamental changes were needed.
Senior Prison Service officials came to the conclusion that the use of managerialist 
tools would be the most effective way of achieving the much-needed change, as 
these quotes from senior officials indicate:
“Something had to be done... Some Governors were simply not implementing 
Orders, others were, quite frankly, not up to it. We had lost public and political 
confidence and things had to be changed. So we tightened up line management, 
built in a bit of competition and got rid of some crap Governors.”
“We looked at how we could make sure that things changed ... we all knew that 
performance across the estate varied hugely and that some area managers were not 
doing their job. They were not sorting out foiling prisons. Part of the problem 
though was a lack of data to compare prisons and when we got that we could see 
where things were going wrong.”
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“We were all adopting what had previously been private-sector management tools 
... we had to improve our performance somehow, and the new management 
approach had started to work so we kept going with it.”
“I attended a few meetings around then and there was a good consensus about what 
we should do. To start with we needed to be clear about what was needed, set 
standards, tell people what they should be doing and then police them to make sure 
that they did it. Simple stuff really but not something that the Service had really 
done before.”
The Prison Service had to decide how to co-ordinate, control and direct potentially 
‘recalcitrant’ Governors. Managerialism presented itself as a strong and authoritative 
approach that would solve the problem. It called for strategies for the future, rational 
and effective use of resources, consistent delivery and vigorous pursuit of the 
achievement of targets.
11.4 Changes to organisational structure
Every organisation finds itself confronted with ‘the same basic constitutional 
problem’ of deciding what level of control is necessary to ensure minimum levels of 
performance and adherence to organisational requirements (Selznick 1957). The 
Prison Service responded to the large-scale organisational failure by opting for a 
more cohesive and integrated service organisation, adopting managerialist tools, and 
shifting power from Governors to the centre. This move to a more ‘rational-legal 
bureaucracy’, in which the central administration formulates policy, develops 
comprehensive rules and regulations and unceasingly monitors the prison’s day-to- 
day activities (Jacobs 1977, p73) has had a number of consequences, as a former 
Chief Inspector of Prisons commented:
‘The numbers working in the ‘faceless monolith’ that was Prison 
Service Headquarters had grown from 168 in the days of the Prison 
Commission to more than 1800. From it spewed an endless stream of 
rules, regulations, operating standards, operating instructions, orders, 
targets and performance indicators...’ (Ramsbotham 2003, p76).
In terms of Mintzberg’s model of organisational design configurations, the Prison 
Service developed into a ‘machine bureaucracy’ within which the technostructure 
(analysts and central office administrators) became dominant, and exercised 
increasing control through standardisation of rules and procedures, and data
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collection and analysis (Mintzberg 1983). This bureaucratisation has created an 
organization whose ‘structure and operations are governed to a high degree by 
written rules’ (Mann 1984, p28). A priority is now placed on prisons carrying out 
strictly-defined tasks that produce determinable, impartial, and impersonal 
operations for a whole range of functions within the prison. What has emerged as a 
result is an ever-increasing level of cohesion and uniformity in practice, with a 
concomitant sacrificing of local diversity and discretion.
From the point of view of Governors, there was a clear re-composition of previous 
modes of power within the Prison Service. Managerialism became synonymous with 
the demise of Governors’ organizational power and a clear shift in power from 
Governors to the centre (defined as Headquarters and its field representatives, the 
area managers). Governors pointed to the way in which devolution increasingly 
became a fiction:
“Actually the area manager can take any bit of their budget away at any time o f the 
year, and give it to somebody else.”
“So much of my budget is ring-fenced by Headquarters for specific purpose it’s 
hardly worth being in charge of the budget.”
Other areas, which were initially devolved to Governors, were returned to central 
control:
“... the contract for catering and contract for education are not signed by me, and 
that irritated me and it weakened my ability to effect the delivery locally of kitchen 
and education.”
“I have seen it go back to something that is very centralised. I think they are trying 
to pull it back to a very centralised way.”
Restrictions were placed on what Governors could deliver within their prison regime. 
For example, the programme accreditation process (whereby the Correctional 
Services Accreditation Panel authorises which offending behaviour programmes can 
be run in prisons - Joint Prison/Probation Accreditation Panel 2002) is seen by some 
Governors as ‘a further, and not entirely benign, limitation on the range and content 
of the programmes and courses which they can offer’ (Carlen 2001, p6):
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“I must admit to some niggling concerns about the current push to only deliver 
‘What Works’ programmes. We have been doing some good interventions over 
many years and we are now being forced to dump them in favour of the ‘What 
Works’ programmes. I honestly question whether some of them will actually 
work. But the worst bit of all this is that I can no longer run what I know does 
work for my prisoners.”
11.5 Performance management
The desire to control Governors, and to improve the level of each prison’s 
performance, manifested itself most clearly in the adoption of a performance 
management framework. The framework consisted of: minimum standards; targets; 
performance indicators; and a clearly set-out personal accountability framework for 
Governors. The introduction of a number of these performance-regulating tools into 
the Prison Service has had a significant impact on Governors.
11.5.1 Minimum Standards
For many years there had been a debate over whether minimum standards should be 
set for various aspects of the prison regime. (For the history of the development of 
minimum standards see Bryans and Wilson 2000, p i50-153.) The issue was 
formally addressed in the 1991 White Paper, which led to the introduction of a series 
of consistent mandatory standards. The White Paper made clear that the standards 
would provide an ‘objective framework’ in which to measure performance of 
establishments (Home Office 1991, para. 7.22). However, it was not until April 1994 
that Minimum Operating Standards were first published. The covering letter, by the 
Director General, made clear that ‘meeting the operational standards will be a line 
management responsibility’ (HM Prison Service 1994e). Governors were, for the first 
time, made personally accountable for their establishments’ achieving these defined 
standards.
Standards were set initially for security and later for all aspects of the prison regime. 
The last decade has seen the introduction of 72 standards to which each prison must 
comply. Today standards cover everything from accommodation and hygiene to 
industrial relations and regimes (Leech and Shepherd 2003, p28-32, and HM Prison 
Service 2000b). The development of mandatory minimum standards has increasingly
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constrained and directed Governors in what they can and cannot do, as Governors 
pointed out:
“I sometimes feel that my hands are tied. We are increasingly getting to a point 
where every minute detail of a prison will be the subject o f a standard. I have 
very little discretion to move away from the prescribed standards.”
“It’s much more like MacDonalds than it was. There are huge manuals setting out 
standards and how to do things. We must comply with these central directives 
and all be the same.”
“My professional judgement and skills are not needed as much these days. It’s 
about following detailed instructions and doing what we are told.”
11.5.2 Orders and Instructions
A constant theme that caused friction between Governors and their line managers 
during the 1990s was whether Instructions to Governors were mandatory. This 
culture of non-compliance was most famously exposed by Sir John Woodcock in his 
report on the escape of prisoners from HMP Whitemoor: ‘It could be said that what 
the Prison Service needs to do most of all is to comply with its own written 
instructions’ (Woodcock 1994, para. 9.27). A similar theme was found in the 
Learmont Report which pointed out that ‘the rules are in place. What is now needed 
is the resolve to abide by them’ (Learmont 1995a, para. 6.15).
In response to this criticism, a new system of Prison Service Orders (PSO) and 
Instructions (PSI) was introduced in 1997 that made clear which elements were 
mandatory. These documents created comprehensive and detailed directions on how 
to implement policy and exercise discretion. PSO and PSI now cover all aspects of 
prison life and have increasingly specified what Governors should be doing. There 
are now 147 PSO (Leech and Shepherd 2003, p518-524), compared to only 27 
Standing Orders, which they were introduced to replace. Some Governors expressed 
concern that their discretion had been severely curtailed by the new system:
“We have rather gone back to this tying it down on paper and you know, I mean 
look, two manuals came in today, when in God’s name am I going to read those but 
there’s whole pages of it that says ‘the Governor will’. So I think that Headquarters 
has gone back towards centralised control.”
“Today everything we do is specified in a manual. Do this, do that, don’t do that and 
so on and on and on. It gets to me sometimes. Things were much simpler when the
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Governor just decided things. It is getting so bad that it won’t be too long before 
there’s a manual telling me what I should be wearing!”
11.5.3 Business plans and contracts
The process of holding Governors to account for delivering specified outputs began 
in the late 1980s with the setting of corporate objectives for each establishment 
(Fittall 1989). The development of corporate objectives at establishment level, 
together with the collection of quantifiable information on the actual delivery against 
those objectives (HM Prison Service 1989a and Evans 1990) gave Governors, and 
importantly, their line managers performance information on the delivery of selected 
activities for the first time. The introduction of computer programs enabled the 
compilation of data, and its transmission electronically to Headquarters, on a weekly 
basis. This ‘corporate objectives’ approach was the first real attempt at specifying 
outputs and then measuring actual performance.
The introduction of business plans for each establishment in 1993, along with a new 
style contract, further embedded a performance management approach. The 
‘development of new forms of contractual relationships’ (Clarke et a l 1994a, p24) 
was a common feature of managerialism as it was adopted in the criminal justice 
system. At the end of each year, the completed business plan showed the 
performance that had been achieved and formed the annual report for the 
establishment. It also contained the level of achievement against local targets. 
Governors were no longer able to produce subjective and anecdotal reports of the 
activities of their establishments, which had been the norm previously.
The new output-based quantitative annual reports allowed the area manager to assess 
the performance of a Governor through a detailed examination of the performance of 
the prison. Governors described the changes in this way:
“It came as rather a culture shock for people from the old school like me. I used to 
quite enjoy writing my annual report on the performance of the prison. I would wax 
lyrical about what had happened and what we had achieved and say what my plans 
were for the future.”
“The new system of business planning was clearly based on a commercial 
perspective... I certainly felt that it was mechanistic and took some of the trust out
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of the relationship. It was as if  Governors could no longer be trusted to get on with 
the job.”
“It all became much more visible and explicit if  you know what I mean. You said at 
the beginning of the year what you were going to deliver and the area manager said 
at the end whether you had or not based on the figures.”
11.5.4 Key Performance Targets
Contained within the business plans were Key Performance Targets (KPTs), which 
were based on the national Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), and reflected the 
level of performance expected from each prison. Today, each prison has around 48 
KPTs. The underpinning purpose of KPTs was to drive up the performance of 
Governors and their prisons, and to contribute to the achievement of the Service’s 
KPIs. The then Director General pointed out to the 1997 Home Affairs Committee:
‘It is irrefutable that our performance has improved enormously over 
this period. I think the biggest contributor has been the establishment 
of key performance indicators and targets. This has focused people’s 
attention on improving performance’ (Home Office 1997, vol 1, para.
133).
The introduction of KPTs created a number of issues for Governors. It led Governors 
to focus on a narrow range of areas -  the areas covered by the KPTs. A number of 
Governors were quick to point to the dangers of focusing on areas that could easily 
be measured, rather than on more qualitative but important aspects of the operation 
of a prison. As one Governor put it:
“It is easy enough to measure simple things such as escapes and drug tests 
through KPIs but what about other areas which are just as important like justice 
and fairness. The danger with the current KPIs is that they distort what a 
Governor focuses on. I am as guilty as the next man, I put all my efforts into 
hitting my KPIs and sometimes I am sad to say it is at the expense o f other 
things.”
A focus on narrow measures may therefore ‘inhibit and deflect managers’ (Newell 
2002, p i2) from more fundamental changes such as attitudinal change, how staff and 
prisoners relate to each other and legitimacy issues.
Governors, like managers elsewhere, were tempted to distort the data to present a 
‘rosy picture of their achievements’ (Boyne et al 2003, p33). Governors were quick
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to point out that performance levels could be ‘adjusted’ as KPI data was collected 
and ‘interpreted’ locally:
“I don’t think KPIs have got a great deal to do with being a good prison and I say 
that simply on the grounds that we can massage almost any of the figures we have to 
meet KPIs.”
“It is easy to spin the KPI data, believe me. If you want to play games with it you 
can. I have heard of Governors logging staff meetings and POA meetings as staff 
training, backdating request/complaints, reducing the frequency of PPM [planned 
maintenance], removing people from offending behaviour courses early to get new 
starters, I could go on but you know what I mean.”
The National Audit Office also highlighted the problems with the data collection 
systems and accuracy of the data collected:
‘the internal monitoring of data varied considerably as did the 
validity of the data’ (National Audit Office 2003, para. 2.6).
One of the effects of this strand of managerialism has been to direct Governors’ 
attention to the internal functioning of their prisons and away from the social 
purposes of imprisonment. The Prison Service’s KPIs are centred on process and 
outputs rather than outcomes -  they are about the number of offending behaviour 
places and education qualifications rather than reconviction rates and crime 
reduction. As Feeley and Simon point out: ‘the importance that recidivism once had 
in evaluating the performance of corrections is now being taken up by measures of 
system functioning’ (1992, p456). This ‘decoupling’ of performance evaluation from 
external social objectives makes it more difficult to evaluate whether institutions are 
achieving their substantive social ends. One Governor emphatically made this point:
‘we must be careful not to believe everything we see as performance 
improvement affecting desired outcomes: despite all our efforts the 
standard reconviction rate for prisoners remains the same’ (Newell 
2002, plO).
11.5.5 Monitoring and audit
The creation of standards and the promulgation of orders is only part of the picture. 
The new performance management framework required that people be held 
accountable for delivery against those standards and for implementing orders. For the
174
purpose of assessing performance, data had to be collected, monitoring mechanisms 
introduced and an audit structure created.
Technological innovation, and the desire to monitor performance in greater detail, 
led to the technostructure increasing in importance. This technostructure created 
information management systems and ‘computerizing of virtually every database 
imaginable’ (Freeman 1999, p99). The advent of facsimile machines and, more 
recently, electronic mail, led to greater micro management, as communications 
between Headquarters and establishments became instantaneous. Area managers and 
Headquarters were able to request information, issue instructions, and monitor 
performance, in ‘real time’.
Governors soon found that not only were they required to provide detailed 
information returns but that a Standards Audit Unit had been set up to assess their 
level of compliance. Prisons are now faced with a barrage of internal and external 
audits and inspections. Many Governors expressed concern over the amount of time 
that has to be put into preparing audits and dealing with their aftermath:
“I think we are over-audited. There are too many people looking at what you are 
doing. We waste so much time preparing for audits and inspections, then doing 
them and then of course we have all the action plans in the reports. By the time you 
have read them someone else is at the gate wanting to have another audit.”
“We have got more inspectors and auditors than you could shake a stick at, you 
know. I think really that they are great wedges of managerialism being injected into 
prisons.”
Prisons are now measured against KPTs, audited against standards and inspected by 
an independent inspectorate. Yet it is possible to pass an audit, deliver the KPT 
performance and yet be severely criticised by the Chief Inspector on an inspection:
‘High and improving scores on the indicators would still be combined 
with an overall performance which would be perceived as harsh, 
oppressive or unjust. A prison ... may well perform well on its key 
performance indicators, but still be the subject of public criticism or 
an adverse inspection report’ (Faulkner 2001, p85).
Unfortunately for Governors each monitoring mechanism has different baselines and 
approaches. KPTs have a narrow focus and are about delivering numbers. Audits are
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about systems and processes, with little or no attention to quality. If procedures are in 
place, documents filled in and notices displayed, then an establishment is likely to be 
compliant (Newell 2002). Whereas the Chief Inspector deals in a subjective appraisal 
of establishments based on key values and principles and focuses more on outcomes. 
A former Chief Inspector put it in this way:
‘The Inspectorate and the Prison Service appeared to be working to 
two different agendas. Our parliamentary remit required us to 
concentrate on the treatment of and conditions for prisoners. Prison 
Service management concentrated on exact compliance with rules and 
regulations, and the achievement of a myriad of targets and 
performance indicators. These were more to do with process in 
prisons than outcomes for prisoners’ (Ramsbotham 2003, p218).
From the Governors’ point of view the difference of approach can produce mixed 
messages about an establishment’s performance:
‘I am sitting at my desk contemplating two reports which have arrived 
on my desk almost simultaneously. The Inspectorate report says I am 
a decent bloke trying to run a prison on tuppence ha’penny. The 
report of the security audit basically says that I am the handmaiden of 
Satan’ (Prison Governors Association 2001b).
Whatever the criticism of these arrangements, Governors are today far more closely 
monitored against standards and plans, and have to account for what their 
establishment delivers. Governors believe that their work is subject to greater 
scrutiny, and that they are far more accountable for the detail of their work, than their 
predecessors.
“Everything is measured and there is much more accountability.”
“It’s clearly a much more, or it’s expected to be a much more accountable role, 
there’s much more scrutiny over everything...”
11.6 League tables and competition
Flowing from the introduction of KPTs came another managerial tool -  league tables 
and competition between prisons. The Director General at the time described the 
purpose of this approach:
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‘A powerful tool for reinforcing a performance culture is 
measurement. We introduced individual targets for each prison, ... 
that in itself concentrated the minds of Governors, but the publication 
of inter prison comparisons was even more effective’ (Lewis 1997, 
p79).
The Prison Service has made various attempts to create league tables showing 
comparative performance between prisons and thus identify poor performing prisons. 
The most recent version involves a quarterly system of ranking prisons, known as the 
‘weighted scorecard’. It scores an individual prison’s performance against its target, 
its previous performance and the performance of other prisons in the same category. 
Individual targets are then weighed according to the prison type. For example, 
escapes are weighed more heavily in a maximum-security prison than in an open 
prison.
Governors remain concerned that league tables do not identify what a prison is really 
like but simply reflect what can be measured:
‘There is a reality to prison life which we cannot easily measure but 
prisoners, members of staff and visitors know when performance is 
good or bad... No league table accurately reflects this. Our 
performance is not just about statistics, it is about everything we do’ 
(Wagstaflfe 2002, p2).
Using a range of data and subjective impressions, prisons are today rated on a 
performance scale (from 4 indicating exceptionally high performance, to 1 for poor 
performer). Prison Performance Ratings were first published outside the Prison 
Service in July 2003 (HM Prison Service 2003a). Poor performing prisons are 
subject to performance testing and, if performance does not improve, contracted-out 
to the private sector (see section 10.5).
Governors had mixed views about comparative tables showing relative performance 
levels across the prison estate:
“I feel that the climate is so competitive now, using other establishments as 
benchmarks or examples to compare against.”
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“We may all say that the tables are not important but I bet you everyone looks to see 
where they are and tries damn hard to get better results each year - 1 know I do.” 
“One of the sad things for me is that we are so preoccupied with KPIs and league 
tables that the things that are not measured are lost sight of. As Governor I try to 
look to the bigger picture but that’s difficult when all the area manager wants to 
look at is how well I score in the tables ... you could certainly say that it has 
changed my focus and what I look at.”
11.7 Line management of Governors
One of the most significant developments in recent years has been the strengthening 
of the line management of Governors. These changes have had a major impact on 
how Governors operate and on their level of accountability. Until the late 1980s the 
organisational structure failed to provide clear and effective line management of 
Governors (HM Prison Service 1989b). There was confusion as to whether 
Headquarters and regional offices existed to advise or to direct, as one Governor 
reflected:
“I used to work for a wonderful Governor. He was a delightful man and people 
would ’phone from Headquarters and his first question was “to whom do I 
speak?” and I think if  they were anything below about senior principal, he would 
tell them to go away and find somebody who had the proper rank to address him 
and then they would clearly ask him to do things and you would hear him say no, 
no, no, and they obviously would say at the end why and he would say, because I 
am too old, I am too tired and I am too rich, good morning... He shouldn’t really 
have done it but he actually got away with it and he wouldn’t anymore.”
The main weakness of the structure was that the management of Governors was in 
the hands of only four regional directors and their teams. Many regional staff 
regarded their role as being to provide support and advice rather than manage their 
Governors. The span of command for each regional director was between 25 and 39 
Governors, which was regarded as ‘impossibly wide’. As a result, there was ‘no clear 
and effective management chain between the top of the Service and Governors’ (HM 
Prison Service 1989b). A number of Governors spoke of the distant management 
exhibited under the regional structure:
“There was nobody to say nay or question it and, as I think you know, there was 
never any contact, or very minimal contact, with regional office.”
“Regional directors ... didn’t visit too regularly and Governors very much did as 
they wanted.”
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A decision was taken in 1991 to restructure the management of Governors, with the 
creation of geographical groupings of nine or 10 establishments under 15 area 
managers. These changes fundamentally changed the way Governors were managed. 
Governors were, for the first time, closely monitored and supervised. There was 
some sensitivity over the impact that the area managers would have on Governors, 
which led the Service to make clear that ‘strengthening management should not be
seen as a threat to the position of the governor as the person in charge of the
establishments’ (HM Prison Service 1989b, p20). However, the creation of this ‘new 
managerial strata’ (McLaughlin and Muncie 1994, p i20) resulted in a redistribution 
of power and resources from Governors to area managers.
Governors pointed out that there was still some confusion in the early 1990s as to 
whether the area manager existed to support, advise or direct Governors.
“One of the things that struck me forcibly about being in Headquarters and seeing a 
number of area managers operate, both from their own offices and in area
managers’ meetings, is that there is no agreed structure for the way area managers 
operate. Each area is managed as a function of the personality of the individual, 
very much so. There is no real sense of what exactly the area manager should be 
doing.”
The inability of the area manager to fetter a Governor’s statutory discretion added to 
the ambiguity, as a Home Office review noted:
‘... neither the area manager nor anyone else can give instructions to 
governors on the matter on which they have statutory discretion. In 
accordance with the general principles of administrative law, no one 
may fetter the governor’s discretion in exercising such powers. The 
current arrangement is, therefore, somewhat of a contrivance. 
Moreover, it sends a signal to the service about the degree of 
independence which governors enjoy which is not completely 
compatible with effective line management, and which is undesirable 
in an organisation with no established culture of following 
instructions’ (Home Office 1995).
The then Director General had no doubt about the role of area manager:
‘Some governors claimed that the 1952 Prison Act gave them the 
freedom of action and immunity from instruction by their bosses, and 
some area managers behaved as though they believed that to be the 
case... Time and time again I had to drive home the message that
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operational directors, area managers and governors were all line 
managers with both authority and responsibility for results’ (Lewis 
1997, p78).
By 1996 it was clear that Governors had lost the internal power struggle and an 
assessment of the role of area managers concluded that they were the essential 
mechanism for the supervision, control and development of an operational Prison 
Service (HM Prison Service 1996c). The transfer of power to area managers was 
completed in 1997, when all policy formulation responsibility was removed from 
them in order to enable them to focus solely on line-managing their Governors.
As a result of these developments, there is now much closer supervision of a 
Governor’s work than has ever been the case previously. Area managers now 
supervise around eight prisons each, compared to previous arrangements where one 
regional director managed between 25 and 39 establishments.
“The area manager is able to see his or her governing Governor at least every month 
... to visit each of their establishments at least monthly.”
“I don’t think you, as a Governor, now feel so autonomous as previous Governors 
did. The introduction of area managers changed that. ”
Each area manager now has a significant area office that includes: analysts; auditors; 
senior investigating officer; and specialist advisors (works, personnel, security, equal 
opportunities, regimes, drugs, resettlement):
“It sometimes feels that the area manager has more admin staff than I’ve got to run [a 
small training prison]. She has more bag carriers and experts than the old regional 
director had to run a huge region. I guess she is only protecting her back and keeping 
an eye on what her Governors are doing but it does seem excessive.”
There has been a transformation of the relationship between Governors and 
Headquarters. Supportive supervision has been replaced with taut and robust 
management. The introduction of contracts and Service Level Agreements has 
reinforced the contractual and performance-based nature of the relationship:
“Governors are just managed much more than they ever used to be, so that has 
affected very much the approach to the job.”
“Governors feel that they have less freedom in terms of the line management that 
came in under area managers - we are less autonomous.”
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“My new area manager did pay a lot more attention to detail and did want to be 
involved a fair bit in what was happening with the place ... she said what I will 
want is to be assured that you are delivering and when I come round I will expect to 
see certain things.”
“I think some area managers are more into audit mode, Mr Clipboard, going around 
ticking the boxes, asking where are the cleaning schedules, where’s this, where’s 
that, and that.. .What they all have in common, and it’s increasingly becoming quite 
clear, is the drive for them all to get their Governors to achieve the targets that are 
set for them...They are not particularly interested in why you haven’t achieved it, 
it’s how well you have achieved it.”
One of the consequences of managerialism is that it tends to ‘relocate 
professionalism up the hierarchy’ (McWilliams 1992). Changes to line management 
arrangements led some Governors to raise the issue of who was really governing 
prisons. The level of involvement, and direction of day-to-day matters, suggests that 
a number of area managers have interpreted their role as being that of ‘super’ 
Governor:
“I worked for one area manager, who would basically just shout at people and tell 
the Governors what he expected them to do in minute detail on just about 
everything in the prison.”
“Some of these area managers see themselves as ‘super Governors’ and try to run 
your prison for you. Always phoning and faxing wanting some stupid bit of 
information or asking you why you did this and that, or more often why you have 
not done something. You might not mind as much if  they were actually any good at 
running their own prisons. Many of them were crap at it or only governed for a 
short while.”
The more performance-based, hands-on approach adopted by area managers has led 
some Governors to question the legitimacy of area managers:
“They are always bloody interfering. If it is not difficult enough governing, you 
have now got to keep looking over your shoulder as the bloody area manager is 
second-guessing you all the time. It has changed the way we do the job. You ask 
any of the Governors you are interviewing, they will tell you that you spend most of 
the time doing stuff for area office rather than running the prison.”
11.8 Assessing the impact of managerialism on Governors
While some would dismiss managerialism as some ‘Thatcherite, neo-liberal or neo­
conservative political project’ (Clarke et al. 1994b, p227) aimed at reducing the cost 
of public services, it was seen by criminal justice organisations as a means to drive up
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their performance (Loveday 1999). The Prison Service enthusiastically adopted the 
various private-sector management tools and techniques. A Governor commented:
“I would suggest that the Prison Service has surpassed almost every other 
organisation in the implementation of managerialism in its service.”
At first Governors generally welcomed the new approach as it resulted in increased 
devolution and greater freedom from the centre. However, it soon became clear that 
the introduction of various managerial tools would increase Governors’ 
accountability. The late 1990s saw the development of various forms of competition 
(private-sector involvement, market testing, performance testing and league tables); 
the setting of clear standards of performance; the creation of key performance 
indicators and targets; development of robust line management to monitor and assess 
delivery; and the construction of an audit infrastructure to ensure compliance. 
Middle management (area managers) has been redeployed to rationalize and regulate 
the daily operation of the prison system -  what Foucault presciently called 
‘supervising the process of the activity rather than the result’ (Foucault 1979, pi 37).
Managerialism has not been without its critics. Governors have suggested that the 
danger with over reliance on performance data is that it ‘can mislead us into thinking 
we are achieving something we are not’ (Newell 2002, plO) and the Prison Service 
will become ‘an organisation that is cynical, overshadowed by managerialism and 
which values people less than statistics’ (Wagstaffe 2002, p4). A former Chief 
Inspector of Prisons expressed his own reservations about managerialism:
‘Managerialism includes the fallacious belief that you can achieve 
[the Prison Service goals] by demanding and measuring exact 
compliance with budgets, targets, performance indicators, 
orchestrating the process with a plethora of rules, operating standards, 
operating instructions, orders, visions and mission statements, all 
backed up by frequent reports and returns on everything you can think 
of, often reporting the same thing in different ways to a variety of 
different people’ (Ramsbotham 2001, p43).
As a result of these managerialist changes some at the centre began to see Governors 
as managers whose role was to manage a ‘service unit’ and ensure that it met targets, 
delivered services according to laid-down standards and kept within budget. The then
182
Director General of the Prison Service was robust in his defence of the introduction 
of a performance culture:
‘The year [1999-2000] saw a greater emphasis on firm and effective 
line management based on the need to deliver on our targets.
Detailed monthly meetings between the DDG and area managers 
closely examined the performance of all their establishments 
against key performance targets and were followed up with focused 
line management by area managers of Governors. This process has 
allowed poor performers to be identified and the issues addressed 
and dealt with at an early stage’ (HM Prison Service 2000c, p28).
‘... I am also looking for further improvements in performance 
against target ... I want the Service to have a performance culture. I 
want us to measure ourselves against stretching targets and improve 
year on year’ (Narey 2001, p7).
While it can be argued that the managerialisation of Governors was a necessary 
‘corollary of the dismantling of the structures of bureau-professionalism’ (Clarke et 
al 1994a, p25) some suspected a more sinister motive. By creating managers out of 
Governors, it was thought that they could be more easily controlled.
Part six now goes on to look at where these internal and external environmental 
changes leave the role and work of today’s Governors. It considers the generic role 
and duties that Governors perform, before identifying the prison-specific work that 
they do. It concludes by discussing the reality of governing in a managerialist 
environment and seeks to discover whether today’s Governors are ‘managing’ or 
‘governing’.
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PART SIX: 
GOVERNING PRISONS
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CHAPTER 12: 
GENERIC ROLE AND DUTIES
Part six of the thesis explores in detail the various aspects of the role and work of 
today’s Governors. Chapters 12 and 13 use data generated during the interviews with 
Governors, and information from Governors’ job descriptions, to identity the various 
roles and duties that Governors undertake. Chapter 14 then considers the reality of 
governing from the individual Governor’s perspective and identifies variations 
between Governors in what they do.
12.1 Defining the Governor’s role
Role can be defined as: an actor’s part; one’s function; what a person or thing is 
appointed or expected to do (Oxford English Dictionary 1985); the part or character 
which one undertakes, assumes, or has to play (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 
2002); and a socially expected behaviour pattern usually determined by an 
individual’s status in a particular society (Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 
1973). In short, role is not only about what a Governor does, but also about the 
patterned expectations attached to the Office of Governor.
“I see role as a sort of wider and more kind of rounded definition than tasks and 
duties. Or to put the point another way, I would see tasks and duties being an 
element, or two elements in a role, but I think role embraces such concepts as 
status, I mean status in the kind of sociological sense rather than in the lay sense. So 
I suppose a kind of snappy definition, sort of working definition of role would be 
the position of the Governor in the totality of the organisation - in this case the 
Prison Service.”
Despite the general consensus on the importance of the Governors’ role, there has 
been little literature that explores what Governors do and the roles that they occupy, 
as one of the Governors pointed out:
“There has never been a really deep look at how the role has changed, what the 
current role is, and what the requirements are in terms of personality attributes, 
training, skills, and so on. I think, understandably, I think it has just kind of evolved 
historically.”
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One author suggested that the Governor’s role was as simultaneously a manager, 
leader, co-ordinator, expert and administrator (Reed 1985). More recently, a review 
of the Prison Service described the role of Governor as that of:
‘General manager, but with a significant professional component 
which relates to managing prisons and managing staff and, most 
critically, managing the interface between the two ... there is also a 
political dimension in relation to the wider Prison Service, Ministers 
and other stakeholders and representing those interests back to the 
prison’ (HM Prison Service 1997a, p99).
An alternative formulation of the role was provided in the second edition of The 
Prison Governor:
‘The governor must provide both staff and prisoners with strong 
professional leadership that can enable the establishment and the 
Service as a whole to deliver objectives set by Ministers... The 
governor is required to maximise resources to protect the public and 
reduce crime. The work is accomplished with and through people; 
therefore, many of the skills needed are those associated with general 
management. However, the role goes further: the governor must 
appreciate the political sensitivities and public concerns surrounding 
prisons and understand the sometimes volatile or fragile nature of 
prison culture. Occasionally the role requires calmness and courage 
in the face of violent disorder’ (Bryans and Wilson 2000, p31-32).
The present research set out to fill the existing gap in the literature by providing a 
research-based description of the current role and duties of the Governor in HM 
Prison Service. The interviews with Governors revealed that they perform generic 
roles and duties, which managers and leaders in all organisations undertake. In 
addition, there are a number of prison-specific roles and duties that are unique to the 
custodial environment. The roles themselves are not easily separable, as there is 
invariably some overlap between roles and sub-roles within each group. The roles 
themselves form a Gestalt - an integrated whole - which defines the overall 
gubernatorial role. No role can be pulled out of the framework if the Governors’ job 
is to be left intact. The key elements of each role, as identified by the Governors, are 
set out below.
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12.2 Job descriptions and main duties
The current research set out to identify the Governors’ work and determine what 
duties and tasks must be carried out, regardless of who holds the Office of Governor. 
This is often referred to as a ‘practice description’ (Whitemore 1995, p58). 
Information was gathered about the Governors’ key tasks and duties in two ways. 
Firstly, the Governors of 126 publicly-managed prisons were asked for a copy of 
their job description and, secondly, the 42 Governors interviewed were asked to 
describe their main duties and tasks.
The identification of core work using existing job descriptions, and job description 
questionnaires, has been widely used in management research (a useful summary is 
provided in Yukl 1994). Such an approach has also been used to identify the major 
duty areas and tasks completed by prison administrators in the USA (Whitemore 
1995). No comparable study of the job descriptions of Governors in HM Prison 
Service has been undertaken in the past.
A total of 98 job descriptions were received in response to the written request (and 
follow-up telephone call), which represents an overall response rate of 78 per cent. 
The quality of the job descriptions submitted varied. A number of descriptions were 
one-page long, while one stretched to eight pages. Some job descriptions had 
recently been drafted, whereas one job description had not been updated for 12 years.
The job descriptions received were scanned into a computer and analysed using 
NUD*IST to identify common themes (see section 5.1 above). The job descriptions 
contained a variety of output descriptions mixed with distinct duties and tasks 
(processes) that Governors were required to undertake. The most frequently 
described outputs are shown in Table 23.
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Table 23: Main output statements in Governors’ job 
descriptions
Prison management Ensure the actions of the establishment comply with the
policies of ministers and the law
Hold prisoners in safe, decent and healthy environment
Provide constructive regimes that promote law-abiding
behaviour
Protect the public
Maintain order and discipline
Ensure that prisoners are treated fairly and justly
General management Deliver key performance targets
Deliver establishment contract
Ensure standards o f behaviour conform to PSO/PSI
Ensure value for money
Leadership Provide the vision and direction for the establishment 
Foster effective public relations
Command Ensure the successful resolution of incidents
12.3 General management
The notion that Governors have a general management role is not a new one. As 
early as 1974 the Governor was talked about as a:
‘permanent official carrying out the function of general manager o f a 
penal establishment who should be managing a number of parallel 
operational activities, each of which deals with its own operative 
problems within predetermined guidelines and delegated authority’
(Home Office 1974, p65-66).
More recently Governors were exhorted to take on the full role of general manager of 
establishments and to understand specialist areas, as well as the need to think and 
plan strategically (HM Prison Service 1994c). Even though Governors were tasked to 
take on the role of general manager, no clear exposition of what was meant by the 
term was ever given. This is not surprising given that the literature reflects confusion 
about what is meant by a general manager and the concept of general management 
itself.
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The literature reveals various descriptions of managerial roles. Scientific 
management (Taylor 1911) saw managers planning and designing tasks, controlling, 
monitoring, and supervising. Other management theories have identified 
management-related roles as planning, organising, co-ordinating, and controlling 
(Fayol 1949). The role of the general manager was further developed by Drucker 
(1974) who believed that managers have to be capable of managing the entire 
company and had, therefore, to be masters of all business disciplines, from finance 
and operations, to marketing and human resource management. The most widely 
accepted description was provided by Mintzberg (1973 and 1989), who described the 
manager’s job in terms of various ‘roles’ or ‘organised sets of behaviours’ identified 
with a position. Mintzberg identified the roles as: interpersonal (figurehead, leader, 
liaison); informational (monitor, disseminator, spokesman); and decisional 
(entrepreneur, disturbance handler, resource allocator, negotiator). Many of these 
roles can be seen in the activity of today’s Governors.
Governors saw themselves as performing a general manager role:
“I mean my view, and it’s just a personal view, is that the Governor is broadly 
responsible for carrying out a managerial role, for seeing that arrangements are in 
place and that systems are in place for these procedures to be carried out properly. I 
suppose the Governor is like a general manager in any company in that sense.”
“The Governor is the appointed official who runs the prison and I guess that you 
could call him the general manager. He is responsible and should be accountable 
for all that happens to the prisoners and the staff that are employed to look after the 
prisoners in that establishment and, at that level, it’s a simple managerial task.”
All the job descriptions set out specific general management tasks. These relate to 
finances, planning, human resources, auditing and monitoring. A number of broad 
tasks in the job descriptions related to the general achievement of all the 
establishment functions, for example:
‘To be in charge of the overall management of the prison, ensuring 
that the functions of the establishment are fulfilled.’
12.3.1 Finance and resources
Governors made clear that they were responsible for seeking, utilising and maximising 
resources for the establishment. The challenge for the Governor was to achieve the
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KPTs, and to deliver better outcomes, against a background of infinite demands and 
limited resources. In their ‘resource-getter’ role Governors lobbied area managers, 
Headquarters policy groups and external bodies (statutory, private sector and voluntary 
sector) to obtain routine and project funding.
“The Governor is the resource getter. So the job is to explain and make sense o f this 
thing in a way that’s meaningful and significant enough to enable funding to be 
secure for the purposes that would make sense in this organisation.”
“I’ve canvassed Headquarters, I’ve canvassed area managers. I’ve bid for this and 
I’ve bid for that and I’ve got visitors down and rammed it down their throats so they 
go away and try and find us resources.”
Having obtained the money Governors indicated that they were responsible for the 
proper management of the finances and the allocation of resources in support of their 
priorities.
“He is responsible under Civil Service terms for the proper financial proprieties, 
audits and systems to be in place and he is also responsible for insuring when 
internal auditors visit that any non-compliance is met. There are certain things he 
has to do a monthly check. He is responsible for the financial planning in terms of 
conjunction; in terms of how you choose to do it in conjunction with the head of 
finance, with the accountant, the senior management team in devising internal 
allocations in terms of devolved budgets how far he wants to go with that.”
The financial aspects of a Governor’s work were reinforced in the job descriptions, 
which made particular mention of the need to act with due propriety and to deliver 
value for money:
‘As sub-accounting officer to ensure the proper management of the 
establishment’s budget, having due regard to economy, efficiency, 
effectiveness and propriety.’
12.3.2 Planning
Governors are responsible for drawing up and implementing business and strategic 
plans for their establishments. This involves looking into the future and bringing 
together various initiatives, as well as planning the allocation of resources. All of 
which have to be incorporated into the various plans. The job descriptions described 
the task as:
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‘The preparation and implementation of approved strategic and 
business plans.’
The majority of job descriptions (93 per cent) made reference to the planning 
elements in the Governors’ work. Governors are expected to use a systematic and 
analytical approach to the development of integrated and consistent operational, 
organisational and resourcing plans that set the direction in which the establishment 
should go in the longer term. They also have to set the short and medium term 
performance and service delivery targets, and prepare the business plans to achieve 
them. Governors pointed to the planning aspects of their work:
“The head of custody should be the sort of operational day to day head of the 
prison. The Governor should be able to step back and to get more involved in 
policy work for his or her establishment. To actually look and plan and see where it 
needs to go, where we want it to go and how it’s managing at the moment.”
“Increasingly now I think that it is the strategic planning of the establishment...
[which is] key to a Governor’s work.”
12.3.3 Human resource management
While Governors do not have responsibility for setting pay levels, they are 
responsible for industrial relations, staffing numbers, recruitment, selection, 
discipline and training of staff. These aspects were mentioned in 89 per cent of job 
descriptions:
‘Maintain proper discipline among staff and ensure there are 
procedures for occupational health and safety, staff support, 
grievances, disciplinary action and employee relations, including 
relationships with trade unions.’
‘Ensure the efficient and effective use of staff resources and rigorous 
adherence to equal opportunities.’
Governors dealt personally with the more difficult aspects of personnel management 
including conducting disciplinary hearings and deciding on appropriate action 
against poor performers:
“We have got rid of a fair few staff because they simply have not been performing 
and we have had to sack a couple for improper relationships. We sacked one for 
fiddling, two for not performing. And I will always do that myself I mean the
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manager will deal with it but at the stage when it gets messy I will always sit with 
the manager and then I will take over and actually do the really nasty bits.”
For many Governors effective personnel management was important because if they 
looked after their staff, and treated them properly, that would influence the way staff 
treated prisoners:
“I have a simple management philosophy which I tell my people when I go to any 
jail, that it is my job to look after them and their job to look after the prisoners, and 
I believe if  I look after staff and by looking after I don’t mean just being kind, I 
actually mean shoving and pushing sometimes, I use that as a euphemism for the 
whole range of discipline and control, but caring as well. If I give them a quality 
service then I can expect and demand that they give a quality service to prisoners.”
A number of Governors pointed out that prison staffj and their expectations, were 
significantly different today, which made the Governor’s job more challenging. They 
suggested that staff: had higher expectations; were less willing to obey orders and 
instructions; wanted to be consulted more; and were less cohesive as a group. Some 
speculated that this was because: prison officer staff social clubs had been closed; 
officers were no longer required to live on prison estates; the background of officers 
was less homogeneous; and that they were better educated and more highly trained. 
There is evidence to support this view in that prison staff are more diverse (increased 
minority ethnic staff and more female officers) and possess a different philosophy 
about their work and careers than their predecessors (Crawley 2003).
Governors increasingly see creating and nurturing the senior team and ensuring that 
they adhere to a collective way of working as key to their role:
“You have to manage a prison through a team and part of the Governor’s 
responsibility is to make sure that each member of that senior team knows and 
understands what the objectives are, what the team working is all about, 
understands what cabinet responsibility is all about, which may or may not be about 
agreeing what has been decided but taking that decision collectively with the 
Governor overriding it if  necessary.”
“I think it’s a mistake to believe that any place can actually sit on the shoulders of 
one person, even a very small place. But I do think that the style of the Governor 
can actually have an impact on the way the management team operates. One o f the 
things I’ve done almost from Day 1 ... is to actively work on my relationship with 
other members of the senior management team and their relationships with one 
another.”
This element of a Governor’s work was reflected in 44 per cent of job descriptions.
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‘Manage the senior team and through them empower all staff to meet 
the objectives of the establishment’
‘To act as team leader of the senior management team.’
Managing, or in most cases responding to, the latest industrial relations crisis with 
the Prison Officers Association (POA) was a dominant feature in a Governor’s work 
in the 1990s. As a former Chief Inspector of prisons put it: ‘Dealing with the POA 
has taken up far too much of prison governors’ time ... and the quality of industrial 
relations has in too many instances been lamentable’ (Ramsbotham 2003, p234). 
The industrial relations crisis came to a head in 1993 when the Prison Service 
succeeded in getting an injunction from the High Court to stop the POA from 
inducing prison officers to breach their contracts of employment. In order to clarify 
the situation the Government decided to make appropriate provision in the Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act (1994) (Wasik and Taylor 1995) to make it unlawful to 
induce Governors, prison officers and/or prisoner custody officers to withhold their 
services or commit a breach of discipline.
The industrial relations climate in the Service inproved following the implementation 
of the Act. A new industrial relations procedural agreement with the POA was agreed, 
which made clear that disagreements should be resolved wherever possible at 
establishment level (HM Prison Service 1993g). The Governor was given the crucial 
role in ensuring effective local industrial relations. Governors believed that by the late 
1990s they were in a position to more effectively manage relations with the POA:
“The position is so different today on the IR front. I actually feel that I am managing 
what is going on. Gone are the days of being held to ransom by the local POA... If I 
want to change something then I can. As you will remember for a long time it was 
the other way around. The POA could block any change. Now I can change staffing 
levels, attendance systems and the regime if  I think it best for the prison. Yes, there 
will still be a battle and I will get yet more ‘votes of no confidence’ but I will 
eventually get there.”
“I still spend a lot of time on POA issues. I meet with the POA chair weekly for 
informal chats, then have a formal monthly meeting with the full committee. Some 
of the hotheads still bang the table but at the end of the day they know that I can 
change things, and the most they can do is delay the changes for a few months.”
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12.3.4 Audit and monitoring
Governors audit and monitor their establishments as part of their routine duties. To 
do so they seek information from a variety of sources including reading reports and 
memos and attending meetings and briefings. Most information gathered is analysed 
to discover problems and opportunities. These are then fed to the appropriate 
manager to deal with.
The requirement to audit and monitor was contained in 45 per cent of job 
descriptions:
‘Create and implement a self-audit system to ensure the agreed 
processes and outputs are being delivered in accordance with the 
relevant legislation, standards, orders, and instructions.’
‘To monitor and report at monthly intervals on all aspects of the 
running of the prison.’
Most Governors pointed to the need to do personal monitoring, as well as managing 
the audit process. In order to do this they emphasised the need for the Governor to 
conduct observational visits.
“I think it’s fair to say I tried to get out to some part of the prison every day. I even 
tried, at one stage in my career, to offer to carry out the checklist sheets on a daily 
basis where I visit and follow up notes I’d made for myself so the next time I 
visited, I’d mention something from last time and could say ‘what did you do about 
that?’ or ‘have you done something about that?’. So the visits aren’t just a social 
delight but are actually a piece of work and I think at times, where you might lose 
sight o f that, it is work. You have to check, monitor, congratulate or refuse 
people.”
“Because of the nature of prison institutions, and the importance of human rights 
considerations, the importance of being always vigilant to prevent abuse, that I do 
think it is a very important part of the top person’s role to be doing sufficient hands- 
on work to satisfy himself personally that the rules are being correctly adhered to. 
And therefore it is not enough simply to have managerial levers and to be able to 
tap into a computer and say ‘Yes all those procedures were properly carried out’ It 
is important that there is visible, personal, hands-on checking.”
12.4 Leadership
While much has been written about the concept of leadership in recent years, 
reaching a consensus about the nature of leadership has proved elusive. Leadership
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constantly runs the risk of being all things to all people: a nebulous catchall phrase. 
One estimate puts the number of leadership definitions at over 400 (Crainer 1996, 
p4). New leadership theories have replaced the traditional management paradigm of 
planning, organising and control, with a leadership paradigm of vision, values and 
empowerment (Pitt 1998). While some authorities see management as a sub­
element within leadership (Kotter 1990), others have seen clear differences between 
managers and leaders in terms of their approach and role (Bennis 1992). The 
literature now provides lists of: the differences between management and leadership 
(Bennis 1989, Freeman 1999, Bryans and Walford 1998); traits that leaders exhibit 
(Stogdill 1948, Kouzes and Posner 1990); contingency models which associate 
leadership with specific situations (Tannenbaum and Schmidt 1958, Fielder 1967, 
Hershey and Blanchard 1974); and various styles of leadership (Bums 1978 and 
Seltzer and Bass 1990).
For the purposes of the current study, leadership is regarded as ‘a specialized form of 
activity, a kind of work or function’ (Selznick 1957, p22). It is now generally 
accepted that leadership relates to deliberate efforts aimed at building and 
maintaining an organisation. The leader defines what an organisation is about, 
clarifies the core values and promotes and inculcates those values into the 
organisation (Terry 1995). In the prison context, leadership has been described in this 
way:
‘This leadership approach does not focus solely on such managerial 
activities as planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, 
reporting and budgeting. Institutional leadership goes beyond 
management. Leadership pertains to the domain of crucial decisions 
with regard to long-term organizational survival, effectiveness and 
legitimacy. These are decisions which shape the dominant goals of 
the organization and define the means by which to achieve them. 
Leadership is, ultimately, about determining the core values which 
drive the organisation’ (Boin 1998, p212-213).
Prison researchers have started to factor leadership into their analysis (Dilulio 1987, 
1989 and 1991, Useem 1990, Cullen et al. 1993a, Bryans and Walford 1998, Bryans 
and Wilson 1998). Findings from recent studies suggest that leadership has an 
important impact on the functioning and performance of prisons (Dilulio 1987, 
Wright K. 1994, Boin 1998). In the USA there has been a move to teach leadership
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to Wardens. The National Institute of Corrections runs leadership training for new 
Wardens (National Institute of Corrections 1997, p i9-22). The California 
Department of Corrections has created a Leadership Institute (California Department 
of Corrections 1997). Various other states have adopted a Correctional Leadership 
Practices Model (Mactavish 1997).
Nearly all the Governors interviewed as part of the current study spoke of their 
leadership role.
“I believe that the key word is leadership. Leadership means to me that there is 
somebody in charge who is making it very clear what is to be done, which includes 
persuading people to do what they don’t necessarily want to do, but is there - and 
everyone knows that they’re in charge - and they know that, if  they have got 
problems or concerns, there is somebody who will take an interest in them.”
It is perhaps not surprising that Governors were keen to speak of leadership in the 
context of their role, given the emphasis placed by the Prison Service on the 
importance of leadership in recent years. Many of the reports written about the 
Prison Service (often in the wake of escapes, riots or industrial relations problems) 
have suggested that if Governors had demonstrated leadership then the problem 
would not have occurred in the first place. The Learmont Report, for example, made 
clear that ‘positive and visible leadership must be shown’ (Learmont 1995a, 
recommendation 61). More recently the Prison Service Review noted the 
‘requirement for a particularly high level o f ... leadership skill in the Prison Service’ 
(HM Prison Service 1997a, para. 9.4). The need for the Governor to demonstrate 
leadership is specified in over half the job descriptions:
‘To provide effective leadership of staff and prisoners.’
Based on what Governors said in the interviews, their leadership role includes: the 
representational/figurehead elements of the Governors’ work; the part Governors 
play in creating meaning out of the world around their establishments; and how 
Governors develop and maintain the vision of the prison.
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12.4.1 Figurehead/representation
As a consequence of their formal authority as holder of the Office, Governors are 
required to undertake figurehead and representative roles. These roles involve the 
Governor undertaking certain duties inside the prison and in the wider community. 
Governors are the public face of prisons to the external world. It is Governors who 
represent establishments in the community, to the media and at official functions 
with local dignitaries. The job descriptions emphasised that Governors should ‘work 
on the boundaries’ and 37 per cent of job descriptions made reference to the need for 
the Governor:
‘To represent the establishment at local and national levels.’
This aspect of their work came up frequently in the interviews with Governors:
“I think the Governor’s job is to represent the prison to the world ... speaking on 
what goes on in the prison to public meetings and to groups and associations and 
virtually anybody that will invite you, any non-political group that will invite you 
and generally be the persona of the establishment, the embodiment o f the 
establishment.”
Governors are expected increasingly to represent the Prison Service on local criminal 
justice and other bodies (partnership meetings with National Health Service/Primary 
Care Trusts, public protection strategy groups, Youth Offending Teams, crime and 
disorder committees, judges and magistrates training, drug action teams, local 
criminal justice boards, joint working with probation and voluntary sector groups):
“Trends in regionalisation of government have meant that the prison Governor as a 
local player has become more significant - if  you look towards drug action groups 
and criminal justice liaison committees, the whole business of bringing together the 
criminal justice agencies, puts this sort of ambassadorial role, as I call it, 
representative role much more firmly in the Governor’s work.”
The Governor also represents his or her establishment to the rest of the Prison Service 
through attendance at Headquarters and area meetings. Occasionally the Governor 
may also represent the Prison Service and Home Office in public situations, as in this 
example given by one Governor:
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“There was a public meeting in which the Governor of [a local prison] appeared in 
the last couple of weeks, because the cameras are overlooking some of the houses in 
the area. The local MP who is supporting the residents is saying it should not be a 
prison. The Governor has to be up front to hear what the community are saying, but 
also, if  you like, to represent the Prison Department in all sorts of areas. How many 
managers of Burger King get called up to presentations at the local University, or to 
attend the local Cathedral because the local Bishop is being inducted. And I think, 
I’m using that as a demonstration that the Governor still has status, as much, 
sometimes, as the Department would not like to accept.”
Governors also have figurehead responsibilities within the prison. This involves them 
participating in rituals and ceremonies such as attending funerals, commemorative 
ceremonies and making presentations to staff and prisoners:
“I think one of the bits of learning for me ... has been the value that staff put to 
some of the ritual bits. Somebody said recently ... that as a Governor one of the 
most important things I do is go to staff funerals, so I think it may sound a slightly 
odd starting point but I think that the symbolic aspects of the job are not to be 
ignored.”
“The most important thing I do is go to staff funerals. I think that has a resonance. 
Probably at other points along the way, I would have thought silly bugger, but I 
think I have probably come to the view that those kinds of things are important.”
12.4.2 Interpreting and ‘sense-making’
Governors believe that they are the people who have a total overview of their prisons 
and the place of prisons within the wider framework of the criminal justice system. 
This brings with it a distinct role -  that of interpreting and making sense of the 
external environment for staff and prisoners.
The objectives and goals of public-sector services tend to be multiple and diverse, 
vague and intangible and often conflicting (Cressey 1959 and Rainey et al. 1976). 
This is certainly true of the Prison Service, as chapter 2 pointed out. Governors see 
their role as reconciling, for their staff and prisoners, the conflict between the various 
penal objectives, political expediency, humanity and expectations of various 
stakeholders (both inside and outside the establishment), as these quotes indicate:
“We’ve got an oddity insofar as we’ve got these organisations which deliver the 
most serious sanctions against citizens in peacetime on behalf of the state and yet 
we don’t have an agreed clarity about what prisons are about ... I firmly believe 
that that means that that ambiguity finds its focus in the Governor, because the 
only person you can really pin the tail on in legalistic terms, in organisational
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terms, in public relations terms, in proximity terms, is the Governor and actually 
the Governor holds that ambiguity. That’s the role of the Governor.”
“To be the interpreter or sense-maker, of the external change in the outside world, 
in a way that interprets the meaning and the significance of that establishment.
What he is interpreting is the meaning of the establishment in terms of the 
meaning and significance of the outside world.”
Governors also act as the interface between Prison Service Headquarters and their 
establishment, as ‘staff do not see much beyond their Governor’ (HM Prison Service 
1997a, para. 10.10). As one commentator put it:
‘An organizational chart of the interface between a prison and a 
prison administration looks more or less like an hourglass, with the 
governor occupying the central position’ (Vagg 1994, pi 10).
Governors are often the most senior Prison Service or Home Office manager with 
whom many staff will come into contact. One of the Governors’ tasks, as a result, is in 
relation to representing the wider organisation within their establishments:
“I am Headquarters in a sense. As the head of this establishment, I represent 
Headquarters here. I represent the policy”.
This interfacing role involves Governors interpreting information flowing into the 
establishment and making sense of it for staff:
“The Governor is the interface between the work of prisons - the work as 
undertaken in outstations or in the branches of the company - and what goes on at 
Headquarters. So, he is understanding, filtering, gleaning, interpreting policies, 
procedures, instructions, intentions, aspirations from the centre of the organisation 
and translating them and trying to make sense of them in the branch, as it were, and 
vice versa, sending messages back to head office, how people are thinking and 
feeling and doing in the branch office.”
The interpreting role sometimes involves Governors having to reformulate some of 
the instructions from Headquarters, in order to make them operationally feasible, as 
in this example given in one interview:
“Interpreting what comes down from Headquarters and trying to work sensibly 
through it, knowing when actually “God we better do that” and knowing when 
actually “I think we can reinterpret that”. .. I mean there is one come down today: 
‘no other prisoners apart from Muslims must be offered halal meat’ I don’t think 
that’s what the directors meant. I think they meant that we shouldn’t force it on 
people, but if  a non Muslim prisoner wanted to eat lamb halal curry tonight on 
the pre-order system that was fine. I think that’s what they meant to say, they 
just didn’t say it. Because if  I turned round to my caterers and say ‘tonight folks, 
you can’t give that to them and you can’t give that to them and we can’t give that
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to them’, they will just throw the towel in. They up there are not dealing with 
them out there, they issue the edict - 1 have actually got to interpret that to what I 
think is the best for [this YOI].”
Governors believe that they have a role in interpreting the work of prisons to the 
community outside the Prison Service.
“The Governor’s role is to defend, explain, promote, market, sell, the inside world 
and its sense to the outside world. In the sense that the more he is engaged in that 
strategic thinking, the more he is able to do both of these roles.”
“Selling [my prison], I think, is an important thing, trying actually to raise the level 
of awareness of what we are doing outside, certainly inside, but outside in the 
Service at large, and also outside in the community at large. And I think that is 
something we are not. We have done well locally, but we could do better.”
12.4.3 Vision and direction
Crainer suggests that there is one element that unites past and present conceptions of 
leadership: a sense of vision (Crainer 1996). Leaders are able to call upon strategic 
and visionary abilities which will allow a clear view of where the organisation is
going and ‘communicate that vision in a compelling manner to people both within
and outside the company’ (Gratton 1989, p513). Kotter suggests that key to this is 
creating a sense of purpose and direction; generating support for that vision and 
inspiring people to achieve it (Kotter 1990).
Governors indicated that they contribute this ‘strategic vision’ aspect of leadership 
for their prisons and, as strategic leaders, aim to stimulate and sustain the shared 
acceptance and achievement of the strategic vision:
“To me the main role is first of all to be the generator and keeper of the vision.”
“The vision, the strategic direction, the selection of that direction and the 
maintenance of it - that rests with the Governor and cannot be given to anyone else 
to do. It wouldn’t be credible.”
Governors need to provide a clear personal vision of what is to be achieved, how it is 
to be achieved, and communicate that to staff and prisoners.
“I suppose really it’s setting the strategic direction for the prison.”
“Vision sounds a bit grand but that is what it is about. If the Governor does not 
create the vision and sell it no one else will. I have got to keep at it all the time, over
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and over again using every newsletter, staff meeting and walkabout to tell them 
about where we are going as an establishment and how they contribute to that.”
A former Governor described this aspect of a Governor’s role in this way:
‘His job was to present a philosophy, a modus vivendi. The governor 
was not perceived as an administrator or executive, but as a leader in 
terms of policy, values and goals’ (Gadd 1988, p8).
12.5 Incident command
Prisons are institutions that are particularly vulnerable to a range of incidents. The 
type of person held, and the coercive nature of the environment, will lead, on 
occasion, to situations that are not routine and which potentially threaten the order or 
security of the establishment. Once they begin, incidents in prisons can quickly 
‘spiral out of control’ (Boin and Rattray 2004, p54). In order to deal with incidents 
and prevent them from escalating, Governors must be effective incident commanders 
(acting in a ‘command role’) during incidents such as fires, riots, demonstrations, 
escapes, hostage-taking and rooftop protests.
The notion that ‘command’ differs from ‘management’ is now widely accepted (see 
for example, Brunacini 1985, Keegan 1987). The difference between command in 
an emergency and routine management has been highlighted in the following way:
‘Command is predominantly subjective and directive. Management 
is predominantly objective and consultative. An important 
subsidiary conclusion is that the application of conventional 
management techniques can ironically be quite dangerous in an 
emergency’ (Larken 1992 p54).
In referring to their ‘command role’ Governors spoke of this difference between 
‘management’ and ‘command’ and highlighted that they needed to be able to shift 
from one role to the other:
“When the bells go, you change from running the production line at Fords, with all 
its problems, and it is very much like that, you move from that into the command 
role where you’ve actually got to sit in the chair in the command post.”
“There is the operational role of the Governor. We can function in broad terms in 
management, in managerial principles but when the phone goes and the security girl
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says ‘sorry to bother you Governor but there is a slight problem in the yard, 38 of 
them have refused to come in and seem to have blankets and food with them’, you 
have to change. There is no point in saying at that stage ‘who the hell let them in 
the yard with blankets and food?’ So it is a serious incident when it happens, it’s 
the planning and having the contingency plans in operation, and being ready to 
command the incident there and then.”
Incidents are often characterised by: ambiguous and conflicting information; shifting 
goals; time pressure; dynamic conditions; complex operational team structures and 
poor communication. The complexity of the command role requires certain 
command skills, (Flin 1996, p42-44). While many of these individual traits and 
skills are required in general management, commanding an incident requires a 
different approach.
“It’s like the command - management spectrum. In an emergency - there’s not 
going to be very much flexibility about what they do, and there’s not very much 
debate in certain circumstances. Whereas in normal circumstances you are really 
discussing something much more openly and long term, then people have very 
much more space to express their own ideas.”
Most Governors accepted that they will have to act in a command role and that 
moving into a command role is not a concern for them:
“I don’t worry about the next incident. I think they’re just part of the job that you 
do. That’s what we’re experienced at handling. If it comes, you know how to handle 
it. So, in a sense, you’ve got confidence. The majority of us as Governors have 
confidence in our ability, our staff; our planning to handle incidents ... it can be 
messy at times.”
All job descriptions placed great emphasis on the need to prepare for incidents and 
for the Governor to develop and test contingency plans.
‘Develop and test comprehensive contingency plans to ensure the 
successful command and resolution of any serious incident.’
‘Command major incidents to ensure maintenance and restoration of 
control.’
Commentators have also highlighted the importance of having good contingency 
planning for incidents:
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‘Effective crisis management thus requires preparation. Unprepared 
prison organizations allow small incidents to escalate into serious 
riots’ (Boin and Rattray 2004, p55).
In responding to incidents Governors have to make key operational decisions, which 
range from launching a ‘paramilitary’ counter attack on riotous prisoners to 
evacuating a burning prison wing or engaging in protracted negotiations with 
hostage takers.
“Dealing with incidents is an important part of my work now but was not at my 
last place. We have a lot of incidents here -  the youngsters tend to be more volatile 
and are unpredictable. I spend a lot of time in the command post. [This YOI] has 
had the lot recently, roof tops, hostage incidents, passive demos.”
“Dispersals have more incidents than other prisons. The staff are good at handling 
all sorts. The duty governors do most of the incidents, so I only get involved if  it is 
a big one -  you know sort of hostages and sit-downs that last a long time. Oh, and 
I always do the hostage incidents.”
The requirement to act in a command role is not, however, unique to the prison 
Governor. To some extent all managers act in, what Mintzberg calls, a ‘disturbance 
handler’ role, in that they all deal with sudden crises that cannot be ignored 
(Mintzberg 1973). These unforeseen events include strikes, fires and accidents. What 
tends to make the command role a more significant role for Governors is the 
frequency with which the events may occur, and the potential risk if those events do 
occur, as these Governors made clear:
“It’s more like the police than it is the manager of Marks and Spencers. Incidents 
happen all the time and each one could escalate. You need to be ready to cope and 
how you handle it comes down to your jailcraft. A wrong decision and it could all 
go belly up very quickly.”
“Don’t get me wrong, lots of other operational managers have to deal with 
incidents -you know, like the police, fire brigade, ambulance. So it’s not that 
unique, but it has a different feel inside prisons. I think it has to do with the speed 
things happen, the potential that they will all join in like at Strangeways and that 
you need to act very quickly initially to stop it escalating and it is at the beginning 
when you have least resources.”
The next chapter now goes on to look at those aspects of a Governor’s role and 
duties which are organisation specific -  that is, are only required of those working in 
custodial institutions.
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CHAPTER 13: 
PRISON SPECIFIC ROLE AND DUTIES
The previous chapter outlined a Governor’s generic managerial duties and the 
requirement to act, on occasion, in a command role. This chapter looks at other 
aspects of a Governor’s work - that is, work specific to the prison environment. The 
current research suggests Governors undertake four main prison-specific areas of 
activity: maintaining a secure prison; achieving order through effective control; 
providing positive regimes; and regulating the prison.
13.1 Maintaining a secure prison
Prisons contain people who would rather not be incarcerated and Governors have a 
duty to ‘keep in custody those committed by the court’ (HM Prison Service 2003b). 
Most prisoners accept their sentence and make no attempt to leave before its expiry. 
Some prisoners are opportunistic and will attempt to escape if they see what they 
think to be an opportunity to escape. A small minority of prisoners are determined to 
escape and will make numerous concerted attempts until they have gained their 
freedom.
Prison security became the central concern of Governors and their managers after a 
series of high-profile escapes of high-security prisoners in the mid 1990s (see 
Learmont 1995a and 1995b and Woodcock 1994). Governors were given a clear 
message that security was paramount and that it was their responsibility to prevent 
prisoners from escaping (Lewis 1997). As a result, managing security to prevent 
escapes is a core element of a Governor’s job and explicit reference is made to 
maintaining security in over 90 per cent of job descriptions:
‘Ensure that high standards of security are achieved’
‘Ensure the secure custody of prisoners’
‘Recognise and prevent potential security breaches’
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‘Maintain an environment for effective dynamic security’
The specific duties and tasks that Governors must undertake in relation to security 
are set out in some detail in Prison Service Orders and Instructions, and in the Prison 
Service security manual. In particular, Governors are required to ensure that 
effective security intelligence systems are in place, that security is regularly 
reviewed and monitored through a security committee, and that physical and 
procedural security is maintained. Governors made clear in the interviews that 
delivering on these areas required a significant effort and took up a considerable 
amount of their time:
“I expected a good report on the security because I actually put a lot of work in 
and set up an internal audit team and we went round cracking heads to make sure 
that it was right.”
“I’ve put a lot of my time and effort into getting security right and following the 
manual.”
Governors pointed out that maintaining a secure prison involved: having the right 
physical security measures (fences, razor wire, perimeter movement detectors, bars, 
gates); ensuring that effective procedural security measures were in place (searching, 
surveillance, security intelligence systems, categorisation and assessment, accounting 
and control systems) and nurturing ‘dynamic security’. Governors attached great 
importance to this concept of dynamic security, which involves ‘individualism, 
relationship and activity ... coming together through the relationship between staff 
and inmates’ (Dunbar 1985, p23):
“I am a great believer in dynamic security, which I think is far more effective than 
some of the modem technology. For me security is about keeping prisoners 
occupied and staff engaging them in constructive relationships. As you know, 
nothing is secret in such a closed environment as a prison. If prisoners are 
planning to escape someone outside of the circle is bound to know about it. If the 
dynamic security is right, my staff will get to hear about it and we will be able to 
prevent the escape.”
Ensuring that prisoners do not escape remains a central, if not the central, concern of 
Governors. It is not a one-off activity but something that permeates a Governor’s 
daily work on an ongoing basis and requires ‘constant vigilance, maintenance and 
improvement’ (HM Prison Service 2004b, p20). In order to do this, Governors said
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that they had to continually ask themselves various questions: Are the appropriate 
physical security means in place and functioning? Are there enough cameras? Are 
they working and do they point in the right direction? Are the locks right? Are there 
enough fences? Is the procedural security effective? Are staff watching the cameras? 
Do searches take place and are they thorough? Are gates being locked? Has dynamic 
security been maintained? Have staff withdrawn to their offices? Do prisoners have 
enough to occupy their time? Are staff and prisoners communicating?
13.2 Achieving order through effective control
Security and order are inextricably linked, as a disorderly prison creates the potential 
for a breach in security. A Governor’s duty therefore extends to ensuring that order is 
maintained in the institution, both as a contribution to effective security and to 
provide a safe environment for staff and prisoners. Over 85 per cent of job 
descriptions required the Governor to:
‘create an environment in which order and control in achieved’
‘ensure the good order of the prison’
Order is taken here to mean the absence of violence, overt conflict or the imminent 
threat of the chaotic breakdown of social routines (Sparks et al. 1996, pi 19). 
Governors have been faced, since the introduction of modem prisons, with the 
fundamental problem of how to prevent disorder. Commentators have suggested that:
‘The ability to establish and keep control is probably the single 
make-or-break test of a governor’s reputation and may be judged, 
especially by outsiders, as overriding and rendering invisible his or 
her other strengths and weaknesses’ (West 1997, p34).
‘The concept of control is at the heart of prison management 
mentality’ (Cullen and Newell 1999, p73).
Despite the appearance of pervasive control, most prisons offer prisoners ample 
opportunities to misbehave. In 2002-03 the Prison Service recorded: 28 hostage 
incidents; 26 acts of major concerted indiscipline (including one riot); seven roof
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climbs; and 6479 assaults (HM Prison Service 2003b). Governors emphasised the 
need to ensure order and control in their prisons, as this Governor made clear:
“It’s always struck me as being open to the most major criticism, if  the offenders 
are in a highly unsafe environment, where people are assaulted and scared. I think 
that’s horrendous. That comes back again to my point about control. I don’t think 
you can do any of the good things you want to do unless you have structure and 
control.”
Governors indicated that they adopted a number of broad strategies to achieve well- 
ordered prisons. The first broad strategy Governors used focused on ‘situational 
control’ (Sparks et al. 1996 and Wortley 2002). Situational control methods aim to 
tackle precipitating factors that generate control issues and to reduce the opportunity 
for disorder to take place. Situational control can involve ‘softening’ the environment 
by removing precipitating factors so that prisoners do not want to cause disorder, for 
example by: creating pleasant physical surroundings; reducing environmental 
irritants; provision of good food; division of prisoners into smaller groups; 
liberalising the regime; and normalising the environment.
Alternatively, it can also involve ‘hardening’ the environment so that it is more 
difficult for prisoners to disrupt the order of the prison (reduce opportunity for 
disorder). For example by monitoring and containing prisoner activities using: 
observation posts; CCTV; bars; razor wire; improved surveillance; the control of 
movements using lockable gates; searching of prisoners and cells; and the removal of 
disruptive prisoners. By tightening control, improving surveillance and strictly 
enforcing rules and regulations, the aim is to make misbehaviour more difficult, risky 
or costly.
Governors gave examples of where they had successfully used situational control 
methods:
“One of the big problem areas was always the canteen [prisoner shop]. Prisoners 
would line up and wait their turn, then buy their stuff and take it back to their 
cells. Well you can imagine what happened. There was a lot of bullying in the 
queues, prisoners were forced to buy things that they did not want and hand them 
over to stronger prisoners, or they were mugged on the way back to their cells.
Fights were always breaking out. Today, prisoners order their stuff on a 
shopping list which they hand to staff and their goods are then delivered to their 
cells. A lot of hassle has been prevented and it is much safer.”
207
“The bloody design of this place is crap - dog legs and blind alleys everywhere.
Bullying was going on and staff no-go areas were starting to creep in. There 
wasn’t a lot we could do about the building, so we went for the camera option.
This place now looks like something from ‘Big Brother’, but it worked.”
In reality, Governors indicated that they used both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ means of 
situational control and, as one researcher suggested: ‘the issue for prison control ... 
is to find the appropriate balance between these interventions’ (Wortley 2002, p219). 
A Governor put it in this way:
“Let me give you an example of what I mean about which levers to pull. We 
recently had a problem with the food here - SIRs [security information reports 
from staff] were telling me that there was going to be trouble, there were lots of 
CARPS [complaints and request forms from prisoners] about the food and wing 
staff were reporting that lots of food was being dumped. So we had to take action 
to prevent the trouble -  in this case it meant doing something about the food and at 
the same time sending messages that we would not put up with trouble. That was 
about lifting [removing from normal location] the ring leaders and making sure 
that there were lots of staff around at meal times.”
The temporary removal of prisoners (either to a different wing, to the segregation 
unit or to another prison) was an approach that Governors used to prevent trouble 
happening or to deal with an existing problem. They pointed out, however, that using 
this option was only a short term ‘fix’, that it could only ever be used for small 
numbers of prisoners, and that at some point the prisoner would need to be 
reintegrated back into the prison:
“If you walk around the seg like I did this morning you will find a mixed bag of 
prisoners. Most are under punishment but a few segregated under Rule 43 GOAD 
[Good Order and Discipline]. They’re down there in most cases because of 
intelligence they’re dealing, bullying, about to do [assault] someone or stirring up 
general trouble about the food or regime or something, and we don’t have enough 
evidence to nick them. But to be honest putting someone in the seg [segregation 
unit] is easy. The difficult bit is getting them out again. Someone cannot stay 
down there for ever so we need to work out a way to get them back on normal 
location.”
Governors gave other examples of how they dealt with potential control problems. 
Examples included regulating situational factors: increasing staff patrols and 
visibility (formal surveillance); increasing time in cell; only unlocking a few 
prisoners at a time; limiting the numbers of prisoners permitted to gather in one 
place; and transferring trouble-makers:
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“When I arrived in this place it was out of control. The prisoners were running the 
place. Staff were hiding in their offices, there were ‘no-go’ areas. The place stank 
of fear. Everyone felt unsafe. There was violence, intimidation, bullying, no-go 
areas, taxing [prisoners demanding goods from other prisoners]... I called a staff 
meeting and told them that we were going to sort the place out together. It was a 
slow process but we got there in the end. It took about six months, I suppose.. .To 
begin with we did controlled unlocking [only letting a small number of prisoners 
out of their cells at any one time], searched the whole place, and I was pretty 
tough on adjudications. As staff got more confident I relaxed things a bit and we 
took things from there.”
The second broad strategy Governors used is based on social controls. This approach 
involves attempts at socialisation and strengthening social relations: having the right 
balance of prisoners; changing prisoner culture; attempts at consultation and 
participation with prisoners; strengthening relationships; ensuring that the exercise 
of power was seen as legitimate by most prisoners most of the time; and developing 
mutual trust. A number of commentators have highlighted the need to get the ‘right’ 
relationship between staff and prisoners in order to negotiate the peaceful operation 
of a prison (see, in particular, Liebling and Price 2001). This mirrors the official 
position that ‘relations between staff and prisoners are at the heart of the prison 
system and that control and security flow from getting that relationship right’ (Home 
Office 1984b, para. 16).
The challenge for Governors is to decide what is the ‘right’ relationship within their 
prison and how to develop and sustain those relationships. Governors emphasised 
the importance of getting the right staff-prisoner relations:
“For me keeping order is about relationships and dynamic security. In my 
experience there is less violence, less bullying and it’s a whole lot safer where 
there is a healthy relationship between staff and prisoners. My job is to make sure 
the relationships are right.”
“Well, prison officers are the primary relationship in any prison. How prison 
officers interact and relate to prisoners is the primary relationship. My role as 
Governor has to be to ensure that that relationship is as positive and appropriate as 
possible.”
Governors also pointed to the advantages of being able to use other social control 
means such as rewards and punishments to manage prisoners’ behaviour:
“IEP [Incentives and Earned Privileges scheme] was one of the best things to have 
happened in the Prison Service in my career. There is a clear set of carrots and 
sticks or should I say costs and benefits in management speak. They are applied
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more or less the same across prisons and prisoners know where they are with it.
You know - if  you behave then you get a TV. If you don’t you lose it.”
Few Governors spoke of the role of prisoners in achieving order. The use of 
prisoners in positions of authority over their peers, or using prisoners to control other 
prisoners, breaches a number of international and Prison Service policies. One 
Governor did however give an example of the informal use of prisoners to ‘police’ 
other prisoners:
“The days of writing the name of a noisy prisoner on the wing board and letting 
the rest of the prisoners sort him out the next morning are hopefully long gone.
But I would be lying to you if  I said officers do not use prisoners to police other 
prisoners. I came across it the other day on B wing -  they were having a problem 
with stuff being thrown out o f the windows and I was giving the wing PO 
[principal officer] grief about the mess. The next thing I heard was that the SO 
[senior officer] made the wing ‘heavies’ go outside in the rain and clear it up.
Litter soon stopped being chucked out.”
To some extent Governors were able to choose which elements of control to adopt. 
However their choice is often constrained by factors such as the architecture and 
function of the prison. For example, the high turnover of prisoners in old local 
prisons makes it more difficult for staff to use ‘social’ control methods by 
establishing positive relationships. More recent prison designs keep prisoners in 
smaller groups and bring officers into contact with them, thereby emphasising 
‘social’ control methods:
“The advantage of this place is that it’s new. The units are small and self- 
contained which helps with control but that also means that my staff get to know 
the prisoners better. Staff felt a bit isolated to begin with but since we put the 
cameras in that’s not such a big issue. But as I told you earlier, I’m not a great 
believer in cameras and all this modem technology. For me it’s more about 
dynamic security and relationships than it’s about cameras and geophones.”
In addition to the physical environment, Governors pointed out that funding was 
often not available to introduce situational control measures, such as CCTV or to 
make structural changes.
Governors emphasised that maintaining order is not a one-off event but something 
that they had to continually focus on:
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“It’s something which we have to keep on top of all the time. It’s not something 
you achieve and then forget about. You can lose control in the blink of an eye 
unless you keep at it. You need systems and routines but most of all you need 
good intelligence so that you can nip things in the bud... If your intelligence is 
good you know in advance that there is going to be a demo or protest or escape 
attempt and then you can prevent it.”
In order to identify potential control problems before they develop into disorder, 
Governors used a variety of means to monitor the stability of their prisons:
“In my last place there was a sticky period when I could see that things were not 
right. We were starting to lose control of the place after an overcrowding draft of 
scousers came in. There were some of the usual signs: increase in adjudications, 
more request-complaints than normal, people banging themselves up rather than 
going on association, staff and cons staying in groups, high levels on sick parade, 
increase in requests for Rule 43 [administrative segregation]. All these told me 
that things were not right.”
Governors made clear that order is undermined where prisoners have the inclination 
to misbehave (caused by poor conditions, perceived unfairness or lack of justice, lack 
of legitimacy, change in regime, variation to the ‘normal’ relationships between staff 
and prisoners), and where prisoners have the ability to misbehave (administrative 
breakdown in operation of the prison, lack of effective situational control, weak 
contingency and incident management arrangements). The Governor is able to have a 
significant influence both on prisoners’ inclination and on their ability to contravene 
the ‘routine expectancies’ (Young 1987) of everyday life in prison. In exercising that 
influence, Governors make a series of moral decisions and policy choices, because 
‘more than one version of sustainable ‘order’ has been shown to be possible’ (Sparks 
et al. 1996, p320).
13. 3 Providing positive regimes
One element in providing legitimacy and a well-ordered prison is through the 
provision of positive regimes. A Governor used this metaphor to describe the 
balance between security and regimes:
“I often think back to a metaphor I read about in which prison is compared to a 
car. You have got to keep people in when the car is moving for their safety, and 
the safety of the general public. But the purpose of a car is to get people to a 
particular destination. Destinations will vary but progressive movement is what 
they are about. I like that metaphor because it is a constant reminder that prisons
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should be about taking people forward, but in a safe and secure manner, according 
to the rules.”
Despite the widespread use of the term, ‘regime’ is a complex and rather abstract 
concept and in its broadest sense can refer to almost any aspect of imprisonment 
affecting the prisoner’s life (Wortley 2002). The term regime is used here to refer to 
the provision of core requirements (food, accommodation etc), as well as 
employment, education, leisure and offending behaviour programmes.
A number of job descriptions (46 per cent) referred to the Governors’ responsibility 
in relation to creating and maintaining regimes for prisoners:
‘Provide constructive regimes for prisoners that reduce re-offending 
by improving basic literacy, numeracy and work skills, providing 
programmes that address offending behaviour and reducing drug 
misuse.’
‘Develop and implement a constructive regime which ensures that (a) 
care with humanity is provided for prisoners, (b) the weakest 
prisoners feel safe, (c) all prisoners are treated with respect as 
individuals, (d) prisoners address the causes of their offending 
behaviour and (e) prisoners are provided with educational 
opportunities.’
Governors highlighted the need to get the core elements of the regime right -  the 
accommodation, food, clothing, canteen and visits:
“I always give the example of a hotel and what you have to do to keep the 
customers happy. It’s the same for us -  it’s about hot meals, clean laundry and 
something to do. All right, it’s a bit more complicated than that but I still maintain 
that if  we get the food, laundry, canteen, visits and association right, 99.9 per cent 
of prisoners will cause no problems.”
In addition to these core elements, Governors emphasised the need to provide a 
constructive, purposeful and balanced regime if prisons were to be more than just 
‘human warehouses’:
“Governors will be working actively to create a regime which, as far as it can, 
depending on the type of prison we’re dealing with, will be varied, interesting, 
constructive and would be a regime which gives them something that they can use 
to move them towards release or to help them to recover their lives and operate 
effectively when they’re released.”
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“You have got to provide some sort of meaningful regime. You have got to 
manipulate the money and get the people to provide it, both the hours out of cell 
and things for them to do when they are out.”
Governors are often regarded by staff as the regime ‘innovator’, who seek to 
introduce new ideas:
“I was told that I must be the man who would do midnight cricket. And when I 
said ‘Why would I do midnight cricket?’, the Principal Officer said ‘We’ve had 
everything else. There’s only midnight cricket left.’ And the idea was that the 
Governor was there to invent new ways of helping young people or prisoners 
move along.”
Governors highlighted some of the problems that they faced in providing positive 
regimes, including: budget constraints and limited funding; a lack of space in which 
to run the activities; more prisoners than regime activity places; a shortage of prison 
officers to escort and monitor prisoners; insufficient trained staff to run offending 
behaviour programmes; and cultural resistance from some prison officers to the 
introduction of programmes. One Governor put it in this way:
“I really do wish that I could develop the regime here. I find it depressing to 
wander around and find that prisoners are locked in their cells all day. It is so 
wasteful and not good for the health of the establishment... I have tried to bring in 
new things but it is a constant uphill struggle trying to get resources from area 
office, battling with the POA over manning levels and also some prisoners would 
rather stay in their cells and do nothing.”
13.4 Regulating the prison
A common theme emerging from all the interviews was that a key role for the 
Governor was ensuring that prisoners and staff viewed the operation of the prison as 
being legitimate, just and fair; and that the security, order and regime were held in 
balance. Governors used a number of terms to describe this aspect of their role - 
‘balancing’, ‘mediating’, ‘harmonising’ and ‘shaping’ - but the most frequently used 
term was ‘regulating’. They referred to it as the ‘professional part’ of their job and as 
being specific to the prison environment:
“I still subscribe to the notion of the Governor who is regulating - the governor is 
regulator, leave aside your innovation, leave aside planning whatever - just 
regulating relationships, group dynamics, planning whatever. Regulating 
dangerous individuals, trying keeping a healthy community where people have
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confidence, largely anyway, that they are being treated fairly, decently and even 
in reasonably safe conditions.”
“I think any Governor, any person who has governed a prison, will immediately 
know that managing the ever-present tensions takes up a lot of their working day.”
“The reality is that I see the Governor as the buffer. The Governor has to weave 
between all functions. He has to mediate between all functions.”
One of the main ways that Governors regulate the operation of a prison is through the 
decisions they reach. These decisions enable Governors to send clear messages to 
staff and prisoners:
“I suppose you’d call them balancing acts, and we like to talk in management 
terms of prioritising, of competing demands and we’ve got plenty of those. But 
I’d much rather use the image of balancing acts, of taking decisions around whose 
interests are served in this area, which decisions would give benefit to which 
clientele, who should have priority in that situation.”
This chapter now goes on to look at the different ways that Governors regulate their 
prisons and achieve the desired balance between the competing elements.
13.4.1 Balancing security, order and regime
It has been pointed out that ‘like virtually all conceptualisations of social relations, 
order is a matter of degree’ (Wrong 1994, p9). Governors indicated that they could 
achieve security and order through excessive control but that to do so would make 
their prisons punitive, restrictive, oppressive and over-controlled. They pointed out 
that oppressive confinement and repressive brutality and intimidation had no place in 
a modem prison system. One Governor gave this example:
“What people forget is that morality and human rights and what is acceptable 
today will have an impact on what the prison is like. Take two examples, drugs 
and keeping control. If there was no personal contact on visits and no temporary 
release there would be very few drugs inside but that is not acceptable. If I kept 
everyone locked up with no association and no work, I would have no problems 
keeping order, but today that is not acceptable. It used to be, but not today.”
They also recognised the danger in deliberately provoking tensions through 
employing ‘excessively repressive measures’ (Useem and Kimball 1989). As one 
commentator put it:
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‘Control measures that are perceived as unnecessarily manipulative, 
those that incite frustration and anger and those that do not show 
respect for human dignity run the risk of encouraging disorder rather 
than controlling it’ (Wortley 2002, p222).
None of the Governors advocated the maintenance of order through strict 
enforcement of rules alone. This is in contrast to the view of some commentators 
who argue for high levels of control and rule enforcement:
prisons that are organized along bureaucratic, even paramilitary, 
lines and operated strictly “by the book” will have less violence than 
those that are organized and run more loosely’ (Dilulio 1987).
Governors have to decide for themselves where the balance should rest:
“I think your aim as Governor, always, is to have a stable, consistent, lawful prison 
and that means you spend a lot of time trying to balance the three elements of 
security, custody and care and constantly trying to make sure that one doesn’t 
impinge on the others to such a great extent that it destabilizes.”
Other Governors used an example of where security and regime came into conflict as 
an area in which they could influence the balance within their institution:
“The POA said that officers had to be able to walk into the [sex offender] 
programme rooms now and then to ensure that no potential threats to security 
existed. The psychologists said that any interruptions would impact on group 
dynamic and confidentiality. They all came to me to argue the point. I had to
decide and knew whatever I decided would send a clear message on how I saw the
prison going in the future.”
13.4.2 Ensuring legitimacy, justice and fairness
There was a commonly held understanding amongst Governors that most prisoners 
have a precise sense of what they can and cannot legitimately expect from life inside
and it is only when this ‘legitimate expectation’ is met that order and safety can
result. Commentators support this view and indicate that most prisoners accept life in 
prison if they regard the way that they are treated as being legitimate, fair and just:
‘If prisoners perceive that -  in their opinions -  the community they 
live in is just, in the sense that wrongdoers are apprehended, good 
conduct acknowledged and those in authority mete out impartial and
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fair treatment, most will agree to conform to prison rules without too 
much complaint’ (West 1997, pi 11).
Regulating the prison in such a way as to deliver these elements was a central theme 
in good governance, according to Governors. In the absence of this sense of a “just” 
community, not only would the rights of prisoners be gravely undermined but also 
the security of the prison and safety of staff and prisoners would be put at risk.
In reality prisons differ to a ‘significant extent’ in values such as respect, humanity, 
relationships, trust, fairness, order, well-being and decency’ (Liebling and Arnold 
2002, p5). The challenge for Governors is to regulate their institutions in such a way 
that they ensure that these positive values are embedded in the culture, and are 
adhered to by both staff and prisoners. Ensuring that the operation of the prison is 
seen as being legitimate is far from easy when:
‘every instance of brutality, every casual racist joke and demeaning 
remark, every ignored petition, every unwarranted bureaucratic 
delay, every inedible meal, every arbitrary decision to segregate or 
transfer without giving clear and well founded reasons, every petty 
miscarriage of justice, every futile and inactive period of time -  is 
delegitimating’ (Sparks and Bottoms 1995, p60).
Governors have to be seen to be acting legitimately (in terms of formal rules) at all 
times, and in ways that demonstrate fairness and provide meaningful rationales for 
the exercise of their power. This was particularly the case when conducting 
adjudications:
“People are looking for clues, staff and prisoners are looking for clues about how 
the prison is being run, what is important, what is not important, what is 
acceptable, not acceptable. It is a simple mechanism for gauging what is 
important and what is not in prison is adjudications, and that is at several levels in 
respect of managing the prison.”
“The importance I attach to adjudications, because that is the one central activity 
in a Governor’s life where there is a public statement that the Governor is able to 
make about the standards, the values that he or she will expect of all the parties in 
the community. And that is actually speaking publicly to the institution. I mean 
that is a very interesting opportunity to do that and also a formal opportunity for 
the process of reparation to be seen to be taking place actually.”
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Prison officers possess a considerable degree of discretion in carrying out their job 
(Hawkins 1976, Fleisher 1989, Earley 1993, Liebling and Price 2001, Conover 
2001). Lipsky, in his study of ‘street-level’ bureaucrats, concluded that the field of 
corrections was ‘perhaps the most highly-refined example of street-level discretion’ 
(Lipsky 1980, pi 3). In the absence of detailed and unambiguous directions, a prison 
officer is confronted on a daily basis with ‘numerous dilemmas’ (Sykes 1958, p i30, 
and Morris and Morris 1963, p209). These dilemmas surround the interpretation of 
rules and regulations: whether a prisoner should be put on a disciplinary charge; what 
is appropriate behaviour; what is a reasonable amount of property in a cell; who to 
unlock from a cell first; who can have a shower when.
Governors indicated that they needed to ensure that the behaviour of their officers 
was appropriate. This involved Governors having to prevent: unnecessary 
adjudications; undue searches; inconsistent treatment; staff picking on particular 
prisoners; varying access to gym, canteen, showers and time out of cell. Governors 
need to stop prisoners being humiliated or feeling powerless, as well as ensuring that 
abuse does not take place and prisoners are not subjected to mind games and ‘wind­
ups’ by staff. A Governor gave this example:
“However good the regime and conditions, if  officers are abusing prisoners there 
will be trouble. I don’t mean by that physically abusing prisoners, but in the way 
officers talk to prisoners and respond to their requests, the way they deliver the 
mail, what they say when unlocking in the morning and when locking up at night.”
Governors are able to limit the discretionary room of their prison officers by 
resolving dilemmas that officers have to cope with. They are able to do this by 
designing detailed rules, regulations and routines that help to clarify what is expected 
in specific circumstances (Etzioni 1965). In addition, Governors can seek to 
influence how officers use their discretion by creating an ‘interpretative framework’ 
for dealing with day-to-day issues which arise in the officers’ encounters with 
prisoners, and by establishing clear standards and expectations, as these Governors 
make clear:
“The Governor’s job is to set the tone and pace of the establishment is the way in 
which I always describe it. I think the tone is about all the concepts that I would 
want to see in a well-run prison. The tone is about things like inside justice. The
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tone is about dignity, the way in which we treat each other, not just the way we treat 
the prisoners but the way in which we treat each other as staff.”
“I think that one of the most important things that a Governor does, much more 
important than being a good finance manager, being a good personnel manager ... 
is set a moral standard for the establishment. He dictates the way the prisoners are 
treated.”
Regulating the interface between uniformed staff and prisoners is made the more 
complicated because of the imbalance of power between them, the nature of a closed 
institution and the often-conflicting values and beliefs. Governors spoke of having to 
balance the interests, expectations, demands and perceptions of these various groups 
within their prisons:
“The all important thing to me is for the Governor to make sure that he actually 
has the balance between the managers, the staff, and the prisoners absolutely right, 
so that the prisoners feel safe and are satisfied that we are giving them a fair deal, 
the staff feel safe and feel that they are having a good deal and the managers 
therefore actually also feel safe because we are a stable environment without too 
much problem.”
“It is the bit about almost the sibling rivalry that takes place between staff and 
prisoners all the time in a prison. You spend your first fortnight or whatever on 
induction. You go round everyone. People will say to you in different ways, but I 
guarantee you it will come up time and time again, a question which is 
fundamentally this question ‘Are you for the staff or are you for the prisoners?’.
And that for me says it all because it assumes that in a sense you are for the one or 
the other. And my point always, obviously is that you are for both. It is actually a 
very hard message to get across in terms of what you say, but more important, 
what you do. And the really good Governors are the ones for whom in a sense it is 
self-evident to the staff and the prisoners that they are for both, and you can see 
it.”
The differing perspectives of staff and prisoners becomes most explicit when staff 
safety is perceived as being at risk:
“It has happened to me a few times. A prisoner has assaulted a member of staff and 
the staff have moved the prisoner to the seg. At what point do I let him up. The staff 
want to keep him down there, the prisoner has done his time in CC [cellular 
confinement]. Everyone - the staff and the cons - are watching to see what you will 
do. You’ve got to balance lots of things in deciding what to do.”
Governors saw the way in which prisoners’ complaints were dealt with as being 
particularly important. Governors differentiated between complaints from one 
individual and a collective grievance shared by the larger prison population. They 
accepted that individuals would invariably complain about how they had been treated 
by the system but that these were manageable in the routine course of events.
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Governors took a greater personal interest in collective grievances by groups of 
prisoners as these often had some legitimate basis:
“There will always be individuals who have personal gripes -  whether it’s about 
parole, not wanting to work, the result of an adjudication, or some such. But 
most prisoners will just get on with things. Where it goes wrong is i f  there is a 
cause that lots of them share or can identify with. You know, if  the food is crap 
day after day or association keeps getting cancelled or if  they think someone has 
been assaulted in the block. If that happens then I do take an interest and make 
sure we do something.”
“I don’t get concerned about the odd cell barricade or dirty protest but I do if  
things involve a group of prisoners. If there are lots of complaints about the food 
or a number of prisoners moan about the way a governor grade does 
adjudications that’s a different matter. Collective grievances can be a big 
problem.”
While there will always be a danger that officers perceive that a Governor is 
appeasing prisoners by ‘giving in’ to their demands, Governors indicated that they 
had always to bear in mind the importance of achieving and maintaining legitimacy:
“I need to always bear in mind the bigger picture even if  it does make me 
unpopular with staff sometimes. What they forget is that prisoners are often right 
about things -  take for example something that happened a few weeks ago. There 
has been a problem with the laundry and getting clean kit to the wings on time.
We should have sorted it but for whatever reason we let it slip. The prisoners on B 
wing decided to refuse to go away [return to their cells] until they got clean kit. I 
went and talked to them and agreed with the points that they were making and said 
that we would sort it out. For me that was about doing what was right but some of 
the officers thought that I had given in to their demands and showed weakness.”
One of the most sensitive areas is how a Governor deals with an allegation against a 
member of staff. All eyes in the prison focus on the Governor and watch to see what 
the Governor does with the complaint:
“If one of the prisoners makes an allegation, what do you do? Do you suspend the 
officer, call the police, get someone to investigate, see the prisoner? It is not easy 
and probably has caused me most anguish since I came here. It sends messages, 
whatever you do sends messages out there. All sorts of things go through your 
mind. If the prisoners think you are doing nothing they will kick off. If you 
suspend the officer the POA will storm in and there may be a vote o f no 
confidence. As you know, I’m not joking. My last Governor had a demo in the 
yard because the prisoners thought someone had been hit and the Governor was 
doing nothing about it. You’ve got to balance things, try and do what you think is 
right and stick with it. I’ve suspended a few staff since I’ve been here -  there was 
a culture that it was OK to clip the lads around the ear. They now know that I will 
not put up with that crap.”
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The need for reasoned explanations and just and fair procedures have long been held 
to be important prerequisites of a legitimate institution:
“What do you do if  someone is being moved, for instance, in enhanced status from 
one prison to your own prison? Do you put them into enhanced status or do you 
start them off as standard? Does it depend whether or not it is a so-called 
improvement, betterment move to your establishment? Or does it depend whether 
or not it was a sort of punishment move? You wrestle with that and you reach a 
conclusion that you think is right and just. Whatever you decide though I believe 
that you need to take time and explain your decision to the prisoner and also to the 
staff.”
“Whether you let someone go on HDC [temporary release on Home Detention 
Curfew] is a matter for you but you must be prepared to justify the decision. 
Prisoners are usually quite reasonable if  you take the trouble to explain the basis of 
your decision. Of course there will always be a few who want to take your head off 
but most just want someone to explain the thinking to them.”
13.4.3 Personal example and role modelling
Governors also regulated their establishments by maintaining a high profile and by 
acting as a role model. This approach has been noted in other prison studies:
‘visibility was one way in which the Governor modelled 
relationships and influenced the bigger picture’ (Liebling and Price 
2001, p35).
Governors believe that they are seen as the embodiment of what the establishment 
stands for and that staff and prisoners mirror their behaviour and approach:
“... people actually trust what you do, not what you say or what’s written down in 
the policy ... and if  your examples are bad, then it makes it very difficult for 
people to give of their best. And it encourages people who might want to behave 
in an inappropriate way to do exactly that. Similarly the converse is true, if the 
example is good, then it will encourage people who would want to follow that 
example to be able to do it. And it discourages people from doing the opposite.”
This view is supported by the findings of a study of staffiprisoner relationships that 
found that:
‘the Governor appears to have been an icon for officers, a symbol of 
the cultural values of the prison’ (Leonard 1999, p72-73).
Governors spoke of the need to establish a physical presence in their prisons. This 
aspect of the work involves more than visiting areas of the prison to do auditing and
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monitoring. It was about finding out what was going on and ensuring that standards 
were being upheld:
“I said clearly that everyday I’m in the prison I have to go on the landings. No its, 
no buts. I don’t care who’s visiting. I don’t care what meetings are on - 1 have to 
be visible. The primary function of a Governor is about being visible... I walk 
round everywhere at least once, maybe twice, once in the morning and once in the 
afternoon, and aim to be at the hotplate. I will know then that I will see every 
prisoner at [this small category C prison] because I will be there and they will 
walk past me. I just think that’s the real, first practical element at looking at being 
a governing Governor... It allows you to set the tone, allows people to see you, 
allows you to gauge the feeling about the place, allows you to set proper 
standards, allows staff to see that you’ll go where they may think it’s difficult, and 
that’s just a basic fundamental of governing. You cannot govern an establishment 
from behind a desk. ”
“Ideally I would spend more time than I do walking around but in truth I actually 
do manage to talk to people. It’s listening and pulling together the pieces. It’s 
thinking laterally in terms of information gathering, that something that an 
inmate says to you in A block may actually link to something that you picked up 
from a member of staff at the gate. It is making those connections and following 
through and thinking, well is that the case, and then testing that and testing out 
what is happening, asking awkward questions occasionally... It’s about being 
sensitive to what you see and hear and feel and it is that sensitivity that allows 
you to know what is going on. You can influence things so that they change. If A 
block feels tense you can say to the PO [principal officer] what is going on and 
move someone if  an individual is the problem. Or it may be that food is always 
cold when it gets there or an officer is stepping out of line. You pick things up 
and then do things about it.”
Maintaining a high profile also enabled governors to talk to staff and send messages 
about their standards and beliefs:
“I think it’s very important that you are seen round the prison, that people know 
what your views are ... staff should be aware of what the Governor is, or what 
his views are, what his standards are, and what sort of formal and informal 
measures, or should I say informal sanctions, are acceptable.”
An earlier study highlighted the impact that Governors could have whilst walking 
about their establishment:
‘Governors were closely watched when they came on a wing and 
talked to officers and prisoners. Their conversation topics, their 
ability to listen, the ways they interacted.. .would be closely 
observed by staff and prisoners. In this sense, Governors could ‘lead 
the way’, though they recognised the difficulties of such role- 
modelling’ (Liebling and Price 2001, p38).
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The amount that a Governor interacts with prisoners, the manner of the interaction 
and the language used, all send messages about how the Governor sees the 
community behaving:
“The feet is people do as you do. That the role model that you portray is very 
important. And that is delivered personally by the individual who is in charge.”
“As a Governor you have to have energy, enthusiasm, commitment, standards, 
values and to clearly articulate, communicate and reinforce those throughout the 
whole of your day. You are what you are seen to do, not what you are heard to 
say.”
“Someone once described, very accurately in my view, the Governor’s role as 
being someone who is on stage, somewhat o f a performer. From the moment he 
walks in the gate, he is under constant focus from his staff who watch very 
closely his reactions to certain things and I think that’s right. Governors 
generally ... are frequently tested to gauge their reaction to see what they will 
tolerate.”
Walking around the prison allows Governors to communicate key messages but it 
also brings with it a potential danger. Governors do have to be wary of what they say 
and do as their actions and words can be misinterpreted, as one Governor 
recollected:
“Everything you do as Governor sends messages about where the line should be 
drawn. They all look to you for a signal about what will be tolerated and what 
won’t. You’ve got to be very careful about what you do and say and what 
decisions you take. An off the cuff remark can have a major impact. I remember 
the time I told my security PO [principal officer] that one workshop did not have 
good tool security because of the windows. The next thing I knew the works were 
boarding up the windows. It didn’t matter that it had been like it for years. The 
Governor had said something so it needed sorting. Didn’t matter about the poor 
sods in the workshop having to work without natural light!”
13.4.4 Managing risk
Many of these regulating functions can be described in today’s vocabulary as 
manifestations of ‘risk management’. Governors have to identify risks, assess those 
risks and then decide what level of risk is acceptable, on a daily basis. These risks 
can be either ‘high consequence risks’ (Giddens 1990, p i31) such as the potential for 
escape, riots, or major disturbances, or more ‘routine risks’, including suicide and 
self-harm, HIV/AIDS transmission, arbitrary or oppressive treatment, temporary 
release, and work allocation. Governors gave these examples of where balancing 
risks became critical:
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“Let me give you a recent example of what I mean by the delicate balance. I got 
kosher security info that there was a knife on the wing. So what do you do? One 
answer is to target who we think has got it and shove him in the seg. Fine but 
he’s unlikely to keep the blade in his cell and someone else may get their hands 
on it, so we would have to wait for more intelligence. Or do you bang up the 
entire wing till it’s found and manage the reaction from the lads when they 
finally get unlocked? Or do nothing and wait for it to be used? There are lots of 
other ways to manage that situation as you know but that gives you an idea of the 
sort of decisions we have to take... It’s about risk assessment to use the modem 
jargon... You use your experience, advice from others and often a gut feeling for 
what is the right thing to do.”
“The doctor told me the other day that a red band [trusted prisoner who is given 
a responsible job] in the kitchen was HIV positive. You then have to think it 
through, the risks, and the possible consequences. Do you leave him there or do 
you move him?”
13.5 Understanding prisons and prisoners -  ‘jailcraft’.
Underpinning all aspects of a Governor’s work is the need for the Governor to 
understand: how prisons work; how the different aspects of a prison are intertwined; 
how a decision about one issue will have implications in another; and how the 
differing stakeholder groups will perceive decisions. This is what Governors call 
‘jailcraft’. Many Governors in the study highlighted its importance:
“I view jailcraft as knowing the ins and outs of a prison. Of being able to walk in 
all lines of that prison. Of being able to move up and move down at a whim, 
depending on who you are talking to. Of being able to gauge the atmosphere 
within a prison, not just gauging the atmosphere of whether there’s tension, but 
gauging the actual atmosphere when you are talking to an inmate. The vibes 
coming from that inmate. Knowing what you can say and what you can’t say. 
Knowing how you should bring him down. Knowing that if  you say the wrong 
thing it is going to bring him up. That is jailcraft.”
“There are times and situations where you have to recognize that prisoners as a 
group can behave in ways and respond in ways that would not apply to other 
groups of people. I remember an occasion when Douglas Hurd came to [a 
category B training prison] and I was doing the kind o f walk around and he went 
on to the exercise yard when exercise was happening and gradually prisoners 
started to realise who it was and there was a certain amount of jeering and 
barracking. Now Douglas Hurd was a very experienced politician, ascribed no 
significance to that, because he’d stood in front of groups of people, you know, on 
the hustings. My reaction was, I think we’d better move now because the jailcraft 
bit was saying, in that situation that reaction can easily become more and more 
volatile to the point where it tips over into disorder... that is one of the ways in 
which dealing with prisoners has a different dimension and it’s a dimension that 
people who haven’t served our apprenticeship would probably not really grasp 
until it came up and bit them on the bum.”
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The next chapter now goes on to look in more detail at the reality of governing from 
the perspective of the individual Governor and the factors that influence how they 
govern.
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CHAPTER 14: 
THE REALITY OF GOVERNING
The previous two chapters took a macroscopic approach to identifying what 
Governors do. They emphasised what was common to all Governors -  a generic 
description of the work of Governors as a class. This chapter considers the reality of 
governing from the individual Governor’s perspective. It focuses on variations 
between Governors in what they do and how they do it, as well as exploring what has 
an impact on individual Governors’ ability to achieve what they set out to do in 
prisons. Some of those factors are to with the individual Governor, such as personal 
style and approach, time in post, and experience of governing. Other factors are more 
to do with specific institutions within which they work, the stakeholders in those 
prisons and line management. Governors also indicated that occupational stress, 
support mechanisms, ethics and values had an impact on their work.
14.1 Stakeholder power and impact
Earlier chapters pointed out that the days of the prison fiefdom are long gone and 
Governors are now no longer free to do things according to whim. What the 
Governor is able to achieve today is dependent on a complex network of power- 
relations between stakeholders. These stakeholders include: prison staff, Prison 
Officers Association (POA); prisoners; administrators at Prison Service 
Headquarters; area managers; politicians; pressure groups; and the public. As one 
study pointed out:
‘... although the governor is in overall charge of the institution and 
its various parts, he or she must satisfy a number of masters over a 
wide range of issues’ (Vagg 1994, pi 10).
These stakeholders confront one another as actors in a dynamic play of conflict, 
compromise, and mutual influence, what Giddens terms the ‘dialectic of control in 
social systems’ (Giddens 1984, p i6). The situation has been described in the 
following way:
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‘Power is not untrammelled, and governors are routinely in 
negotiation with others -  uniformed staf£ central administration, 
prisoners, Boards of Visitors, and so on’ (Sparks et al. 1996, pi 36).
In reality, a Governor’s ability to deliver will depend on the relative power of 
stakeholders and their willingness to use that power to enact or subvert the 
Governor’s plans and activities.
The relationship between Governors and the centre (Headquarters and its ‘field’ 
representative, the area manager) is a complex, and sometimes tense one. In the past, 
Governors were in a position in which they were either unable, or unwilling, to 
comply with centrally prescribed policies. They were able to ignore, manipulate or 
interpret policy directives. Governors have ‘implementation discretion’, like all 
operational senior managers, which allows them to develop courses of action that 
contradict or violate central policy prescriptions (Ingram 1990 and Winter 1990). 
‘Implementation discretion’ arises because of the limitations of central policy 
making, in that central policy makers do not have sufficient operational knowledge to 
define in minute terms all aspects for the implementation of a policy, nor do they 
have the ability to control all aspects of the actual behaviour of Governors. 
Operational realities, and the need to deal with the contradictions that present 
themselves in Governors’ daily work, are not easily reconciled with central 
prescription.
It became clear during the interviews that some Governors also fail to comprehend 
the values, perceptions and approach of administrators at Prison Service 
Headquarters -  what Hill (1979, pl45) refers to as the ‘appreciative gap’. This 
‘appreciative gap’ allows Governors to say that central policy makers do not know 
what they are talking about because of their lack of operational experience and, as a 
consequence, Governors should be able to legitimately ignore or redefine 
instructions:
“There are too many civil servants working at Prison Service Headquarters who 
have no idea of what life is like at the coal face. They’ve never worked or even 
visited a prison and don’t know that there’s a very different culture in prisons 
compared to Headquarters.”
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“I get really pissed off when some spotty youth at Headquarters tries to tell me 
what to do in some policy document. His brain may well be the size of a planet 
but I doubt he knows what a prisoner looks like.”
The issue was highlighted by the Woolf Inquiry:
‘What is heard in establishments is that headquarters, who are 
regarded overwhelmingly as being administrators without practical 
experience, [are] telling very experienced governors and staff how to 
do their jobs which they have been doing for most of their working 
lives’ (Woolf and Tumim 1991, para. 12.69).
It has been suggested that central administrators and field managers work in 
‘different worlds’ (Dunsire 1978 and Sabatier and Mazmanian 1983) and that their 
relationship can be described as a ‘struggle for power and domination’ (Adler and 
Longhurst 1994, p27). A former Director General put it is this way:
‘... Whitmore [Home Office permanent secretary] was dismissive of 
prison governors, who were allegedly so incompetent that 2,000 
people in Prison Service headquarters, including ‘sound’ civil 
servants, were needed to keep them in order’ (Lewis 1997, p6).
The operations/policy divide has much to do with the varying cultures, experiences 
and claims to expertise between Governors and Prison Service administrators. The 
policy civil servants at Headquarters have tended to adopt a paper-based 
management approach, where direction has been exercised through written 
prescription and by control of the inputs. Governors on the other hand lay claim to 
the ‘real world’, lead from example, derive their expertise from operational decision­
making and have spent a considerable amount of time working in prisons. A former 
Governor described the difference between Governors and civil service mandarins:
‘Governors see their own professional skills as managing prisons, 
whereas mandarins merely manage paper. The mandarin, in turn, 
sees the governor as something of a thicko who may be good at the 
locks, bolts and bars but, even if he or she could recognise a 
preposition, would not know that it is something to avoid ending a 
sentence on (or is it with?)... Officials look up the line to service 
their Ministers. Governors look over their shoulders to Ministers 
almost as necessary nuisances, and down the line to their staff and 
their prisoners who clamour with equal vigour for their attention’ 
(Quinn 1997, p826-827).
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The tension, between the Governors’ desire to run their prisons, as they would wish, 
and the Prison Service administrators’ belief that all prisons should be managed in a 
consistent manner, continues to be a dominant issue.
Governors emphasised that at establishment level the nature, character and culture of 
a prison has a huge impact on what they are able to do, how they manage and how 
quickly they are able to deliver changes. Challenging the status quo and achieving 
fundamental change requires existing patterns of behaviour, attitudes and 
expectations to change. This, in turn, requires that the existing ethos and equilibrium 
of a prison be disturbed, a process which can encounter resistance, both passive and 
active, from staff and prisoners.
Incoming Governors quickly become conscious that their freedom of action is 
constrained. They have to be particularly aware of what Giddens (1984) refers to as 
the ‘sense of place’. Each prison staff culture is distinct in terms of its memories, 
folklores, identities, and enmities (Garland 1990). It is the product of complex 
connections between everyday activities of individuals, the larger trajectory of their 
biographies, and the special features of each prison. This is especially true of older 
prisons that are small and bounded communities, and where many of the staff have 
been there for an extended period. Prison officers are therefore intimately aware of 
the history, traditions, and culture of the place, and significant events which, in the 
past, have helped to shape the culture and the ‘way’ things are done there. One 
Governor explained the importance of understanding the relationship between local 
culture and change in this way:
“I’ve worked in many prisons over the years and I can honestly say that the
culture was very different. I did things in one which I would never have got away
with in another... The staff vary a lot -  some of that has to do with the power of 
the POA, how long staff have worked there and the style of previous 
Governors... That effects what you can do. Changing anything at [an old training 
prison] was a huge bloody trauma. The POA would come in and say ‘back in 
1890 Governor so and so tried that and it didn’t work, so let’s not bother trying 
again’. Whereas at [a new local prison] there was no real history, so everything 
was new and certainly in the early days the staff were up for trying out new 
things.”
The power and ability of the POA to resist change at a national Prison Service level,
as well as at each prison, is legendary and well founded (see section 12.3.3).
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Historically, the focus of the power struggle has been between Governors and 
uniformed staf£ as the often vitriolic industrial relations situation demonstrates (see 
Stem 1987, p78-83). Governors made clear that where the POA is particularly strong 
a Governor’s ability to drive forward change would be more limited:
“I must say it’s been a battle here over everything. The POA are antediluvian in 
their approach. They want nothing changed. They argue over the smallest things 
and we have so many ‘failures to agree’. I’ve worked hard to try and get a good 
relationship but for the POA it’s about objecting to everything. I’m sure if  I said 
that door was blue, they’d argue it was red.”
Line managers below the Governor, particularly senior and principal officers, are 
responsible for the daily implementation of the Governor’s policies. This group is in 
a strong position therefore to impact on the level of implementation and the routine 
treatment of prisoners. As one Governor put it:
‘... officers identified what they regarded as a flaw in the 
management chain which sometimes altered the Governor’s 
intentions, preventing them from being translated into action. In 
other words, middle managers were thought to modify the 
Governor’s policies’ (Leonard 1999, p62).
Governors also highlighted the power of prisoners, as a group, to thwart or delay 
change. Governors spoke of having to negotiate with prisoners or to ‘bribe’ them into 
accepting changes to the regime:
“I remember well the change over to private firms taking over the canteen and 
bringing in a bagging system. That was potentially a difficult change to manage, 
something which prisoners were concerned about and something that would have 
led to much grief if  we didn’t handle it well. As it happens I gave them all an extra 
phone card and quarter of an ounce of tobacco and there was no problem.”
“Most people would think prisoners do what they are told. Well, you and I know for 
a feet that’s not true. There is no such thing as absolute power; it’s about relative 
power. Take for example when I tried to extend the working day in the shops...
Then the prisoners started, wanting more pay for a longer day. I couldn’t bloody 
believe it. We put a few of the ring-leaders in the block [segregation unit] but there 
was still a groundswell of feeling ... and we had to rethink it all.”
This view reinforces findings of an earlier study which concluded that ‘most 
prisoners find the ability to express their agency and to resist. Few prisons are run by 
coercion’ (Bosworth 1999, pi 31).
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Governors are reliant on others for resource allocation and to support them in trying 
to achieve change. In the past there seems to have been a reluctance to confront 
existing power bases, and Governors said that they have not always been supported 
by Headquarters in trying to achieve change. This has led to stasis and appeasement 
in some prisons:
“When I was at [a large local prison] I got really pissed off with Headquarters and 
nearly left the service. They told me to change things and that’s what I tried to do 
but as soon as the POA got bolshy and did their usual threats, I was told to back 
down... I felt like they had cut my legs from under me.”
“You’ve got to get your supporters lined up if  you are going to take on the vested 
interests in a place. I’ve found that you can only take on one group at a time, you 
cannot do battle with staff and prisoners and Headquarters and the BOV all at the 
same time. You can take on the prisoners if  everyone else is behind you and knows 
why you are screwing the place down. Or you can take on staff culture but only if  
the BOV, prisoners and Headquarters are on your side.”
A former Chief Inspector of Prisons gave an example of a similar occurrence:
‘Where one Governor tried to introduce a new staff shift system 
unforgivably his immediate superiors, his area manager and regional 
director, supported the POA rather than face confrontation’ 
(Ramsbotham 2003, p i05).
14.2 Multiple and conflicting roles
Merton’s hypothesis is that each social status (an individual’s position in the social 
system) involves not only a single associated role but also ‘an array of associated 
roles’ (Merton 1957, p369). This ‘role-set’ consists of the complement of role 
relationships which persons have by virtue of occupying a particular social status. 
Governors spoke of having a number of related and overlapping roles, instead of 
having a single role. To speak of the Governors’ role is therefore misleading, in that 
there appears to be no single role but rather a ‘role-set’ associated with the Office of 
Governor. The Governor has internal (prison) roles in relation to staff and prisoners, 
and at the same time external (Prison Service) roles in relation to Headquarters and 
the broader community.
Part five of this thesis described the environmental changes that have had an impact 
on the role and work of the Governor. As a result of these environmental changes the
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relative importance of the various roles that the Governor is expected to undertake is 
changing:
“The reality of taking on the role of the Governor is that it is changing and you 
need to keep up with how it is procedurally prescribed, culturally prescribed, 
socially prescribed, and organisationally prescribed.”
One of the themes to emerge from the research is that there is some disagreement 
amongst prison stakeholders over the Governors’ current role, what they should do 
and the way they should govern. At times, different stakeholders (‘role senders’ - 
Yukl 1994) can make incompatible demands on the Governor, creating role conflicts 
(Kahn 1964). Conflicts may involve a difference of opinion over the relative priority 
of two roles (for example, internal manager or external figurehead), or the manner in 
which a role is carried out (for example, ensuring justice by doing adjudications 
themselves or by checking the records of adjudications completed by others). 
Sometimes role conflict occurs simply because of the range of expectations placed 
on the Governor, as this quote suggests:
“It’s a difficult one. It’s difficult sometimes knowing what you should be doing as 
we wear so many hats. Everyone wants a piece of you as Governor and they all 
want you to do different things.”
Role expectations can also be inconsistent with objective task requirements. This is 
especially the case when the nature of the task has changed, while the norms and 
beliefe about the proper exercise of the role have remained the same.
“I get a little frustrated at times as you are pulled in so many different directions.
Area office want you to do the papers and write reports. My staff want to see me 
around the place and to be able to see me about their personal problems. Prisoners 
want me to do their apps [applications to have an interview with the Governor]. The 
area manager told me to do adjudications, and wants me to represent him at 
meetings at Headquarters. And on top of that the local community want me to cut 
ribbons and speak at the WI [Women’s Institute]. Well, you can’t do the bloody lot, 
can you? You have to make choices.”
The conflict between the organisational demands to operate as the general manager 
of the prison, and the expectations of the staff and prisoners who adhere to a more 
traditional view of how Governors should use their time, creates tension for 
Governors. In Giddens’ (1990) terminology, there is a tension between ‘place based’ 
(traditional figurehead, highly visible, direct contact with prisoners) and ‘non-place
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based’ (modem manager) structures and systems. Governors pointed to a number of 
specific examples where their traditional and modem roles came into conflict:
“I am finding it harder and harder to achieve a balance between what I need to do to 
keep the area manager happy and what staff and prisoners expect me to be doing as 
Governor. This is not some semantic difference, it is a real issue for many of us - 
Do the paperwork or get around the prison. Spend time in the prison or go to 
outside meetings. Talk with staff and prisoners or write a report on something for 
area. I exaggerate but there are real tensions. ”
“Uniformed staff still, particularly those more experienced uniformed staff, still 
view their own Governor in the traditional sense. That he is the master o f all you 
survey and he is the really important one in the prison that you have got to worry 
about. It’s changing - some of the younger staff are seeing the Governor in a wider 
concept, as someone that should be giving support and guidance - should be giving 
them support and guidance - and a much more modem managerial role o f the 
Governor.”
A number of examples were recounted by Governors of where incoming Governors 
had adopted very different approaches and styles to their predecessors or were not 
the ‘type’ of Governor that the staff wanted. As a result, Governors have been known 
to suffer ‘status degradation’ (Garfinkel 1956) or have been moved from their post 
(Finkelstein 1996).
Faced with potentially conflicting views about their roles, Governors have either to 
conform to expectations from as many role senders as possible, or risk being labelled 
as non-conformist or bad Governors. The current research suggests that Governors 
each take up the roles as they see fit, in the context of the various expectations placed 
upon them. This always leads to some variation between Governors.
14.3 Variations in management style and approach
Governors do very similar work, as earlier chapters have shown. As one Governor 
put it:
“I think there will be a pretty good slam of commonality between what they are 
doing as Governors and what I’m doing as a Governor. I’d hazard a guess that 
there’s probably about 80% overlap - 1 don’t know. The critical bit is the bit on the 
margin but what I do outside of very interesting interviews with Shane Bryans et al. 
is do what everybody else is doing, which is flog through the paperwork, translate 
the paperwork and intention and policy and instructions into managerial action.”
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How they do that work depends on the style and approach of each Governor. Each 
Governor approaches his or her work with a complex array of concepts, theoretical 
models, experience and knowledge:
“We are all different and we have all got our own styles and ways of doing it ... 
different individuals will do that differently because of their styles.”
The interviews indicated that Governors have different management styles and 
approaches with regard to: whether power was shared and with whom; how visible 
they were in the prison; what they spent their time doing; and how a prison should be 
organised and run. A Governor’s approach and style is influenced by a number of 
factors: background, ideology, training, experience and needs of a particular post 
(Margerison 1991, Salaman 1992, Mumford 1997). From the current study it is 
possible to identify variations in the approaches adopted by Governors.
Some Governors adopted a more ‘autocratic approach’ and their responses indicated 
that they sought to dominate staff, as well as prisoners. These Governors exercised 
personal power and seemed to share decision making with few others. A number of 
interviewees spoke of their prisons in a way that conjured up images of a prison 
fiefdom reminiscent of a medieval barony:
“Some people would call me autocratic I suppose but it is more about setting 
standards and making sure they are met. I’m the Governor and I’m in charge. My 
officers and prisoners know that. They know I make the decisions and I am 
responsible for everything that happens in my prison... Yes I do go around bollocking 
people but I see that as part of my job.”
“It is no different to when I was in the army. I am the commanding officer and people 
do what I tell them or else. I don’t hold flicking debates, I make up my mind and tell 
people. My dep expects me to tell him what to do and that goes all the way down...
Everyone in this prison knows what is expected of them and gets on with it.”
Most Governors adopted a more ‘shared-power approach’, where the staff are 
empowered but the Governor remains in control. This approach seemed to place less 
emphasis on the use of detailed written orders and more on ‘trusting’ officers to 
exercise their discretion according to the ethos and standards set by the Governor. 
Governors who adopted this approach would often consult staff and prisoners before 
making decisions.
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“I can’t tell you when I last issued an order... It’s very easy. I could just walk in 
and say do that and it would be done. It would be done without question but what I 
need to know is that it is being done when I’m not there. You have to encourage, 
you have to remind, you have to persuade people that there is a better way to do it 
or you want something else to happen, but you have to explain why you want it to 
happen and the part that plays in a bigger picture, so that they have got a framework 
in which to operate.”
“I don’t always feel comfortable with the paramilitary uniformed bit. Society has 
moved on and so have people’s expectations. I just couldn’t get away with some of 
the things I saw my old Governors doing to staff. These days we need to involve 
more, consult more and get people to see why we want things done. It’s more about 
asking and encouraging than telling.”
One of the main factors that differentiated Governors in terms of their style was the 
degree to which they got involved in the detailed operation of the prison. Some 
Governors were more ‘hands on’ and spoke of being involved in the smallest detail 
of the running of the prison. Examples given included: doing cell inspections; 
checking keys at the key safe and money in the cashier’s office; and allocating all the 
incoming mail at a daily meeting. Others adopted a high-level, strategic approach 
focusing more on long-terms plans than day-to-day operational issues:
“I quite often go and help out with rub down searches during labour movement or 
go and serve the food on the hotplate... It helps me to remember what all this is 
really about.”
“I see my role as a strategic one, it is about direction and planning not about the 
day-to-day operations of [a large local prison]. My senior team, especially the dep, 
run the routine things and to be honest I don’t understand the detailed mechanics of 
what keeps this place going. My dep was promoted from PO [principal officer] to 
the governor grades so knows what makes this place tick and I leave that to him.”
What was common to both groups was the belief in the need to maintain a personal 
presence in the prison (see chapters 12 and 13). As one former Governor put it:
‘we must recognise that prisons are not perfect organisations of 
efficiency, fairness and justice. Because of this, the governor’s 
awareness of his prison must rest on more than a vicarious 
knowledge’ (Gadd 1988, p8).
While the desire to be visible was common to all Governors, in reality Governors 
varied in the extent to which they visited all areas of the prison, and what they saw 
as the purpose of the visit. Some Governors did a traditional daily ‘tour’ of the 
prison; others were more focused and conducted inspection visits according to a
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rolling schedule. This individualistic approach can be compared to the US Bureau of 
Prisons, which is prescriptive and requires that: ‘when they tour, [Wardens] must 
actively seek out information, not just passively walk around’ (Henderson and 
Phillips 1989, pl6).
Governors indicated that the length of time that they had been in post, the “phase of 
governorship”, as one Governor put it, influenced the way they did the job. The 
longer that Governors had been in post the more willing they were to trust other 
people to do routine work, and the less need they felt to impose themselves on daily 
decision making. After a long period in post, Governors believed that staff 
understood their approach and could be expected to make decisions in accordance 
with their standards. In the early days of a governorship, Governors appeared keen to 
establish themselves and maintain a high visibility to ensure that staff knew what was 
expected and to set standards.
“I suppose it is about the stage in the governorship. Here I am still very much about 
trying to set standards and picking up things that I think are not right and trying to 
say to people, this is not right, this is what we need to do to set it right... I like to 
know what’s going on and why it’s going on. At [my last prison] in the latter days, 
then I suppose I was slightly different. I would have much more of a routine day 
because the staff there were empowered so I had complete confidence that, in a 
sense, nothing would go wrong or happen, with any significance, without me 
hearing about it. That’s not the case here. It’s still very much this is the problem and 
the Governor will sort it out, so we are still in the very early days I think.”
There is no ‘the Prison Service way of doing it’ embedded in the socialisation or training 
of Governors. A book or manual on ‘how to govern a prison’ does not exist and there is 
currently no prescription on style or ‘mould’ into which Governors must fit. To a great 
extent Governors seem to develop their own ‘how to govern’ template from seeing other 
Governors operating, their role models, and experience early in their service. Governors 
are able to decide not to do certain types of work, where there is someone else more 
suitable to take on a task:
\
“You command a situation and there is a uniqueness about being able to switch to 
that and, indeed, I’ve known a couple of colleagues who’ve said they can’t do that.
And that’s actually been accepted by their manager. Which creates a very difficult 
problem, but what’s been agreed, certainly in one case, is the deputy governor 
would always be the person who would take on that command task.”
“I am not very good at public speaking and I am quite a shy person. I avoid doing 
staff meetings and all that bit with visitors. That’s why I don’t do much in the 
community. Fortunately my dep loves all that crap and I let him get on with it.”
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“Some Governors do not like the interpersonal bit and avoid spending too much 
time on the wings. Other Governors, like me, like chatting to people and can always 
find something to say to people in a relaxed sort of way. But I don’t like the 
paperwork side as much. To keep me away from that side of it, I’ve built a good 
team over the years and I’ve created a secretariat.”
14.4 Institutional influences
The individual prison (size, age, stage of development, architecture and category) 
can have an impact on the way Governors govern. The size of a prison, in terms of 
the number of staff and prisoners, can dictate how the Governor spends his or her 
time:
“I think you have got to look at the size of the establishment before you can actually 
come to a view on the role and work of the Governor... I think Governor 3 prisons 
are still o f a size and non-complexity that an energetic Governor can run by the dint 
of their own personality... I think once you move up to the next level of 
establishment, to a Governor 2 establishment, then the Governor, as a manager has 
to be reverting to being a team player. You are working through systems. In small 
prisons, the Governor is clearly the dominant force, both physically in terms of 
being able to get round it and in terms o f having the hand on most key decisions.
You move up then to the next level... you need the systems to run it.”
The physical structure, architecture and area the prison occupies also had an impact 
on what a Governor is able to do. Governors have far more contact with staff and 
prisoners in smaller establishments, as they are able to maintain a presence in all 
areas of the institution on a daily basis. In larger establishments Governors have to 
rely on other means to ensure that key messages about standards and culture reach 
the staff and prisoner population:
“Here for instance you can’t go right round the establishment in the morning 
because it is too big, unless you just walk. If you want to stop and talk to people, 
you can’t do it. So I don’t get around [this prison] daily like I did at [a small local 
prison].”
It is not only the size of the establishment that dictates the ability of a Governor to 
visit all areas; it is also the physical layout, as one Governor made clear:
“The amount that you can do yourself in any gaol differs. It wasn’t difficult at [a 
small YOI] - i f  I wanted to get round the gaol and be seen in all the wings, I could 
do that in an hour and a half very easily. I couldn’t do that [at this large local 
prison]. If I was at Pentonville, for all the size in terms of prison numbers at 
Pentonville, like almost twice the number we’ve got here, I could do it in 15
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minutes, because Pentonville has only got a traditional Victorian four wings and a 
lot of prisoners on each of the wings. It’s all contained literally within a very short 
site and you can actually physically get round the site in no time.”
The challenge for Governors of prisons which are not of a traditional panopticon 
design is how best to maximise their presence across a geographically spread-out 
institution. One Governor had clearly appreciated the social meaning of more 
modem prison architecture:
“At [a large local prison of a panopticon design] it was easy. I would stand on the 
centre first thing in the morning, at lunch and teatime and everyone would know 
that the Governor was there. I could see all the landings on all the wings but more 
importantly all the staff on duty that day and all the prisoners could see me. They 
seemed to find it reassuring to know that ‘the old man’ was there. Whereas here 
[a campus style training prison] it’s a nightmare. I could spend all morning 
walking about and only see a few staff and prisoners. So I thought about it and 
now I always head for the times and places when people will see me. You know, 
in the gate first thing in the morning to see the staff coming on duty; or standing 
on the yard when labour movement is going on. All the prisoners walk by and see 
you there.”
Governors are able therefore to compensate for a prison’s physical layout by 
adjusting their way of working. Overcoming the constraints of prison architecture is 
possible as ‘ultimately the problem is not one of architecture. It is a problem of 
philosophy’ (Casale 1989, p98).
Another factor highlighted by Governors as determining the work that they did was 
the stage of development of the prison:
“There are certain things which, at certain stages, depending on what you feel about 
where the organisation is, you spend more time on.”
“If the jail is going through a difficult time, whether it be a rocky time 
operationally, then clearly your approach has to be different than if  it’s going 
through a difficult time financially. If it’s the former you will probably be about the 
prison more and be visible. If it’s financial difficulties you will be in an office 
pouring over a bloody calculator. So I think it is different depending where you 
are.
“If you have just taken over perhaps a big local prison whose culture needs sorting 
out, then I think one spends an enormous amount of time and energy trying to shift 
the culture and redirect that place rather than looking at other stuff.”
237
14.5 Occupational stress
Governors shared the belief that governing a prison could be a very stressful 
occupation.
“I have a lot of colleagues who suffer from ill health. I mean it is a stressful job.”
The level of stress related to the nature of the work, hours spent working, operating 
environment, and the achievability of the expectations placed on Governors. 
However, little is known about stress levels amongst Governors and the impact it can 
have.
Governors tended to feel under pressure to complete the ever-increasing 
administrative tasks and at the same time provide the more traditional visible 
leadership expected by staff and prisoners. Most found it difficult to do both in 
anything less than a 50-hour week. Some Governors worked very long hours in the 
prison to do what they believed was required of a Governor:
“I am spending between two and two and a half-hours a day travelling. But I tend 
to have a working day from between eight every morning, and I would think I 
would finish at some point between six and seven in the evening and have in the 
last four weeks left the establishment for lunch only twice... I work a weekend once 
a month and I have worked to lock up a couple of evenings a week and would 
expect to do that... So I guess I am probably working fifty-five hours a week, 
something like that.”
“I work anything up to 12 hours a day.”
In order to create time to be visible in their prisons, many Governors routinely took 
paperwork home.
“I take work home every day ... my view is that I will have to do more work at 
home if  I am going to be as visible around the establishment as I think it is 
important for me to be. Because at the moment I can’t achieve all the things I want 
to achieve in that fifty to fifty-five hour working week.”
“I take stuff home as well. I think most people do though. Just to keep up with the 
paperwork. And at weekends I’ll take a bit of reading or rough draft things that you 
won’t get the quality time at work to do it. I’ve currently got 30 days’ leave left.”
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Very few Governors worked less than 50 hours a week, and those who did so 
believed that this had an impact on their establishment and the work they were able 
to do:
“For the first year here I was working over a seventy hour week just to keep the 
place going. So much needed to be done, people wanted to see the Governor around 
the place. I could not maintain that pace and got ill, so now I only work about 45 
hours. It’s difficult, I never get to the bottom of my in-tray, never get around all the 
prison each week, and people have to wait over a week to see me. You just have to 
leave things but that generates its own stress... I am probably not a very good 
Governor from that point of view.”
The very nature of a Governor’s work had the potential to create stress. For some 
Governors the amount of responsibility that rested with the Governor came as a 
shock:
“I don’t think that I was quite prepared for the exposure of being in charge.”
“I don’t think you’re ever prepared for it when you come into it. I remember 
sitting behind the desk at [a small local prison] when I first got there and thinking - 
Hell! This is all mine! And then came the realisation that I was responsible for 
everything that happened at [a small local prison]... it is frightening and daunting. I 
try not to think about it too much or else I would get myself into a state.”
The level of responsibility, the increase in managerial duties, and the range of 
competing demands put Governors under significant occupational stress, as these 
Governors pointed out:
“I think I have certainly gone through some periods when it has affected me from a 
pressure of work kind of way. The sheer pressure and the stress of working at [a 
large YOI] for a period of time, and dealing with some really quite unpleasant 
people, and some of those were the staffi took its toll on me.”
“The emotional demands are considerable. They arise from carrying out the 
Governor’s duties in the highly charged, even volatile atmosphere of a prison, often 
dealing with seriously disturbed, possibly violent prisoners and difficult issues such 
as drug taking and those arising in adjudications. Achieving a proper balance 
between the custodial and caring responsibilities inherent in the role can create role 
conflict which itself results in emotional demands. Governors are under constant 
pressure to achieve the key performance targets.”
Governors reported that the most stressful aspect of the job was dealing with 
operational incidents. While some Governors took naturally to incident management, 
for others it was an infrequent occurrence and one that put them under huge pressure.
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Other Governors pointed to the stress caused during periods when a number of 
incidents followed in quick succession:
“I’m usually fine with incidents but we have just been through a spell of constant 
trouble of one sort or another. We’ve had [a number of incidents including a death, 
hostage incidents and rooftop protests] in two months and I don’t mind saying to 
you Shane that it has been hard. You get tired, staff get tired, your senior team get 
tired and the cons get jumpy and you have to keep them all going. It has probably 
been the most stressful period of my life.”
“I went through a period of not sleeping and worrying about what was going to 
happen next. I can honestly say that I dreaded the phone going at certain times of 
the day and night. Mostly at lock and unlock, it was then that staff would find 
someone hanging or someone missing. I would get sick if  the phone went in the 
night... It was really difficult for me and I had to get counselling. I don’t think 
people understand what we go through sometimes.”
Another area of stress was the relationship between the Governor and the POA. It 
has been pointed out elsewhere that manager-union relations are a major source of 
stress (Weinberg et al 1985). This view was supported by Governors who found 
dealing with the POA an area of immense frustration and anger.
“I was at [a large local prison] and it wasn’t an easy establishment. Nobody would 
ever say it was an easy establishment, and I was told to sort the place out. For four 
years there it was a constant battle with the POA. I went through votes o f no 
confidence, the POA refusing to talk to me, deliberate acts to challenge my 
authority, POA members refusing to do certain work. I can honestly say that I 
wouldn’t go through that again. It had a real impact on me personally. I mean it 
affected me as a person. My domestic life suffered. I nearly ended up getting 
divorced.”
“I could not believe how ... the POA were when I got here. We had problems 
changing anything. They even lodged a ‘failure to agree’ when I created some new 
posts. I tore it up and put it in the bin, but it just shows the problems here. It has 
made it very hard to do anything with them objecting at every stage. Don’t get me 
wrong. As you know it’s not like that everywhere. Some POAs are great but here 
they have no idea. I got very stressed out about it.”
Governing can also be a very solitary occupation, as one Governor pointed out:
“I didn’t realize the pressures on a governing Governor as such, which are far 
greater than a deputy governing governor. I wasn’t aware how - not lonely, that’s 
the wrong word - but solitary. I think it can be a very solitary occupation.”
American studies into stress amongst correctional staff have tended to focus on 
correctional officers rather than Wardens (for a review of the literature see Morgan et 
al 2002). These studies have found that high levels of stress amongst correctional
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officers are associated with: high divorce rates (Cheek and Miller 1983, pi 16); 
burnout and leaving the job (Linquist and Whitehead 1986, p21); cardiac difficulties 
and cardiovascular problems (Wynne 1977 and Harenstam et al 1988); substance 
abuse (Svenson et al 1995) and becoming cynical with little or no concern for 
prisoners (Chemiss 1980 and Maslach 1982). While the Governor’s work is 
qualitatively different from that of front-line workers (prison officers and 
correctional officers), it is reasonable to assume that some of these consequences 
may also flow from the level of stress experienced by Governors.
Governors have created personal support mechanisms to cope with the complexity 
and stress of the job. Increasingly Governors are looking beyond line management 
for that support, as they believe that as area managers become more performance 
focused they are less able or willing to provide the necessary support:
“When something goes wrong you do not get support from the area manager or 
Headquarters -  they are too busy protecting their own backs. Governors take the 
risks and take the blame. When was the last time that an area manager got sacked?
Never, that’s when. They like the credit and always appear for the photos but you 
can never find them when you are in trouble. In fact, it is usually the area manager 
who commissions the investigations into what you have or have not done.”
“I have been through some bad times at [a large local prison]. We had a spate of 
suicides and the press picked up on it. The area manager and Cleland House [Prison 
Service Headquarters] wanted briefings and lots of details. But I didn’t get a single 
’phone call from them asking how I was or whether I needed any help or support...
We are shit at looking after Governors.”
Many Governors have created a network of colleagues from whom they can get 
support and with whom they can discuss prison-related matters:
“Within the service there’s at least one ex-Govemor who looks after me, and picks 
up the phone. And I know that I could pick up the phone and have a chat with him. 
And there are one to two peers around that I would equally pick up the phone and 
chat through something with.”
“The most important thing is to have your own network of colleagues who you can 
simply talk to. I call them soul-mates. I have a small group of soul-mates with 
whom I relate to very closely and regularly, simply to exchange day-to-day 
experiences and chew the cud, quite often.”
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14.6 Ideological, ethics and values
It is generally accepted that the actions of managers are shaped by their sets of 
beliefs and ethical principles (Denhardt 1988 and Watson 1996). One commentator 
points out that:
‘Ethical issues are all around those who work in organizations... Not 
only that but those working in public services are working within 
organizations which exist to fulfil social and ethical purposes’ 
(Lawton 1998, p i53).
The degree to which their ideologies, ethics and values inform and direct Governors’ 
work is an issue which has received little attention (a notable exception being 
Rutherford 1994). Chapter 9 described the Governors’ espoused ideologies -  the 
values, beliefs and goals that underpin their daily work. Based on their ideologies 
Governors appear to develop what Skyes (1958, p35) refers to as a ‘philosophy of 
custody’ in order to inform the way they exercise their discretion and run their 
institutions. Governors seem to develop this ‘philosophy of custody’ as a means of 
coping with the ambiguity and uncertainty of centrally-imposed goals and tasks 
(Street et al. 1966, Dilulio 1987, Boin 1998) and because ‘prisons are a minefield of 
difficult moral issues’ (Lewis 1997, p62). This ‘philosophy of custody’ may not be 
explicit but rather a subconscious operating philosophy that underpinned and guided 
their daily work.
Governors in the study made the point that that you cannot have ‘value-free’ 
governance but that values should inform daily activities and decision-making:
“The governance of prisons cannot be reduced to the ‘value-free’ promotion of 
economy, efficiency, effectiveness. It’s got to be about more than just getting more 
for your money or the achievement of key performance indicators. It’s about 
promoting human rights and keeping potential harm to a minimum. Governors must 
know where they stand and keep to their principles.”
“I think that Governors have a duty to think about the legitimacy and propriety of 
things before rushing to do them. We must ask ourselves ‘Is this the right thing to 
do?’ And we must be prepared to make a stand on some things. After all, I believe 
that we are the last bastion in protecting prisoners rights.”
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Commentators have taken a similar view and suggested that:
‘Values are not an optional extra’ (Pilling 1996, p2).
‘The values which inform the way managers manage in prisons are 
vital to their success ... if this is not taken fully into account as 
managers plan or respond to situations in the daily life of the prison, 
they are in danger of exacerbating the dehumanising process, 
consciously or unconsciously’ (Hutton 2001, p22).
‘Prisons and other institutions retain one major difference, they 
operate within an intensely moral arena... Good Governors provide a 
strong sense of what their values are -  what is acceptable and what is 
not... Governors must have the capacity to project a strong moral 
framework in their unique institutions. This is more than rule setting 
or passively requiring standards to be observed’ (Acheson 2003, pi 2).
Governors face ethical dilemmas on a daily basis. They are required to make 
decisions that may involve: a breach of acceptable behaviour or the rules (Zinn
1993); a choice between equally unsatisfactory alternatives (Davis and Aroskar 
1978); competing values and loyalties (Loewenberg and Dolgoff 1988); conflicting 
ethical values (Walker 1993). These examples provided by Governors indicate types 
of ethical issues that can arise:
“What you stand for comes out in different ways. I had to decide the other day 
where to spend a bit of money we had. It came down to a choice between spending 
it on the visits room or the staff locker room. Not a life and death matter but made 
me think about things.”
“Should I break the rules if  I morally think it the right thing to do? You know what 
I mean - do I let someone out for a funeral even though they do not fit the criteria?
Well, I am old enough in the tooth to do what I think is right. Not everybody does 
that these days. I guess the ambitious Governors do everything by the book, which 
is why I am probably still a Governor and not an area manager.”
“I was doing adjudications the other day and had to decide whose evidence to 
believe -  the prisoner or the officer. Did I believe the prisoner who has a criminal 
record or the officer who has a responsible job? It’s something Governors have to 
do all the time.”
A number of Governors spoke passionately about their belief that they had a duty to 
prevent physical and mental damage to prisoners. This duty was grounded in 
morality and ethics rather than in any managerial requirement to prevent abuse.
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“So I think the role of the Governor is far greater than just managing an institution.
It’s far greater than just being managerially responsible. It has a social dimension as 
well. I see my job as making sure that people are not abused. I do not mean 
physically abused, even though that is always a danger, but mentally abused and 
taken advantage of. You know, being unlocked later than everyone else or having 
smaller portions of food or letters not arriving. That sort of thing.”
“It is a personal belief in what is right and wrong. It doesn’t tell you in any manual 
about feelings and emotions. Yes it tells you to investigate allegations but it doesn’t 
tell you when to investigate, how to interpret the investigation report and how to 
deal with people who step over the mark. That’s got to come from within you. It’s 
about who you are ... It’s more than about physical abuse. It’s about how staff 
speak to prisoners, how they search cells and do strip searches. You decide what is 
acceptable based on how you think people should be treated and then you make 
sure people stick to that line.”
There is always potential for a Governor to act in an unethical manner and pressure 
can sometimes come from: senior management; an overemphasis on performance 
and targets; pressure to be loyal and to be a team player; internal and external 
competition; and a lack of personal values (Badaracco and Webb 1995 and Danley et 
al 1996). On occasion Governors are willing to expose publicly this moral and 
ethical conflict, as in this example where a Governor felt so strongly that he wrote to 
a national newspaper:
‘From my personal point of view I did not join the Prison Service to 
manage overcrowded cattle pens, nor did I join to run a prison where 
the interests of the individuals have to be sacrificed continually to the 
interests of the institution, nor did I join to be a member of a service 
where staff that I admire are forced to run a society that debases... As 
it is evident that the present uncivilised conditions in prison seem 
likely to continue and as I find this incompatible with any moral ethic,
I wish to give notice that I, as the governor of the major prison in the 
United Kingdom, cannot for much longer tolerate, either as a 
professional or as an individual, the inhumanity of the system within 
which I work’ (McCarthy 1981).
Governors pointed to the mid to late 1990s as a period of personal and organisational 
tension created by the ever-increasing prison population and pressure to reduce 
budgets. The then Home Secretary adopted a much narrower and retributive agenda 
focused on an increase use of imprisonment. The resulting overcrowding, together 
with pressure to make efficiency savings, led to the reduction of ‘educational, 
recreational and sporting facilities within prisons’ (James and Raine 1998, p87); the 
number of prisoners held two to a cell designed for one increased by 50 per cent 
(between 1992 and 1997); and the level of purposeful activity for prisoners dropped
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(Straw 1997). This operating environment created ‘value conflict’ for a number of 
Governors:
“It’s about firefighting not rehabilitation these days, at least in locals. My time is 
spent managing a huge transit camp and cramming in as many bodies as possible.”
“Well, to be honest it’s been a bad period for me. A lot of the positive things we got 
going here have been stopped recently all thanks to efficiency savings. Over 80 per 
cent of my budget is staffing costs, so to save money I reduce staff or regimes or 
both. I spend most of my time, and so do my senior team, looking at where we can 
save money and make cutbacks.”
“I am finding it much harder to get the right balance between what is right for 
individual prisoners and what I am being told to do. These days with pressures on 
numbers and space it is all about moving people around. But it causes problems, for 
example, what about the prisoner who is in the middle of a course or training 
programme? What about the prisoner who wants to come back here for a local 
discharge? Do I do what is right for the prisoner or what I am being told to do by 
the Prison Service?”
Moral conflict can also be seen as resulting from the drive to introduce 
managerialism (see chapter 11) into the Prison Service. A number of Governors 
spoke of the potential conflict between running an efficient machine-like 
bureaucracy which ‘processed’ prisoners, reduced costs and achieved targets, and 
their commitment to treat prisoners as individuals with needs that should be met. The 
management of any penal institution carries with it the moral duty to remember that 
it holds individuals and that it is not about processing ‘units’. One Governor put it in 
this way:
“Actually it is more than bureaucracy. It’s more than the administration process. It’s 
not just about having a nicely administered prison. Because I’m sure it’s perfectly 
possible to conceive of very nice concentration camps that would have been very 
clean and all the paperwork was done, and all the rest of it, but actually, probably 
were achieving their purpose, but not the humanitarian sort of thing. So I see, in that 
sense, management and administration as neutral. That they are what you have to do 
to achieve a particular end, but the end in fact could be making widgets. It is how 
the Governor exercises his discretion that influences the culture and what the place 
is really like and that depends on his values and beliefs.”
The concentration camp example used by the Governor in this quote has been 
highlighted elsewhere. Bauman (1989) in his analysis of the Holocaust argued that 
the Holocaust and atrocities which were carried out in concentration camps were not 
just a consequence of the activities of a few psychopathic Nazis, but were made 
possible by a developed bureaucracy and its associated forms of rationalisation. The 
Holocaust was:
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‘. . . a  paradigm of modem bureaucratic rationality. Almost everything 
was done to achieve maximum results with minimum costs and 
efforts’ (Bauman 1989, p i49).
A functional analysis of the Nazi death camps shows their close relationship with 
western modernity (Traverso 1999). They were modelled throughout on the Taylorist 
(Taylor 1911) principle of productive rationality, with death as the end product of a 
‘rational processing’ of raw material -  the people deported to the camps. The camps 
embraced the administrative rationality described by Weber: division of labour, 
hierarchical decision-making, separation of policy and its implementation, and 
bureaucratisation (Weber 1979).
Matthews puts it in this way:
‘Behind every camp commander was a body of bureaucrats gathering 
information, collating files and making decisions. It was the 
breakdown of the overall process into a multiplicity of discrete tasks 
that created a form o f ‘moral blindness’ (Matthews 1999, p61).
Governors were aware that the ‘neutralisation of normal moral concerns’ 
(Wardhaugh and Wilding 1993) is a constant danger in closed, inward-looking 
bureaucratic organisations, as ‘prisoners’ can come to be regarded as ‘less than 
human’ (Everitt and Hardiker 1996, p31-36) and a ‘nuisance’ to the efficient 
operation of the prison. The move towards ‘expedient managerialism’ (Rutherford
1994) was seen by some Governors as a move away from concern for prisoners. One 
former Governor wrote:
‘There is a grave danger that adopting a managerialist approach to the 
running of prisons will ignore humanitarian, ethical and moral 
principles and concerns... An organisation which focuses on cost and 
quantitative outputs, at the expense of treating individuals with 
humanity and respect, would be in danger of losing its moral 
legitimacy... Perhaps the biggest concern with the push to 
managerialisation is that managerialisation itself will become the end 
rather than the means.’ (Bryans 2000b, p8).
The managerialist culture did not fit readily with some Governors’ caring and 
reforming ideas and was seen as an attempt to change their orientation, value base 
and ways of working. The language and tools of managerialism (for example,
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managing director instead of Governor, strategic and business planning, units as a 
term for prisoners) have been criticised as being inappropriate for use in a caring 
profession (Wilson 1995). One Governor was moved to write:
‘Values and policies to which Governors have long been committed, 
are now derided as soft-headed and soft-hearted ... one consequence 
of the trend towards pragmatism is that we have become accustomed
to seeing efficiency as the only goal ... I believe that one of the
reasons for Governors’ depression is that many of us do not share the 
values underlying current policies. Nor do we believe that those 
policies are in the best interests of victims, potential victims, 
offenders or their families’ (Godfrey 1996, p i3).
This view was endorsed by a number of academics who noted that new
managerialism in the Prison Service was seen by its critics as eroding the traditional
moral (including reformative) commitments of institutions in favour of an exclusive 
concern with process and measurement (Sparks et al 1996). The professional and 
vocational values that underpinned the motivation of many Governors on joining the 
Prison Service came into conflict with the more managerial approach found today 
(Painter 1992 and Clarke et al. 1994a), creating a degree o f ‘institutional dissonance’ 
(Rutherford 1994, pi 60). The managerialisation of the Prison Service may therefore 
augur poorly for maintaining the job satisfaction associated with being a Governor 
(see section 9.3).
Internal dissent concerning the changes was, however, somewhat muted (for one 
notable exception, see Newell 2002). This lack of open dissent may have been a 
manifestation of ‘pluralistic ignorance’ (Taylor 1982). Governors did not speak out 
because others did not do so and they therefore believed that their view was in the 
minority. Some may have been reluctant to express their true feelings because of the 
need to ‘conform to the views of those who had power and influence’ (O’Gorman 
1986, p337) and, as a result, attitudes that Governors held privately were ignored in 
favour of ‘supporting the apparent new group reality’ (Grekul 1999, p515). Some 
Governors embraced the changes (for various reasons -  survival, self promotion, 
belief in the new way), while others waited silently for the pendulum to swing back 
in the other direction. A few Governors were subjected to ‘robust management’ as a 
result of their views and approach. A small number of senior Governors who were
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not well disposed to the changes left their governing posts (some willingly, others 
less so), either on early retirement or were given non-operational posts. One 
Governor described his dilemma in this way:
“I love governing and it’s why I joined the Service but to be frank, the pressure is 
starting to get to me. The performance management stuff and the paperwork, it’s 
not the same as it was and I’m not convinced that it is the right way forward. I’m 
looking to move on and spend my last few years behind a desk somewhere 
shuffling papers.”
Whatever their correctional and managerial orientation, Governors in the study 
shared an espoused commitment to: protect prisoners’ rights, ensuring that no 
brutality takes place; preserve life, minimising the number of suicides; and provide 
decent living conditions. Most achieve this; a few do not. The Prison Service 
continues to be faced with criticism of the conditions in a number of its prisons (see, 
for example, HM Chief Inspector of Prisons 1997a, CPT 1996, 2000 and 2002, 
annual reports of HM Chief Inspector of Prisons) and the lack of care of some 
prisoners (Wilson and Fowler 2004). In an effort to raise standards a former 
Director General set out a value framework based on what he termed the ‘decency 
agenda’, something that was widely welcomed by Governors:
‘Decency is a key element of the first of the Service’s over-arching 
objectives. Yet the lack of decent treatment and the lack of a decent 
environment at some of our prisons is a matter of public knowledge 
and concern... I am going to repeat my view that we have to 
reform them and make them decent -  whatever the difficulties, 
whatever the overcrowding, whatever the resource constraints.
Often, the practical things that contribute to decency -  things like 
' clean recesses, access to showers, treating prisoners with dignity -  
cost nothing’ (Narey 2001, p6).
This chapter has given an indication of some of the elements that influence the 
reality of governing. What Governors do, and what they are able to achieve, is the 
result of the interaction of a range of personal, organisational and prison-specific 
factors. The simple conception that Governors are free agents able to do and achieve 
what they want is no longer, even if it ever was, a reality. No Governor receives, or 
is able to impose, a template of how that prison should be governed or what they can 
hope to deliver, on taking over a prison. The myriad stakeholders, the idiosyncrasy 
of Governors, and the architecture of prisons all combine to make each period of
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governance distinct and inherently unpredictable. The next chapter now goes on to 
consider whether the role and duties of the Governor have changed significantly and 
what any changes will mean for the future of governing.
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PART SEVEN: 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
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CHAPTER 15: 
GOVERNORS AND GOVERNING TODAY
The last decade has seen significant changes in the environment in which the 
Governor operates (see Part five). The courts and Ombudsman have taken a greater 
interest in what Governors do. Prisoners are more able and willing to challenge a 
Governor’s decision. The law and order debate has been politicised and politicians 
make clear their views on what prisons should be like. The prison population has 
soared and the composition of that population has changed. The level of 
accountability, degree of monitoring and standards to be complied with have all 
increased. Prison staff are more diverse and have higher expectations and demands. 
Technological advances have brought new security systems and faster 
communications. Privatisation and performance testing have introduced an element 
of competition and benchmarking across prisons. This chapter returns to the research 
questions to consider the degree to which Governors’ role and work have changed, 
as a result of these environmental developments, and whether Governors’ work 
remains sui generis. Before doing so, the chapter outlines a typology of today’s 
Governors, which emerged during the study.
15.1 Variations on a theme -  a typology of Governors
Previous chapters have identified the origins, backgrounds and career paths of 
current Governors (chapter 8), described their motivation for doing the job and the 
ideologies which influence the way they do their work (chapter 9), emphasised work 
elements common to Governors as a group (chapters 12 and 13) and the uniqueness 
of each Governor and environment (chapter 14). During the research it became 
apparent that groups of Governors shared common beliefs, ways of operating, and 
approaches to prison governance -  what Reiner refers to as ‘distinctive constellations 
... which can be seen as variations around central themes’ (Reiner 1991, p 303).
While prison sociology has been criticised for contenting itself with producing 
‘anodyne typologies’ (Sparks et al 1996, p81), typologies can be meaningful if
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categories are constructed with careful thought (Doty and Glick 1994). Common 
themes found amongst Governors can be viewed as ‘ideal types’ in the Weberian 
sense (Weber 1949, p84). Ideal types are models of what are logically possible 
permutations but are, at the end of the day, generalisations, fictitious and unlikely to 
be encountered in a pure form in the real world. Governors, after all, are individuals 
with distinct attributes and unique histories. That said, the ideal types can provide 
helpful comparators and benchmarks, when considering prison governance in its 
many forms.
Each ideal type of Governor can be defined by pedigree (origins, ideology, career 
path), period (when they joined the Service), place (where they have governed), and 
approach (management style, way of operating). Using these themes, four ideal 
types of Governors suggest themselves from the research: general managers; chief 
officers; liberal idealists and conforming mavericks.
15.1.1 General Managers
General managers joined the Prison Service in the 1980s or 1990s. They joined on a 
fast track scheme, in response to job advertisements describing the role in managerial 
terms. General managers can best be described as coming from an upwardly mobile 
working-class background. They tend to have a degree that is managerial, such as 
business studies, rather than a vocational degree. Their motivation for joining tended 
to be ‘instrumental’ and focused on the material aspects of the job such as pay, 
status, security and career prospects. General managers define their values and 
beliefs in managerial terms. For them it is less about moral mission to reform 
prisoners and more about ensuring that key performance indicators are achieved. 
Individual prisoners, and their needs, are not particularly high on their agenda, as 
they adopt an ‘actuarial approach’, in which prisoners are dealt with according to 
group criteria. They tend to work more in large prisons where other managers deal 
with the daily operational grind. General managers see themselves as chief 
executives of a company, supported in their work by a number of departmental or 
functional managers. They feel comfortable chairing meetings, studying financial 
spreadsheets and dealing with papers. The main focus of general managers is running 
an ‘efficient, economic and effective’ prison that achieves its KPIs and runs as
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smoothly as possible. They concentrate on performance measures, focus on tangible 
achievements and adopt a short-term orientation -  the annual business cycle. Their 
emphasis is on quantifiable results not qualitative improvement. The difficulties 
associated with prisons can, according to the general manager, be dealt with by a 
sophisticated and professional management approach. The general manager is the 
very model of a modem prison Governor.
15.1.2 Chief Officers
Chief officers have spent most of their working career in the Prison Service and have 
been promoted through the ranks. Their pedigree is working class; they enjoy the 
epithet ‘man of the people’ and pride themselves that they have made it to the top -  
the ‘working class lad made good’. Chief officers tend to have lower levels of formal 
education but do not see that as a disadvantage. Many have obtained educational 
qualifications, including degrees, whilst working in the Service. They have a wealth 
of prison specific operational knowledge gained in the officer grades and are always 
keen to recount the experiences of their days in uniform -  ‘I’ve tried it, been there 
and done it’. Their decision-making is heavily reliant on previous experience. Chief 
officers espouse no particular ideology but are keen to ensure that Manuals, Orders 
and Instructions are read and implemented to the letter. Their philosophy is centred 
on doing as instructed, and achieving a disciplined, well ordered and clean prison. 
There is less interest in longer-term strategic issues than on daily operations. They 
maintain a high level of physical presence in the prison and define their management 
style as ‘management by walking about’. They are more comfortable on the landings 
than they are chairing business meetings. Because of their in-depth operational 
knowledge they micro-manage. Chief officers can be more autocratic and 
confrontational in their style and tend to be less inclusive, as they believe they ‘know 
best’. They enjoy the authority that the role of Governor brings and the status of 
representing the prison at external functions.
15.1.3 Liberal Idealists
Liberal idealists joined the Prison Service in the 1970s or early 1980s. They did so 
with a sense of vocation and out of a desire to reform and rehabilitate prisoners. They
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were mostly recruited directly from university, with a vocational degree in one of the 
social sciences, and tend to come from a more middle-class background than other 
Governors. Liberal idealists spent their early career working with prisoners, often as 
borstal housemasters or wing governors. These formative experiences were carried 
into their later career and they maintain the optimism that constructive work can be 
done with prisoners, provided appropriate resources are available. Underpinning their 
work is a desire to make prisons into constructive and purposeful places. In order to 
do so, they spend much of their time cultivating a vision, undertaking strategic 
planning and engaging stakeholders, including prisoners, in the process. In doing so 
they adopt a longer-term perspective and focus more on cultural change than short­
term performance improvement. Operational daily management is left to others and 
they look to their deputy to be the operational head of the prison. They see 
managerialism, and its manifestations, as a distraction from the real purpose of the 
job and consider recent changes as undermining their professional expertise. Prison 
officers can view liberal idealists as social reformers who do not appreciate the 
‘hard-end’ of the business and who often take the prisoners’ side over theirs. They 
prefer to work in prisons that are focused more on training and reform, rather than on 
containment and processing of large numbers of prisoners. Liberal idealists tend to 
have a wider view of the criminal justice system, are interested in penal theory and 
get involved in criminal justice system non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
(such as the Howard League, Centre for Criminal Justice Studies, Prison Reform 
Trust and Penal Reform International).
15.1.4 Conforming Mavericks
Conforming mavericks can come from any of the other ideal types but are a distinct 
group in that they challenge the status quo. They conform to the extent that they need 
to, in order to be able to be creative and developmental. Conforming mavericks tend 
to be entrepreneurial, to want to try new ways of working and are willing to ‘push the 
boundaries’. The system tolerates their individuality because they produce high- 
profile and pioneering schemes and ways of operating. They conform to the extent 
that their prisons achieve most of their KPIs, and they adhere to most of the 
requirements imposed by Headquarters. Conforming mavericks are confident in their 
abilities, are highly focused and well motivated. Their prisons become the focal point
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for official visitors because of their innovative ways of working and examples of 
‘best practice’. They also tend to be more charismatic than other Governors, are 
able to articulate publicly their values and belief systems and demonstrate what they 
are trying to achieve. Conforming mavericks gravitate to niche areas of the Service, 
often produce eye-catching initiatives and court publicity. The latter may be for their 
own aggrandisement or out of a genuine belief that their ‘good practice’ should be 
replicated elsewhere. They are very much energetic evangelists, who have the power 
to transform an institution either because of a single programme or because of their 
‘spirit’. However, because they push the boundaries, conforming mavericks are 
vulnerable to criticism and censure if things go wrong. Conforming mavericks are 
also the group that are most likely to leave the Prison Service because they become 
disillusioned, frustrated or feel that their talents are not being put to best use.
It is unlikely that any one Governor will fit the totality of an ideal type. Individual, 
and often contradictory, factors surrounding Governors are more likely to make each 
of them a hybrid of one of the ideal types.
The structuring process of identifying ideal types does however provide an 
opportunity to understand the range of variation of Governors and their approaches, 
styles and philosophies. There continues to be a variation between the types, defined 
by operating philosophies and approaches, as well as their mode of entry to the 
Service and the era in which they joined. A clear trend was identified in the shifting 
balance between the ideal types. General managers are increasingly replacing liberal 
idealists, as the work takes on an increasingly managerial flavour. Conforming 
mavericks are disappearing as diversity, variation and the Governor’s ability to shape 
the prison regime is being curtailed. The number of chief officers is growing as the 
Service comes to value people who will ensure compliance with orders and 
instructions.
15.2 Changes to Governors’ work.
The fundamental task of Governors remains the same. As a former Governor put it:
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‘There were ... still the same prisoners to be dealt with and the same 
problems, even if slightly altered by the advance (or otherwise) of 
civilisation. Prisoners still have to be provided with food and beds 
and put to work; their families have to be catered for by visits and 
communication made with the public and friends’ (Miller 1976, 
pi 87).
Governors were unanimous in their view, however, that some elements of their work 
were substantially different to that undertaken by their predecessors:
“In terms of running the establishment I think it is vastly different.”
“It has changed beyond all recognition. Quite genuinely beyond all recognition.”
This section highlights the most significant thematic changes that have taken place 
over recent years.
15.2.1 Emphasis on management and administration
A long-term dynamic, which James and Raine refer to as ‘administrative processing’ 
(James and Raine 1998, p47), has led to more complex procedures and bureaucracy, 
within which Governors have to operate. This mass of regulations - international 
prescriptions relating to basic human rights, Prison Service Orders and Instructions, 
performance-measuring, KPIs and Prison Service Standards -  is significantly greater 
than earlier Governors had to endure. The work has become far more rule-based as a 
result.
The complexity of the role increased as Governors took on a broader range of 
responsibilities including the requirement to manage finances, to be involved in 
personnel management, and to undertake longer-term planning:
“The job has changed in respect of the content of our work. As things like 
finance and personnel issues have been devolved to Governors, so the workload 
has increased enormously. People used to make the decision about finance for us.
They used to make the decision about how many staff we would have, to make 
the decision of how much overtime we would work.”
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A time-consuming new area of work is budget management and the need to find 
efficiency savings. A former Chief Inspector of Prisons highlighted the impact that 
this budget focus had on a Governor’s work:
‘I asked the Governor what was the aim of Parkhurst, he said that it 
was to save £500,000 this year in the form of efficiency savings. I 
said that that was not what I meant. I meant ‘Why should a prisoner 
be sent to Parkhurst, and for what treatment?’ He told me that that 
was the direction he received from his line manager, and that all his 
energies were having to be devoted to identifying such savings...’ 
(Ramsbotham 2001, p43).
Governors today not only manage multi-disciplinary teams, they also have to 
manage contractual relationships with a number of service providers from the 
private, public and voluntary sectors. Those contractors deliver a range of services 
that traditionally were provided in-house. A Governor may well be managing 
contracts for the provision of education, catering, maintenance, library, canteen, 
laundry, visitors’ centre, probation, offending behaviour programmes, and drug 
treatment, each of which may be with a different organisation:
“Life is very different today. I no longer just manage direct delivery of services. I 
have to manage other organisations managing those services. It gets very time- 
consuming drawing up the specifications, awarding contracts and then monitoring 
the delivery of the service. ”
“My head of activities calculated the other day that we have five different 
contractors working here and 26 different voluntary sector organisations coming in.
That makes things bloody complicated I can tell you.”
Governors now have to undertake partnership working with local bodies, such as 
Drug Action Teams, Primary Care Trusts, Crime Reduction Groups and victim 
groups:
“I’ve had to devote much more time in recent years to working outside of the 
prison. I sit on a number of local bodies and local government groups. It is a new 
way of working but a way that Governors have to get used to.”
As budgets were reduced Governors have had to generate new sources of funding, 
rather than relying simply on an allocated budget from Headquarters. The effect was 
to stimulate some innovation, although this remained at the level of the ‘individual 
rather than service initiative’ (James and Raine 1998, p42). Governors, like public-
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sector managers in education and healthcare, undertook increasing amounts of 
‘entrepreneurial activity’. (See Boyett 1996 for a discussion of the ‘public-sector 
entrepreneur’.) Some Governors set up innovative joint working with private-sector 
and voluntary-sector organisations and in some cases established joint ventures with 
private-sector firms to run workshops and vocational courses in prisons (Davies 
1995, Flynn 1995, Simon 1999).
Governors have had to develop new skills (management of finance, personnel and 
contracts), deliver a broader range of regime provision, understand and exploit 
multiple funding streams (national, local, European), accommodate new 
accountability mechanisms (area manager, inspectorate, ombudsman, courts, HSE) 
and develop partnerships with a range of organisations:
“You’ve got to understand all sorts of things previous Governors would have had 
no idea about. ”
Governors were of the view that their job had moved away from ‘traditional 
governing’ and had become more managerial:
“I think that my observations have been pretty much consistent with the view that, 
over 20 years, Governors have migrated somewhat from being ‘Governor the other 
bit’ 90% of the time and ‘Governor procedural bit’ 10% of the time. They’ve 
probably got to the point where it’s 90% the procedural manager, and 10% the 
Governor bit.”
“We are much more concerned now with processes and about managing as opposed 
to governing and it just takes up so much of your time.”
Commentators have taken a similar view and have highlighted the fact that the 
Governor’s work had taken on a stronger managerial flavour:
‘The idea of the ‘governing governor’, who holds a tight rein on the 
prison, is constantly about the establishment, and does his own 
troubleshooting, is now largely defunct... The ‘Number One 
Governor’, these days, is more often to be found chairing institutional 
meetings, attending headquarters functions, composing reports, or 
devising budgets’ (Vagg 1994, pi 13)
‘[managerialism] made the governor focus more on performance 
indicators, measures, business planning and budgets than ever before.
The main result of this has been a reduction in the direct management
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of prisoners by governors. Governors have been forced to limit the 
amount of time they spend conducting adjudications, hearing 
applications and touring the prison. The days of the ‘hands on’ 
governor who knew the names of all their prisoners and staff are long 
gone’ (Bryans and Wilson 1998, pxx).
One of the consequences of introducing so many managerialist processes is the 
proliferation in the amount of paperwork in prisons. As one commentator put it: 
‘Governors increasingly need good time-management skills in order to deal with the 
vastly increasing amounts of paperwork which threaten to become their false raison 
d ’etre’ (West 1997, p35). The production of performance reports, audit documents 
and action plans, together with having to read weighty and detailed Instructions and 
Orders has added to the administrative burden faced by governors:
“It’s a constant battle -  the paperwork. I could spend twelve hours a day, seven 
days a week trying to keep on top of the paper work. There is so much of it these 
days. Huge manuals to read, letters to do, reports to write, complaints to deal with. I 
could spend my whole day in the office and never see the end of it.”
“If I’m honest it’s quite a task keeping on top of the paperwork. I am absolutely 
overwhelmed by paperwork. Every afternoon would be given over to paperwork. I 
take stuff home as well. I think most people do though. Just to keep up with the 
paperwork.”
The amount of time taken in dealing with the paperwork has had an impact on the 
ability of the Governor to maintain a high level of visibility in the prison. Sir John 
Learmont, in his report on the escapes from HMP Parkhurst, found that:
‘Governors in charge of prisons commented that the paper load they 
bear prevented them from taking more of a personal interest in the 
running of establishments... A typical prison was asked to record all 
correspondence received for a period of one month (20 working 
days). The prison logged an average of 230 letters, 65 faxes and 24 e 
mails per day during that period. Other governors confirmed that this 
was a fair reflection of their own experience’ (Learmont 1995a, pi 02-
3).
A former Chief Inspector of Prisons expressed similar concerns about the impact 
paperwork was having on Governors’ ability to do provide visible leadership:
‘bureaucratic overload that is swamping Governors and taking them 
away from their primary responsibility, which is leading their staff in
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providing decent treatment of and conditions for prisoners’ 
(Ramsbotham 2001, p43).
Governors were united in their views about the negative consequences of being 
‘chained’ to their desks. In particular, it was increasingly making them more remote 
from staff and particularly prisoners, and less aware (from direct personal contact) of 
what was happening in their prisons:
“I do feel that I am becoming more and more remote both from prisoners and from 
the front-line staff as well.”
“The danger is, as you know, you become increasingly deskbound ... what you 
don't do is get out and talk to prisoners and staff. But one thing I have always been 
quite clear about is you do not run a prison from sitting behind your desk in an 
office. You can lose touch very quickly with reality, if  that’s the way you operate.”
“When you stop walking the prison you stop governing the prison. Now I actually 
believe that that is correct. And I try to ‘walk’ the prison as much as I can. But, 
sad to say, the pressures that are on me are such that if  I am able to get round my 
establishment twice a week, that is a good week.”
15.2.2 A shift in power -  fettered discretion and intensive monitoring
The new governance structure has, in reality, not been so much about giving 
Governors the freedom to manage but rather about creating new mechanisms that do 
exactly the opposite. One commentator goes so far as to suggest that:
‘... overblown managerialism which has eroded the power of the 
governors to govern according to a professionalism accountable to 
clearly-defined ideals and with a clearly-defined expertise serving a 
clearly-defined clientele’ (Carlen 2001, p2).
The desire to control Governors has manifested itself in typical bureaucratic 
mechanisms such as: elaborate written rules and regulations; using distortion-proof 
instructions; setting objective measures of performance; and intensively monitoring 
their performance. Some thought that the introduction of private-sector practices and 
management techniques would free Governors from traditional bureaucratic control. 
The reality has been somewhat different:
‘what might appear at first sight to be a de-centralising agenda, the 
management techniques introduced to monitor better performance of 
new corporate and individual operatives in the penal field, arguably
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strengthened the authority of the “new” system at the centre rather 
than weaken it’ (Ryan 2003, p75).
The more corporate approach to planning introduced in recent years, together with 
auditing to ensure adherence to detailed orders and instructions, has resulted in less 
scope for individual Governors to shape their prisons as they would wish.
The current reliance on written rules and regulations within the Prison Service is 
seen by many as a substitute for managerial discretion and professional judgement, 
and has led to ‘an obsessive emphasis on merely following the rules’ (Freeman 1999, 
p49). This approach is at odds with the view of many Governors who believed that 
they should keep considerable ‘operational discretion’ (Berman 1980, p211). As one 
Governor put it:
“I get the feeling that Headquarters would like to go back to the Du Cane days 
when the DG [Director General] knew exactly what was going on in every prison at 
any one time because it was set down in detailed rules... Governors would simply 
be administrators making sure things happened when they should and to the set- 
down standard. ”
Governors made clear that the job now is more about managing the delivery of a 
service and meeting laid-down standards:
“I consciously set out to say I must improve this because it won’t pass the standards 
audit. It has sort of redirected my focus and made me look at things I might not 
have looked at... My work now is much more about meeting laid down standards 
and pushing up performance to hit my KPTs. Before it was much more creative and 
thoughtful. Today I feel much more like a small cog in a wheel than someone who 
can design the machine.”
The ‘clawing back’ of power and decision-making to the centre has reduced the 
discretion resting with the Governor. For example, Governors are no longer the 
ultimate operational commanders in emergencies and have limited freedom to shape 
the prison regime:
“Any Silver [the title of the Governor in charge o f a prison during an incident] will 
tell you that, though he may have to take a quick decision without consultation, the 
process is designed to ensure that he submits plans which are ‘approved’ by Gold 
[an area manager based at Headquarters].”
“I think that another thing which is again a shift in the distance one has travelled 
managerially is the regime of a prison. The regime of the prison was determined by
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the Governor, largely on kind of almost personal whim and personal belief. There 
were no standards. There were no business plans. And there was really very little 
resource management. So that the extent to which industries were or were not 
developed, education was or was not developed, was very much a matter o f the 
local culture, what had happened over time, and there was really no kind o f formal 
management of it. Things are different now -  there are orders on what offending 
behaviour programmes I can run, what education I must provide, what I must do in 
my workshops.”
Similarly, a Governor is no longer the ultimate dispenser of his or her budget, as it 
can be cut or reallocated by the area manager at any time. The award of contracts for 
drug programmes, education, canteen and works service takes place on national or 
area level and the decisions do not rest with the Governor. Other budgets are ‘ring- 
fenced’ so Governors cannot reallocate the money to other areas, or have been 
removed completely from the Governor’s control (such as the budgets for healthcare 
and education).
The ‘professional structure’ in which Governors were assumed to know what was 
best for their institutions and their prisoners has changed. The new status assigned to 
area managers has created a tension for some Governors and has made them feel 
devalued, as their autonomy has increasingly been curtailed. The rigorous application 
of standards and instructions meant that some Governors were increasingly alienated 
from the Prison Service as they perceived their status as professional practitioners 
was being undermined (see for example Godfrey 1996 and Wilson 1995 and 2000).
In addition to the transformation of the Governor’s work resulting from NPM, there 
has been a growing desire by prisoners (and staff) to challenge a Governor’s action 
(or inaction) and a willingness by the courts to entertain litigation. In 2002 -  2003 a 
total of 728 cases to be defended were submitted by Governors to the Treasury 
Solicitor (Treasury Solicitor 2003). Governors now have to give prisoners reasoned 
explanations for their decisions (R (Angle and Angle) v Governor o f HMP Ford and 
Home Secretary [2002] Prison Law Report 218) and all decisions made by 
Governors in the discharge of their duties can be reviewed by the High Court 
(Lennon 2003, p449).
Prisoners can now challenge a Governor’s decision by writing to the area manager 
and to the Ombudsman. Governors today have to ensure consistency in their
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treatment of prisoners and justify their decisions, and produce evidence to support 
them, or they find their action overturned or criticised. They need to ensure that 
prisoners’ rights are not denied, that prisoners are treated consistently and that their 
decisions are fair and reasonable. Governors now have to check carefully and 
monitor the decisions made by subordinates and to pay greater attention to ensuring 
a written ‘audit’ trail is in place to back up their decisions, in case of future 
challenge.
In short, there has been a significant shift in power away from individual Governors. 
Governors are today told: what resources are appropriate for their prisons (by 
‘management consultancy reviews’ commissioned by, and reporting to, area 
managers); how those resources should be used (ring-fenced budgets for various 
areas such as offending behaviour, education, healthcare); what the regime should 
consist of (PSO on regime elements such as education, physical education, offending 
behaviour programmes); what rewards and privileges should be made available to 
prisoners (the PSO on Incentives and Earned Privileges); and what level of 
performance is expected (Prison Service Standards). ‘Robust’ line management then 
intensively monitors Governors, ensures that they do not deviate from laid-down 
procedures and holds them to account for the performance of their prison. Should 
line management fail to identify any shortcomings, a number of external bodies are 
now able to scrutinise and challenge a Governor’s decision (Ombudsman, courts, 
NGOs).
15.2.3 Style and type of governorship.
The Prison Service has not in the past sought to impose, or to socialise Governors 
into, a ‘common mould’ (Waddington 1983). The opportunities for the socialisation 
of Governors into a corporate mould are limited, with few training events for 
Governors and infrequent meetings of Governors as a group. The Prison Service has 
in the past tolerated differences of style and approach. As one Governor put it:
“If you put all Governors in a room, you will still see that there is a difference
between us. There is no company man approach. We do not dress the same. We do
not come from the same backgrounds. We have different social characteristics.
We do things in a different way. It is not like MacDonalds, where there is a
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manual that tells you how to manage, what to wear and what to believe. To me 
that’s a good thing.”
Governors suggested that this approach might be changing:
“... in recent years we have started to get more corporate. A certain type of person 
is being appointed as Governor and we are all under pressure to do the same 
things and in the same way.”
The changing nature of the work, the need to conform to a prescribed managerial 
image and increasing pressures on the holder of the Office of Governor, are having 
an effect on the style of governing. There is less room in the Prison Service today for 
the flamboyant, charismatic and independent Governor of the past. While Governors 
continue to bring to the post their own individual biographies, personal attributes and 
values, the scope for individualism is significantly reduced:
“I think it is fair to say that probably there was a time where you could govern 
through sheer strength of character. If you had a particular style and you were a 
very strong-willed person, and perhaps a very charismatic person, then probably 
you could get away with managing by character and personality, largely anyway, so 
long as you got things right. I don’t think that people can get away with that sort of 
style nowadays ... the old sort of archetypal Captain on the Bridge bit, is totally 
redundant. I think that style of management has long gone.”
“I think the Prison Service has probably said goodbye to the solely charismatic 
Governor, at least people who depended on charisma to govern. Governors today 
are very similar, and we all do the same things. It’s a pity really not to have some of 
the colour and eccentricity that those old Governors had.”
Governors are now expected to be competent and professional managers who plan 
and deliver a public service within a set budget and to laid-down standards. They are 
expected not to be insubordinate, freethinking, or openly challenge the current 
approach to prison management. As one commentator put it: ‘Departmental officials 
look for strong but “obedient” field leaders in order to maintain cohesion’ (Boin 
1998, p210). Governors are less willing today to ignore, or fail to comply with, 
written instructions. This is partly because the chances of their delinquency being 
found out are higher (through the more intensive monitoring and audit 
infrastructure), but also because of the increased frequency with which action (often 
disciplinary) is taken against those found not to be compliant. It has been suggested 
that:
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‘disciplinary excesses to which public sector workers have been 
subjected since the 1980s have made corrosive and disabling inroads 
into the willingness of public service professionals to use their 
discretion to take risks in the public interest’ (Carlen 2001, p i4).
Governors shared this perspective:
“You don’t have the freedom you once had to be critical. It’s like New Labour, no 
one wants to hear a dissenting voice. Prison Service conferences are set-piece 
events and ‘troublesome’ Governors are disappeared.”
“There is a feeling of paranoia around at the minute. Governors are all paranoid that 
they will be the next one to be investigated or moved from their post. I am old in 
the tooth enough to see what is going on. They want ‘yes men’ to govern according 
to the book, not Governors who will take a risk or ignore instructions which they 
think are not in the best interest of their prison.”
The status and respect which Governors receive from their staff has also changed 
over the years, as these quotes from a former, and a current, Governor reveal:
‘To the prisoners and the officers the governor is a person of 
considerable importance and authority. Great deference is shown to 
her: doors are opened and shut; there is a feeling of extra alertness 
when she appears. One governor confessed that he sometimes feels 
strange and mildly outraged to be treated as an ordinary person when 
jostling in a bus queue or waiting to be served at Woolworth’s: ‘Can 
they not see that I am the governor?’, he finds himself thinking’
(Kelly 1967, pi 71).
“Things are not like they used to be. Prison officers and prisoners show less respect 
to me as Governor. I remember the days when officers would stand up when you 
went into an office or on the wing and prisoners would accept what you told them.
Not today, society has changed and with it the standing and approach to the 
Governor.”
15.3 The continuing significance of the Governor
Historically there have been immensely powerful Governors who have single- 
handedly determined the course of a prison for long periods of time (Jacobs 1977, 
Dilulio 1987, Taylor 1993, Pisciotta 1994, Kantrowitz 1996). It would be reasonable 
to speculate that the importance of the role of Governor would have significantly 
diminished with the increased control, direction, regulation and monitoring of 
Governors’ work described above. For a variety of reasons, however, Governors
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remain significant and influential players in the prison landscape. As one 
commentator put it:
‘Governors are the most important individual influence on what a 
prison is like, even though no governor can any longer be the nearly 
autonomous agent he or she once was, equally able to create either 
charismatic and meaningful establishments or ill-functioning islands 
determined by whim. The prison community is their resource and the 
quality of life within it is their product’ (West 1997, p32).
Governors continue to have a fundamental impact, either by contribution or default, 
on how a prison is run (Sparks et al. 1996, HM Prison Service 1997a, West 1997, 
Bryans and Wilson 1998, Boin 1998, Carlen 2001). Governors themselves 
recognised the continuing importance of the role:
“I think the prison is about the Governor and that the character of the establishment, 
the atmosphere in the establishment and the professionalism of the establishment all 
still radiate from the Governor himself.”
“The sudden and complete transformation by a change of Governor, which has 
always been my experience, means that a Governor should never underestimate her 
or his influence. And I spent quite a lot of my career pretending that it wasn’t true, 
and only latterly accepting that that is true.”
“... there are so many obvious examples of that where an establishment will go one 
way or another depending on who is in charge of it.”
A Prison Service director took a similar view of the continuing importance of the 
Governors’ role:
“Aside from the Director General as an individual, the Governor o f the 
establishment is the key role in the Service, beyond any doubt in my view. More 
important than area managers, he’s more important than directors, he’s more 
important than policy people at Headquarters by a factor of thousands of percent 
in terms of what happens on the ground in their establishment. So if  you want to 
deliver, if  you really want to do things, then you’ve got to get Governors on your 
side, and tuned up to do it.”
There are a number of reasons for the continuing importance of the Governors’ role: 
the nature of the environment; the historical vestiges in the role; the level of 
discretion that Governors still exercise over individuals; and the need for someone to 
regulate the operation of a prison on a daily basis.
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15.3.1 Working in a unique environment
Prisons have a number of characteristics that continue to make them a unique social 
institution and public service (HM Prison Service 1997a and Matthews 1999). 
Perhaps the most significant feature is the dynamic created as prisoners are detained 
against their will. In addition, unlike mental hospitals, where psychiatrists do have 
the power to exclude certain classes of patients, Governors have to take all the 
prisoners they are sent. The potential for prisoners to be disruptive, unless prompted 
and encouraged to conduct themselves well, remains a distinct feature of the prison 
environment. One Governor commented:
“You have a totally diverse range of people in your institution which you have to 
manage, and I include staff in that. You have no control over your client group at 
all. You get what you get... So we have got a totally diverse client group that we 
have to manage. And the feet that they are not volunteers I think is also the other 
big difference. You could take the military analogy quite a long way, but then 
you come down at the end to the crunch that none o f ours are volunteers. So you 
have got a potentially 100% hostile group being managed, which has got to be 
unique. They do not want to be here. And that must be a unique challenge for the 
person in charge.”
Other distinctive features of the prison environment which point to its uniqueness 
include: the power disparity between staff and prisoners (the dialectic of domination 
and subordination is very different from that which subsists in the ‘open parts of 
society’ (Cohen 1985)); the level of deprivation (liberty, movement, access to goods 
and services, sexual relations with partners); high levels of surveillance (in cells, 
toilets, showers, meetings with family); and limited freedom of choice (daily 
timetable, regime, food).
While the modem prison is not as completely or effectively ‘cut off from the wider 
society’ as Goffman (1968) once claimed, they remain, for the most part, closed to 
the public. It can be argued that although prisons are now much more open places, 
and many have an almost constant stream of outside visitors coming through their 
doors, the true heart of prison life remains just as hidden as before.
Prisons continue to encompass the whole of the lives of their inmates for 24 hours a 
day, 365 days a year. A number of features that define ‘total institutions’ (Goffinan 
1968) still apply to prisons today - hierarchy, routine, rituals of degradation and
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initiation, bureaucratic categorization and segregation of their populations, and a 
complex interaction between formally acknowledged procedures and informally 
controlling social processes (Sparks et al 1996, p50).
Prisons exercise power and influence over the individuals held within them. This 
power can be used for positive purposes or it can be abused. The Governor, as head 
of the institution, has the ability to influence how that power is exercised and the 
purposes to which it is put. That has not changed over time. The external controls 
and monitoring have increased but on a daily basis it is still the Governor who 
signals what is and is not acceptable behaviour, the way prisoners should be treated 
and what restrictions are reasonable. Where the Governor does not exercise that 
power, some other individual, or group of individuals, will set the standard and 
decide what is acceptable behaviour.
“Prisons are very coercive environments. Even today the Governor should visit 
the punishment cells, visit the hospital, I mean areas of vulnerability, is my kind 
of general point. Areas where there is sensitivity, where things can go wrong, 
where abuses can occur. So health care, segregation... A good Governor 
understands that ... I think it is also important for the Governor to go into what 
one might call the dark corners. Things like the boiler house, and the store rooms.
To see all parts of the prison and make sure that things are working right. If 
people know the Governor is watching then they will do what is right but if  they 
know that he is not watching or that he does not care then it is a slippery slope to 
abusive behaviour. ”
The level of accountability and scrutiny from politicians, the courts, inspectorates, 
audits and the media also adds to the uniqueness of the environment:
‘There are not many important jobs where the entire rationale of the 
work is, rightly, under such scrutiny, and someone going to work in 
the prison service for the first time will feel this quite acutely’ 
(Dunbar and Langdon 1998, p7).
Whether prisons are indeed unique institutions, or simply ‘special cases’ of the 
problems of action, structure, power and authority (Sparks et al. 1996), there was a 
general consensus amongst Governors that the nature of the environment in which 
they operated was sufficiently distinctive to make their role different from any other. 
In particular, Governors highlighted the fact that the complexity of the environment 
meant that they had, frequently and at short notice, to switch between roles (for
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example, from manager to incident commander). Governors also pointed to the need 
to balance the competing demands of the various groups in the prison in order to 
ensure that the prison functioned safely, securely and humanely.
15.3.2 Historical vestiges in the role
The Governors’ role has developed over time, as chapters 6 and 7 describe.
As it did so, the role became vested with a certain amount of mythology, symbolism 
and power.
“The role or the Office of Governor is vested with mythology and power because 
it has to be I suppose... We have enormous power over people's lives.”
“It comes back to the sort of symbolism of the role... It is a total institution.
There is a lot of implied danger within it. It’s a risk business. It’s very people- 
orientated and complex. Those all make it such that the head is vested with more 
symbolism than, say, a general manager of a factory.”
Much of that symbolism and mythology remains with the post today, and contributes 
to the significance that people attribute to the holder of the Office of Governor. One 
manifestation of this mythology is the way in which prisoners and staff consider the 
Governor to be the ultimate source of power and authority. This is surprising given 
that: a superstructure above the Governor makes many decisions and allocates 
resources; most Governors now have little to do with individual prisoners and their 
problems (those Governors who do adjudications and visit their segregation units 
have some direct contact with ‘troublesome’ prisoners but most prisoners see little of 
the Governor and have even less personal contact); and decisions about individual 
prisoners (such as temporary release, category change or segregation) are often 
decided on by other managers. However, for most prisoners and staff it is still the 
Governor who can make a difference in their fives and it is to the Governor that they 
turn to address their requests and concerns.
To some extent prison staff have been compficit in maintaining the ‘mythology’ that 
surrounds the Governor. They encourage prisoners to believe that Governors remain 
powerful. This mythologizing enables staff to use the Governor as a way to manage 
their interaction with prisoners -  for example, by saying that: “the Governor won’t
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let us”, “it’s the Governor’s fault”, “the Governor changed the rules”, “if the 
Governor finds out I’ll be in trouble”.
Prison officers also still expect Governors to attend social events, speak at funerals, 
visit sick staffj and sort out domestic issues (debts, marriage problems, housing 
matters). They expect to be able to have private meetings with Governors and that 
they will take an interest in their personal lives. Few senior managers in the business 
world would face similar expectations.
15.3.3 Principled professionalism - exercising sound judgement
The professional is described as someone who has acquired a body of knowledge 
and experience that enables the immediate exercise of discretion in complex and 
uncertain situations (Mintzberg 1983). While Governors’ powers have been directed 
and constrained in many ways, their residual power remains extensive. Governors 
still exercise considerable discretion in how to exercise their power on a daily basis. 
Policy instructions, despite their proliferation to cover a greater number of areas, can 
never be so comprehensive as to cover all eventualities in what is a complex 
operational environment. Many rules, instructions and orders remain sufficiently 
‘open textured’ (Twining and Miers 1982, p213) to provide considerable scope for 
interpretation by the Governor:
“On the one hand, we are not short of instructions, you know; this office is full of 
cupboards which are foil of manuals; but whether those instructions folly meet, 
folly advise, folly structure, folly guide Governors in order to make the decisions 
on a day-to-day basis, I’m very doubtful of that. I mean it’s down to you as the 
Governor to deal with ambiguity.”
“I think by and large as long as you are within the Prison Rules and the broad 
guidelines that we get within the specific functions, there is still a colossal amount 
of both autonomy and flexibility in how you govern a prison.”
It can also be argued that NPM itself has enhanced the importance of Governors by 
making them accountable for the total operation of their prisons (budget, staffing, 
prisoners and achievement of KPTs). The Governor is now both managerially and 
institutionally powerful, despite being more closely line-managed, monitored and 
accountable:
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“There are still very few heads of large organisations where so much 
responsibility, authority and power is vested in a single role.”
“So I think we still, as a Service, believe that Governors have to be powerful 
people, run on varying lengths of lead, but with the area manager hanging very 
firmly onto the other end of that lead these days.”
The prison environment remains one of great ambiguity in terms of its conflicting 
purposes. The Prison Service as a ‘Weberian bureaucracy is ill-equipped for 
correctly translating vague and conflicting goals into integrated action’ (Boin 1998, 
p66). Coming up with policies that allow Governors to achieve all official penal 
goals in a uniform, efficient and politically acceptable manner is an ‘impossible job’ 
(Dilulio 1990 and Hargrove and Glidewell 1990). It falls to the Governor to interpret 
the aims, purpose, and goals of imprisonment. Governors must still balance 
competing priorities in the light of a proliferation of objectives and tasks, which go 
way beyond Governors’ functional and financial capacity to deliver (Carlen 2001). A 
Governor in the study explained it in this way:
“I think primarily we are talking about, not totally, but a fairly unique institution...
If you look at the stakeholders, the interest groups that you are trying to satisfy, I 
doubt if  there are many organisations as complex as the Prison Service and often 
contradictory constituents as stakeholders. And in that sense, I think it’s more 
complex, less clear in its aims, contradictory in some areas so that you are facing 
often in more directions than you’ve got feces. That gives it a bit of a uniqueness 
and I think that’s to some extent too because of the lack of clarity in that and I don’t 
think it can be clarified. I think it’s intrinsically complex and contradictory and, 
because of that, you’re doing much more as a Governor. People look to you as the 
Governor to put it all into context, to explain things and to put the pieces of the 
jigsaw together.”
Social systems that may appear stable and permanent are, in reality, in a dynamic 
state o f ‘perpetual reconstruction’ (Hatch 1997). Prisons are volatile institutions that 
can quickly degenerate into a state of disorder. In their daily work Governors must 
exercise their judgement to manipulate the various aspects of the regime in order to 
ensure security, order and justice on the one hand, and reform, rehabilitation and 
reintegration on the other. As one commentator put it, ‘There can be no simple and 
invariant solution to all problems of order and legitimacy. Prisons are mercurial 
institutions’ (Rock 1996, p349).
The implementation, on a daily basis, of all aspects of centrally-prescribed policy is 
not feasible and Governors have to decide the degree and speed of implementation.
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“We get so many manuals and instructions these days that you can’t do everything.
I have a look at them and decide what is most important and what can be left for 
later. It is only when standards audit come that you realise you should have 
implemented something a long time ago.”
Governors continue to have a role in assessing and managing risk. Judgements have
to be made about: what level of risk is acceptable for any given purpose or in any
particular situation; what factors should be taken into account; and what weight 
should be given to those factors. Whatever the process for risk assessment (actuarial 
or otherwise -  see section 10.6) Governors continue to have to make the final 
decision on the risk posed by an individual in various circumstances such as: Home 
Detention Curfew; release on temporary licence; the size of an escort to court or 
hospital; employment location; segregation; transfer; and security category.
Governors saw risk management as a key element in the continuing importance of 
their role:
“There is no scientific way of doing a risk assessment when you are working with 
people and especially cons. You might be able to do a proper risk assessment with a 
gas boiler or oil rig but with prisoners it’s different. You can try and be objective 
and use all the modern assessment techniques but at the end of the day it’s a human 
judgement -  my judgement in many cases. There will always be a risk when you 
are working with prisoners. That’s the nature of the beast -  they are unpredictable 
and cannot be relied upon to do what you expect. After all, that’s why most o f them 
are in here.”
15.4 Governors and today’s penal paradigm
In governing their prisons, Governors must accommodate the four functions of penal 
confinement (see section 2.4) - the custodial function (incapacitation and deterrence 
by preventing escapes), the restorative function (providing opportunities for 
rehabilitation and reform), the controlling function (ensuring order, safety and 
justice) and the maintenance function (providing decent and humane conditions). The 
balance among the four elements is not static. Public and political views of where 
that balance should rest have changed over time. The resources available to deliver 
the goals, and the number of prisoners who have to be managed, have also varied 
significantly over the years.
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The 1990s saw imprisonment re-emerge with a new value placed upon it. It has been 
argued that prisons came to be seen as:
‘a symbol of reassurance rather than shame to an anxious public, 
and, with the injection of the private sector into its administration, 
it begins to turn itself into a high quality product’ (Pratt 2000b, 
pl41).
The development of this populist penal agenda (see chapters 2 and 10) has 
manifested itself most clearly in the increase in prisoner numbers. The impact on 
Governors of the rise in prisoner numbers has been significant. The Prison Service 
points out that:
‘The impact of this population growth ... cannot be underestimated 
... the most troubling aspect was the Service’s inability to maintain 
the reduction in self-inflicted deaths that had been achieved over the 
previous two years ... further pressure was experienced with regard 
to maintaining order in establishments ... the Command Suite was 
opened 62 times -  (a 27% increase on the previous year) to deal with 
a range of serious incidents’ (HM Prison Service 2003b, p9).
Managing the increased population places a huge burden on all operational 
managers. As Governors struggle to cope with the implications of accommodating 
the highest ever number of prisoners there is inevitable disruption to offending 
behaviour work, drug treatment programmes and education courses. It does not sit 
well with the Service’s efforts to raise standards of decency and make prisons 
increasingly more constructive. A Governor put the problem in this way:
“So long as overcrowding remains a chronic problem, Governors are unable to 
foresee any lasting improvement in prison conditions, and face an increased risk 
of violent disorder in their prisons”.
The shifting politics of law and order have also had an impact on what Governors do. 
The phenomenon and ramifications of toughness in penal policy have been well 
documented (see, for example, Cavadino and Dignan 2001) and were discussed in 
earlier chapters. The 1990s saw the political rhetoric of the then Home Secretary 
making clear that ‘prison works’. The ‘prison works’ mantra focused on its 
destructive and incapacitating qualities rather than on any notion that prison reforms 
or rehabilitates the individual. This was coupled with an abandonment of any pretext
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of benevolence as there was no longer any anxiety to ‘camouflage the debilitating 
aspects of imprisonment’ (Pratt 2000b, p i33). Prison conditions were to be ‘decent 
but austere’. The more punitive approach has been reflected in both policy and 
practice within prisons. One Governor commented:
‘Sadly, we have lately seen attention paid to party political 
concerns at the expense of fairness in dealings with individual 
prisoners, particularly classes of prisoners and individual members 
of staff (Godfrey 1996, pi 2).
As part of the response to party political imperatives, recent years have seen 
Governors having to: make their prisons ‘austere’; transform their institutions into 
‘boot camps’; develop ‘tough regimes’; reduce the availability of temporary release 
leave; send life sentence prisoners back to more secure establishments; and cut their 
budgets.
At the time of the fieldwork for this study (the late 1990s) Governors were 
incarcerating an ever-increasing number of prisoners in overcrowded 
accommodation, budgets were being reduced and prison security remained the 
dominant feature of imprisonment. Managerialist concerns (performance indicators, 
strategic planning, audit and monitoring, robust line management) came to replace 
notions of reform and rehabilitation. Prison regimes were re-orientated to make them 
‘decent but austere’, self-inflicted deaths increased, and regime hours decreased. 
While the majority of Governors were satisfied overall with the job of governing (see 
chapter 9), many expressed disillusionment and frustration with what they were able 
to achieve in the working environment. This is understandable given that 73 per cent 
of Governors espoused reformist and rehabilitative ideologies (rather than punitive 
and managerial ones).
The trend to appoint more managerial Governors (‘general managers’ and ‘chief 
officers’) rather than rehabilitative and reformist Governors (‘liberal idealists’) has 
continued since the fieldwork was completed. Increasingly Governors are more 
focused on keeping the ‘business’ running (and coping with the more short-term 
goals of managing prisoner numbers) than on achieving any long-term crime 
reduction through the rehabilitation of offenders.
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There are some signs, however, that in the last year or so rehabilitating prisoners is 
once again establishing itself as an important function of our prison system. Some 
managerial targets are being reformulated to become output measures (such as 
reconviction rates) rather than process measures. Even though many problems 
remain (overcrowding, reduced purposeful activity, increased self-inflicted deaths, 
rise in serious assaults), a number of recent developments (an investment in literacy 
and numeracy in prisons; a focus on the ‘decency agenda’; more programmes to 
address offending behaviour; and better resettlement work) will have bolstered those 
Governors who adhere to a rehabilitative ideal.
15.5 Prison governance today - sui generis revisited
There has been a long-held view that governing is a unique and distinct professional 
occupation. The previous Governors’ union incorporated in its logo the words sui 
generis. Their current representative body, the Prison Governors Association, 
maintained in its submission to the 2001 Prison Service Pay Review Body that the 
role remained ‘unique and special’ (Prison Governors Association 2001a, p9).
Earlier chapters have shown that the work of Governors has changed significantly over 
recent years. Today Governors are more accountable and their level of responsibility is 
greater. Robust line management ensures that Governors deliver set-down policies and 
are not deviant in their activities. External scrutiny is far higher and every decision a 
Governor makes is open to challenge. Paradoxically, at the same time as their 
responsibility and accountability has increased, Governors’ power to shape their prisons 
has decreased, as central prescription of what has to be done, and how it has to be done, 
has become much more widespread. One study concluded:
‘A transformation has thus occurred in the role of the prison 
governor, changing from that of a feudal-baron-cum-house-parent to 
that of a corporate manager’ (Genders and Player 1995, p205).
Governors manage resources (money, people, physical assets), command incidents, and 
lead people (staff and prisoners). This rather trite description does not however do
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justice to what remains a key role in the Prison Service. The reality is that Governors 
must not only be competent in technical areas (such as financial management, incident 
command, conducting adjudications) but also must have an appreciation o£ and be able 
to manipulate, the ‘softer’ elements of a prison (such as culture, emotions, tensions, 
expectations) in order to regulate its daily operation. This aspect of a Governor’s role -  
jailcraft - has remained constant over the years. A Governor described governance in 
this way:
“I think the very title Governor implies a key role which is multi-faceted ... as a 
Governor I need to be financially very astute, politically aware, able to manage 
the dissonant balance between the need and expectations for trainees and the 
needs and expectations of staff and the needs and expectations of society. That 
triangular balance is very interesting. One needs to set standards for normal 
behaviour within the institution, in other words so that a community o f this size is 
actually able to function in a positive, meaningful way for everybody, not to 
stagnate and not to have a period of attrition in the relationship between the 
various key players who will vary from day to day. I also need to ... balance 
their justifiable expectations.”
Contemporary prison governance is still about creating a safe and secure 
establishment, which has a positive ethos, and in which staff and prisoners are able 
to make a contribute to the community. This involves the Governor crafting prison 
culture (both prison staff and prisoner sub-cultures); and understanding how to blend 
the various approaches to maintaining order. It entails demonstrating clear values 
and beliefs in order to make clear what is, and is not, acceptable behaviour and 
setting appropriate boundaries. It is about guarding against abuse of power and 
ensuring that staff exercise their authority legitimately and fairly. It requires imparting 
respect for the rights of others among both staff and prisoners, as well as ensuring 
that the rules are applied in a fair and reasonable manner. It involves exercising 
power and decision-making based on a firm moral foundation. It necessitates 
effectively channelling the extreme emotions and feelings of prisoners and managing 
relational and discretionary elements of the prison environment. It is about providing 
a range of constructive activities and promoting participation in those activities. It 
involves representing the establishment outside the walls and managing the 
boundaries with external stakeholders. But above all, it is about creating hope and 
providing the opportunity for personal growth amongst staff and prisoners, in what is 
a potentially damaging environment.
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Governors’ ability to do this is linked to the quality of relationships that they form and 
develop with other people, and the way they exercise their authority. Governors must 
create and nurture shared ownership of and commitment to, driving the establishment 
forward. Governors must recognise the potential in their senior team, and use it to 
empower and develop all staff This requires visible leadership of both staff and 
prisoners, particularly where decisions need to be made in complex and difficult 
situations.
Like the head of any organisation, the Governor:
‘has the task of creating a true whole that is larger than the sum of its 
parts, a productive entity that turns out more than the sum of the 
resources put into it’ (Drucker 1954, p341-342).
While the nature of some of the work that Governors undertake has changed, 
Governors were of the view that aspects of their role were very similar to those of 
their predecessors:
“The leadership issue has not changed. The responsibility issue has not changed.
It’s just that the tools used have become more complex, and the pitfalls are far 
greater, but the actual role I don’t think has changed. I’m sure it’s not changed.”
“The work has changed. There is no doubt that in terms of the things you have to 
spend time on now as a Governor, that has shifted around ... if  I differentiate the 
role and the work, I think the role probably hasn’t changed.”
This view is shared in the American context:
‘While his role has become more complicated, there are more
similarities than differences in the warden’s functions over time’
(Murton 1979, p ll).
The distinctiveness of the working environment, historical vestiges in the role and 
the need to exercise a balancing and regulating function, all contribute to making the 
Governor’s role critical to the successful operation of today’s prisons. The issue,
though, of whether that role is sui generis remains a debateable one. There is no
doubt that features of imprisonment make prisons distinct environments in which to 
manage. But many other working environments are also distinct and require specific 
knowledge, skills and experience in order to work within them. To justify the
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assertion that the Governors’ role is sui generis it would be necessary to demonstrate 
that there is no other comparable role.
Governors base their assertion that their role is unique on a number of features: the 
amount of power, influence and authority that still rests with the Governor; the 
uniqueness and complexity of the environment in which it is exercised; the breadth 
and range of responsibilities; the ability and requirement to switch between 
management and command roles; the level of involvement they must have with the 
detailed operation of the institution (requiring technical expertise); and the intensity 
and coercive nature of prisons, which require balancing the control of prisoners with 
their protection. They point to the need to regulate and balance the daily operation of 
a prison, and the requirement to demonstrate clear moral and ethical standards, as the 
unique element in their role:
“The Governor’s role as regulator is, perhaps, the role which has changed the 
least over the years. It is also the role that is specific to the total institution o f the 
prison.”
While there have been some attempts to eradicate ‘qualitative, professional and 
discretionary judgement from operational decisions’ (Carlen 2001, p ll) , and to 
make Governors operate within narrower and less flexible boundaries, Governors 
still need to use their power, authority and discretion in a way that protects the 
individual and mitigates the negative aspects of the closed institution. One Governor 
described it in this way:
“I think the worst of it is that those who don't realise that they have a greater task 
to perform get sucked into the managerial model. They end up doing trivial 
things. And whilst they are doing these things they lose sight of what they are 
supposed to be doing. The net result is that the establishment will start to drift 
and they drift inevitably. You can’t actually take your hands off the steering 
wheel and expect not to hit something eventually. It is absolutely vital that the 
governing Governor stays there and keeps it on track and understands that that is 
his or her role. And it isn’t anybody else’s job. You can’t hand it over to the 
area manager. You can’t hand it over to [the deputy director general] although I 
am sure he would like to direct everybody. You can’t hand it down to your 
deputy. It is recognising that nobody else can do that job. I think, most 
importantly, recognising what that job is and what the distractions are around.”
Governors saw their continuing significance as the ‘soul and conscience’ of the 
prison. Their values and principles were embodied within all that they did and were
278
the benchmark for measuring everything that happened in the prison. For them it was 
about ensuring that:
‘The pursuit of values such as justice, tolerance, decency, humanity, 
and civility [are] part of any penal institution’s self-consciousness -  
an intrinsic and constitutive aspect of its role’ (Garland 1990, p292).
It is in these areas (custodian of values and ethos, regulator and creator of balance, 
managing in a potentially damaging and hostile environment) that the sui generis 
aspects of the Governors’ role are most clearly manifest.
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CHAPTER 16: 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH
Over 40 years ago, in the classic volume The Prison: Studies in Institutional 
Organization and Change, Cressey (1961) suggested that administrators and other 
policy makers do not find theoretical works too helpful for their job. More recently, 
an academic described the relationship in this way:
‘Theorists may offer elaborate and well-designed models but the 
practitioner may ask, ‘What use is this to me?’ The practitioner 
might argue that what is important is not necessarily the truth or 
degree of probability of a theory but its utility’ (Lawton 1998, p9).
It is hoped that the current research will contribute to bridging the divide between 
theory and practice in three ways: first, by offering policy makers and practitioners 
perspectives on their work; secondly, by providing a number of practical 
recommendations which flow from the research; thirdly, by contributing to penal and 
management theory. Giddens suggests that research can reconstitute and alter the 
field of practice where the research is absorbed back into discourse and practice 
(what he call the ‘double hermeneutic’, Giddens 1989, p289). This last chapter 
therefore pulls together the different strands in the research and assesses the 
contribution of the research to theory and practice.
16.1 Contribution to theory
Thomas Jefferson once warned that ‘the moment a person forms a theory his 
imagination sees in every object only the traits which favour the theory’ (quoted in 
Matthews 1984, pi). This study did not set out specifically to develop or test an 
existing theory, but rather to answer a number of questions about the role and work 
of current Governors, and to consider to what extent that role has changed. During 
the course of the research a number of theoretical perspectives were explored and 
their accuracy and relevance tested against the emerging findings. The contribution 
this study makes to affirm or contradict existing theories is discussed below. Even
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where the current research does not support an existing theory, it should not be 
forgotten that:
‘Theoretical frameworks remain the essential lenses or filters through 
which people view information, select facts, study social reality, 
define problems, and eventually, construct solutions to those 
problems. Even when theories are wrong they can be useful...’
(Duguid 2001, p51).
The study sought to identify the patterns and structures of prison governance 
primarily through Governors’ discourse. Their discourse was grounded in 
experience rather than in some esoteric body of knowledge. It was derived from 
Governors’ claims to know prisons and prisoners, gained from experience of dealing 
with prisoners and from running prisons. Very few Governors set their views within 
any theoretical, academic or legal framework. This reflects perhaps the fact that 
Governors receive minimal training on the theory of prison management, 
international standards and ethical issues.
This section provides a reflection on a number of theoretical concepts as ‘the task of 
social research is in large measure to illuminate (or to “make better sense o f’) the 
social world as it is experienced on a day-to-day basis’ (Sparks et al 1996, p299).
16.1.1 Public-sector management
The academic literature suggests that developments in public-sector management in 
the past 20 years have seen a shift from traditional public administration to public 
management (Gray and Jenkins 1995) and more recently to New Public Management 
(NPM) (Pollitt 1990 and Hood 1991), what one commentator has called ‘a deliberate 
change in the arrangements for the design and delivery of public services’ (Boyne et 
a l  2003, p3).
The current research contributes to that literature by charting the rise and 
implementation of NPM in one particular public service (the Prison Service) and 
considers what NPM meant for a particular group of senior managers (Governors) in 
that organisation. The findings lend support to the view that a general pattern of
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change is apparent across the different public-sector settings. NPM has had a 
significant impact on the operation of the Prison Service and the way that it is 
managed. Governors were of the view that NPM tools, practices and approaches are 
now firmly embedded in the Prison Service. This supports earlier research that found 
that NPM changes in the public sector were more than ‘symbolic accomplishments’ 
(Czamiawska-Joerges 1989).
The Prison Service, like the rest of the criminal justice system, adopted a more 
managerialist approach to its activities in the 1990s (for a description of 
managerialism in the probation service see: Vanstone 1995, Fionda 2000, Cavadino 
and Dignan 2001). The new priority became to ‘manage’ the resources of the Service 
more efficiently and to demonstrate the effective disposition and use of those 
resources, whether staf£ buildings or equipment. The perceived attributes of the 
well-run private-sector company (of high efficiency, of explicit accountabilities, of 
clear objectives, and of measured performance) became the mantra of the Service. In 
short, NPM led to a number of changes in Prison Service policies, structures, power 
relations, cultural values, mindsets, language, work procedures and processes.
The success of NPM in establishing itself in the Prison Service is in contrast to 
earlier ‘short-term managerial fads’ (Abrahamson 1991) which soon fell out of 
favour. NPM’s success in the Prison Service can be attributed to the coming together 
of external environmental changes (budget reductions, challenges to Governors’ 
decisions, increased media and political interest) and internal dysfunction 
(particularly the escapes from Whitemoor and Parkhurst prisons). This supports 
earlier research that emphasised the need for both external and internal pressure for 
reform to be successful (Chandler 1962, March and Olsen 1989, Chen 1990, Pawson 
and Tilley 1997).
There has been a move in some public-sector organisations to adopt private-sector 
organisational forms, such as ‘divisionalised’ structures, with the associated greater 
accountability, delegated budgets, and clear performance indicators. Middle 
managers are given objectives and targets to achieve and otherwise left to run their 
divisions as they feel best -  in other words, they are held to account for results or 
outcome, and not directed on process (Mintzberg 1983). This has led to:
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‘organizational variety increasing rather than decreasing, reflecting 
a move within the new public management to greater devolution, 
less standardization, and greater local flexibility’ (Ferlie et al. 1996, 
p246).
The current research indicates that NPM did not have this effect on the Prison 
Service and instead led away from organizational heterogeneity to increased 
‘isomorphism’ (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). In the last ten years, power moved 
firstly from the centre to the Governor, and then back to the centre (in the form of the 
area manager). While there were initial attempts at creating a divisionalised structure 
and delegating power, authority and accountability to Governors (Lewis 1997), the 
structure and power balance were later realigned. A widespread process of 
‘deprofessionalization’ has taken place and there is now less autonomy at local level 
as a result of increased standardisation of procedures and performance management. 
This shift in power (from Governors to the centre) confirms the view that: ‘new 
managerialism operates to redefine power relations’ (Clarke et al 1994b, p6).
What emerged was an increase in central control, more accountability, intense 
performance scrutiny and checks on professional and administrative discretion. 
Governors were measured on outputs and had the processes for achieving those 
outputs specified - what has been referred to as the ‘double whammy’ of NPM 
(Raine and Willson 1993, p210). The Prison Service structure today has more in 
common with a rigid ‘machine bureaucracy’ (Mintzberg 1983) with its: eleven 
hierarchical levels, tightly defined jobs and an abundance of rules and procedures 
that direct decision-making. Indeed, it can be argued that bureaucratic culture has 
become embedded and further hierarchical behaviour engendered. The Prison 
Service has moved, in terms of its organisational architecture, from a ‘profession’- 
dominated culture (in which the Governors, as professionals, knew what was best for 
their prison) to a ‘managerial bureaucracy’ (in which Governors retain some 
professional discretion but their work is being increasingly directed and constrained 
by detailed regulation and robust line management).
Commentators have suggested that public-sector managers have changed their 
discourse from ‘professional’ to ‘managerial’ (Pollitt 1993). They point to examples
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where managerial discourse (of performance management and efficiency savings) 
has replaced the professional discourse (of caring, meeting needs, and doing what is 
best for the individual). In changing the discourse, managerial imperatives are placed 
at the heart of the reconfigured public management system. The interviews with 
Governors would partially support such a conclusion. Most Governors peppered their 
discourse with current managerial language of mission statements, strategic and 
business plans, indicators, measurements and targets, budget management, cost 
reduction and ‘doing more with less’. A number of Governors made very little 
reference to prisoners during their interviews and were more concerned with 
‘running a business’, than with any issues to do with any moral or reformatory 
element of their role. Had the interviews been conducted with Governors in the 
1970s and 1980s, it is reasonable to speculate that their discourse would have been 
far more focused on industrial relations, regimes and programmes for prisoners, as 
they were more dominant organisational issues at that time.
There is an ongoing debate in public management research as to whether there 
remains a distinct ‘public service mission’ (Osbome and Gaebler 1992). The 
argument is centred on the proposition that the public sector is constituted in a 
specific way and has its own particular operating environment containing a distinct 
set of constitutional, legal and political influences and constraints. Despite the 
changes brought about by NPM, Governors’ discourses lend support to those who 
argue that a distinct public sector ethos exists (Allison 1983, Ranson and Stewart 
1994, Ferlie et al 1996, Lynn 1996). Governors identified four elements which made 
their work distinct, when compared to managers in the private sector: their ‘value- 
driven’ approach (which underpinned their work in protecting the public, upholding 
prisoners’ rights, delivering quality services to prisoners and trying to rehabilitate 
them); the more stringent political, managerial and legal accountability and levels of 
probity that they faced; the fact that their core purpose was to provide a service rather 
than to make a profit; and that they were not free to select those to whom they deliver 
services.
The current research also contributes to the debate about the consequences of NPM 
reforms for the performance of public organizations. While this area of investigation 
has been generally neglected, there have been studies that have looked at the impact
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of NPM changes in healthcare, education and housing (see Boyne et a l 2003). At a 
simplistic level, one of the NPM tools (key performance indicators) can themselves 
be used to demonstrate that there has been a marked improvement in Prison Service 
processes and outcomes in recent years (escapes are down, regime activities up, 
offending behaviour programmes up (HM Prison Service 2003b)). One commentator 
suggested that many improvements, such as the end of slopping out, fewer escapes, 
more purposeful activity and an end to three to a cell ‘could be associated with the 
effects of the new public management’ (Faulkner 2001, p297). It is open to debate as 
to whether these advances were in fact more the result of post-Woolf reforms than 
any changes flowing from NPM.
What is clear is that a greater reliance has been placed on NPM to manage the strains 
arising from the continued increase in prisoner numbers. The system has been better 
able to cope with a larger number of prisoners than ever before (notwithstanding that 
the rise in numbers has arguably led to a rise in self-inflicted deaths in custody, more 
drug taking, a fall in purposeful activity and greater overcrowding) with the danger 
that a certain level of complacency has been allowed to creep in.
If KPI results are taken as measures of improved performance resulting from NPM, 
then NPM has indeed had a significant positive impact. However, such an approach 
to assessing the impact of NPM raises two issues: firstly, the question of causality 
and secondly, the appropriateness of using NPM measures to assess the impact of 
NPM.
NPM has had an impact on the way prisons are governed and has made a number of 
significant changes to what Governors do, and the way that they work. Governors 
were generally of the view that the performance of their prisons had improved as a 
consequence of the adoption of NPM tools and practices by the Prison Service. 
Performance management (setting of explicit standards, measuring of performance, 
tight and robust line management, comprehensive audit and monitoring) and 
competition (league tables, performance testing) were highlighted as being of 
particular benefit in driving up overall performance. They were less convinced that 
the introduction of privately managed prisons had improved public-sector 
performance across the board.
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While it is possible to come up with a ‘shopping list’ of criteria for assessing the 
impact of the changes, the fundamental problem remains that there are many 
dimensions of success or failure, and many different stakeholder groups who place 
different weights on these dimensions (Connolly et al 1980). Commentators have 
suggested that NPM tends to decouple performance evaluation from social 
objectives, and to measure system functioning rather than broader imperatives 
(Heydebrand and Seron 1990 and Feeley and Simon 1992). Governors in the study 
took a similar view and believed that the approach adopted by the Prison Service is 
increasingly about measuring process rather than outcomes. They pointed to the lack 
of evidence that NPM reforms have led to a significant improvement in social 
outcomes and that there has been no reduction in reconviction rates in the period 
since NPM tools, approaches and systems have been introduced. As a Prison 
Commissioner put it over 80 years ago:
‘The prison record that shows no escapes and no assaults is too 
often counted a record of success. It is the record of many 
receptions but few returns, that is the triumph of a good prison 
administration’ (Ruck 1951, p29).
This ‘goal displacement’ (focusing on process indicators rather than outcomes) 
arising from NPM is a phenomenon that has been seen elsewhere in the public sector 
(Newman and Clarke 1994).
16.1.2 Managerial roles and competence
Governors spoke of themselves as having a number of related and overlapping roles, 
rather than as having a single role, confirming Merton’s (1957, p369) hypothesis. 
Various stakeholder groups (line management, prisoners, staff and so forth) define 
the Governor’s roles. These stakeholder groups can have contradictory role 
expectations. For example, the traditional ‘matemalistic/patemalistic role’ which is 
place-based and requires the Governor to be in the prison, comes into conflict with 
the ‘figurehead/representative’ role which demands that the Governor attends area 
criminal justice committees and other meetings outside of the prison.
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The assessment of the nature of a Governor’s work, and the competence (knowledge, 
skills, experience) needed to do it, inform the debate concerning the utility of the 
notion of management competence. There has been considerable management 
research into the roles and functions of the heads of organisations, which has 
described roles and generic management competencies common to all types of 
managerial occupations, in all organisations, and at all times (Mintzberg 1973 and 
1989, Schroeder 1989, Gratton 1989, Yukl 1994, Dargie 2000). General 
management as a universalist and normative approach, therefore, implies a focus on 
the basic managerial role regardless of context (Warner and Witzel 1997). NPM 
thinking emphasises commonality and transferability in chief executives’ roles. Chief 
executives are seen to be doing a similar job requiring similar skills, despite the 
distinct organizational contexts of the public sector (Dargie 2000, p39). Governors 
pointed out that they have had to develop traditional private-sector management 
skills of managing strategy, finance, contracts and human resources. Services within 
prisons are increasingly delivered through a network of organizations and involve 
joint working and partnerships. Such developments have led Governors to acquire 
other private-sector skills such as contract management and managing relationships 
between organizations (Lawton 1998). The current research therefore lends support 
to the view that management roles and skills from the private sector are readily 
transferable to the public sector.
A number of the additional competencies that Governors require can be found in 
managers in other specific environments, such as the ability to command 
disturbances and hostage incidents, and undertake quasi-judicial functions. The 
current research supports the view that a distinct set of sector-specific skills are 
required (Ranson and Stewart 1994), and that the nature of tasks is different between 
sectors (Pollitt 1990, Hood 1991). This lends support to the ‘contingency’ approach, 
which is based on a belief that competencies required by managers will vary 
according to the environment in which they operate and the jobs that they do (Kotter 
1982 and Stewart 1986).
Governors make the case that there are competencies that are specific to the prison 
environment. The specific features of a prison (closed community, imbalance of 
power, people kept against their will, potential for abuse and so forth) combine to
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create an environment in which there is a need to regulate the interface between the 
two main groups -  the prisoners and the staff. Governors indicated that the 
uniqueness of the regulating role centred around: setting the tone and standards for 
the establishment; balancing the interests of prisoners and staff; and understanding 
and managing the tensions and emotions evident in the prison community.
To be effective in the role of Governor, therefore, an individual requires 
competences additional to generic management competences. This finding confirms 
Boyatzis’ (1982) theory that individuals are only effective in roles where their 
competence match the job and environmental demands, which are specific to each 
‘distinct form of work organization’ (Ferlie et al 1996, p21). This is not to suggest 
that a manager from a different organisation could not govern a prison, but that to do 
so he or she would require additional competences -  what some Governors referred 
to as ‘jailcraft’. They would also need to be able to exercise their generic skills in the 
Prison Service organizational context (Hale 1986). Indeed, in other jurisdictions 
managers have been recruited from outside the prison service to run prisons, and 
were selected based on their business-management skills rather than ‘detention 
values’. (For a description of the Dutch experience see Boin 1998, pi 38.)
16.1.3 Prisons and prison management
Goffinan identified several basic themes or attributes as characterising and 
distinguishing the ‘total institution’: total control of the inmate population; total 
structuring of the inmate’s environment and activities; total submergence of the 
inmate’s pre-institutional entity; and the total separation and isolation of the 
institution (Goffinan 1968). Governors in the study believed that prisons remain 
‘total institutions’. In support of this assertion Governors pointed to the fact that 
prisons: encompass the whole of the lives of their inmates; are based on hierarchy, 
routine, rituals of degradation and initiation, bureaucratic categorization and 
segregation of their populations; and contain a complex interaction between formally 
acknowledged procedures and informally controlling social processes (Sparks et al 
1996).
288
The current study does, however, support the view of commentators (see particularly 
Irwin and Cressey 1962, Irwin 1970 and 1980, Jacobs 1977 and 1983, Farrington 
1992) that the prison boundary is far more permeable than it once was. Prisons today 
are shaped by their wider environment and react to, and are acted upon by, the 
broader community. Early researchers viewed ‘the society of captives’ (Sykes 1958, 
p79) as bounded by the prison wall and marked by its own conventions, codes of 
conduct and isolation. While prisons remain a ‘society apart’ the prison system is far 
more responsive to surrounding economic, political and managerial circumstances 
than earlier commentators like Sykes suggested. Penal policy-making is now less 
free from political influence (see section 10.3). The shaping of the prison by the 
external environment does not however always result in positive changes. (For 
example, in the Dutch case the broader community has had a harsh effect on prisons 
as the penal climate has hardened. See Pakes 2004.)
Governors were quick to make clear that prisoners were far from being a malleable 
and passive group, and that they frequently exercised power. They gave examples 
where prisoners had demonstrated their power by collectively protesting over: food; 
regime time changes; visits arrangements; the time that television is turned off; the 
quality of the laundry; temperature in cells; and suspected brutality by prison 
officers. These protests are usually met with some success, in that Governors 
indicated that they would take such collective complaints seriously. Governors gave 
examples of individual prisoner protests that they had to deal with: movement to 
another prison; parole results; what personal possessions can be held in cells; 
adjudication results; and change of category. These individual protests tended to 
meet with a less sympathetic response from Governors.
This study lends support to the view that life in a prison is a continuous process of 
negotiation between the various actors, and that power is not a thing which is 
possessed by one group of actors (prison staff) and directed at another (prisoners) but 
something which is in a constant state of negotiation between the two groups (see 
Sykes 1958, Morris and Morris 1963, Sparks et al 1996, Liebling and Price 2001). 
Governors highlighted the fact that they needed to get prisoner agreement, or at least 
acquiescence, to maintain the daily routine in their prisons. They relied on prisoners: 
for intelligence information; to co-operate with the regime; and on prisoner labour to
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undertake routine tasks. The same is not true for all prison systems. The development 
of Supermax prisons in the USA, for example, has to a great extent designed out the 
scope for prisoners to have any influence whatsoever (King 1999).
Prisons continue to direct the lives of prisoners to a level of intimate detail. The rules 
cannot cover every situation and eventuality, so prison officers have to exercise 
considerable discretion in dealing with prisoners (Liebling and Price 2001), what 
Mathiesen (1965) referred to as the distribution of ‘benefits and burdens’ by staff. 
Governors in the study confirmed that view and believed that staf£ in exercising 
considerable discretion, had a real impact on individual prisoners. Governors 
believed that they had a central part to play in setting the boundaries for the 
compromise and accommodation which daily takes place between staff and 
prisoners. As a consequence, Governors pointed out that an important aspect of their 
work was to set the boundaries for the exercise of the prison officers’ discretion and 
to establish what was and was not acceptable behaviour.
Governors frequently made the point that while prisons were substantially the same 
with regard to rules and regulations, they could vary dramatically in terms of their 
local culture and working practices. This is in contrast to earlier studies that adopted 
an ideal-type notion to prisons that saw them as everywhere substantially similar 
(Sykes 1958, Goffinan 1968) but supports other studies that saw distinctions between 
prisons (Morris and Morris 1963, Mathiesen 1965).
Underlying the current research was a belief that in order to develop a better 
understanding of the prison environment, researchers need to focus not only on 
prisoners and prison officers and their social systems, but also on how prisons are 
managed. The current study is well placed to contribute to the emerging field of 
prison management literature as it focuses on the discourse of a powerful group in 
penal institutions (Abercrombie et al 1980). Governors’ discourse can be 
characterised as bom of ‘grounded professionalism’ based on their accumulated 
knowledge, their practical experience and their personal judgement’ (Adler and 
Longhurst 1994, p i56) and, as such, can shine an important fight on how our prisons 
should be managed.
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Early prison sociologists maintained that prison officials held a ‘grant of power 
without equal in society’ as they:
‘have the right not only to issue and administer the orders and 
regulations which are to guide the life of the prisoner, but also the 
right to detain, try and punish any individual accused of 
disobedience -  a merging of legislative, executive and judicial 
functions which has long been recognised as the earmark of 
complete domination’ (Sykes 1958, p41).
The current research suggests that Governors do indeed have wide powers and are 
able to exercise considerable personal power within their institutions. On the 
instructions of the Governor, prisoners can be physically restrained; segregated: 
transferred; confined to their cells; strip-searched; refused physical contact with their 
families; and released temporarily. However, in reality there are significant checks 
on the exercise of Governors’ power and it is far from absolute. Any decision the 
Governor takes in relation to prisoners is now open to challenge through the area 
manager, Ombusdman, Independent Monitoring Boards and, increasingly, through 
the courts. The days of the ‘authoritarian’ Governor who had complete power over 
staff and prisoners are therefore long gone.
Prison management models tend to differ in relation to the body of rules, regulations 
and routines according to which a prison is managed. Such models tend to vary 
between the extreme ends of ‘laissez faire’ and ‘strictly disciplinarian’ (Cressey 
1958) and represent a choice made among various means of inmate governance 
(Sykes 1958). Prison management models also suggest a difference in a second 
dimension: the formal structure, administrative routines and organizational culture 
(Cressey 1959 and Dilulio 1987). The military-type command structure with its 
formal system of control occupies one end of the continuum and the decentralised 
decision-making structure is positioned at the opposite end.
The approach adopted in prisons in England and Wales can best be described (using 
Barak-Glantz’s (1981) classification) as a ‘bureaucratic-lawful’ prison management 
model, in which the operation of the prison is directed by detailed rules and 
regulations, and breaches of which can be challenged internally and externally. A 
few prisons (Special Security Units, Special Control Units, large local prisons) adopt
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a more ‘controlled’ approach, in which prisoners have a restricted and controlled 
existence. An even smaller number of prisons (Grendon therapeutic prison and some 
therapeutic units within other prisons) have elements of ‘shared-powers’ in which 
aspects of running the prison are shared by management and prisoners. While an 
increasing number of prisons have independently recognised the value of prisoner 
involvement in the running of regimes (see Solomon and Edgar 2004 for a discussion 
of the work of prisoner councils) the level of prisoner involvement is far from that 
envisaged in an absolute ‘shared-powers’ model. No Governor spoke of ‘inmate- 
control’ as a basis for running his or her prison. Some did however point to inheriting 
prisons in which there were ‘no-go’ areas for staff and where some wings were ‘run 
by prisoners’.
Within this ‘bureaucratic-lawful’ prison management model, Governors suggested 
that there was some level of variation depending on: the Governor’s personal style, 
approach and values; the history of the prison and its culture; the type of prisoner 
held; the views and relative power of stakeholders (POA, prisoners, area manager, 
Independent Monitoring Board); current Prison Service policy; views of the 
inspectorate; and the external environment.
It falls to Governors to create ‘some sort of management model’ (Boin 1998, p9) that 
is appropriate for them and their prisons. Governors emphasised in particular that the 
use of different administrative features (prisoner/staff relationships; discretion 
afforded to prison officers; regimentation of regime; degree to which rules are 
implemented and rigidly enforced; response to prisoner rule-breaking and disruption; 
level of prisoner consultation, participation in decision-making and ability to exercise 
choice) should depend on the particular environment, the category and function of 
the prison and on what level of ‘control’ is needed at a particular moment in time. 
For example, there were times when a ‘control model’ approach was more 
appropriate (in the aftermath of a series of escapes; where there were high levels of 
disorder; where particularly dangerous prisoners were held; or when a new prison or 
regime was being established).
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This suggests that there is no single best management approach to the running of 
prisons, which is contrary to findings in other jurisdictions (see for example Dilulio 
1987). The current research suggests therefore that a ‘contingent model’ of prison 
management is the dominant feature of prison governance in England and Wales.
The work of Governors is now more managerial, with greater emphasis on financial, 
personnel, strategic and performance management aspects of the work. Governors, 
like their counterparts in other jurisdictions (see Wright, K. 1994 and Hunter 2001 on 
American Wardens) have moved from being ‘specialists’ to being ‘generalists’ but 
have retained a significant specialist element within their role. Governors were 
united in their view that this specialist (or sui generis) aspect involved regulating the 
operation of the prison, managing emergent tensions and the interface between staff 
and prisoners, and creating a working balance of the various forces and influences 
operating in their prisons. In order to do this Governors adopted a pragmatic 
approach to governing, whereby they ‘muddle through’ (Lindblom 1959) in an 
attempt to find the right balance and feasible solutions to practical issues that arise on 
a daily basis. Governors reinforced earlier findings (for example, Matthews 1999) in 
that they saw themselves as having to effectively balance and regulate the use of 
space, time and the quality of relationships in order to create a ‘good’ prison.
Despite the pressure to move from ‘management by presence’ to ‘management by 
information’, Governors were emphatic in their belief that prisons could not be 
effectively governed from sitting behind a desk. It is only by making personal 
contact with staff and prisoners, by visiting the less-frequented areas of a prison, by 
looking and listening to the interaction between staff and prisoners, and by speaking 
with visitors to the prison, that Governors can get a real appreciation of what is 
happening in their institution. In spending less time ‘walking the landings’ there is a 
danger that Governors will lose the ‘feel’ for their establishments and will no longer 
sense when things are not right. While Governors now have detailed information of 
the performance of various aspects of their prison’s operation (from other managers, 
audits, internal monitoring, and prisoner request complaints forms) all of these are 
open to omission, manipulation and distortion. Governors who seldom leave their 
office run the risk of becoming isolated and removed from the reality of the prison’s 
routine operation, and are no longer able to detect and prevent abuse and unfair
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treatment. These conclusions support earlier findings on the importance of the head 
of the institution being visible, interacting with the stakeholders and monitoring 
personally what is happening in their establishment groups (National Institute of 
Corrections 1997, Mactavish 1997, Boin 1998, Bryans and Wilson 1998).
16.2 Recommendations for organisational policy and practice
This section draws from the field research in order to make a number of 
recommendations for organisational policy and practice.
Clarification of expectations. The changes in recent years to the Governors’ role 
and work have resulted in confused expectations over what Governors should be 
doing. This lack of clarity is compounded, as the existing rules, regulations, orders 
and instructions require that Governors personally undertake a host of duties, some 
of which have their basis in history rather than the contemporary prison world. There 
is a need for the Prison Service to set out in clear terms what it expects of today’s 
Governors and agree a standard job description to underpin those expectations.
Time in post. Governors spend a relatively short period of time in each prison they 
govern. It was reported that 44 prisons have had four or more Governors, or acting 
Governors, in charge in the last five years (Lyon 2003, p3). Only 17 of the 42 
Governors interviewed for this study were still governing a prison at the end of 
2003. One Governor highlighted the issue:
“We all seem to move around so quickly these days. There cannot be so few good 
Governors that they are moved from crisis to crisis ... it cannot be good for the 
prison.”
The impact on a prison of a change in Governor can be enormous. A prison will 
need to adjust to the Governor’s personal style, understand the new priorities, and 
cope with the Governor’s lack of local knowledge. Stakeholders will need to develop 
relationships and trust with the new Governor. While these issues may not be a 
problem in stable institutions, in more troubled prisons frequent changes in Governor 
can be extremely damaging. Frequent changes of Governor:
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‘allowed those resistant to change to fight rearguard actions, slow 
down the pace of change and, if we are not careful, send 
establishments into reverse’ (Newell 2003, p26).
The ability of a Governor to make lasting changes and embed those changes in the 
prison culture takes time. Governors suggest that it takes at least a year to identify 
issues, build relationships and understand the culture, another year to develop, 
resource and implement change, and a third year to establish and embed a long-term 
strategy.
“I think Governors should be made to stay in post for at least five years. It takes 
that long to sort somewhere out and to make the changes last. There are too many 
people who look at Governing as a stepping stone for promotion or who want 
bigger prisons or more money. Prison officers can see right through that sort of 
Governor and the place may look as though it has changed but as soon as he goes 
it’s back to where it was.”
The PGA takes a similar view, as does a former Chief Inspector of Prisons:
‘The Prison Service should look to encouraging Governors to remain 
in post for longer periods of time by reviewing promotion and pay 
arrangements. As one former Governor put it: ‘It is time to change the 
stories so that longevity becomes the norm rather than the rare 
exception” (Newell, M. 2003, p22).
‘The Prison Service ... moves its commanding officers, or prison 
governors, around far too often, leaving them in post for much too 
short a time’ (Ramsbotham 2003, p36).
The Prison Service should look to encouraging Governors to remain in post for 
longer periods and provide incentives for those that do so.
Contributions to policy formulation. Governors currently feel that they are unable 
to influence policy. The research indicates that this is one reason for Governors not 
implementing policy as it was intended. The Prison Service should look to reduce the 
‘appreciative gap’ between those who formulate policy and those who have to 
implement it by involving Governors at the policy formulation stage. This will help 
to achieve ‘like-mindedness’ among members of the organisation and reduce the gap 
between policy and its implementation (Sabatier and Mazmanian 1983).
295
Training. Prison governance has evolved a body of practice, a way of going about 
things, which has been generally responsive to changes in the internal and external 
environment. The individual Governor is initiated into this practice and learns much 
of the substance of his or her work through a process of on-the-job apprenticeship, 
rather than through formal training courses, textbooks or college teaching. The 
‘rules’ of how to do the job are not so much the product of design but the product of 
countless long-forgotten experiments that achieved practical results. Others relate to 
the ‘art’ of the job: the hints, tips and clues which Governors learn to read, 
understand and use to their advantage. The research has found that aspects of the 
Governors’ work have changed significantly over recent years. Governors are now 
taking on a much more managerial role. The switch to more managerial training has 
resulted in the demise of professional training for Governors. There was unanimity 
amongst Governors that one of their key roles remained regulating the balance of the 
establishment. The learning and knowledge that underpins this ‘jailcraft’ has, in the 
past, been passed from generation to generation through the training that prepared 
people to govern. Governors made clear that this sort of training is critical, as there is 
very little written material to help them better understand their role and how to 
perform it. The Prison Service should review the way in which it will facilitate this 
passing of knowledge from generation to generation, as there is currently no written 
tradition of doing so.
Applying academic research. With more practitioners undertaking academic study 
that is relevant to operational policy and practice, there is a need to consider how the 
findings can be transferred into the operational domain. Readily accessible, 
understandable and relevant research findings will help to establish a written 
tradition of learning, which currently does not exist amongst Governors. The Prison 
Service is encouraged to look at the best means to disseminate the research material 
that is currently being generated.
Stress amongst Governors. Changes to the work, competing priorities, and 
pressures of robust performance management have all contributed to increasing the 
level of stress that Governors endure. Many Governors also reported conflicts over 
values and ideology, especially in relation to the impact of managerialism. There is a 
need for the Prison Service to exercise its duty of care to Governors by monitoring
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their stress levels and ensuring that appropriate action is taken to support them in 
their work. If Governors are not functioning properly, it is unlikely that their prisons 
will be operating effectively.
16.3 What next? -  Suggestions for further research
This study was based on a sample of Governors in post in the late 1990s. Not all 
Governors at the time were interviewed and the turnover of Governors has proved to 
be very high since the research was conducted. The views of Governors may have 
changed since the fieldwork was completed, as the continuing structural changes 
(such as the creation of NOMS, a new Director General, continued rise in the prison 
population) will have had an impact on Governors and their work. A new study 
would be able to chart further changes to the work and perspective of Governors.
The current research has, for the most part, focused on Governors’ views about their 
work. While self-report data has a respectable place in criminology (see, for 
example, Hirschi et al 1980 and Graham and Bowling 1995), it has been pointed out 
that ‘groups of social actors in specific settings produce discourses that reflect and 
construct their social interest’ (Adler and Longhurst 1994, p31). As managers often 
do not act in ways that they claim to act (Watson 1996), the ‘espoused’ theories of 
Governors about what they do, and their role, may differ from reality. Research 
based solely on managers’ accounts of what they do is necessary but not sufficient. 
There is a need to analyse how they act, through, for example, participant 
observation (Lawton 1998), and future researchers should consider such a 
methodological approach. A study using different methodologies (such as 
observation or work diaries) may also shed some light on different aspects of a 
Governor’s work, which were not revealed in their oral accounts. Such research 
would also indicate whether what Governors said they did was borne out in their 
day-to-day work.
This study has provided one snapshot of prison governance and, like many research 
studies, has left many questions unanswered, in particular, questions relating to: 
situational and environmental impacts on a Governor’s work; the role of the senior
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team; gender issues; and the relationship between a Governor’s ability and the 
performance of his or her prison.
Situational and environmental issues were raised by a number of Governors in this 
study as having an impact on what they did and how they did it. For example, it is 
now widely accepted that different dispositions of power and practice exist in 
juvenile and women’s institutions, compared to adult male institutions (see for 
example, Street et al 1966, Carlen 1983, Manderaka-Sheppard 1986, Willmott 
1999). It has also long been recognised that the social structure of female prison 
communities differs from male prison communities, and that this will have an impact 
on the way they should be managed (Ward and Kassebaum 1965, Willmott 1999, 
Carlen 2002, De Cou 2002). These areas require further study and suggest a number 
of research questions: Do different environments exist within one organisation? 
What impact does the type of prison, size of prison, category of prison, or stage of a 
prison’s development have on the way it should be managed? Do different prison 
environments have different job demands that require different competencies of their 
Governors? Can the Governor of a high-performing dispersal prison successfully 
govern an open prison? Does the Governor of a small training prison need the same 
skills as the Governor of a large local prison that is ten times the size?
Many Governors spoke of the importance of the senior team and pointed out that it 
was only through their ability to develop and work within a strong senior team that 
they were able to deliver change. Management theorists support this view and 
suggest that organisational success has as much to do with the functioning of a high- 
performance team as it does with the head of an organisation (see for example, 
Johnson 1995, Bennis and Townsend 1996, Owen 1996 and Obeng 1997), a view 
shared by the Learmont Report on the Prison Service:
‘The selection of the Management Team in particular, is of
paramount importance’ (Learmont 1995b, para. 2.31).
If this is true, then the selection and appointment of a senior team within a prison will 
have as much impact on the health of that prison as the appointment of a Governor. 
Further research looking at prison governance from a team perspective is therefore
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needed, as ‘insufficient attention has been paid to the development of management 
groups within prisons’ (Newell 2003, p21).
The majority of Governors are male (86%), which was reflected in the interview 
sample for this study. Recent management researchers have argued that female 
senior managers do things differently from their male colleagues, and adopt distinct 
styles and approaches (see for example: Collinson and Collinson 1989, Sheppard 
1989, Kanter 1993, Owen 1996). While the role of females in criminal justice 
professions has received some research attention in the USA (Wilson 1982, Moyer 
1985, Pollock 1986, Zimmer 1986, Famworth 1992, Heidensohn 1992, Martin and 
Jurik 1996, McMahon 1999), female Governors in this country, like their male 
counterparts, have been the subject of very limited study. One small study that has 
taken place suggested that ‘governing was somehow “different” for men and women 
and made different demands of them ... they brought different skills to the job’ 
(Cawley 2001, p49 and 53). Further research is needed to identify any difference 
between male and female Governors in what they do, the way they do it and the 
outcomes they achieve.
The issue of institutional failure and governance has also not been adequately 
explored. A number of research questions present themselves in this area: Can a 
good Governor govern a poorly performing prison? Can a poor Governor govern a 
high-performing prison? What relationship is there between organisational failures 
(such as high-profile escapes, deaths in custody, major disturbances) and the 
Governor of the prison concerned?
16.4 Some final thoughts -  Governing in the future
It follows from earlier discussions that Governors today are somewhat less mythical, 
and more managerial, than their predecessors. Prisoners and staff are often heard 
mourning the loss of the highly visible, charismatic and powerful Governors of the 
past and compare them unfavourably to the more office-bound managers who now 
occupy the Governor’s chair. There will invariably be further changes to the 
Governors’ role in the future. As Ryan puts it: ‘The profound changes which have
299
transformed the delivery of our penal services will not be the last’ (Ryan 2003, 
pi 06).
Many Governors expressed concern that future changes to their role and work will 
be shaped by bureaucrats at Prison Service Headquarters, who have as their 
continuing quest the constraint and restriction of Governors’ discretion, their aim 
being to achieve a uniform prison system, in which Governors would simply become 
administrators, implementing set-down policy (as is the case with Governors in 
French prisons -  see Vagg 1994). This organisational tension centres around: the 
balance between uniformity and diversity (how much diversity in prison conditions 
or treatment can properly be sustained or tolerated in a legitimate society); and the 
mechanism of accountability (the balance between political, administrative and legal 
methods of holding prisons and their Governors to account).
The debate about uniformity manifests itself in the degree to which Governors 
should have the freedom to govern without being dictated to by the centre. 
Unchecked fragmentation has in the past led to a lack of cohesion, inflexibility, 
variety in thinking and differentiation of practice. A more integrated and controlled 
approach, it is argued, will ensure more consistency and higher performance levels. 
Advocates of this more integrated approach point to the Federal Bureau of Prisons 
(FBOP) in the USA, where a tight control of Wardens led to the implementation of 
policy in a consistent, effective and legitimate manner (Fleisher 1989, Dilulio 1994a, 
Roberts 1994, Boin 1998). The FBOP has built a comprehensive enforcement 
machine that prevents any idiosyncratic behaviour or deviant activity by Wardens. In 
1996 Bureau policy consisted of some 9000 pages and 260 Standards (Boin 1998, 
p i97, note 28). One commentator found that:
‘despite the many other differences that one could easily enumerate 
(physical distance from FBOP central office, architecture and 
physical plant, nature and extent of prison industry operations, 
accreditation status), the operational uniformities were profound’
(Dilulio 1994a, pi 66).
A Warden moving from one federal facility to another will find ‘all systems in place’ 
because ‘bureau policy structures everything we do’ (Warden quoted in Boin 1998,
300
pi 09) and ‘if you see the FBOP shield on the front gate, then whether it’s Talladega, 
Memphis, or Bastrop you know how things run inside’ concluded another Warden 
(Dilulio 1994a, pi 65). Indeed, many of the changes in this country had their genesis 
in the BOP approach. A former Director General of the Prison Service made clear his 
view that the BOP was ‘a model of how I wanted our prisons to be run’ (Lewis 1997, 
p72-73).
A high level of integration can have a number of drawbacks, including over­
controlled behaviour and a unity of approach that does not permit alternative ways of 
doing things. When individuals who are less inclined to allow dissent, 
experimentation, and variation dominate integrated systems the organisations may 
develop into unhealthy totalitarian institutions (Wolin 1960 and Perrow 1986). To 
opponents, this highly integrated approach creates an image of a prison system 
operating as though it were in a controlled and value-free environment. What would 
be recognised and rewarded in such a system is the efficient, economical and trouble- 
free management of establishments. This would best be achieved through the use of 
comprehensive and detailed procedures, which were applied in an impersonal and 
automatic manner. The removal of all discretion would lead to the reduction of the 
uncertainties of human contact and human judgement. Comprehensive auditing and 
monitoring would allow failures of compliance with the system to be instantly 
recognised and blame laid immediately on the Governor, with no room for argument 
or excuses. The Governor concerned would then be removed for poor performance 
and the establishment performance-tested. Faulkner paints a bleak picture of what 
this managerial future could look like:
‘All that matters is what can be counted or measured; questions about 
how people think or feel, the character of their relationships, the 
extent to which there is a spirit of confidence, respect for human 
dignity and decency or a sense of compassion or mutual trust and 
understanding are reduced to tick-boxes concerning the completion of 
processes or procedures, compliance with requirements or indicators 
of failure’ (Faulkner 2001, pi 00).
This is not to argue that many of the recent developments are without merit. 
Attempts to deliver minimum standards across the prison estate are to be welcomed. 
Prisoners are today less subject to the vagaries of individual Governors and their
301
staff. There is greater consistency and a better understanding of what is needed to 
drive up performance. Clearer and more robust line management of Governors has 
contributed to improved performance and will no doubt continue to do so in the 
future.
While the level of system integration has increased, and the work of a Governor has 
changed in recent years, the current research suggests that the nature of the prison 
environment is such that it will always require an on-site gubernatorial figure to 
exercise discretion and ensure that a balance is maintained. One Governor put it in 
this way:
‘Prisons are intensely human situations in which there can never be 
enough rules to cover every eventuality. Rules are likely to inform 
knowledgeable individuals engaged in discourse but, where none 
exists or they do not cover the presenting situation accommodations 
must be reached between the individuals so that the prison can run’ 
(Leonard 1999, p30).
It is generally accepted that the complete control of the behaviour of ‘street-level’ 
managers is beyond central control, even if it is the goal (Lipsky 1980). Rather than 
seek to control and dictate everything that a Governor does, a more constructive 
approach would be to view discretion as ‘inevitable, necessary and desirable’ rather 
than problematic (Handler 1986, pi 1). This view has been reinforced by a number of 
commentators on the prison system:
‘Headquarters must also be able to create and establish consistent 
policies and practices between prisons... But these policies and 
practices need to take account of the practical requirements of 
running a prison. They need to help the ultimate aim of the Service, 
not shackle the establishments into uniformity and inappropriate 
procedures’ (Woolf and Tumim 1991, paras 12.69 and 12.71).
There are some early signs that the Prison Service is starting to move away from 
unnecessary central prescription and that it is trying to achieve a better balance 
between mandatory standards and operational discretion (see for example the 
decision to do away with central prescription on training and security - HM Prison 
Service 2003b, p23).
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Prisons are more than just bricks and mortar and will remain ‘complex and dynamic 
social organizations’ (James et al. 1997, pi 73). Prison governance will not get any 
simpler, and if the recent past is any indication, is likely to become even more 
complex, requiring greater use of professional judgement and discretion. As one 
Governor put:
“I hope that the pendulum will swing back the other way. Governors must be 
allowed to govern. I accept that all this performance management and targets has 
improved things in many places but the danger as I see it is that the creativity and 
experimentation has gone. I cannot do the things that I want to, the things that the 
young men in this prison need. I have to do what the orders and instructions tell me.
My area manager tells me not to take any risks or that I cannot do this or that 
because it is not part of the ‘What Works’ stuff. Well, that’s all well and good but 
sometimes you have got to just get on and do it.”
Governors will continue to be able to shape a prison and dictate by their action, or 
inaction, the safety, stability, security and justice within that prison. A good 
Governor will still encourage a positive approach to looking after prisoners with 
humanity, safeguarding prisoners’ rights, minimising the negative aspects of 
imprisonment and providing prisoners with the opportunity to obtain skills and tackle 
their offending behaviour. Poor Governors will still let their prisons ‘very rapidly 
deteriorate into unruly places that can only encourage further delinquent behaviour’ 
(Dunbar and Langdon 1998, p32).
Prisons will continue to be ‘complex institutions, difficult to manage’ (Simon 1999, 
p218) and managing them will continue to be ‘an exceptionally complex task’ 
(Faulkner 2001, p301). Exactly what a Governor should do to achieve a healthy 
prison will remain a little elusive, a little like ‘the flower in the mirror and the moon 
on the water ... that which can be seen but cannot be grasped’ (Lodge 1984). As a 
result, governing a prison will remain an exciting, demanding and complex 
responsibility that requires enormous dedication and commitment. What is clear is 
that Governors will increasingly be held accountable for all that happens in their 
institutions, even though they are responsible for matters that they cannot wholly 
control.
Governors are key actors in prisons and it is only by understanding how prisons are 
governed, and by whom, that we will have a better insight into how our prisons
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operate. It has been suggested that: ‘Just as early Roman history was measured by its 
consulships, so prison history can be measured by its Governors’ (Rock 1996, p ll). 
During the course of the research nothing has suggested that the same will not be 
true in the future.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
PRISON SERVICE KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
(2000-2001)
(Source: HM Prison Service 2000a, p21)
KPI
NUMBER
1 Category A escapes
2 Number of escapes from prisons and escorts undertaken by Prison 
Service staff
3 Number of escapes from contracted out escorts
4 Number of positive adjudications of assault on staff, prisoners and 
others
5 Number of prisoners held two to a cell designed for one
6 Rate of positive drug tests from the random drug testing policy
7 Number of voluntary drug testing compacts
8 Completions of offending behaviour and sex offender treatment 
programmes
9 Basic literacy and numeracy targets
10 Purposeful activity hours
11 Cost per uncrowded prisoner place 1
12 Cost per prisoner
13 Number of staff sickness days
14 Reply deadline for correspondence
15 Response time for call to HQ switchboard and abandoned call 
numbers I
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TYPICAL MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE IN A PRISON
Appendix B
GOVERNOR
Administrators 
(civil servants)
Uniformed Prison 
Officers
Employees of 
contractors
Doctors, dentists, 
psychiatrists etc
Volunteers from 
NGOs
Specialists 
(civil servants)
DEPUTY
GOVERNOR
Head of 
Healthcare
(GPs, dentists, 
specialists, 
psychiatrists)
Head of 
Prisoner 
Casework
(sentence
planning,
reports)
Head of 
Residential 
areas
(normal units, 
segregation 
unit, special 
units)
(budgets,
purchasing
cashiers,
contracts)
Head of 
Finance
(maintenance,
building
projects)
Head of 
Works 
Services
(work, gym, 
education, 
offending 
behaviour 
programmes, 
chaplaincy)
Head of 
Regime 
Delivery
Head of 
Security 
and 
Operations
(physical
security,
procedural
security,
escorts)
(secretariat, 
internal audit, 
business and 
strategic plans, 
monitoring)
Head of 
Planning 
and Audit
Head of 
Human 
Resources 
and Admin
(personnel,
prisoner
admin,
training)
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Appendix C
QUESTION SCHEDULE FOR INTERVIEWS WITH 
GOVERNORS
Explain purpose and background to study
Confidentiality
Tape interviews
Any questions before we start?
SECTION A - Present job and Prison Service career
A1 Could you describe for me your current job and position?
What type of prison, budget, staffj prisoners are your accountable for? 
What grade are you?
How long have you been here?
A2 Could you take me through your Prison Service career to date, leading to
your current post?
What year did you first join the Prison Service?
Did you join as an Officer or as an Assistant Governor?
Did you spend any time in uniform?
How long have you been a Governor grade?
How many prisons have you worked in as (a) uniformed grade,
(b) governor grade, (c) in-charge Governor?
Have you worked outside of a prison? For how long? What job?
What different types of prison have you worked in?
When were you promoted to being an in-charge Governor?
How long have you been an in-charge Governor?
SECTION B - The Role and work of the Governor
I should like to move on to explore in a little more detail what the job of a prison 
Governor is all about.
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B1
B2
B3
B4
B5
B6
B7
B8
B9
BIO
B l l
B12
B13
B14
B15
What do you see as your main roles as a Governor?
Which is the most important?
What are your main priorities as Governor?
What do you spend most of your time doing?
What tasks do you believe you must do personally and not delegate to other 
governor grades?
How do you influence security and order in your prison?
Do you shape the values and culture in your prison? How?
How do you ensure justice and decency?
How confident are you that you know what is really going on in your 
prison?
How do you know?
Who do you share powers with (who constrains you, and to what extent)?
Negotiated/compromise with whom?
How powerful are prisoners?
How would you describe the POA here?
What level of discretion from Headquarters do you have on a day-to-day 
basis?
How much scope do you have to shape the regime?
Do you take many risks in running the prison?
What sort of risks?
How do you assess them?
Do you spend much time doing things outside of the prison?
What sort of things do you do?
What are the main management problems facing you as the Governor?
Can you give me an example of when you feel you have performed at your 
best as a Governor? What has been the high point of your career as a 
Governor?
What three things would you like to have changed which would make you 
more effective as a Governor?
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SECTION C -  Changes to Role and work
C l Do you think that the job and role of Governor have changed since you
joined the Prison Service?
If yes, in what ways?
What is different today?
C2 Do you think that the role of the Governor will change in the future?
In what ways and why?
SECTION D -  Management of Governors
D1 What is your understanding of the area manager’s role? Is it an
improvement on the old regional structure?
Does the area manager influence the way you govern your prison?
How do area managers assess the effectiveness of their Governors?
D2 In what way does your Operational Director/Executive Committee/Prisons
Board influence the way you govern your prison?
D3 How are you held to account for the operation of your prison?
Has this changed since you became a Governor?
D4 What impact do external bodies and organisations have on your prison?
BOV, pressure groups, politicians etc?
SECTION E -  Personal style and approach
E l How would you describe your management style?
E2 How important is the senior team in a prison to a Governor?
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E3 How do you assess your effectiveness as Governor?
E4 How many hours do you work each week?
Evenings/weekends
SECTION F - Operating credo, job satisfaction & motivation
FI Can you recall what attracted you to the Prison Service as a career?
F2 Prior to taking up your first in-charge post, can you recall why you wanted
to govern your own prison?
F3 What motivates you to continue being a Governor?
F4 Do you get a sense of achievement from your work?
Can you give me an example of what you have achieved?
F5 In what way does your religion or moral beliefs and values shape the way
you do your job?
F6 Who provides support for you in your work?
Inside/outside of work 
Do you have a mentor?
F7 Are Governors paid adequately for the task they are asked to undertake?
What other recognition/rewards do you get?
F8 Have you thought seriously about leaving the Prison Service, at any time
during your career? If Yes:
When and why?
F9 Overall, are you satisfied with your job as Governor?
F10 How has being a prison Governor shaped you as a person?
F l l  When you joined the Prison Service did you have any particular ambition?
What level/grade did you want to reach?
F12 What status do you think prison Governors have in society?
Can you draw a parallel with any other professional group, in terms of 
social status?
Do you tell friends/associates that you are a prison Governor?
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SECTION G - Other Governors and prisons
G1 Which Govemor(s) do you consider to be your role model(s)?
G2 Why did you pick him/her/them as role models?
What do they do?
What do they believe?
G3 What qualities (personal and professional) do good Governors need?
Do they have a particular set of beliefs/motivations?
G4 Is there a ‘right way’ to govern prisons?
G5 Describe the best and worst run prisons that you have worked in?
What are/were its main characteristics?
What impact did the Governor have in achieving that?
G6 How would you characterise prison Governors, as a group, if you were 
describing them to an outside body?
SECTION H - Recruitment and Training/development of Governors
HI How should Governors be recruited?
H2 What training should potential in-charge Governors receive?
Should it be mandatory prior to taking up post?
What training did you receive to equip you to govern?
H3 Could a general manager from Tesco, a factory or an NHS trust effectively
govern a prison?
Why could/couldn’t they?
Is being a Governor more than just being a manager?
In what ways?
H4 How long should a Governor stay in post?
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SECTION I -  Prisoners
11 Do you think that prisoners are capable of changing their criminality?
12 Are the individual treatment/rehabilitative needs of prisoners identified or 
are prisoners treated as a group (sheep dip scenario)?
13 Is the Prison Service doing sufficient to tackle the causes of criminality of 
individual prisoners?
If not, why?
14 Do prisoners have more or less contact with the Governor now compared to 
ten years ago?
15 What direct contact do you have with prisoners?
Applications?
Adjudications?
New receptions?
16 Do you involve prisoners in any formal way in the running of the prison?
Do any prisoner committees exist in your prison?
Do you consult prisoners before/after changes?
17 How do you think prisoners would describe the role and work of the
Governor?
What do they expect of the Governor?
Has the expectation changed since you joined?
18 How would you like to be perceived by prisoners?
SECTION J - Prison Staff
J 1 How would prison staff describe the role of the Governor?
J2 What do the staff expect the Governor to do?
J3 How powerful are staff as a group?
What about the POA?
Can you give me an example of staff resistance to something you 
wanted to do?
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What about an example of staff acceding to something you wanted to 
do?
J4 What system do you use for communicating with and briefing your staff
about your views and beliefs?
J5 How would you like to be perceived by staff?
SECTION K -  Imprisonment and external influences
K1 What do you consider to be the main purposes of the Prison Service?
K2 Is the Prison Service effective in achieving its aim?
What are the main obstacles to success?
K3 Has the purpose of imprisonment changed since you joined the Prison
Service?
If Yes, how has the purpose changed?
What has it changed?
Do you agree with the changes?
K4 What impact do you think politicians have had on the Prison Service?
K5 What about the public and media?
What do you think is the public perception of the Prison Service?
K6 Do you believe that Governors are able to influence the development of
penal policy?
In what ways/how?
Role of PGA as professional body?
K7 What impact has the privatisation/market testing of prisons had on the
public-sector Prison Service?
SECTION L - Personal Background
Finally, I should like to ask you a little about your background.
LI Are you Male or Female?
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L2 What ethnic group would you describe yourself as belonging to?
L3 In what year were you bom?
L4 Are you married/do you have a long-standing partner?
L5 Have you any children?
L6 What types of school did you attend?
L7 At what age did you leave school?
L8 What qualifications did you leave school with?
L9 Have you got any qualifications since leaving school?
L10 Did you go on to University? If so:
What subject did you get a degree in?
L ll  Have you gained any qualifications since joining the Prison Service?
What subject?
L12 Could you briefly talk me through your previous occupations between
leaving school/university and joining the Prison Service?
L13 What was your father’s occupation at the time you joined the Prison Service?
L14 Would you describe yourself as being socially upwardly mobile compared
to your family origins?
L15 Do you have any family members in the Prison Service?
SECTION M - Other Issues
M l Finally, is there anything that you would like to add to what you have 
already said?
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